O 221723Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6775
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T ALGIERS 001329 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, S/CT, DS/ICI/CI, NEA/EX AND NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2033 
TAGS: ASEC AMGT KMSG AG
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL SVBIED ATTACK AGAINST U.S. OR FRENCH 
EMBASSIES IN ALGIERS 
 
REF: A. TD-314/089151-08 
     ¶B. STATE 133222 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce for reason 1.4 (g) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The Algerian police have provided Embassy 
with specific and credible information concerning a possible 
imminent suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device 
(SVBIED) attack against the U.S. or French embassies in 
Algiers.  The EAC convened twice on December 22 to review the 
information, police activities in response, and appropriate 
changes to Embassy security posture.  As a result, the 
Embassy reconfigured its observance of the Christmas holiday 
to conform with Department guidance in ref B, and will 
consequently be closed for the holiday from December 23-26. 
The EAC will review the situation December 26 to determine if 
non-holiday closure to the public is warranted.  The EAC 
concluded that no public announcement is appropriate at this 
time, and that the no-double-standard policy is being duly 
observed.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On December 22, DCM convened the Algiers EAC to review 
the Embassy's security profile in light of credible 
and specific threat information provided by host government 
law enforcement to RSO.  Local police informed RSO the 
morning of December 22 that they had indications of a 
possible SVBIED attack against the U.S. or French embassies. 
Police said they were actively searching for a red Peugeot 
205 bearing Algerian registration tags 14207-19016.  RSO 
informed the EAC that, after receipt of the information, all 
entrances to the Embassy had been blocked with old 
fully-armored vehicles.  Guards and PSU personnel were also 
instructed to put on their protective equipment and to be on 
the lookout for any suspicious-looking vehicles.  The 
Embassy's principal vehicle entrance (Main CAC) was closed to 
vehicular traffic.  In addition, spike strips and a blocking 
vehicle were placed at the rear service entrance to the 
Chancery.  The EAC concurred that the security measures taken 
were appropriate in light of the information received, but 
agreed to reconvene later in the day following additional 
investigation by RSO. 
 
POLICE BRIEFING/ACTIVITY 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) RSO met with local police at 1230 on December 22 to 
seek additional information regarding the threat and the 
police ability to counter and respond.  Local police informed 
RSO that the threat was an AQIM plan they considered to be in 
the "execution" phase, and that their information was "100 
percent reliable" and based on an inside source within the 
terrorist group.  The attack plan allegedly includes the use 
of an SVBIED carrying a bomb of between 200 and 500 kg of 
"TNT" (Comment: Local authorities customarily refer to the 
car bombs used by AQIM as carrying TNT, though in fact most 
if not all use ammonium nitrate-based explosives.  End 
Comment.)  The police told RSO that two occupants, a male and 
female, would be in the vehicle.  The police stated they 
suspect the two occupants were being used to "trick" the 
police into thinking they were a family and thus more likely 
to pass through police checkpoints.  Although they had a 
suspected license plate number, the police acknowledged the 
plate could be changed, and therefore checkpoints and other 
security elements were watching for any red Peugeot 205. 
Police further stated that the SVBIED originated from either 
Tizi Ouzou or Boumerdes provinces (both just east of 
Algiers).  Police did not know if the SVBIED had already 
entered the city of Algiers or was even yet en route, but 
were actively searching for it in and around the city in a 
combined police/gendarmerie/military operation.  RSO was 
informed that the increased security posture in the areas 
around the U.S. and French embassies would remain in effect 
until January 2 or until the threat was neutralized. 
 
¶4. (C) Separately, RSO surveyed changes to the security 
presence in the larger area around the two embassies.  The 
police presence around the Hydra neighborhood (site of the 
French embassy and west of the U.S. Embassy compound) had 
been increased significantly and police were observed 
stopping vehicles and interviewing passengers.  In general, 
the police presence in the streets around the Embassy is the 
most extensive we have observed since just after the December 
11, 2007 bombing of the UN and the Constitutional Court in 
Algiers.  All existing police checkpoints have been augmented 
 
and the police appear to be actively searching all vehicles. 
 
SECOND EAC 
---------- 
 
¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador chaired a follow-up EAC meeting the 
afternoon of December 22 to review the additional information 
obtained.  RSO provided a summary of the police information. 
GRPO reported no additional information from liaison or other 
sources.  The EAC took note of the fact that the threat 
information was specific to the U.S. and French embassies and 
did not involve other American interests.  Given the ongoing 
police effort to interdict the suspected would-be bombers, 
the EAC agreed that it would be prudent to rearrange the 
upcoming holiday schedule to conform to Department guidance 
(ref B).  Embassy had originally planned for operational 
reasons to observe the holiday  December 24-27.  The EAC 
agreed that the Embassy would instead observe the Christmas 
holiday from December 23-26.  The EAC also agreed to 
reconvene on December 26 to review whether the threat 
information warrants closing to the public on Saturday, 
December 27. 
 
¶6. (C) Since the threat information was specific to the 
Embassy, the EAC agreed that a warden message was not 
necessary or desirable (see below).  The EAC also concluded 
that the no-double-standard policy was not violated by the 
decision to alter the holiday schedule.  The Ambassador 
informed the Embassy community (USDH and LES) of the change 
and of the existence of threat information at a meeting that 
followed the EAC.  The RSO also shared the essential threat 
information with colleagues at the French embassy during the 
course of the day. 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT: It is virtually unprecedented for the 
Algerian police to provide us threat information this 
specific and detailed.  The fact that they took the 
initiative to do so is a major positive step in our 
cooperation and an additional impetus for us to take this 
threat information very seriously, especially in light of the 
aggressiveness of the police response.  At the same time, the 
EAC is cognizant of the need not to compromise the 
information by unnecessary publication of the details of the 
threat or the police response to it.  The altering of our 
holiday observance, in accordance with existing Department 
guidance, provides us with a four-day period of closure 
during which we hope the police can apprehend the would-be 
bombers.  The EAC will keep the situation under close review, 
and will meet again not later than December 26.  End Comment. 
 
¶8. (U) Point of contact for this report is DRSO Miguel A. 
Eversley 
PEARCE