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INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0065

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000290 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO THE SECRETARY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM OSCE OVIP PHUM PREL PROG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY: HELSINKI OSCE 
MINISTERIAL 
 
¶1. (SBU) Madame Secretary, we look forward to seeing you at 
the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Helsinki.  FM Stubb 
has succeeded in attracting a record number of ministers to 
this OSCE meeting, and hopes to rally the Organization in a 
renewal of the Q&Spirit of Helsinki.Q8  Following closely on 
the NATO Ministerial, Helsinki will come face to face with 
the challenge of dealing with increased Russian assertiveness 
(with a good sprinkling of intransigence), especially against 
the backdrop of last AugustQ,s conflict in Georgia.  The 
Russians hope to convert the entire meeting into a showcase 
for President MedvedevQ,s proposals for a European Security 
Treaty.  Our European allies are wary of RussiaQ,s approach, 
but seem all too willing to play along.  Your participation 
in Helsinki will be important to keep our allies and the 
Organization focused on the values and common view of 
security that is reflected in the Helsinki Final ActQ,s 
balance, and to challenge Russia to explain the widening 
chasm between RussiaQ,s rhetoric and its flouting of OSCE 
commitments and principles. 
 
A 21st Century OSCE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The OSCE played an important role in helping to move 
toward a Europe whole and free.  It remains the largest and 
most comprehensive regional security organization in the 
world, spanning Eurasia and North America, and including 56 
countries and 11 Partners coalesced around a comprehensive 
security approach that includes human rights, economic 
freedoms, and political military confidence and security 
building measures.   More recently, however, the consensus of 
the 1990s has broken down, and RussiaQ,s increasingly not 
constructive attitude has caused this consensus-based 
organization to drift.  It is returning to its origins Q) a 
forum to confront directly and seek to work through issues 
with a resurgent Russian Federation. 
 
Helsinki 
---------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Despite FM StubbQ,s efforts to rally the 
organization, expectations for Helsinki are low.  Still, we 
can use the gathering to further our policy goals, 
particularly vis-Q-vis Russia, and to underscore and reaffirm 
existing commitments that underpin current European security. 
 We should seek to have the Ministerial reassert, in both 
practical and symbolic ways, the values and commitments 
enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act (HFA). 
 
¶4. (SBU) FM Stubb has hung his hopes for a successful 
ministerial on adoption of a political declaration that aims 
to articulate a common denominator consensus on European 
security and next steps.  He has purposefully avoided the 
Vienna negotiating forum that has failed to deliver for the 
past half decade, hoping instead to make a pitch directly to 
ministers in Helsinki.  His draft was delivered only one week 
before the ministerial gathering, and papers over significant 
differences obvious to all.  Many of our European allies, led 
by Germany and France, are ready to adopt this approach in a 
desperate effort to deliver a message of common ground with 
Moscow.  Given both the still raw emotions from the conflict 
in Georgia and swirling and conflicting expectations for a 
treaty and a summit, this declaration seems unlikely to serve 
simultaneously all the purposes intended for it.  We will 
continue to negotiate in good faith, but in the end, 
foregoing the declaration may be necessary. 
 
European Security Architecture 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) The other major element of the gathering is the 
Ministerial lunch, where A/S Fried will represent you.  The 
Finns intend to focus discussion on ideas for EuropeQ,s 
future security, and this is where MedvedevQ,s wedge-driving 
proposal for a new security treaty and SarkozyQ,s codex for 
an OSCE summit next year come into play.  The Finns perceive 
a gathering momentum for these proposals, but they are also 
sensitive to our view that the current architecture, were it 
to be respected, adequately serves EuropeQ,s security 
interests.   They hope that a thorough airing of views, led 
on our side by A/S Fried, can help ease some of the emerging 
transatlantic differences on this issue, and their draft 
political declaration clearly signals they would like the 
ministerial to emerge with agreement to consider convening an 
OSCE summit in the near future Q) something that has not 
happened since 1999.  Your work in Brussels at the NATO 
Ministerial can have an impact on Helsinki, as the tone of 
the NATO communiquQ should have an impact on attitudes around 
 
USOSCE 00000290  002 OF 003 
 
 
the table in Helsinki and will likely influence the course of 
the discussion. 
 
¶6. (SBU) We need to challenge Russia to explain exactly what 
it believes isnQ,t working well now, what it is proposing as 
a replacement and how it treats existing security frameworks. 
 Moscow must explain why OSCE participating States should 
engage seriously with Russia on this initiative at a time 
when Russia has abandoned its CFE Treaty obligations and 
failed to honor the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
a neighbor. 
 
Georgia 
------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Aside from MedvedevQ,s security treaty proposal, 
Georgia is sure to be a secondary topic in Helsinki. 
Unfortunately, it appears to us in Vienna that most of Europe 
considers the relationship with Russia too important to put 
in jeopardy by standing firm in favor of GeorgiaQ,s 
sovereignty.  The Finns want any discussion to be Q&forward 
looking,Q8 and most delegations appear willing to Q&move 
on.Q8  We will have to press hard to keep a focus on Georgia, 
especially as Russia is threatening to close down the OSCE 
Mission in Georgia unless its legal mandate is adjusted to 
reflect MoscowQ,s version of Q&reality on the ground.Q8  No 
final decision on Mission mandate is required at the 
Ministerial, as the mandate formally expires on December 31. 
However, we see benefit in political-level consideration of 
this issue in early December, or we face a likely stalemate 
and possible mission closure four weeks later.  We have 
advised the Finnish Chairmanship of our preference for 
resolution of this by the close of the Ministerial so that 
the situation receives prominence during the meeting. 
 
Other Issues 
------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Other issues that will form the context for Helsinki 
include RussiaQ,s decision late last year to suspend its 
participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe (CFE), in large part because, it said, Allies had 
failed to ratify the adapted CFE treaty.  The U.S. and Allies 
have repeatedly made clear their support for CFE and the 
future entry into force of the adapted CFE Treaty.  No 
specific action on CFE is expected at the Ministerial but it 
will be an important backdrop issue.  The strong language 
agreed for the NATO Ministerial will be helpful in this 
regard. 
 
¶9. (SBU) With these big ticket issues likely to lead to 
stalemate, however, the rest of the Ministerial will be small 
potatoes.  Russia has played a destructive game in 
negotiating almost every proposed decision.  In the end, we 
expect there will be Ministerial Decisions on: 
 
-- Trafficking in Persons Q) The Finns feel this decision is 
one of the signature achievements of their Chairmanship; its 
main feature is to adopt a Q&victim-centeredQ8 approach to 
combating human trafficking. 
 
-- Roma and Sinti Q) Seeking to highlight the plight of these 
minorities in Europe, this decision addresses a longstanding 
U.S. human rights concern and it looks likely to achieve 
consensus support. 
 
-- Rule of Law Q) This German initiative aims to focus on 
national legislation in conformance with OSCE human rights 
commitments. 
 
-- Inland Waterways Cooperation Q) a technical and 
non-controversial decision on pan-European cooperation with 
the International Maritime Organization and UNECE; 
 
¶10. (SBU) In addition, many Western delegations had high 
hopes for a decision pegged to the 60th anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights that would seek to 
re-affirm the progress made in OSCE commitments on democracy, 
human rights, and fundamental freedoms.  Unfortunately, 
Russia has adopted a posture that clearly illustrates its 
effort to pare back commitments and distance itself from the 
OSCEQ,s achievements in the 1990s. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The EU countries are also seeking a decision on the 
Security Aspects of Climate Change.  We remain skeptical that 
the OSCE can find a role that adds value to this issue, but 
hope to find common ground with our European friends on this 
decision.  Russia, however, is playing hardball.  Our 
 
USOSCE 00000290  003 OF 003 
 
 
preferred outcome: US and EU together, with Russia 
responsible for failure to agree to this high-priority for EU 
countries. 
 
Conclusion: 
----------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) OSCE has long been a key freedom and democracy tool 
in our toolbox, but Russian actions are taking a toll.  The 
Finns are looking to navigate a safe course with a minimalist 
agenda that gets them a tangible outcome but perhaps at the 
expense of long-held security beliefs and principles. 
Failure to reach agreement is no tragedy, since it is more 
important to stand for common principles and values at this 
time than to accommodate RussiaQ,s bullying.  Much will 
depend on the tactical game, and your involvement is critical 
to making certain that responsibility for current tensions 
fall squarely on Russia, which has put itself beyond the pale 
of OSCEQ,s prior commitments. 
FINLEY