VZCZCXRO3730
OO RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0265/01 3101418
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051418Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6016
RUCNOSC/OSCE COLLECTIVE
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000265 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM, 
NSC FOR HAYES, JCS FOR J5/NORWOOD/CAMPBELL, 
OSD FOR ISA/PERENYI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2018 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: GEORGIA/RUSSIA SPAR OVER ISTANBUL 
CONTINUES 
 
Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour, 
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  During the November 4 JCG, Russia 
rebutted Georgia's October 28 JCG statement in which Georgia 
detailed Russia's failure to fulfill its Istanbul 
Commitments.  Georgia responded to Russia's rebuttal, 
reiterating many of the points it made during previous JCG 
meetings.  Germany and Belarus were the only other 
delegations to contribute to the debate.  Germany expressed 
serious concern that the CFE impasse would continue if Russia 
does not fulfill its Istanbul Commitments, and especially 
questioned what Russia planned to do with respect to Gudauta 
in light of the August war.  Although some delegates during 
last week's JCG suggested canceling the November 4 and 11 
meetings due to technical reasons, all countries appeared to 
be present at today's plenary with the usual faces; the UK 
decided to send a more junior representative.  End Summary. 
 
Whoever Has Implemented the Most Istanbul Commitments, Raise 
Your Hand! 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The Joint Consultative Group (JCG) met on October 
28 under the Chairmanship of Portugal (Barata).  As promised 
during the last JCG meeting, Russia (Ulyanov) delivered a 
lengthy rebuttal countering Georgia's October 28 statement in 
which it detailed Russia's failure to fulfill many of its 
Istanbul commitments.  Ulyanov asserted that Russia had 
reduced the amount of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) within 
the territory of Georgia per the Joint Statement of the 
Russian Federation and Georgia of November 17, 1999.  He 
noted that even Georgia had acknowledged Russia's compliance 
with its Istanbul Commitments with the exception of Gudauta. 
Ulyanov, however, said that Gudauta was 'dismantled and 
decommissioned on time' and that OSCE monitors had observed 
only 'peacekeepers, civilians, and cattle' on the base. 
Ulyanov also noted that no agreement had been reached between 
Georgia and Russia on subsequent utilization of the bases, so 
Russia thought it 'permissible to maintain peacekeepers' 
there. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Ulyanov then went back on the offensive and 
accused Georgia of not fulfilling all of Georgia's Istanbul 
Commitments, specifically, the use of facilities at Vaziani 
and Gudauta and Russian temporary deployments at Batumi.  He 
expressed disapproval that delegations around the table had 
not called out Georgia on its noncompliance.  Ulyanov singled 
out (again) the Czech Republic for 'observing a double 
standard.'  Ulyanov explained that discussions on this matter 
were appropriate for the JCG because of the 'Georgian 
factor,' which Ulyanov defined as one of 'the main factors in 
determining the fate of CFE.'  Ulyanov surmised that arms 
control must not be an important priority in Tbilisi if the 
Georgians had tried to resolve the South Ossetia/Abkhazia 
issue by putting pressure on Russia with respect to CFE. 
Ulyanov concluded that this was a 'strategic error' on the 
part of the Georgians because Russia is 'keen to see CFE move 
ahead but no less keen on other subjects.' 
 
Gudauta Is No Longer Russia's to Handle 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Ulyanov noted that the U.S. has said there will be 
no ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty without Russia's 
fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments, but said the 
Georgians have been given 'carte blanche.'  Ulyanov ended his 
monologue by commenting that Gudauta was no longer an issue 
since it now belongs to the Republic of Abkhazia and, 
therefore, is for the Abkhazian authorities to decide. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Georgia (Giorgadze) responded that the failure to 
decide how to utilize the Gudauta and Vaziani bases was not a 
relevant argument.  The first article of the Joint Statement 
of the Russian Federation and Georgia of November 17, 1999 
required that the TLE located at the bases be dismantled by 
 
USOSCE 00000265  002 OF 003 
 
 
July 1, 2001.  Giorgadze clarified that, in other words, this 
meant that Gudauta had to be dismantled first before 
determination could be made on the base's subsequent use. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Germany (Richter) commented that, yes, in fact, 
many Istanbul Commitments have been fulfilled, but this does 
not excuse away those which have not yet been fulfilled. 
Richter expressed that Germany had considered its Istanbul 
Commitments crucial and, thus, fulfilled all of them.  He 
took issue with Russia's passing off responsibility onto 
Abkhazia and questioned how we could turn to a state we have 
not recognized to fulfill a commitment taken by Russia in 
¶1999.  He raised concern that this impasse was not 
'constructive' to moving forward on the Parallel Actions 
Package. 
 
The 'Cornerstone' of European Security...or, Georgia? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Russia (Ulyanov) reacted to Germany's comment with 
respect to the Parallel Actions Package by saying it would 
not go back to capital for further guidance since 'all talk 
has stopped...unless we talk about the three brief meetings 
that took place this year.'  Ulyanov expressed disbelief that 
states would link local conflicts to the 'cornerstone of 
European security,' and questioned what other states Parties 
thought was more important.  Georgia (Giorgadze) disagreed 
with Russia's unwillingness to link the two and said that 
what happened in August was full-fledged war.  He accused 
Russia 'of toppling the CFE Treaty, not to mention other 
international laws,' by invading Georgia.  He then noted the 
title of a recent newspaper article he had seen that read, 
'Russia Killed CFE and Buried it in Georgia.' (COMMENT: 
Giorgadze later clarified that the article title does not 
reflect an official position of the Government of Georgia.) 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Belarus (Pavlov) thanked Germany for its 
intervention and called on Allies to fulfill their commitment 
to expedited ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty.  Germany 
(Richter) returned to the importance of the Parallel Actions 
Package and asserted that the only reasonable approach is to 
ensure that we do not look independently at things we could 
be doing, hence the term 'parallel.' Richter reiterated that 
the situation had become more complicated now that Russia is 
throwing its responsibility onto Abkhazia to fulfill a 
commitment that Russia signed onto in 1999. 
 
JCG-T Plus 4...What Should We Do? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (C)  At the JCG-T plus 4, chaired by Portugal on 3 
November, Allies wrung their hands over their failure to get 
Russia to agree to the cancellation of the November 4 and 11 
JCG meetings due to technical reasons.  Several delegations, 
including the UK, expressed that they were considering 
whether to be absent from the November 4 JCG and instead send 
junior delegation members to represent them.  The UK, 
Netherlands, France, and Greece felt that showing up to the 
meeting would be an 'admission of guilt,' and that the 
technical reasons argument was actually a cover-up for an 
ulterior motive to cancel the meetings.  Germany (Schweizer) 
disagreed and said technical reasons could simply mean that 
delegates required more time to prepare for this week's HLTF 
in Romania and, therefore, it was reasonable to request the 
cancellation of the next two JCG meetings.  (NOTE:  During 
the November 4 Plenary the UK, which is normally represented 
by First Secretary Berenice Gare, instead was represented by 
Sam Toporowski, whose title according to the OSCE address 
list is &support officer8 and is more junior than Gare.) 
 
¶10.  (C)  Allies expressed frustration in a circuitous 
dialogue over what to do beyond the November 4 JCG.  The 
Netherlands (Kleinjan) cleverly suggested that the delegates 
hold two additional JCG meetings, which would essentially 
'bump the Russians up' in the schedule to preclude them from 
sitting in the Chair during the Helsinki Ministerial.  The UK 
delegate (Gare) commented that the Dutch proposal was indeed 
 
USOSCE 00000265  003 OF 003 
 
 
creative.  Additionally, Gare noted that it would seem 'odd' 
for Russia to refuse more meetings since Ulyanov expressed a 
desire for the JCG to have more dialogue.  Denmark (Peterson) 
thought it might be hard to justify adding two additional 
JCGs since we did not even add one extraordinary JCG in July, 
2007, when Russia announced their intent to suspend 
participation in the CFE.  Turkey (Begec) asked whether 
anyone had any information on how the Russians planned to 
'use/abuse' their time in the chairmanship, but his question 
went unanswered. 
 
Next Meeting 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶11.  (U)  The next JCG Plenary will be on November 11 under 
the Chairmanship of Romania.  The next JCG-T will be on 
November 10 and will be chaired by Luxembourg. 
FINLEY