VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0585/01 3091422
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 041422Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8635

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000585 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018 
TAGS: AORC KNPP IAEA UN
SUBJECT:  IAEA: PURSUING TERM LIMITS FOR THE DIRECTOR 
GENERAL 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 
1.4 b and d 
 
 Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) The IAEA is an outlier among most international 
organizations (IOs) which have instituted term limits for 
their directorships.  Previous efforts to do so at the IAEA 
have failed due to G-77 opposition as they were seen as 
directed against DG ElBaradei.  The DG election cycle 
presents an opportunity for a renewed push for term limits as 
a management reform objective, as opposed to a referendum on 
a current or newly appointed DG.  Term limits would be good 
general practice in light of the growing influence of the 
G-77 at the IAEA and the likelihood that future DGs come from 
G-77 ranks.  Board discussion of term limits would also serve 
an unspoken purpose of dissuading DG ElBaradei from 
reentering the race in the event of Board deadlock, were he 
inclined to do so.  Implementation of term limits would not 
require an amendment to the IAEA Statute but could be 
accomplished in tandem with the Board appointment of the next 
DG, via a draft resolution for GC approval.  Kwaku Aning, 
Secretary of the Policy-Making Organs, advised informally 
against presenting term limits as a Geneva Group initiative, 
and encouraged broad and early consultation with Board 
members and non-members to get G-77 buy-in.  Such an effort 
would have to be rolled out by the November 2008 Board and 
incorporated in DG election consultations over the coming 
months.  Mission requests Department guidance on whether to 
explore DG term limits at the IAEA.  End Summary. 
 
Arguments for Term Limits 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) The United States and the Geneva Group have 
historically supported term limits for directorships of 
international organizations (IOs).  While the majority of IOs 
have instituted term-limits, the IAEA is one of a few 
outliers without formal or informal term limits for Directors 
General.  To the contrary, IAEA Directors General (DGs) have 
traditionally served successive terms, a reflection of the 
"technical mandate" of the organization, though most other 
technical agencies have term limits.  There have only been 
four DGs since the Agency's inception in 1957: ElBaradei 
(Egypt) (1997-present); Blix (Sweden) 1981-1997; Eklund 
(Sweden) 1961-1981, and Cole (USA) 1957-1961. 
 
¶3. (C) The Annex of a 1997 UNGA resolution (51/241) 
encourages specialized agencies to consider implementing term 
limits on their directorships.  Though it is not officially a 
specialized agency of the UN, the IAEA generally models its 
rules and procedures after those of the UN.  The United 
States and Geneva Group raised this issue at the IAEA in a 
2001 letter to DG ElBaradei, when he ran for a second term, 
which emphasized the Group's policy on a two-term limit for 
heads of UN organizations.  This and subsequent efforts to 
pursue term limits at the IAEA have failed, largely due to 
the perception that they were directed at ousting DG 
ElBaradei.  In addition, Kwaku Aning, Secretary of the Policy 
Making Organs, recalls that the 2001 Geneva Group letter 
prompted a negative reaction among the G-77 because it came 
across as intimidation on the part of major donors. 
 
¶4. (C) As the Agency has grown over the years, so too has the 
influence of the G-77.  The days when a Western European DG 
could expect to reign over the IAEA for a 20-year period are 
long since gone.  DG ElBaradei was the first to come from 
G-77 ranks, but will certainly not be the last.  The 
arguments for term limits are all the more salient today 
because the chances that we will always get a Director 
General "to our liking" have significantly diminished. 
Absent term limits, it would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to unseat an incumbent DG who has G-77 backing 
and is intent on a third term, as we learned in 2004 with the 
re-election of ElBaradei. 
 
Term Limits as an Electoral Issue 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The DG election may present a good opportunity to push 
for term limits at the IAEA.  Doing so concomitant with the 
election process would avoid any misinterpretation of term 
limits as aimed at the current or newly appointed Director 
General.  DG ElBaradei has already declared himself 
unavailable for a further term of office.  The best time to 
pursue this effort would be before a successor is appointed; 
candidates for Director General should also be encouraged to 
support term limits as part of their platform.  Among the two 
current front-runners, South African Governor Minty has 
already told Ambassador Schulte he would be inclined to seek 
only one term due to his age.  As a Geneva Group member, 
 
Japanese Governor Amano would presumably support term limits, 
though we have not broached the subject with him. 
 
¶6. (S) Although the USG should refrain from stating this, 
initiating a discussion of term limits early in the electoral 
cycle would also help discourage any last minute 
reconsideration by DG ElBaradei of reentering the race in the 
event of Board deadlock.  We have no indication that DG 
ElBaradei is so inclined, and by all appearances he is 
preparing to leave office.  However, if no candidate for DG 
can command the required two-thirds support of the Board, the 
slate of candidates would be wiped clean.  It would be 
theoretically possible for ElBaradei to reenter the race and 
"save the day" in such a scenario. 
 
Implementing Term Limits 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Since the IAEA Statute is silent on the issue, 
instituting term limits would not require an amendment to the 
Statute, a cumbersome process that could take decades.  The 
Board could technically adopt term limits through an 
amendment to its Rules of Procedure (Rule 48 on appointment 
of the DG) or the selection procedures for election of the 
next DG, which were approved in October.  In an informal 
discussion October 29, Aning agreed that an amendment to the 
Statute was unnecessary, but advised that it would be 
inappropriate and undemocratic for the Board to institute 
term limits without the consent of the General Conference 
(GC), as that body comprising all Member States approves the 
Board's appointment of the DG.  Aning recommended attaching 
term limits to the June Board decision on appointment of the 
next Director General, i.e. via a Board recommendation / 
draft resolution on term limits for GC approval. 
 
¶8. (C) Aning further advised that such an effort would 
require the broadest and earliest possible consultations, as 
early as the November Board.  He recommended against 
presenting term limits as a Geneva Group initiative, as this 
would prompt knee-jerk G-77 backlash.  Instead, he encouraged 
broad consultations with Board members and beyond to seek 
early G-77 buy-in.  At the latest, such a discussion should 
be initiated by the November Board, and incorporated in DG 
election consultations in the run up to the March 2009 Board, 
where term limits could be raised formally under the DG 
election agenda item. 
 
Request for Guidance 
-------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Mission requests Department's authorization to begin a 
discussion of possible term limits at the IAEA with Board 
members and others in advance of the November 2008 Board of 
Governors with a view toward raising this issue under AOB. 
The issue of term limits could arise as early as November 7 
when we are scheduled to meet with like-minded COMs. In the 
meantime, pending instruction, we will simply note standing 
U.S. policy for term limits in IOs.  Mission also understands 
that there may be related issues regarding the new DG's 
contract and harmonization with packages elsewhere in the UN 
system; we request further explication and guidance on this 
as well, although this topic is clearly less urgent than the 
issue of term limits. 
SCHULTE