VZCZCXRO7618
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHSM #0748/01 3121632
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 101632Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3873
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000748 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR CA/P/IP BARBARA HALL, PETER THOMPSON, DIANE BEAN AND MARY 
DOETSCH 
 
C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y 
 
E.O. 12958: 1.4 (B) 1.4(D)  DECLASSIFY 11/07/2018 
TAGS: ASEC CVIS PGOV PREL CMGT PTER SW
 
SUBJECT: HSPD-6 TEAM VISITS TO DISCUSS TERRORIST SCREENING 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITH SWEDEN 
 
REF: (A) STOCKHOLM 704 (B) STOCKHOLM 648 (C) STOCKHOLM 510 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000748  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
(U) Classified by ADCM Marc Koehler, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Meetings between the HSPD-6 terrorist screening 
information negotiation team and the Swedish MOJ and MFA reveal that 
the current Swedish political climate makes any formal terrorist 
screening information agreement highly difficult.  Existing informal 
arrangements are working well, according to Swedish officials, who 
asked whether the status quo would satisfy future requirements under 
the Enhanced Visa Waiver Program. End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  On 23 October 2008, a joint State (CA)/Terrorist Screening 
Center (TSC) team met separately with Swedish MFA and MOJ 
counterparts to discuss possibilities and arrangements for exchanging 
of terrorist screening information with Sweden, as required by 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) (reftel A).  The 
MFA was represented by Director of the Americas Office Ambassador 
Maria Lundqvist, Senior Americas Desk Officer Paula Wennerblom, and 
Desk Officer for the Security Policy Office Sofie Hillbom.  Swedish 
MOJ participants included Dr. Anna-Karin Svensson, Director of the 
Division for Police Issues, International Police Cooperation and 
Crisis Management; Frida Faxborn, Division for Police Issues Desk 
Officer; and Legal Advisor Annika Waller.  The HSPD-6 negotiating 
team included Diane Bean, Senior Coordinator, Office of International 
Programs, DOS/CA; Peter Thompson, Lead Negotiator, Office of 
International Programs, DOS/CA; Zandra Flemister, Deputy Director, 
Terrorist Screening Center; and Wynne Teel, Attorney-Adviser, 
DOS/L/CA.  They were accompanied by Post's Consul and a Vice-Consul. 
 
¶3. (S) After passively receiving an overview of HSPD-6 and the secure 
web-based query system through which Sweden would have access to the 
Foreign Partner Extract of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), 
Ambassador Lundqvist noted this issue was strictly a matter for the 
MOJ to negotiate and that the MFA's only role was to keep itself 
informed of the issues at stake.  She went on to say that this was a 
particularly sensitive time politically in Sweden for issues 
involving government surveillance and affecting personal privacy 
(reftel C), indicating that negotiations were unlikely to proceed 
quickly.  Nevertheless, she appreciated that concluding some sort of 
exchange agreement would satisfy U.S. requirements for Sweden's 
continued participation in the enhanced Visa Waiver Program and 
agreed to underscore this issue with her MOJ colleagues.  Lundqvist 
appeared to accept the U.S. interpretation that such a proposal falls 
under EU third pillar, and thus was a matter within the competence of 
individual member states (see reftel B). 
 
¶4.  (S) During their subsequent meeting with the MOJ, the HSPD-6 team 
was able to drill much deeper into substantive issues, discussing the 
legal basis for HSPD-6, describing specific procedures for the use 
and protection of sensitive data, and brainstorming ways to approach 
a workable agreement which might be politically palatable.  The team 
emphasized that the TSC database was primarily an investigatory tool, 
particularly in dealing with asylum cases, and was to be seen as 
augmenting existing channels of information exchange with the United 
States.  The team also emphasized that the United States is flexible 
as to the form of an arrangement, and shared with the Swedes a model 
aide-memoire that might, with attached procedures, be an approach to 
consider. 
 
¶5.  (S) The MOJ team expressed their appreciation for the flexibility 
of the U.S. side in regards to memorializing any agreement.  They 
expressed a strong degree of satisfaction with current informal 
information sharing arrangements with the U.S., and wondered whether 
the putative advantages of an HSPD-6 agreement for Sweden would be 
offset by the risk that these existing informal channels, which cover 
a wide range of law enforcement and anti-terrorism cooperation, would 
be scrutinized more intensely by Parliament and perhaps jeopardized. 
Dr. Svensson reiterated MFA concerns about the current political 
atmosphere in Sweden.  She believed that, given Swedish 
constitutional requirements to present matters of national concern to 
Parliament and in light of the ongoing controversy over Sweden's 
recently passed surveillance law, it would be politically impossible 
for the Minister of Justice to avoid presenting any formal data 
sharing agreement with the United States to Parliament for review. 
In her opinion, the effect of this public spotlight could also place 
other existing informal information sharing arrangements at jeopardy. 
 
¶6.  (S) As an alternative, Dr. Svensson asked the HSPD-6 team to 
inquire with Washington whether or not continued participation in the 
Visa Waiver Program was fundamentally contingent on signing a formal 
data sharing agreement or non-binding arrangement along the lines of 
the model shared with Sweden, or could the currently strong but 
informal arrangements satisfy DHS's requirements.  More specifically, 
Faxborn and Waller suggested that Sweden's most problematic issue 
might be having access to the database, but in a brain-storming mode 
asked whether an arrangement could be reached that would formalize 
sharing of Swedish information on known and suspected terrorists, but 
 
STOCKHOLM 00000748  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
would not/not include Sweden's access to the TSDB.  The meeting 
concluded with promises for further consideration on both sides. 
 
¶7.  (S) Comment:  While MOJ was expected to raise concerns about the 
need for EU coordination on this issue, they did not.  Moreover, they 
were clearly in no hurry in the present political climate to move 
towards a formal agreement, or to risk jeopardizing existing informal 
data sharing arrangements with the U.S.  In that respect, the MOJ 
does not appear to view the proposed non-binding arrangement as a net 
gain.  The MOJ's notion of a one-sided, informal data exchange 
arrangement reflects Swedish constitutional restrictions on the use 
of intelligence, combined with a willingness to continue feeding 
information to the U.S. through existing informal channels.  In the 
longer term, while a changed political environment in Sweden might be 
more conducive to a formal agreement with the U.S., there is a very 
clear GOS belief that Sweden is not likely to be a direct target for 
terrorists and therefore has little to gain from an HSPD-6 agreement. 
 
WOOD