VZCZCXRO1315
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRH #1647/01 3080614
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030614Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9488
INFO RUEHIC/ORG OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0704
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 9835

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001647 
 
MOSCOW PLS PASS ST PETERSBURG, VLADIVOSTOK, YEKATEREINBURG 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO NEA/ARP FOR JHARRIS, EUR/RUS FOR 
SWATSON, INR/REA FOR DFLAHERTY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2018 
TAGS: ECON ETRD PGOV PREL RS SA
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA DEFIES LIMITED 
PRESENCE 
 
REF: RIYADH 1576 
 
Classified By: CDA David Rundell for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Russia's footprint in Saudi Arabia - official 
and unofficial - is relatively small compared to the U.S. and 
many other countries.  While several positions in their 
Riyadh embassy remain unfilled, Russia seeks an office 
location in Mecca to house their mission to the Organization 
of the Islmaic Conference (OIC).  Russian businesses find 
Saudi judicial procedures opaque, creating a significant 
barrier to entry.  Bilaterally, Russia made a public 
relations push by publicly supporting King Abdullah's 
Interfaith Dialogue Initiative.  Still, the SAG fears taking 
actions that would invite Russian retaltiation in other 
areas.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------ 
MEETING AT THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) On October 14, representatives of Embassy Riyadh and 
INR met with the third-highest ranking official at the 
Russian Embassy, Alexander Bagdatiev.  Bagdatiev described 
himself as an Arabist, having previously served four years in 
Amman, five in Egypt, and now two years in Riyadh with at 
least one to go.  The meeting was extremely cordial and 
positive in tone.  Discussion remained in the comfort zone of 
regional issues of joint concern, such as Israel-Palestine 
and how to deal with Hamas, but did not stray into any 
significant policy discussions. 
 
¶3. (C) Bagdatiev made several revealing comments about his 
Embassy's operations and Russia's presence in the kingdom. 
He noted that Saudi-Russo diplomatic relations officially 
began in 1991, although a Ministry of Foreign Affairs contact 
pointed out later that day that the real relationship started 
long before that date.  Bagdatiev estimated that there are 
about 400 expatriate Russians living in Saudi Arabia: 300 in 
Riyadh, 100 in Jeddah.  He lamented that the Russian Embassy 
in Riyadh is severely understaffed with several open 
positions, creating additional workload for everyone else. 
Bagdatiev explained that Moscow wants Arabists for their 
Riyadh positions, but those with the right skills tend to opt 
for the more lucrative Russian energy sector.  Bagdatiev also 
shared some surprising anti-Saudi sentiments.  "They don't 
understand that they're only powerful and respected because 
of oil," he said.  He bluntly opined that most Saudis are 
"stupid," and added that President Ahmadinejad of Iran is 
"crazy." 
 
¶4. (C) Russia has observer status at the OIC, but they plan 
to establish a more permanent presence.  Bagdatiev described 
Russia's efforts to establish a physical presence in Mecca to 
house its mission to the OIC.  He noted they are actively 
looking for space to house a mission and the four or five 
diplomats who will staff it.  Currently, Russia maintains an 
embassy in Riyadh and a consulate in Jeddah. 
 
¶5. (C) On the economic front, Bagdatiev estimated (perhaps 
liberally) US$500 million per year in Saudi-Russo trade. 
Russian exports to the kingdom are mainly in the form of 
steel, wood and other commodities.  Bagdatiev commented that 
the Saudi judicial system presents a huge obstacle for 
Russian businesses entering the Saudi market.  He explained 
that Russian businesses do not understand Saudi courts as 
they do U.S. or European courts. 
 
¶6. (C) The Russian Embassy is located about 15 minutes from 
Riyadh's diplomatic quarter (DQ), which houses most foreign 
missions.  The Saudis have designated land on the DQ for 
Russia to build an embassy, but construction has not begun. 
Bagdatiev complained that somehow Kazakhstan had already 
built on the space.  He also noted that Russia's current 
embassy is in a leased facility off the DQ, meaning that they 
do not enjoy the diplomatic privilege of stocking alcoholic 
beverages.  Bagdatiev added that the Saudis asked Russia for 
a similar space in Moscow,s diplomatic zone.  The Russians 
found a space in a prime area, but the price of land is very 
expensive - much more than comparable space in Riyadh - and 
currently there is no agreement that would allow the Saudis 
to use it. 
 
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RIYADH 00001647  002 OF 002 
 
 
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR KING ABDULLAH'S INTERFAITH DIALOGUE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶7. (C) The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a seminar 
titled "Russia and the Muslim World: the 4th Forum of the 
Strategic Vision Group" from October 27-29 in Jeddah 
(Septel). The event received significant press coverage, 
including a front-page spread in the English-language Arab 
News, with the headline "Russia Embraces Muslim World."  In a 
speech delivered by President of Tartarstan Mintimer 
Shaimiyev, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said Russia will 
"strengthen its ties with the Muslim world and advance the 
cause of the interfaith-dialogue sponsored by King Abdullah, 
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques." 
 
------------------------------- 
SAUDIS STILL WATCHFUL OF RUSSIA 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Saudis' attitude towards Russia was summarized 
well by Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal in an October 
18 meeting with the Ambassador (Reftel).  While discussing 
Kosovo, Prince Saud explained that, in view of Russian 
concerns, the SAG had judged it wise to delay its recognition 
of Kosovo until all the European countries had done so.  The 
Saudis wanted to avoid taking action that would leave the 
Russians feeling isolated or provoke Russian retaliation in 
another arena.  "Russia is in a strange mood," he worried, 
"and we think this is dangerous." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) The size of the Russian expatriate community is 
suprisingly small, with a few hundred Russians dwarfed by an 
Amcit community estimated at close to 35,000.  We believe 
Bagdatiev's estimate of trade volume is overstated: press 
reports estimate annual trade a closer to US$200 million per 
year.  Further, the embassy staffing shortage could symbolize 
that the Russians to not have a serious diplomatic engagement 
with the kingdom.  Otherwise, they would ensure that these 
empty positions were filled.  However, lack of physical 
presence should not be confused with lack of influence. 
Russia's participation in the Jeddah forum promotes a 
positive image to the Saudi public.  Prince Bandar bin 
Sultan's moves to purchase Russian arms raise additional 
questions about the relationship's direction.  Most revealing 
are Prince Saud's comments, which leave no doubt that Russian 
concerns factor heavily into Saudi decisions. END COMMENT. 
 
RUNDELL