P 211429Z NOV 08
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7746
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000519 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR: DS/IP/SCA; DS/TIA/ITA; DS/EX; S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/21/2018 
TAGS: ASEC PTER
SUBJECT: RSO PESHAWAR MEETING WITH POLICE OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS 
SECURITY MEASURES OF FOREIGN MISSION'S 
 
REF: PESHAWAR 000475 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: David J. Hazarian, Regional Security Officer, 
RSO, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d) 
 
1.(U) On November 19, 2008, Regional Security Officer (RSO) 
Peshawar attended a meeting which was chaired by the Home 
Secretary Branch of Government, North West Frontier Province 
(NWFP), Mr. Fayaz TORU to discuss the security measures of 
Foreign Missions and U.N. Agencies in Peshawar. Present at the 
meeting were: Provincial Police Officer, NWFP; Commissioner, 
Peshawar Region; Commandant Frontier Constabulary, NWFP; Deputy 
Inspector General, NWFP; Chief Capital City Police Officer, 
NWFP; and members representing security interests for the UN-All 
Offices in NWFP; ICRC University Town; British Consul; Afghan 
and Iranian Consulates and RSO Peshawar. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  TORU called the meeting to discuss the significant 
increase of violence in Peshawar over the past week to include: 
the killing of a USAID contractor, the kidnapping of an Iranian 
diplomat, and the attack on a Japanese and a Pakistani 
journalist.  TORU emphasized the ability of militants to strike 
successfully and repeatedly illustrated their acute surveillance 
abilities, targeting their objectives and apparent determination 
to kidnap and/or kill western and foreign targets. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Chief Capitol City Police Officer (CCCPO), NWFP 
indicated they are increasing operations throughout town and 
expressed concern that militant elements may stage further 
attacks throughout Peshawar, specifically in the University Town 
area in reprisal of these operations.  Additionally, the CCCPO 
indicated they have very diminished resources due to their 
heightened state of alert and will not be able to continue with 
the level of support currently being provided. 
 
¶4. (S//NF) The area referenced, University Town, is primarily a 
residential area approximately 13 kilometers southeast and a 
roughly 20-minute commute from the Consulate.  All 46 Consulate 
residences and several off-site facilities, to include the 
consulate's only recreation, TDY lodging and dining facility 
(Khyber Club) is located in this area.  University Town was the 
area of the attack on the Principal Officer in September and all 
Consulate personnel must  transit the limited number of roadways 
into and out of the area on a daily and frequent basis, making 
University Town one of Post's primary security concerns.  This 
was also the area, on November 12, 2008, where a USAID 
Contractor, working as the Director for Community Housing 
Foundation (CHF) was shot dead along with his local driver by 
unknown assailants.  Theses attacks, together with the recent 
successful kidnappings of the Afghan Consul General and Iranian 
diplomat in another upscale neighborhood similar to University 
Town, denoted a clear shift in adversary methods to organize 
coordinated attacks in areas thought to be "secure." 
 
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RSO PESHAWAR ASSESSMENT 
----------------------- 
 
5.A. (S//NF) Based on the complexities and volume of recent 
attacks throughout Peshawar, RSO assesses local police assets 
are inadequate to deal with the current security situation. 
Additional police support is unlikely to materialize, and from 
all indicators it will diminish in the immediate term as the 
NWFP's existing security forces continue to be stretched by 
other demands and operations in support of GOP military actions 
in the NWFP. 
 
¶B. (S//NF) There has been a significant increase in specific 
threat reporting targeting US personnel and facilities in 
University Town, the US Consulate itself and movements 
throughout Peshawar.  Multiple reports specify on-going 
pre-attack surveillance that clearly indicates knowledge of 
Consulate routes, procedures and facilities/residences.  GPRO 
places high credibility on the reporting and assesses that 
militants possess the capability and intention to carry out 
attacks. Additionally, local police also indicate that sustained 
Pakistani operations along the border have also angered 
militants who may now conduct more brazen attacks with less 
concern regarding HN reprisal and collateral damage. 
 
¶C. (S//NF) There is strong indication that pre-attack 
surveillance has been completed against potential targets, 
allowing attacks to initiate at discretion of the attacker 
against US personnel, routes, vehicles and facilities.  All of 
these particulars are known to the adversary. 
 
¶D. (S//NF) In the wake of the PO attack in September, NWFP 
police augmented the BG contingent and RSO has been managing a 
follow/chase car system to increase the level of security 
afforded Consulate motor pool movements.  Consulate/police 
assets are stretched critically thin in maintaining this 
initiative.  The reduction of personnel and increase in the 
number of local guard mobile reaction teams (MRTs) have lessened 
the pressure to a degree but RSO and NWFP police have limited 
ability to provide adequate, sustained security or conduct 
operations to disrupt planned or in-process terrorist 
operations. 
 
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NEXT STEPS 
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¶6.  (S//NF)  In the last week, Post has re-located most of the 
Consulate personnel to Islamabad to reduce the footprint of 
movements in and out of University Town. As of November 22, 
2008, the Consulate's American staffing levels wil be as 
follows: State-seven; USAID-one; ODRP/ Special Operations 
Command and Control Element (SOCCE)-twelve; and RAO-thirty-five. 
GRPO and SOCCE provide for their own security infrastructure. 
The staff who have departed currently reside in Islamabad, a 
two-hour car ride away.  Consideration is being given to visits 
from these officers back to Peshawar so they can review their 
ongoing programs and initiate new ones.  For the reasons 
delineated in the above paragraphs, RSO and Post Management will 
consider these visits on a strict case-by-case basis until 
personnel, procedural and physical resources improve.  RSO will 
provide separate requests for funding and personnel in an effort 
to permit post to move forward with these important foreign 
affairs initiatives. 
 
¶7. (U) Point of contact for this information is RSO Peshawar, 
David J. Hazarian 
 
 
TRACY