O 170914Z NOV 08
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7733
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 
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NSC WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L PESHAWAR 000513 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018 
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV MOPS PK
SUBJECT: NWFP/FATA: SENIOR LOCAL OFFICIALS ON SECURITY CONDITIONS 
 
REF: PESHAWAR 511 (NOTAL) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne M. Tracy, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate 
Peshawar, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In the wake of the killing of a USAID contractor, 
Principal Officer called on key senior local officials on 
November 13 to reinforce that the United States will stay 
engaged on the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and 
the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).  Across the board, these 
officials viewed the attack as part of a broader effort to shake 
resolve and support for military operations in Bajaur that are 
putting pressure on militants.  While all expressed a genuine 
desire to assist the Consulate's security situation, these 
promises may be hard to keep.  The demand for security forces in 
Bajaur, Swat, and other hot spots has left areas around 
Peshawar, particularly Khyber Agency, vulnerable to militant 
encroachment as was the case earlier this year.  The violence 
that spiked in Peshawar this past week with security forces 
struggling to keep up is a stark reminder of the challenge that 
Pakistan faces to clear and hold.  End Summary. 
 
Expressions of Support and Concern 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) PO met separately with NWFP Chief Minister Hoti, Governor 
Ghani, 11th Corps Commander General Masood/11th Corps Chief of 
Staff Brigadier Aamer, and Inspector General Police Malik 
Naveed.  All expressed horror at the killing of USAID contractor 
Stephen Vance on November 12 and urged increased caution in 
movements around Peshawar (see EAC reftel).  CM Hoti asked that 
the Consulate consider co-locating office and residential space. 
 PO explained that the Consulate was looking at this option (but 
did not mention post's interest in the Pearl Continental site). 
IG Naveed offered manpower in the University Town area and is 
working with the Consulate on strengthening security at key 
intersections where post residences are located.  Brigadier 
Aamer said that the 11th Corps is reviewing "silent" support 
that it can provide to the University Town area.  A visible 
military presence in the suburb, he added, would not be the 
right optic. 
 
Spike in Violence -- Pressure from Militants 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Brigadier Aamer tied the spike in violence in Peshawar to 
militants who are under pressure in Bajaur.  Governor Ghani 
ticked off recent acts of violence -- the September 22 
kidnapping of the Afghan Consul General (and 
Ambassador-designate for Pakistan), the suicide bombing at 
Qayyum stadium on November 11, the killing of the USAID 
contractor on November 12, and the kidnapping of an Iranian 
diplomat on November 13 as indicators that operations in Bajaur 
are shaking things up.  PO asked if there had been any progress 
in the Afghan CG's case.  The Governor responded negatively and 
indicated that Pakistani authorities believe that the Afghan CG 
has been moved to Afghanistan. 
 
¶4. (C) Ghani also mentioned the November 12 kidnapping of a 
female Canadian journalist on the outskirts of Bannu, heading 
toward Miramshah.  The journalist was reportedly traveling in a 
hired vehicle in the company of two local support staff.  Her 
companions were also taken.  Ghani noted that the journalist did 
not have permission to travel to the tribal areas.  According to 
press reports, the journalist is a convert to Islam who runs a 
website, Jihad Unspun, and was on freelance assignment for Al 
Jazeera.  (Note:  The Canadian Embassy is aware of the case.) 
 
Bajaur and Mohmand 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Operations in Bajaur are continuing, Ghani said, and 
initial forays into Mohmand (NFI) have begun.  He commented that 
militants from Bajaur and Mohmand are moving into the settled 
districts around Peshawar and shaving their beards to blend in. 
(Note:  According to NGO contacts, 5,000-7,000 IDPs from Mohmand 
have moved into Charsadda district, north of Peshawar.)  The 
government, Ghani declared, was committed to maintaining 
sufficient force levels to keep the pressure on militants and 
wanted to move steadily south.  PO asked about the government's 
hold strategy for Bajaur and other areas.  There were no fixed 
force numbers yet, Ghani responded, but he estimated that 
approximately 60 percent of the Frontier Corps force that is now 
in Bajaur would be left in place to help maintain security. 
 
Pulling Forces From Other Areas 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The November 10 hijacking of containers in Khyber -- some 
carrying supplies for Coalition forces -- was an 
"embarrassment," the Governor continued.  (Note:  A number of 
local papers had carried a front page photo of militants 
standing on a humvee with signs indicating an association with 
Baitullah Mehsud's Tehrik-i Taliban.)  Frontier Corps forces in 
Khyber, Ghani said, had been reduced to 50, based primarily 
inside Jamrud Fort.  The remainder of FC personnel normally 
assigned to Khyber had been moved to support operations in 
Bajaur and Mohmand.  Other FC forces had been considered (from 
on the border or the Waziristans), but these areas had missions 
that were also critical. 
 
¶7. (C) The Frontier Corps, the Governor added, was short two 
wings (approximately 600 soldier per wing), and there had been 
calls to bring down the numbers in Bajaur -- a course the 
Governor said he has resisted.  (Note:  On November 15, 
Peshawar's Special Forces element reported that a wing of a 
Frontier Corps wing from the Khyber Rifles was assigned by the 
Political Agent to help provide security for NATO and wheat 
shipments passing through Khyber Agency.  Frontier Corps is 
reportedly disgruntled because of it has pulled forces out of 
Bajaur and because of the feeling that transporters should hire 
security for these convoys.) 
 
Mehsuds in Khyber 
----------------- 
 
¶8. (C) After the security troubles in Khyber during the spring 
and summer, the Political Agent, the Governor explained, had 
pitched the local criminal warlords Mangal Bagh and Haji Namdar 
(both with militant affiliations) against one another.  Both 
groups had been weakened, but it had also opened the door, Ghani 
observed, for Baitullah Mehsud to make inroads into Khyber with 
his own people.  PO asked why Shinwaris and Afridis were 
tolerating the presence of Mehsuds on their territory.  "Money," 
the Governor stated flatly. 
 
Waziristanis Asking for Peace 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Elders from the Waziristans, the Governor said, were 
approaching him quietly and asking for peace.  With sustained 
operations in Bajaur, community leaders, Ghani maintained, are 
seeing the handwriting on the wall -- and trying to avoid the 
same fate.  (Comment:  Conspicuously absent from his remarks on 
this topic was the impact of air strikes over the past several 
months of which he has been a vocal critic.  End Comment.) 
 
Release of Baitullah Mehsud's Deputy 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Ghani assessed that the government was making progress 
in Orakzai with the help of lashkars (tribal militias) despite 
the toll of suicide attacks on local elders.  PO asked about the 
reported early November release of Baitullah Mehsud's 
Orakzai-based deputy, Maulana Rafiuddin.  (Note:  Rafiuddin was 
picked up by police in July.  The Maulana is reportedly close to 
Mehsud who instigated attacks and kidnappings against government 
targets to pressure for Rafiuddin's release.) 
 
¶11. (C) The Governor confirmed that Rafiuddin had been set free 
in return for 10 kidnapped security forces personnel.  The 
police should have just killed Rafiuddin, the Governor commented 
candidly.  Once in custody, it was much more difficult "to deal" 
with him.  PO began to raise the problems created by such a 
deal, but the Governor cut her off, saying flatly, "we did what 
needed to be done in this case."  (Comment:  The Governor was 
clearly uncomfortable with this topic.  In contrast to PO's 
conversations with him in early mid-2008 where he played down 
prisoner exchanges in South Waziristan as low level and part of 
tribal collective responsibility, the Governor was very 
straightforward in describing the nature of the action.  End 
Comment.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) Operations in Bajaur and Mohmand have likely left 
militants looking for targets of retaliation.  And, with the 
drain in forces from Khyber -- and separately we hear that large 
numbers of police have been seconded to Swat and areas north and 
south of Peshawar recently -- the city and its immediate suburbs 
appear to be vulnerable again to militant/criminal activity 
where reduced presence of security forces emboldens these 
elements to act.  The return of a high volume of violence to 
Peshawar after this summer's operations in Khyber Agency as well 
as the Governor's comments on post-kinetic plans for Bajaur 
underscore the lack of a clear, well-resourced and well-staffed 
"hold" plan for the FATA and areas of the NWFP. 
TRACY