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OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #2023/01 3101432
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O 051432Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4747
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES  PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002023 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/5/2008 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID ECON EUN FR EG CZ IS AG TU
SUBJECT: MEDITERRANEAN UNION MINISTERIAL ENDS UP A SUCCESS 
BY AVERTING FAILURE 
 
REF: A. PARIS POINTS 11/4/2008 
     ¶B. PARIS 2005 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Young for reasons 1.4. (b), ( 
d). 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  The Marseille ministerial on the Union for the 
Mediterranean concluded November 4 amid wrangling over 
organizational details to include in the final declaration 
continuing well past the allotted time for the working 
plenary session.  French FM Kouchner and Egyptian FM Abu 
al-Ghayt, however, presided over a press conference that 
underscored agreement on several key points: 
 
--The final declaration states that the Arab League "shall 
participate in all meetings at all levels" of the UPM.  Abu 
al-Ghayt was emphatic on this point in the press conference 
when pressed by reporters.  Word among journalists and 
diplomats was that the Israelis had compromised on this 
demand in exchange for obtaining one of the newly created 
assistant secretary general positions. 
 
--Although the ministers did not announce who would assume 
the post of UPM secretary general, they did announce the 
creation of five assistant, or deputy, secretary general 
positions with three coming from the northern side of the 
Mediterranean (i.e., the EU) and two from the southern side. 
The first five, who would received unspecified functional 
portfolios and serve on an unspecified "rotational basis," 
would come from the Palestinian Authority, Greece, Israel, 
Italy, and Malta.  One of the last-minute wrangles reportedly 
involved Turkey's insistence, after otherwise receiving 
nothing for its participation in the UPM, on one of the ASYG 
slots or on the creation of a sixth one.  Kouchner made 
repeated reference to the need to review this proposal and 
decide what to do over the next 1 1/2 to 3 months (the 
timeframe for drawing up a formal statute for the UPM 
secretariat).  His comments to reporters after the formal 
press conference and after Abu al-Ghayt's departure suggested 
the understanding on Arab League participation might need to 
be reviewed (a view not shared by most of our contacts, who 
believed the Arab League issue was well and truly resolved 
despite Algerian and other Arab unhappiness that Israel got 
one of the southern ASYG positions). 
 
--Barcelona will host the newly created secretariat, whose 
main function will be to supervise the UPM's work and house 
its professional staff developing and supervising project 
implementation.  A separate joint permanent committee will 
take up residence in Brussels to support the UPM's 
co-presidency. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The contentious issue of the northern (EU) 
co-presidency was vaguely handled in the declaration, with 
the EU determining how it would be handled in conformity with 
the EU's handling of its own presidency.  Kouchner announced 
that the Czech Republic had agreed to France continuing to 
figure in the UPM co-presidency in a tandem arrangement after 
the Czech's become EU president in January 2009.  When asked 
what would happen under the succeeding Swedish EU presidency, 
Kouchner replied that the EU would examine the matter then, 
assuming the Lisbon Treaty had not been adopted in the 
meantime.  Observers noted that Sweden refused to give the 
French ironclad assurances about a continuing French role 
during its EU presidency and would only consent to review the 
situation later.  Another contentious and unresolved issue 
was the nomination of a UPM secretary general, intended for a 
state on the Mediterranean littoral.  We understand that 
Tunisia, in a major sulk over losing the fight to host the 
secretariat, was refusing to agree to any further 
participation in the UPM.  North African journalists covering 
the ministerial attributed this pique to Tunisian President 
Ben Ali's anger over the perceived slight to Tunisian 
prestige.  Kouchner told reporters after the press conference 
that the UPM was leaving the position vacant in the hope that 
Tunisia would reconsider and put forth a candidate, which he 
indicated would receive French support.  Interestingly, 
Kouchner voiced the hope that one day that an Israeli could 
one day be appointed to this position. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Much of the declaration dealt with the UPM's work 
program (reducing pollution in the Mediterranean, 
maritime/land highways, civil protection, alternative 
energies like solar, higher education and research, and 
business development) and priority areas (political/security 
dialogue, maritime safety, economic and financial partnership 
in several functional areas, and social/human/cultural 
cooperation) for the next year.  An introductory political 
statement reaffirmed commitment to "a just, comprehensive, 
and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict consistent 
with ... the Madrid Conference ... principles, including 
 
PARIS 00002023  002 OF 002 
 
 
land-for-peace and based on relevant UNSC resolutions and the 
Roadmap."  In a gesture to the Arabs, it stressed "the 
importance of the Arab Peace Initiative."  The document, 
however, underscored that the UPM was "not intended to 
replace the other initiatives ... but contribute to their 
success."  In this vein, the ministers welcomed the EU's 
"positive role" in the Middle East peace process via the 
Quartet framework and its support for the Annapolis process 
in pursuit of a solution based on a two-state solution.  At 
likely French insistence, the declaration further supported 
indirect Syrian/Israeli talks and welcomed the establishment 
of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Comment:  As a UK colleague observed, the UPM 
ministerial was a success by not being a clear-cut failure. 
Nevertheless, Kouchner's not always deft handling of the 
contentious issues in the plenary session (the stress of 
which was evident in his at times brusque demeanor during the 
final press conference) and resentment by several Arab 
delegations of the manner in which agreements worked out with 
the Egyptians were presented to the others as fait accompli 
made the proceedings something of a cliffhanger.  Algerian 
resentment was said to have been especially high, 
particularly when Israel got one of the scarce ASYG positions 
(Kouchner publicly pronounced the appointment of Israeli and 
Palestinian ASYGs an elegant outcome).  The British, likely 
reflecting the views of other northern EU members, were 
relieved the ministerial did not involve any further 
financial commitments beyond the pre-existing Barcelona 
process.  The Turks, however, are likely nursing the hardest 
feelings, suggesting the negotiation of terms for a sixth 
ASYG position could be key to their further participation. 
We note that Sarkozy special adviser and "eminence grise" for 
the Mediterranean Union, Henri Guaino, suddenly appeared at 
the press conference to answer reporters' questions and 
remind people that the Elysee was closely tracking the 
ministerial's outcome. 
 
STAPLETON