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C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2018 
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL MARR MCAP MOPS DA IC FI SW NO
SUBJECT: NORDIC DEFENSE COOPERATION: A RORSCHACH TEST 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson 
for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The old idea of Nordic Defense cooperation 
(NDC) has had new life breathed into it, bringing with it 
uncertain implications for NATO and the region's 
transatlantic ties.  The momentum for this stems from a 2007 
joint report on potential areas of defense cooperation issued 
by Norway and Sweden's Chiefs of Defense.  Politicians in 
Norway, Sweden and Finland have taken this report as an 
excuse to promote differnet agendas, including Nordic 
solidarity, NATO membership for Sweden and Finland, or 
weakening Norway's ties to NATO.  Denmark has largely chosen 
to remain outside while Iceland is an interested but marginal 
observer given its lack of a military.  The initiative could 
enable cost savings and maintained or increased Nordic 
defense capabilities as well as improved coordination and 
involvement in NATO and UN operations.  Alternatively and 
more worryingly, this initiative could result in further 
reductions in defense spending, a "hollowing out" of defense 
capabilities on a national basis, Norway drifting away from 
its traditional strong transatlantic ties, and reductions in 
operational flexibility.  Norway's December 19 announcement 
on which fighter aircraft they will purchase is the first 
major decision with a significant impact on the Nordic 
Cooperation idea.  At a meeting of Nordic emboffs to review 
NDC, we concluded that continued engagement by the U.S. in 
the region is needed to encourage the positive aspects of NDC 
while reducing the likelihood of the more negative 
implications.  End Summary 
 
¶2. (C) Embassy Oslo hosted our State and DOD colleagues from 
Embassies Stockholm, Helsinki, and Reykjavik for a discussion 
of NDC on October 10.  This cable reports our overall 
assessments and points a way towards developing a USG 
response. 
 
Re-Birth of the NDC: Practical Beginnings 
----------------------------------------- 
¶3.  (C) Norway has long looked for partners and the previous 
GON in a grandly titled "North Sea Strategy" approached the 
Netherlands, UK, Denmark and Germany for NDC-like 
cooperation.  This initiative was not successful and the 
current GON (elected in 2005) looked eastward. Building on 
their personal friendship and sharing concerns over declining 
budgets and increasing costs, Norway and Sweden's CHODs 
developed a joint report (later joined by Finland) 
identifying 140 areas in which cooperation would result in 
synergies and cost savings.  Forty of these areas were 
identified as able to be implemented in 2009 with the defense 
chiefs scheduled to sign an MOU on cooperation on these 
projects on November 11.  The areas identified focus on joint 
training and equipment purchases, joint monitoring and 
surveillance of the region's maritime and air picture, joint 
units for deployment in international operations, and 
harmonization of logistical and other high-demand specialist 
units. 
 
¶4. (C) This study is not the first effort to achieve 
synergies among the Nordics in defense.  Most previous 
efforts have had only marginal success.  NORDCAPS (Nordic 
Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support) was established in 
1997 with the purpose of coordinating Nordic participation in 
peacekeeping operations and capability building efforts. 
NORDAC (Nordic Armaments Cooperation) established in 1994 is 
intended to function as the mechanism for joint equipment 
purchases.  Both initiatives continue to exist but have been 
underutilized. 
 
The Shimmering Ideal of Nordic Cooperation 
------------------------------------------ 
¶5. (C) Seizing on the CHOD's joint initiative, Norway's 
idealist and active Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Stoere, 
initiated a series of joint Nordic FM meetings.  These gave 
what was a technical and practical MOD study a much more 
political tone and have helped revitalize the Nordic Council 
and the broader ideal of Nordic Cooperation.  Personal 
relationships play a role, particularly Stoere's close 
friendship with Sweden's FM Carl Bildt.  The December 4, 2007 
Summary Report by the Swedish Defense Commission and the 
February 13, 2008 Statement of Government Policy, delivered 
by Carl Bildt before Parliament, stating that "Sweden will 
not remain passive should another EU Member State or Nordic 
country be struck by disaster or attack" was noted with great 
interest as a possible sign of a shift in Sweden,s military 
non-alignment.  One offshoot of this momentum is the 
commissioning of Thorvald Stoltenberg, former Norwegian FM 
and Minister of Defense (and father of Norway's current PM 
Jens Stoltenberg) to write a report on the possibilities for 
broader Nordic Cooperation encompassing defense cooperation, 
monitoring of maritime areas (including climate, search and 
rescue operations, and situational awareness), energy and IT 
security and potential joint diplomatic missions.  The 
Stoltenberg report will be released December 18.  The Nordic 
countries all approach these ideas quite differently, making 
realization of the ideal difficult to achieve, something 
Stoltenberg has noted in meetings with Embassy Oslo. 
 
Norway: NDC as supplement for NATO or partial substitution? 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
¶6. (C) Norway has been in many ways the driving force behind 
the NDC idea, both on the practical and political elements. 
Norway's CHOD is driving the MOD engagement on this issue 
with the bureaucracy somewhat skeptical over NDC's real 
potential.  The Norwegian MOD views NDC as only useful if it 
results in cost savings, increased capacity, and ability to 
jointly deploy.  MOD leaders take pains in briefings to NATO 
and with emboffs to stress that NDC will have only positive 
impacts for NATO, both in increasing capabilities and in 
bringing Sweden and Finland even closer to NATO. 
 
¶7. (C) The Norwegian MFA also claims that their enthusiasm 
for NDC is largely to help bring Sweden and Finland closer to 
NATO, but this rings hollow.  The left-leaning GON (including 
the Socialist Left, an anti-NATO party in its ruling 
coalition) has long been uncomfortable with U.S. foreign and 
defense policy.  It also has felt that its attempts to 
interest the U.S. and NATO in issues of concern to Norway in 
the Barents have been largely ignored.  Norway's North Seas 
Strategy, designed to increase cooperation between Norway, 
Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany has not resulted 
in anything significant.  Barred by coalition politics (and 
popular sentiment) from seeking EU membership, GON leaders 
appear to have determined that Nordic Cooperation is a better 
ideological fit and are trying to revive this long-dormant 
movement.  Socialist Left leaders are open about their desire 
for Nordic Cooperation to replace or reduce the importance of 
Norway's NATO membership.  This attitude is not reflected by 
any other party or the majority of the population, but the 
combination of the appeal of Nordic Cooperation, frustration 
with U.S. policies, and apparent neglect of Norway's concerns 
could lead to a weakening of Norway's traditionally very 
close ties to the U.S. in the defense and security areas. 
 
¶8.  (C) Norway's decision on which fighter aircraft to 
purchase will be a crucial indicator of how far the GON is 
willing to go on NDC.  MOD officials believe that a choice of 
the F-35 could delay implementation of NDC, subject to 
Swedish reactions. Embassy Stockholm reports that Sweden 
would like the Gripen to be part of NDC but the GOS is 
committed to  NDC with or without a favorable Gripen 
decision.  The Norwegian MOD has taken great pains to stress 
that the decision between the F-35 and the Swedish Gripen 
will be based on a strict technical study of the aircraft's 
capabilities, price, and accompanying industrial package. 
However, political factors could override this process. 
Reports in the Norwegian press claiming that Swedish PM 
Reinfeldt threatened consequences if the Gripen were not 
chosen, Gripen's massive efforts to tie the purchase to 
industrial cooperation in every province of Norway, and the 
appeal of joint Nordic joint air operations remain factors 
which could sway the decision. 
 
Sweden: Costs Key, but Security and Industry Also Important 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
¶9.  (C) The Swedish MOD has a similar view of NDC as a 
necessary response to declining budgets, especially in an 
environment that sees expenses rising at 3.5 percent per 
year. "The bottom line is more bang for the buck," MOD 
reported in two separate presentations to Embassy Stockholm. 
Like their Norwegian counterparts, the Swedes have only 
conducted a preliminary analysis of what is possible both 
militarily and politically at this point in time, resulting 
in a focus for now on "low hanging fruit" that leads to 
cost-savings: combined training, logistics, and perhaps 
basing. 
 
¶10. (C) The MOD civilian leadership makes the point that 
Nordic cooperation remains very sensitive politically because 
of Sweden,s policy of military non-alignment.  "To discuss 
joint patrols of, for example, Arctic regions does not serve 
the political process" in Sweden or other Nordics, they tell 
us.  But Swedish (and other Nordic) defense planners speak of 
shared security challenges in the region and shared strategic 
assessments, which require all three nations to increase 
operational capabilities -- both regionally for territorial 
defense, and internationally for "flexible and durable" 
overseas deployments.  When asked whether activities like 
joint patrols would therefore make sense in the future, 
senior MOD officials reply that "if you look carefully at 
what we have said, they are nowhere excluded."  Asked about 
the possibility that NDC could help provide political cover 
for unpopular on controversial international missions, our 
contacts have agreed that it could be easier, in some cases, 
to deploy a joint Nordic battalion than one that is only 
Swedish. 
 
¶11. (C) Outside the Swedish MOD, it is clear that many actors 
also see NDC as a means of support for Sweden,s defense 
industries. Saab,s Gripen aircraft are perhaps the most 
prominent example, though Visby Corvette naval vessels, 
submarines and CV90 armored personnel carriers are also big 
ticket items that Sweden would like to sell to its NDC 
partners. 
 
¶12. (C) Finally, although some Swedish security planners may 
see NDC as a "possible military road" towards eventual 
Swedish membership in NATO through the back door of closer 
cooperation with Norway, this is an unlikely development in 
the near future.  Elements in the current Swedish governing 
coalition favor eventual NATO membership, but because popular 
support for such a step is low and other governing coalition 
partners are not on board, the Government has made clear that 
the question will not be on the table until at least after 
the elections of 2010. 
 
Finland: Serious, practical, moving towards NATO? 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶13.  (C) Finnish defense and security policy is governed by 
strong consensus which at present wants to maintain the 
option of NATO membership but not join.  In addition, the 
Finnish President has made it clear that she will not allow 
Finnish NATO membership during her term in office (which 
expires in 2012).  Thus the Atlanticist FM Stubb's positive 
public comments about NATO last August caused a stir in 
political circles, and he later stressed before Parliament 
that they signaled no change in the current consensus. His 
comments should not be viewed as indicative of any NDC 
impact.  Finland is seriously interested in NDC, but only to 
the extent it does not impact their ability to defend 
themselves and if it could be applied to international crisis 
management.   Territorial defense remains the key concept of 
Finnish defense planning, and thus puts into question any of 
the grander ideas about joint Nordic units or support 
responsibilities which could potentially limit Finland's 
freedom of action.  Although it is clear that some political 
parties in favor of NATO membership will use NDC to pursue 
their agenda, Finnish interest in the concept seems most 
concentrated on the practical aspects. 
 
Iceland: Vulnerability leading to increased interest 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶14. (C) The 2006 closure of the Keflavik air base forced 
Iceland to start taking some responsibility for its own 
defense.  This has been a painful process which created some 
ill will towards the U.S. and to a lesser extent NATO.  In 
2007 Iceland passed its first defense budget ($20 million) 
and has taken over responsibility for air radars and for 
support of NATO air policing deployments to Iceland.  This 
year Iceland established a Defense Department, within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, another important development. 
Iceland is currently working on bilateral security agreements 
with the U.S., Norway, Denmark, and Canada and is being much 
more active in security dialogues, including Nordic Defense 
meetings.  Given its lack of military forces Iceland's 
participation in NDC is limited, but they have joined some 
equipment purchases, such as helicopters, and would be 
interested in future joint buys.  Iceland looks to Norway for 
leadership on political questions and thus would strongly 
support more Nordic (and NATO) engagement in the North 
Atlantic. 
 
Denmark:  Looking elsewhere 
--------------------------- 
¶15.  (C) Denmark has been the least active of the Nordic 
countries on NDC.  This stems from a different political 
outlook, resistance to the idea of cooperation with Sweden 
and possibly even to Norway's FM personal dislike of 
Denmark's FM.  Denmark appears to have structured its defense 
to prioritize cooperation with the U.S., the UK, the 
Netherlands and Germany.  Denmark is also an awkward partner 
within the EU, as its EU defense "opt-out" precludes it from 
taking part in ESDP military (but not civilian) missions with 
other EU member states.  Denmark's government tends to be 
less focused on the Nordic region, making Nordic cooperation 
less appealing to the Danes and cooperation with Denmark less 
appealing to other Nordics.  When it looks northward these 
days, Danish security policy is more likely to be focused on 
the Danish territory of Greenland.  The Danes last May 
convened a conference of polar states to tamp down what they 
saw as an increasingly competitive streak in the Arctic, 
punctuated by the Russian flag planting on the North Pole sea 
bed.  The Danes are thus more likely to view Nordic defense 
issues through a particularly Arctic lens, with an emphasis 
on more prosaic matters like Arctic search and rescue and 
protection of sea routes and fishing beds.  Another potential 
issue which may be affected by NDC is Denmark's ongoing 
competition for a follow-on fighter aircraft (Denmark is 
choosing among the F-35, F-18 Super Hornet, and the Gripen to 
replace its aging fleet of F-16s).  Norway's decision could 
be influential for Denmark's decision. 
 
Implications for Russia and the Baltics 
--------------------------------------- 
¶16. (C) Response to Russia is a sub-theme of NDC, although it 
should not be viewed as the primary motivating factor. 
Differing perspectives reduce any joint response to Russia. 
Finland is primarily concerned with its land border with 
Russia, Norway with Barents Sea issues and Swedish security 
thinkers refocused on Russia only after the crisis in 
Georgia.  Iceland continues to be concerned with Russian 
activities and may be the Nordic country most interested in 
NDC due to Russian behavior.  Expanding cooperation with the 
Baltics through the NDC format is not in the cards right now, 
though Swedish Defense Minister Tolgfors and others have 
stated that they "could possibly be included in various 
suitable cooperation projects in the future." 
 
Potential Positives of NDC 
-------------------------- 
¶17. (C) Despite a wide variety of national approaches to the 
NDC concept there are some potential positive developments 
which could result.  The first is the obvious benefit of 
getting more "bang for the kroner" in defense purchases. 
Anything that improves the Nordic countries defense 
capabilities is welcome.  There is also a benefit if NDC 
brings Sweden and Finland closer to NATO in softening public 
opposition to NATO membership and in further integrating 
Swedish and Finnish militaries into NATO standards and 
procedures.  Joint operations could result in better prepared 
and more efficient units available for NATO or UN 
international missions and could help increase public support 
for such missions.  Elements such as a common maritime or air 
picture in the region would benefit NATO and reassure places 
such as Reykjavik and Oslo. 
 
Synergy without Guarantees: potential dangers 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶18.  (C)  NDC does contain a series of potential dangers, 
primarily in its political aspects.  It is important that 
Norway does not drift further away from its traditionally 
strong transatlantic ties and focus on NATO.  This would 
weaken NATO's northern flank, particularly if NDC is the 
impetus for a Norwegian decision to purchase the inferior 
Swedish Gripen fighter for political reasons.  It is also 
important the NDC is not used as an excuse to lower defense 
budgets further or to reduce the number of troops available 
for international operations.  Finally, it is worth noting 
that the NDC offers no formal or specific security guarantees 
and no promise of mutual defense. 
 
Keys to a positive NDC result and a way forward 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶19. (C) We need to shape NDC in a positive direction: 
 
--Norway should be supported in its efforts to develop 
Swedish and Finnish interoperability with NATO, but also 
reminded where its true security guarantee originates from. 
Bringing NDC activities into the Partnership for Peace 
framework would also ensure that NDC complements NATO. 
 
--The USG should encourage Norway to purchase military 
equipment, particularly vital elements such as fighter 
planes, based on capabilities and NATO compatibility, not on 
political desires for Nordic solidarity. 
 
--To the extent that NDC enables the Nordics to strengthen 
their capabilities and increase their deployments to global 
hotspots -- either through contributions to NATO or to EU or 
UN operations -- it should be encouraged. 
 
--With these goals in mind, we recommend deeper USG 
engagement with the Nordics, possibly starting with a mission 
by EUCOM and others to the Nordics to offer engagement in 
areas of mutual benefit, such as the development of a common 
operating air/land/sea picture which is interoperable with 
NATO; defense-related research; anti-submarine warfare 
capabilities; or training amphibious units. 
 
¶20. (C) Potential future impacts of NDC do bring up some 
critical questions for policy makers in Washington and 
Brussels.  These could include: 
 
--Does the USG desire Swedish and Finish NATO membership?  On 
the surface they would appear to be welcome, but there could 
be some potentially negative implications of bringing more 
skeptical and idealistic members into NATO. 
 
--NDC also raises the issue of preparing contingency plans 
for the region.  Is NATO prepared to take such a step if 
asked? 
 
--What is our Arctic policy?  Does NDC help or hinder it? 
 
The answers to these questions will shape the U.S. reaction 
to NDC and help us develop a path to influence it in the 
right directions.  Posts look forward to Department and 
interagency responses to NDC. 
WHITNEY