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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000706 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: ABDALLAHI UNIMPRESSED WITH FRENCH SPECIAL ENVOY 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins 1.4 (b and d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: President Abdallahi's advisors claim the 
special French delegation headed by Elysee Africa Director 
Romain Serman offered no concrete proposals but suggested the 
need for a concession by President Abdallahi.  Abdallahi held 
firm to his position of no negations while the military 
remains in power -- at least until international sanctions 
have reached their peak effectiveness.  The Abdallahi camp 
took exception to French overtures to Leader of the 
Opposition Ahmed Ould Daddah.  The regime blocked President 
Abdallahi's efforts to present his own national day message 
on November 28.  The FNDD is worried about the prison 
conditions for Prime Minister Waghef who is being threatened 
by prison inmates.  End Summary 
 
¶2.  (C) Charge met November 30 with Presidential Chief of 
Staff Mohamed Kaber Ould Hammoudi and FNDD Co-Leader in 
charge of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Ould Maouloud to discuss 
the visit over the previous weekend of a bilateral French 
delegation headed by Elysee Africa Director Romain Serman 
Despite press reports that the delegation was presenting a 
"French Plan" for a solution to the political crisis, Ould 
Hammoudi said Romain never got into details of any proposal. 
Instead, Romain said he was looking for the President's 
appreciation of the situation.  Ould Hammoudi noted, however, 
that Serman's questions "suggested he wanted to see if the 
President was willing to make a concession."  Abdallahi told 
the French that, while he was prepared to engage in a full 
political debate once back in office, he was not prepared to 
negotiate with the military -- "Whether 5% or 50%, any 
concession to the military legitimized this and future 
coups."  Abdallahi said it was too early to discount the 
effectiveness of sanctions since, aside from those from the 
U.S., none had yet been imposed.  He suggested that the 
potential pressure of international sanctions had not yet 
been reached. 
 
¶3.  (C) Ould Hammoudi said the President found weakness and 
vacillation in the French position.  Abdallahi told Serman he 
accepted the French statement of August 7 (Comment - That (a) 
condemned the coup, (b) called for Abdallahi's immediate 
release, and (c) stated "We recall that President Abdallahi 
was elected in March 2007 following free and transparent 
elections.  He is, therefore, the legitimate President of 
Mauritania.").  Abdallahi asked Serman whether the French 
position had changed to which the Elysee representative said 
"no." 
 
¶4.  (C) Charge cautioned Ould Hammoudi and Ould Maouloud not 
to kill the messenger noting that the French remain 
Abdallahi's strongest advocates within the European Union 
against other Europeans who would seek a more "pragmatic" 
approach to the coup.  If they saw some vacillation in 
Serman's message, it reflected the realities of the 
conflicting voices among the Europeans and within the French 
bureaucracy.  Charge highlighted the importance of having 
something concrete to present with the visit of the 
AU/EU/UN/Arab League/OIC/Francophonie delegation slated for 
early December.  While not offering concessions, Abdallahi's 
allies (specifically the French and AU) would need something 
to show that the President has more that just principle in 
his plan to get back into office.  Charge suggested that a 
tentative timeline showing when he saw international pressure 
reaching its peak and what specific steps he would be willing 
to take to  resolve political problems if/when he returned to 
power. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Abdallahi advisors noted their dissatisfaction 
with the fact that Serman had visited Opposition Leader Ould 
Daddah in addition to Abdallahi and Aziz.  They discounted 
Charge's suggestions that as the officially designated 
"Leader of the Opposition" Serman would have seen a need to 
meet Ould Daddah.  "Once he accepted the coup as a 
'rectification,' he lost his role as opposition.  He says he 
is against the military but only in the privacy of his living 
room -- there is nothing in his actions to show his 
opposition."  Ould Maouloud, who had just come from a press 
conference, was also distressed that western diplomats had 
attended the November 28 Mauritanian National Day ceremony at 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000706  002 OF 002 
 
 
the Presidency.  Charge noted that the diplomats, including 
the U.S. Acting DCM, had gone as a gesture of respect for the 
Mauritanian people but had not participated in the 
after-ceremony reception so as not to honor General Aziz. 
Ould Maouloud noted the regime had effectively used the 
coverage of Aziz shaking hands with diplomats (Comment -- 
perhaps aware of diplomats' plans to leave immediately after 
the flag ceremony, Presidential protocol changed the order of 
the ceremony to have Aziz shake hands first.  Some local 
press noted the absence of the U.S. -- not recognizing A/DCM 
as the American representative). 
 
¶6.  (C) Ould Hammoudi and Ould Maouloud noted that the 
President had planned to film a national day message in 
Lemden on the 28th.  Security forces, however, forced the 
President's staff to dismantle reception tents put up for the 
occasion, kept local residents indoors so they could not 
participate in any national day celebration, and temporarily 
confiscated cameras from press in Lemden to ensure that no 
video of the message had been captured.  The advisors noted 
the obvious contradiction to the regime's public statements 
that the President could meet anyone he wished. 
 
¶7.  (C) Ould Maouloud asked whether the U.S. could do 
anything to improve the conditions of confinement for Prime 
Minister Waghef.  Ould Maouloud said Waghef is being held in 
the general prison population and is being daily threatened 
and harassed by the prisoners.  He provided Charge with a 
copy of a confidential memorandum from the Regime's Minister 
of Justice Ahmedou Tidjane Bal to the Attorney General 
offering "suggestions" concerning the prosecution of the 
"political adversaries" of the "current Mauritanian 
Government" concerning the dissolution of Air Mauritanie. 
The memo suggests that the Attorney General build the case 
but use the airline's unions and investors to file a 
complaint so the regime could plead it is only following 
civil procedure. 
HANKINS