VZCZCXYZ0010
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0930/01 3301552
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251552Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9365
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5340
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 4098

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000930 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TALAT URGES FASTER UN PROCESS 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1986 
     ¶B. NICOSIA 813 
     ¶C. NICOSIA 910 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4 (b) and 1.4 
 (d) 
 
 1.(C) SUMMARY:  "Christofias can accept a solution that 
comes in a few years, but who knows if I will be here after 
(2010 "TRNC Presidential") elections," Turkish Cypriot leader 
Mehmet Ali Talat told the Ambassador on November 19.  In 
addition to concerns over the slow pace of the UN-brokered 
process, Talat also complained about RoC President Demetris 
Christofias's recent visit to Moscow and his continued 
refusal to use the "UN Body of Work" -- the Cypriot euphemism 
for the Annan Plan -- in the settlement talks.  He urged a 
greater role for the UN and wanted the USG to press 
Christofias to agree to more frequent leaders' meetings. 
Talat also said that he unsuccessfully had urged Christofias 
to cease G/C oil exploration efforts to the south and west of 
Cyprus in waters disputed by both Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriots (Reftels).  The Ambassador told Talat that the USG 
also wanted a speedier process, but at present, it was up to 
the leaders to make such a change.  Finally, Talat told the 
Ambassador he would travel to Turkey on November 20 to attend 
a conference and, if possible, meet with PM Erdogan.  He 
likely also was seeking Turkish budget support for the 
cash-strapped, pro-solution T/C "government" in an effort to 
forestall early "Parliamentary" elections.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
"Christofias can accept a solution that comes in a few years" 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Talat gave a decidedly mixed review of the ongoing 
UN-brokered process, only once saying that the process was 
going well.  He griped that the pace was very slow and 
worried that Christofias was moving away from what he dubbed 
a "tacit agreement" to wrap up the bulk of the negotiations 
by mid-2009 (Note:  other T/C and UN sources have mentioned 
this deal, but G/Cs publicly avoid mention of any 
"asphyxiating timetables.")  Christofias was simply "not in a 
hurry" and was running out the clock in anticipation of a 
(negative) December 2009 EU Commission progress report on 
Turkish accession, Talat thought.  Christofias had even told 
him he could "accept a solution that comes in a few years." 
 
¶3. (C) Talat, however, said that it was unclear whether or 
not he would remain in place after "TRNC Presidential" 
elections planned for April 2010.  Turkish Cypriots were 
equal parts "indifferent" and "impatient," and could easily 
turn their backs on a solution if talks dragged out. (Note: 
Although polling indicates Talat has no close "presidential" 
rivals currently, the pro-solution and highly unpopular CTP 
"government" led by Ferdi Soyer appears to be on its last 
legs, owing to an economic crisis in the north.  Should 
Turkey not deliver budgetary life support, Soyer could face 
-- and easily lose -- new elections in the first half of 
¶2009.  Such an outcome would force Talat into a stormy 
cohabitation with a nationalist, right-wing "government.") 
 
"Eroding the Basis of the Negotiations" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Talat charged that Christofias was trying to "erode 
the basis" of the negotiations by using bilateral agreements 
with UN Security Council members to bypass mutually 
agreed-upon principles, primarily the creation of G/C and T/C 
constituent states as outlined in the leaders' May 23 
agreement.  He complained, for example, that Christofias's 
November 18-21 trip to Moscow would result in a bilateral 
agreement similar to UK-RoC Memorandum of Understanding of 
June 5, which omitted the constituent states language and set 
off a firestorm among Turkish Cypriots (Note: Russia and the 
RoC inked a "Joint Declaration" on November 19 that, not 
surprisingly, omits mention of constituent states.)  He added 
that Christofias's actions demonstrated a "lack of goodwill" 
and made a mockery of his insistence on a "Cypriot" (vice 
internationally-imposed) solution for the island's division. 
 
"Body of Work Denied" 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Talat said that the existence of the "UN Body of 
Work," often interpreted by T/Cs to mean the 2004 Annan Plan, 
was "being denied" by G/Cs.  He had suggested to Christofias 
to accept "real power sharing" -- were the T/Cs to enjoy 
greater participation and influence in the federal structure, 
they would see it less as a vehicle for G/C control and be 
more willing to cede competencies to it.  Further, the 
arrangement would help dispel charges that the Turkish 
Cypriots actually wanted a confederation.  Talat claimed that 
Christofias was still fixated on obtaining powers for G/Cs 
commensurate with the 80/20 population split (at the time of 
the 1960 censuQ, however, and constantly had to be reminded 
of the principle of political equality. 
 
"UN needs to Facilitate Discussion" 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Talat told the Ambassador that the UN must become more 
involved in the process, facilitating discussion rather than 
"waiting and watching."  He specifically wanted expert advice 
from the UN, includiQ bridging proposals when both sides hit 
a wall.  Without directly criticizing UN Special Advisor 
Alexander Downer, Talat said it was ¬ easy" working with 
him. 
 
USG Must Speed up Process 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) In response to a question from the Ambassador 
regarding how the USG might best support the process, Talat 
urged the USG to pressure Greek Cypriots to speed it up.  The 
USG also favored a quicker pace, the Ambassador responded, 
and regularly pushed both sides to support their leaders. 
Nevertheless, it was Talat and Christofias who had the main 
responsibility of hammering out a deal, not outsiders. 
(Note: The Ambassador made similar remarks to the largest 
circulation daily in the north, "Kibris," which published 
them on its November 20 front page.) 
 
"G/Cs will keep up with oil exploration" 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Again responding to the Ambassador's query, Talat said 
that he had told Christofias to stop oil/gas exploration in 
disputed waters to the west and south of Cyprus where Turkey 
and the Turkish Cypriots had claims (Reftels).  Talat had 
argued that since natural resources were to be a federal 
competency in a reunited Cyprus, such activities should be 
conducted only after a solution.  Furthermore, conflict over 
exploration might harm the climate surrounding negotiations. 
Christofias had brushed aside the idea, however, saying that 
a solution would take "several years".  Despite the 
Ambassador's prodding, Talat would not comment on future 
Turkish actions should the RoC continue seismic soundings. 
 
Off to Ankara (probably for cash) 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Talat concluded the meeting by mentioning that he was 
headed to Ankara on November 20 to attend a think-tank 
conference and possibly meet with Turkish Prime Minister 
Tayyip Erdogan.  (Note:  We suspect that he will appeal to 
Erdogan for budget support to the cash-strapped, pro-solution 
"TRNC government" of Ferdi Soyer, in hopes of staving off a 
possible political crisis.  "PM8 Soyer told the Ambassador 
on November 20 that he and Talat soon would discuss calling 
early elections for the first half of 2009, since the 
"government," already deeply in debt, could not continue 
without an influx of cash.  Soyer added that while Erdogan 
supported his "government," others in Erdogan's inner circle 
did not.  Post will report Septel details of the Soyer 
conversation.) 
 
¶10. (C) Comment:  Talat appeared distracted, perhaps even 
resigned to negative developments, with his customary 
protestations lacking their normal urgency.  We can 
understand why.  The possible fall of Soyer's pro-solution 
CTP "government," to be replaced by a heavily nationalist 
one, would spell bad news for a settlement -- the 
"President's" political raison d'etre.  While a change in 
"government" will not force the T/Cs to leave the negotiating 
table, since Talat as "President" runs that show, it would 
mean a difficult period of cohabitation, likely with the 
anti-federal solution UBP party. 
Urbancic