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OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #2905/01 3171041
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O 121041Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4146
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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7131
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5483
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2882
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RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002905 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018 
TAGS: MARR PREL PROV MASS KOMC IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN GOVERNMENT UNWILLING TO AGREE TO END-USE 
MONITORING, FOR NOW 
 
Classified By: AMB David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  While Indian National Security Advisor M. 
¶K. Narayanan and Defense Secretary Vijay Singh stated their 
urgent interest on reaching agreement on end-use monitoring, 
talks led by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Asian and Pacific Security Affairs) Mitchell Shivers failed 
to make any significant progress.  Defense Secretary Singh 
concluded his final meeting with PDASD Shivers with a promise 
to take the matter to the Prime Minister's Office and Defense 
Minister to seek political clearance of the language, which 
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of 
External Affairs were clearly unwilling to approve at their 
level.  In a November 10 meeting, the Ambassador and Foreign 
Secretary Menon looked for ways to move forward in advance of 
Menon's plans to go to Washington before the end of the 
month.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  On November 6, PDASD Shivers and CDA White received 
a meeting with National Security Advisor Narayanan late in 
the day and provided Narayanan the U.S. end-use monitoring 
(EUM) text.  While Narayanan was cordial and explicitly 
stated that the Government of India (GOI) was eager to do 
business with the United States, it was apparent that he had 
not been fully briefed on developments.  He seemed most 
concerned with mischievous uses of the EUM text to enable the 
United States to probe into Siachen glacier bases or Indian 
forward bunkers.  PDASD Shivers assured him that was not the 
intent of the program.  Narayanan told PDASD Shivers that the 
GOI sought to conclude the EUM agreement during this U.S. 
administration.  PDASD Shivers stressed that the U.S. 
government had little flexibility beyond the draft text, 
which was drafted to be as flexible as possible while still 
fulfilling U.S. law.  Narayanan directed MEA Americas Joint 
Secretary Gaitri Kumar and Ministry of Defense 
Director-General for Acquisitions Shashi Kant Sharma to meet 
with the U.S. team and finalize the text on the following day. 
 
¶3.  (C)  PDASD Shivers and CDA White had a courtesy call with 
Defense Secretary Singh prior to the beginning of talks on 
November 7, where Singh reiterated the GOI,s desire to agree 
to EUM text.  Once talks begin, chaired on the Indian side by 
MoD Joint Secretary for Air Acquisitions Ghose and MEA 
Americas Joint Secretary Kumar, it became apparent that the 
Indian side had concerns with every alteration of their 
October 4 text.  The Indian side had three primary concerns, 
all of which directly conflicted with U.S. requirements under 
the Arms Export Control Act.  First, the GOI objected to 
language that would guarantee U.S. access to transferred 
defense articles in order to conduct end-use monitoring.  The 
GOI sought to use vague language, which had the effect of 
making U.S. access optional rather than mandatory.  Second, 
the GOI opposed the U.S. delineation of a broad number of 
authorized end-uses (internal security, self-defense, civic 
action, etc.) detailed in the Arms Export Control Act.  The 
GOI argued that defense articles once purchased by India 
should be useable in any operation of the Indian Armed Forces 
without restrictions.  PDASD Shivers stressed that it was 
almost inconceivable that the GOI would use articles in a way 
not permitted under the broad U.S. text.  Finally, the GOI 
objected to language that the U.S. would "retain the right to 
verify credible reports" of unauthorized uses of transferred 
defense articles.  The GOI side proposed a variety of means 
to condition the U.S. right, but none of them could satisfy 
the strict requirements of U.S. law in this area. 
 
¶4.  (C)  PDASD Shivers concluded the session as it became 
clear that no additional progress could be made at that 
level.  In his outcall with Defense Secretary Singh, PDASD 
Shivers indicated his disappointment in not resolving the 
issue and that as a consequence the U.S. could not move 
forward with several defense transfers to India.  After 
inquiring as to the areas of greatest contention, Defense 
Secretary Singh expressed optimism that approval might be 
achievable at the political level.  He promised to take the 
matter to the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister's 
Office.  He said he would discuss the matter with National 
Security Advisor Narayanan over the weekend, when they would 
travel together for the Prime Minister's visit to Oman.  He 
thought the Indian political leadership might be able to 
 
NEW DELHI 00002905  002 OF 002 
 
 
bridge the current divide (implicitly indicating the 
political leaders would be willing to accept text 
unacceptable to lower-levels in the government) and the GOI 
would respond in seven-to-eight days.  The U.S. side noted 
that Foreign Secretary Menon, who was noticeably absent from 
Delhi despite having provided the dates for these talks, was 
scheduled to travel to Washington, D.C. for the G-20 summit 
on November 15, which might provide a possible opportunity to 
resolve the matter. 
 
¶5.    (C)  On November 10, Ambassador Mulford met with 
Foreign Secretary Menon to see whether there was a way ahead 
following the Shivers, discussions.  Menon acknowledged that 
he had not had a chance yet to get a full debrief on the 
talks, but said he feared that the issue was becoming 
potentially unsolvable because positions were hardening in 
such a way as to make further discussions unhelpful.  Instead 
of being a "language" problem, it was now looking like EUM 
had raised "substantive" problems.  Menon said the GOI,s 
perception was that the USG-suggested draft language had 
become "harder" over the course of the negotiations and that 
language in existing agreements had not been as restricted. 
He asked why the language had changed over the past three or 
four years.  The Ambassador reviewed the issues raised by the 
USG suggested language on use and stressed that the U.S. 
already had agreements on EUM with over 80 other countries. 
Menon responded that India continued to be interested in 
resolving the issue as soon as possible and said New Delhi 
did not want to wait until the next Administration takes 
office to get this done.  Menon said he was planning to go to 
Washington in the near future to discuss transition issues 
and would like to be able to bring a resolution to this 
issue.  The Ambassador acknowledged that India needed to find 
a politically palatable way of addressing our language and 
agreed that we should make the effort to resolve this issue 
now to enable strong defense cooperation in the future. 
 
¶6. (U) PDASD Shivers has not cleared this message. 
MULFORD