VZCZCXRO3565
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMS #0789/01 3231149
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181149Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0121
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0315
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0312
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000789 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018 
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL GCC PK IN IZ MU
SUBJECT: OMAN'S BIN ALAWI DISCUSSES U.S.-GCC SECURITY, 
MIDEAST PEACE, PAKISTAN, IRAQ 
 
REF: A. STATE 111596 (NOTAL) 
     ¶B. STATE 113956 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo per 1.4 (B and D.) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  In a meeting with the Ambassador November 
17, Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusef bin Alawi 
reviewed Oman's idea for developing U.S.-GCC security 
cooperation, which will be presented for discussion at the 
December GCC summit, his thoughts on Mideast peace, Iraq and 
the SOFA, and Omani and Indian fears over potential future 
instability in Pakistan. End Summary. 
 
U.S.-GCC Security on GCC Summit Agenda 
-------------------------------------- 
¶2.  (C)  Bin Alawi said that Oman was preparing a paper for 
discussion at the December GCC summit on U.S.-GCC security 
cooperation (reftel).  Still incomplete, the paper will lay 
out Omani ideas for strengthening cooperation in areas 
relating to security between the U.S. and GCC as a whole, as 
opposed to individual GCC members.  Existing bilateral 
security arrangements between the U.S. and each of the GCC 
states would not be affected, he said.  The paper will 
address Gulf regional security as well as security challenges 
throughout the Middle East and South Asia in which the GCC, 
working with the U.S., might play a constructive role. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The minister also indicated that Oman might propose 
a conference focusing on how regional states might respond to 
extra-regional problems and crises, e.g., Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Iran, etc.  It would include governments from 
the Gulf as well as outside governments with an obvious 
interest, such as the U.S.  He emphasized that Oman's intent 
was to draw the U.S. and GCC states closer together to 
address the region's security problems.  As the paper moved 
closer to completion, he agreed to share Omani thoughts in 
greater detail. 
 
Concerns over Pakistan 
---------------------- 
¶4.  (C)  One of the reasons behind the Omani idea is growing 
Omani fears over instability in Pakistan.  During the recent 
visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the two sides 
discussed Pakistan and the likelihood of events in Pakistan 
spiraling out of control.  Bin Alawi said that victory by 
Pakistani forces over factions in the tribal areas was 
patently "unachievable;" the best the government could hope 
for was some modus vivendi in which the various tribal 
factions enjoyed a form of autonomy in exchange for closer 
security cooperation and a pledge to keep terrorists and 
other extremists out. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Pakistan's security challenges are further 
complicated by lack of confidence in the new and untested 
president, worries over the ruling party's ability to stay in 
control, a looming economic crisis and consequent fear of 
another army take-over.  All of this, he said, was a matter 
of considerable concern to the Indians, who wondered about a 
"security vacuum" in parts of Pakistan that extremists would 
exploit and the attendant potential for greater Muslim-Hindu 
violence in India itself.  "The Indians were very worried 
about Pakistan," he concluded. 
 
Another Approach to Mideast Peace:  &Two States, One System8 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
¶6.  (C)  Bin Alawi displayed his now standard pessimism over 
Israeli-Palestinian peace.  "Israeli offers of compromise are 
too little to be accepted by the Arabs, and the big 
compromises necessary are too big to be accepted by the 
Israelis," he lamented.  Uncertainty over the upcoming 
Israeli elections and the expanding gap between the PA/Fatah 
and Hamas cast a darker shadow over prospects for peace.  On 
the former, he suggested that the recent meeting in Sharm al 
Sheikh had been done principally to bolster Israeli FM 
Livni's fortunes in the upcoming election, which was 
"logical" in view of the stakes for the Palestinians and 
Arabs. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Bin Alawi said he had met with Livni briefly in New 
York and had suggested that she consider an idea of his for 
Israeli-Palestinian peace.  Calling it "two states, one 
system," he said it would entail fairly quick recognition of 
a Palestinian state but would leave many of the outstanding 
problems to mutually agreed and largely non-government means 
for resolution.  As Israeli and Palestinian areas would soon 
become effectively indistinguishable given population growth 
 
MUSCAT 00000789  002 OF 002 
 
 
rates and the expansion of urban areas, perhaps the people 
themselves through government-blessed institutions and 
business could be left to resolve problems of water, 
boundaries, labor, residences, etc.  He allowed, however, 
that "some fixed borders would probably have to be settled in 
advance."  When asked about security, he confessed, "We Arabs 
probably still don't grasp how critical this is to the 
Israelis."  The minister said he understood that his idea was 
"unorthodox" but he had intended for it to stimulate new 
thinking about the problem. 
 
Iraq:  No Alternative to SOFA 
----------------------------- 
¶8.  (C)  The minister offered his congratulations on the 
Iraqi Council of Minister's recent approval of the SOFA. 
"They have no choice," exclaimed bin Alawi, arguing that 
Iraqi security forces are not yet ready to assume 
responsibility for security in Iraq.  The U.S. must remain in 
Iraq to maintain the improved but fragile security in the 
country and ensure a smooth hand-over of the security 
function to the Iraqis.  He opined that Iraq's Council of 
Ministers would act "sensibly" and also approve the SOFA 
quickly. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶9.  (C)  Oman's leadership, history, and geo-political 
positioning have predisposed the Sultanate to look beyond the 
Gulf region.  Judging from bin Alawi's comments, the Omanis 
are genuinely concerned about the situation in Pakistan and 
the potential for instability there to boil over into India, 
Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region.  The ideas of closer 
cooperation with the U.S. and a regional conference appear 
intended not only to focus the GCC's attention and efforts on 
its potential role in matters outside the immediate region of 
the Gulf, but also to ensure close cooperation and 
coordination with the region's largest non-regional player 
and partner, the U.S.  We cannot dismiss the added 
possibility, however, that the Omanis are looking for some 
mechanism to integrate Iran in the region's political 
apparatus.  Post will remain in close touch with the minister 
and his staff to monitor progress on the Omani security paper 
for the GCC Summit.  End Comment. 
GRAPPO