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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 003419 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS AZ UP MD IZ
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN ON IRAQ, GEORGIA, UKRAINE, 
TRANSNISTRIA, NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
 
REF: NOV 21 MFA DIPNOTE 5226 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In a November 25 meeting, Russian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Karasin sought further information on the 
alleged November 19 collision between a U.S. convoy vehicle 
and a Russian embassy vehicle in Baghdad (reftel).  He called 
the November 23 shooting near the Georgian and Polish 
presidents a "cheap provocation" by Saakashvili that could 
overshadow the success of the Geneva process.  Russia would 
seek an end to the Geneva process by the end of the year or 
"early 2009," but wanted the discussions and working groups 
to continue in a different format, such as the UN or OSCE. 
Karasin emphasized that Russia supported the continuation of 
international monitoring mechanisms in Georgia, but repeated 
South Ossetian approval was required.  He accused Georgia of 
using refugee issues to put emotional pressure on South 
Ossetia, and pressed for the working group discussions on 
refugees and security to continue in parallel.  Karasin 
called for cooperation with Ukraine on the financial crisis 
and thought the energy dispute could be settled once 
Ukraine's internal political crisis was resolved.  However, 
the Holodomor and Russian language issues remained irritants. 
 Characterizing the Transnistria conflict as solvable, 
Karasin criticized U.S. Ambassador Chaudry's November 24 
demand for Russian troops to withdraw from Transnistria as an 
"artificial complication."  On Nagorno-Karabakh, Karasin said 
the Azeri and Armenian governments were working on 
confidence-building measures, and noted the possibility of 
establishing an expert group.   End Summary. 
 
---- 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶2.  (C) In a November 25 meeting, Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Karasin told the Ambassador that Russia considered 
the alleged November 19 collision between a U.S. convoy 
vehicle and a Russian embassy vehicle to be a "serious and 
dramatic" issue.  He called for a thorough investigation into 
why the incident happened, in order to ensure that such 
incidents could not reoccur.  Averring that such events 
should not have an impact on bilateral U.S.-Russian 
relations, Karasin insisted on a detailed explanation of the 
incident. 
 
¶3.  (C) The Ambassador told Karasin that an investigation was 
under way, although the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad had not been 
able to identify the convoy yet, and had contacted the 
Russian embassy there to request further details.  He noted 
the U.S. had only learned about the incident when the GOR 
called us November 21, 18 hours after it allegedly occurred. 
 
------- 
Georgia 
------- 
 
Geneva talks 
------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Agreeing with A/S Fried's characterization of the 
results of the November 18 Geneva talks as "modest," Karasin 
nonetheless commended them for having brought the Georgians 
to talk eye to eye with South Ossetians and Abkhaz.  While 
A/S Fried had noted the usefulness of granting each party 
equal status, EU Special Representative Pierre Morel had 
introduced "artificial complications" by originally calling 
for meetings on different levels.  Georgia had continued its 
"provocative" actions by including in its delegation Alan 
Parastayev, a South Ossetian who had been sentenced for 
making an attempt on the life of the republic's "president" 
Kokoity; Dmitry Sanakoyev, the head of the Tbilisi-backed 
Provisional Administration in South Ossetia; and Lorik 
Marshania, member of the Abkhaz government in exile.  Karasin 
said it had taken much effort to persuade the Abkhaz and 
South Ossetians to sit down with them, by arguing that they 
had equal status as Georgian "professionals," but were 
"phantoms of a past opera" with regard to any status in South 
Ossetia or Abkhazia. 
 
¶5.  (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question, Karasin 
stated that Russia believed the Geneva talks should conclude 
by the end of 2008.  Karasin argued the nature of the talks 
could change with the "more emotional" Czech Republic's 
assumption of the EU presidency.  Saying that Russia did not 
want the Geneva talks to become institutionalized, he 
suggested conducting any further meetings under the umbrella 
of existing formats, such as the UN or OSCE.  He called on 
 
MOSCOW 00003419  002 OF 004 
 
 
the U.S. to convince Georgia that it was only through 
dialogue that quiet, stable, and good-neighborly relations 
could be established in the region. 
 
¶6.  (C) The Ambassador pushed back on Russia's intent to 
terminate the Geneva process, arguing that Geneva was the 
only forum in which to make progress on the security and 
refugee issues.  He rejected the notion that a Czech EU 
presidency was a reason to discontinue the talks.  Karasin 
said the Russians "since September" had said Geneva needed to 
be a dynamic forum that showed results by the end of 2008. 
He added that they were "not categorical" that December 17-18 
must be the final session, and could consider "one more, 
perhaps early in 2009" -- if the December discussions showed 
that there was something to be gained by the continuation. 
 
Polish motorcade shooting incident 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Karasin called the November 23 shootings near 
Georgian President Saakashvili and Polish President 
Kaczynski's motorcade at the border to South Ossetia a "cheap 
provocation," which was "typical behavior" of Saakashvili. 
Questioning the wisdom of two presidents driving up to a 
checkpoint, Karasin said FM Lavrov's characterization of the 
event as a "staged provocation" was too soft, it was rather 
an "act of stupidity" designed to provoke new tensions and 
show the Russian forces up as "evil."  If the international 
community did not jointly condemn such Georgian behavior, it 
would encourage new violence.  If such provocations 
continued, the "modest successes" of the Geneva talks that 
A/S Fried had praised would soon be "totally overshadowed" by 
the incident. 
 
¶8.  (C) Ambassador Beyrle rejected Karasin's characterization 
of the November 23 shooting as a staged provocation, calling 
such an idea extreme and unconstructive.  Instead, the 
incident showed the linkage of events in Georgia and in 
Geneva, underscoring the necessity of continuing the Geneva 
talks in order to find mechanisms to investigate incidents 
and increase monitoring, including by allowing international 
observers into South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  The U.S. was 
concerned that the slow pace of the political process in 
Geneva opened a gap in relation to the pace of events on the 
ground, creating the potential for "mischief," which could 
turn into violence. 
 
Monitors 
-------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Lamenting a lack of insight into the EU's operations 
in Georgia, Karasin said that an agreement on future contacts 
with EU representatives had been reached on the fringes of 
the November 18 Geneva talks during a meeting with the head 
of the EU monitoring mission Hans-Joerg Haber.  Haber had 
explained that the EU monitors conducted many snap 
inspections in the border area, detecting a strengthening of 
Georgian troops in the six-kilometer border zone, with 
weapons of up to 85 cm caliber.  Karasin said that he would 
meet Haber December 1-2 to discuss a mechanism of cooperation 
between the EU observer mission and the Russian military in 
South Ossetia. 
 
¶10.  (C) Insisting that Russian soldiers were the key element 
to provide security inside South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
Karasin confirmed Russian support for the UN mission in 
Abkhazia and the OSCE in South Ossetia, but repeated demands 
that the UN mission needed to change its name to remove any 
reference to Georgia.  He reiterated that Russia did not 
oppose access by the monitors to South Ossetia, but it 
required South Ossetian approval.  South Ossetian authorities 
still felt betrayed by the OSCE monitors, according to 
Karasin.  For that reason, they would not speak with head of 
the OSCE Mission in Georgia Terhi Hakkala, and demanded that 
different monitors than those in August be designated. 
Before any monitors could be allowed inside South Ossetia, it 
was necessary to see how they handled complaints and 
incidents in the border zone.  While the OSCE machinery was 
complicated and indecisive, and it was not clear what the 
OSCE envisioned for its South Ossetia monitoring mission, 
Karasin said he had the impression that changes were 
possible.  The missions needed to start work fast and not 
wait for the Geneva talks. 
 
¶11.  (C) Ambassador Beyrle pushed for movement on the UNOMIG 
mandate, due to expire in February, and argued that South 
Ossetian emotions could no longer govern decisions on OSCE 
monitors, four months after the military conflict.  The OSCE 
knew very well what it wanted to do, but the failure to 
 
MOSCOW 00003419  003 OF 004 
 
 
extend its mission in September came because Russia refused 
to agree to the OSCE mandate. 
 
IDPs/Refugees 
------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Karasin accused the GoG of using the refugee 
situation to place emotional pressure on South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia; for example, by trying to force Georgians to return 
to the Upper Kodori region against their will, and pushing 
for refugees to return to their destroyed homes now, at the 
onset of the cold season.  Noting that thousands of refugees 
had already returned to South Ossetia and that in the future, 
there would be many nationalities living in the region, 
Karasin argued that it was necessary to obtain Georgian, 
South Ossetian, and Abkhaz support for the principle of 
refugee returns and signature of a declaration of the 
multi-ethnicity of the states.  In this regard, Karasin 
praised South Ossetian "president" Kokoity for having opened 
12 Georgian-language schools in South Ossetia. 
 
¶13.  (C) Karasin rejected DAS Bryza's call for the Geneva 
IDP/refugee working group to move forward at a faster pace 
than the security working group.  Karasin insisted that the 
two needed to move in lockstep, in order to provide channels 
of cooperation between the IDP and security groups. 
 
¶14.  (C) The Ambassador rejected Karasin's claim that Georgia 
was politicizing the refugee issue, stressing the Russians 
needed to stop seeing a provocation in everything the GoG 
did.  He asserted the U.S. saw no problems with the IDP 
working group meeting earlier -- with the onset of winter, it 
made no sense to wait till mid-December. 
 
------- 
Ukraine 
------- 
 
¶15.  (C) Karasin said he hoped there would be no cut-off of 
gas to Ukraine this winter, and deplored the media attention 
paid to Gazprom-Naftohaz negotiations, which he described as 
a "normal business argument."  Once Ukraine's internal 
political situation stabilized, the energy issue could easily 
be resolved.  Karasin spoke out in favor of Russian-Ukrainian 
cooperation in the financial crisis, given that the 
countries' economies were so similar and intertwined. 
 
¶16.  (C) The Holodomor issue, however, was a serious issue, 
Karasin stated.  Describing Yushchenko's November 22 
statement as the "unreadable" work of a "sick man," Karasin 
rejected calling the famine a genocide and said Russia simply 
wanted to talk about all the famine victims, not just in 
Ukraine. 
 
¶17.  (C) Karasin said that he had discussed a wide range of 
issues in his November 24 meeting with Ukrainian Ambassador 
to Russia Hryshchenko, and had agreed to visit Kyiv in 
December to continue the constructive talks, including on the 
shut-down of Russian TV stations in Ukraine.  Karasin 
stressed the importance of preserving Russian language 
culture and schooling in Ukraine, arguing that one quarter of 
the population had Russian roots, while one third considered 
Russian a native language.  The Ambassador told Karasin the 
U.S. had no double standards and had told Ukraine and Georgia 
that media restrictions were a bad idea -- a point also valid 
in Russia. 
 
------------ 
Transnistria 
------------ 
 
¶18.  (C) Karasin criticized U.S. Ambassador Chaudry's 
November 24 call for Russian troops to withdraw from 
Transnistria as an "artificial complication."  As there were 
only several hundred Russian soldiers protecting the arms 
depot in Transnistria, it was much more important to get 
Moldovan president Voronin and Transnistrian leader Smirnov 
to meet and work out next steps within the 5 plus 2 process. 
Karasin asserted that Russia was working the issue "every 
day," battling personal resentment, errors, and petty 
disagreements on issues like the meeting venue.  While 
calling both Voronin and Smirnov difficult, Karasin admitted 
the Transnistrian leadership was a "complicating factor." 
Still, a resolution of this conflict was the most likely of 
all frozen conflicts. 
 
---------------- 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
---------------- 
 
MOSCOW 00003419  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶19.  (C) On Nagorno-Karabakh, Karasin said that the Azeri and 
Armenian governments were now looking to identify 
confidence-building measures, possibly by establishing a 
group of five to six experts or members of the political 
elite from both countries.  In the meantime, the Minsk Group 
would meet December 4 in Helsinki to discuss next steps. 
BEYRLE