VZCZCXRO5856
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #3364/01 3251432
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201432Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0824
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003364 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON AM AZ RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA INCHES AWAY FROM ARMENIA 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Alice Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In the aftermath of the Georgia conflict, 
Russian and Armenian officials assert there has been no 
change in Russian-Armenian relations, and see no detrimental 
impact of possible improved relations between Turkey and 
Armenia.  Experts however argue that Russia is able to use 
the leeway it has with Armenia -- due to Armenia's dependence 
on Russia -- to pursue increased ties with the 
geostrategically more wily Aliyev.  Russia sees Armenia's 
relations to Turkey as limited to practical cooperation, 
while the GOT's proposed cooperation platform is still too 
vague to be a factor.  Strong domestic lobbies within the 
Kremlin mitigate against any abrupt change of Russian course. 
 End Summary. 
 
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Bilateral ties 
-------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) MFA Armenia desk counselor Sergei Vinogradov told us 
in an October 31 meeting that bilateral relations between 
Russia and Armenia remained unchanged.  He took pains to 
explain that Medvedev's first visit to Armenia as president 
October 20-21, long after his July 2008 visit to Azerbaijan, 
was not a slight to Armenia.  Vinogradov noted that there 
were 12 presidential visits between the two countries since 
2005, including four visits in 2008 by Armenian president 
Sargsian to Russia in March, June, September, and November. 
There was no reason to believe that the GOR was seeking 
Azerbaijan's favor, to Armenia's detriment. 
 
¶3.  (C) Vinogradov stressed that bilateral ties between 
Russia and Armenia remained significant.  Russia continued to 
be Armenia's largest trade partner in both exports and 
imports, and trade with Armenia had increased sharply in the 
past months, even though Armenia's access to Georgian ports 
had been interrupted in the conflict.  Vinogradov noted 
Russian investments in Armenia helped "keep that country 
afloat," as did the remittances from Armenian guest workers 
in Russia, in addition to improving Armenia's tech level. 
Vinogradov also pointed to Russian military support for 
Armenia, positing that the 2000 agreement to locate the 102nd 
Russian military base in Armenia in order to guard its 
borders was part of Russia's contribution to guarantee 
stability in the Caucasus. 
 
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Turkey 
------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Vinogradov noted Turkey's recent favorable politics 
toward and interest in establishing diplomatic relations with 
Armenia, but stated that Armenia's geographical position -- a 
Christian country almost surrounded by Muslim neighbors -- 
naturally ensured that Armenia would continue to maintain 
close ties with Russia.  Vinogradov saw Armenia seeking ties 
with Turkey for pragmatic reasons only -- to improve 
Armenia's international transport and communications ties, 
which had suffered during the Georgian conflict.  Vinogradov 
said Russia had no formal position on Turkey's proposal for a 
stability and cooperation platform, but was willing to 
consider the GOT's plans once they were fleshed out. 
 
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Nagorno-Karabakh 
---------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Vinogradov affirmed that Russia's support for 
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the Minsk 
Group remained unchanged.  It was a success in itself to get 
Sargsian and Aliyev to talk together again at the November 2 
summit, after their first meeting in June.  Vinogradov 
painted Russia as an impartial mediator whose offer to assist 
had been welcomed by both sides. 
 
---------------- 
Armenian Embassy 
---------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Armenian counselor Ruben Ananyan similarly insisted 
November 8 that Armenia did not feel Russia was letting down 
Armenia by courting Azerbaijan, noting the traditionally 
close ties between the two Christian countries.  In the same 
vein, Armenia had no intention of moving closer to Turkey at 
Russia's expense.  Any improvement in relations with Turkey 
would only be for purely "practical" reasons.  Given 
Armenia's near-isolation, Ananyan said Armenia needed to 
speak with all its neighbors, including Iran, but did so 
openly so as not to antagonize its other neighbors. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00003364  002 OF 002 
 
 
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Experts 
------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Despite the official denials, analysts detect a shift 
in Russian-Armenian relations in favor of a 
Russian-Azerbaijani rapprochement.  An editorial in the 
November 17 Caucasian Review of International Affairs claims 
Moscow is inching away from Armenia and toward Azerbaijan, 
reflecting the view that Russia offered Azerbaijan a Karabakh 
resolution -- which would require Russia to abandon its 
traditional pro-Armenian bias -- in return for access to 
Azeri gas.  Others suggest Russia was now starting to use the 
leeway it already possesses in its relations to Armenia, due 
to Armenian dependence on Russia.  Sergei Markedonov from the 
Institute for Political and Military Analysis asserted that 
the recent warming of relations between Moscow and Baku -- 
including via statements such as chairman of the State Duma 
Committee for the CIS Aleksey Ostrovskiy's recent support for 
the principle of territorial integrity as a "governing 
principle of international law" -- were a cause for alarm in 
Yerevan.  Pavel Sheremet from ORTV credited Russia's new 
friendliness to Azerbaijan, including offers on energy 
cooperation, to the strong Azerbaijani lobby in Russia, which 
"influenced the Kremlin." 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) While Russia may be pocketing its close relations 
with Armenia, investing more time and diplomacy in the 
geostrategically more wily Aliyev, there are strong Armenian 
and Azerbaijani lobbies in the Kremlin that mitigate the 
chances of an abrupt change in GOR policy. 
BEYRLE