VZCZCXRO2815
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHMO #3323/01 3221339
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171339Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0741
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003323 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018 
TAGS: PROV PREL ECON MARR RS XF
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S CONCEPT OF THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST, 
TINGED BY RACISM 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 751 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 346 
     ¶C. MOSCOW 1478 
 
Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  With the prospect of a major Middle East 
conference being convened in Moscow in early 2009, analysts 
explained to us how Russia views the Middle East and how they 
believe the region, in turn, views Russia.  For Russians, the 
"Middle East" is a concept more than a region, which includes 
Russia's Muslim population, Central Asia, and the broader 
Middle East.  The primary importance of the Middle East lies 
in its ability to create instability within the Muslim world, 
which could threaten Russian interests.  Analysts believe 
that Russian influence in the region is severely limited, and 
the GOR has little chance of making an impact on the Middle 
East peace process.  They doubt the real extent of Russia's 
supposed increase in economic activity in the region, which, 
apart from certain energy deals, is based upon Middle Eastern 
governments using Russia to appear to balance their 
relationship with the U.S.  Russia's real influence is with 
the "Arab street" that again looks to Moscow to counter 
Washington, as it did during the Soviet era.  Ironically, the 
analysts believe that Russians harbor racist attitudes toward 
Arabs and Moscow cares little for their well-being.  End 
summary. 
 
Russia's Expansive Idea of the "Middle East" 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Moscow Carnegie Center's Dmitri Trenin explained 
that Russians have an expansive concept of the "Middle East" 
that consists of three parts:  Russia's Muslim population, 
Central Asia, and the broader Middle East that includes 
"everything West of India."  Russia's Muslims are the most 
important aspect of the "Middle East," as they have the 
greatest political and security implications.  While there is 
no Russian version of an American-style ethnic lobby, the 
views of Russian Muslims are taken seriously by the political 
leadership and relations with the larger Muslim world are 
considered a factor in maintaining "domestic tranquillity" 
(ref A).  The potential for trouble with "restive" Muslims in 
the Caucasus still exists, although Moscow is ready to co-opt 
them the way it did in Chechnya through Kadyrov.  Central 
Asia is viewed as part of Russia's sphere of influence and 
has to be protected from outside influences, including Iran 
and Muslim extremists. 
 
¶3. (C) Trenin said that although Russians saw developments in 
the West and East Asia as most crucial to their interests, 
they did consider the "southern flank" because events in the 
Middle East could adversely impact the Muslim populations in 
Russia and Central Asia.  This view was seconded by Tzvey 
Mirkin, an Israeli Emboff and former chief Russia analyst for 
the Israeli MFA, who thought that Russian interest in the 
Middle East was based upon the belief that the region was the 
primary source of global instability and threatened Central 
Asia, the Caucasus, and other predominantly Muslim parts of 
Russia. 
 
Russian Influence and Opportunities Limited 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Analysts were nearly unanimous in telling us that 
Russian influence in the Middle East was limited.  Trenin 
said that Russia was no longer a "stakeholder" in any one 
Middle Eastern country, perhaps with the exception of Syria 
as a result of arms sales.  Even there, however, Moscow's 
ability to influence Damascus' actions was limited.  Both 
Trenin and Marianna Belenkaya, a commentator at RIA Novesti 
and Russia Today's Arabic service, said that Russia was not 
willing to spend its capital, either political or monetary, 
in the manner of the U.S. and Europe.  Until Russia is 
willing to provide real aid to the region, the way the U.S. 
does with Israel, Egypt and Jordan, it will never have 
anywhere near the level of influence. 
 
¶5. (C) Analysts thought that Russia had proven it had little 
ability to bring positives to international dialogue in the 
Middle East, and that Moscow's real influence amounted to its 
"obstacle-making ability."  They reiterated that the 
prospects for the GOR's plans for a Moscow Middle East 
conference, now slated for the spring of 2009, were dim. 
Both Georgi Mirksy, a longtime Arabist currently with the 
Institute of Higher Economics, and Middle East Studies 
Institute Director Yevgeniy Satanovskiy, stressed that if 
Washington could not bring the Israelis and Palestinians to 
an agreement despite years of trying, there was little Moscow 
could accomplish. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00003323  002 OF 002 
 
 
Business Contracts Tied to ME Politics 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Belenkaya argued that Russian prospects in the Middle 
East were so meager that many contracts were given to Russian 
companies by Middle Eastern governments for political 
purposes, and could be withdrawn for the same reasons.  She 
pointed to Saudi Arabia, where Russian Railways appeared to 
win, then lose, a major contract; Libya, where Russian oil 
and gas companies have encountered difficulties and Moscow 
had yet to land an arms deal; and Algeria, which returned 
MIGs to Russia complaining of their quality.  These countries 
went to Russia in order to appear to balance their 
relationship with the U.S., but would go back to the U.S. if 
it suited their interests.  Mirsky agreed that Middle Eastern 
countries used Russia to appear to balance their relationship 
with the U.S., much as Russia used them to appear a 
diplomatic player.  He dismissed Putin's touted 2007 trip to 
the region as being more about wanting to seem active than 
accomplishing real political objectives. 
 
¶7. (C) Ruslan Pukhov, Editor of the Moscow Defense Brief, 
dismissed the prospect of Russian military sales to the 
Middle East increasing dramatically.  He classified Russia's 
primary arms customers as "marginally blockaded markets" 
Syria, Iran and Venezuela, plus countries such as Malaysia 
and Indonesia that wish to avoid the political strings that 
come with buying from the U.S.  Pukhov thought little of 
reports of a potential Saudi arms purchase, saying that 
Riyadh was simply "throwing Russia a bone."  Mirkin thought, 
however, that the Russian establishment took potential arms 
sales and other contracts in the region seriously since they 
stood to benefit personally. 
 
Russia's Influence is With the Arab Street 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) If Russia has influence in the Middle East, it is with 
the Arab street that now looks to Russia the way it did the 
Soviet Union to stand up to the U.S., argued Belenkaya. 
During the Georgia crisis, Russia Today's Arabic service was 
deluged with emails from people in the Middle East who were 
glad that "Russia was back."  The prevalence of such 
sentiments meant that regional leaders talk-up their 
relations with Russia in order to strike a pose for public 
consumption.  The odd arms sale or business contract with 
Russian companies accomplished this as well.  Ironically, 
both Belenkaya and Mirsky argued, the Russian leadership did 
not really care about Arabs, their views of which were tinged 
by racism.  They only felt warmly toward Israelis, with whom 
Russia had strong cultural ties. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Analysts have typically viewed Russian motives in the 
Middle East with skepticism, and recognized the limits of GOR 
influence in the region (ref B).  They appear to have taken 
the last year, which began with hope that Russia could use 
its relationships with Syria, Lebanon, Hamas, and even Iran, 
to help move the various tracks of the peace process forward, 
as a sign that Russian options are even more circumspect than 
once believed.  When it came time for Moscow to use its 
vaunted ties with Damascus and Tehran to help settle the 
stalemate over selection of a new Lebanese President, even 
the GOR admitted that it had little real ability to do so 
(ref C).  For Russia, the Middle East remains a concern 
primarily because Moscow believes that the region can cause 
it trouble.  The Middle East also offers Russia the 
opportunity to appear a vigorous diplomatic player.  The 
upcoming Moscow conference holds out the prospect of 
maintaining this appearance, if little else. 
BEYRLE