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PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #3289/01 3180651
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P 130651Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0687
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003289 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS AZ
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN AND EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSS GEORGIA AND 
NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In a November 1 meeting, Russian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Karasin and EUR DAS and U.S. Minsk Group 
Co-Chair Matt Bryza discussed Georgia, with Karasin striking 
a more constructive tone but insisting that access for 
international monitors to Abkhazia and South Ossetia had to 
be negotiated directly with the separatists.  Both sides 
agreed there were prospects for progress going into the 
November 2 Nagorno-Karabakh summit talks, but that the sides 
had to remain focused on the Basic Principles proposed by the 
OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs.  Karasin noted both sides were 
trying to shape the Basic Principles to their advantage, and 
urged Bryza and the other Co-Chairs to allow the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani presidents to talk through their differences on 
the key principles before proposing any new solutions.  On 
Georgia, Karasin was non-committal in response to Bryza's 
requests that Russia agree not to restrict the participation 
of members of the Georgian delegation to Geneva, agree to 
allow international monitors into Akhalgori, extend the 
security zone patrolled by the EU Monitoring Mission into 
South Ossetia, and allow humanitarian aid into Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia from Georgia proper.  Karasin noted Russian 
concerns about the possibility of Georgian aggression in the 
security zones, the prospect of new armed conflict, and the 
need for substantive discussions on security in Geneva. 
Karasin reiterated Russia's version of the Georgian 
"aggression" on August 7, suggesting Georgia had duped the 
U.S.  He called the idea of redrawing the Soviet-era borders 
of South Ossetia "dangerous," since it could "create problems 
in other regions."  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) On the eve of the November 2 meetings between 
President Medvedev and the Azeri and Armenian Presidents at 
the Maiendorf Castle near Moscow, U.S. Minsk Group co-Chair 
Matt Bryza, Conflicts Advisor Michael Carpenter, and 
Ambassador Beyrle met with Deputy Foreign Minister (DFM) 
Grigoriy Karasin to discuss the prospects for settlement of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as well as the situation in 
Georgia. 
 
---------------- 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
---------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) In view of the presidential meetings between 
Medvedev, Azerbaijani president Aliyev, and Armenian 
president Sargsian, scheduled for the next day, DAS Bryza 
warned that the Minsk Group was "drifting" and needed to 
propose a solution on the Lachin corridor, in order to keep 
the sides from walking away from the table and proposing new 
formulations outside the framework of the Basic Principles, 
which had already been largely agreed.  Bryza noted that 
Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Mammadyarov was seeking to amend 
the understanding that had been reached on the Basic 
Principles to push for Armenia to first remove its troops, 
after which Azerbaijan and Turkey would open their borders, 
and only then would negotiations take place on NK's future 
status.  Bryza warned that would not produce a balanced 
agreement, as agreed previously, and told Karasin that a 
package agreement with step-by-step implementation was the 
only option both sides could support.  Bryza welcomed the 
fact that President Aliyev was now refraining from talking of 
using force to resolve the conflict. 
 
------- 
Georgia 
------- 
 
Geneva Process 
-------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) On Georgia, Karasin outlined three concerns.  The 
first was the lack of agreement with the EU on the modalities 
of the security zones around South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  The 
second concern was the need to move forward, in spite of the 
different positions on the recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, on issues of mutual concern between the U.S. and 
Russia.  Karasin warned that renewed fighting could break out 
if the breakaway regions remained isolated.  Georgia might 
"cunningly" try to repeat its August 8 "aggression."  Bryza 
pushed back and told Karasin that the negotiations on Georgia 
would continue for a long time, and that Russia's compliance 
with the August 12 cease-fire would remain in the spotlight 
even as the U.S. and Russia discussed other issues of mutual 
concern. 
 
¶5.  (C) Karasin's third concern was that the parties to the 
conflict needed to discuss security issues in Geneva without 
boycotting sessions.  Karasin reiterated Russia's condition 
 
MOSCOW 00003289  002 OF 003 
 
 
that South Ossetian and Abkhaz representatives must 
participate in talks about security issues in Geneva.  He 
lamented that the separatists walked out of the talks on 
October 15 over procedural issues, such as different colored 
badges.  Karasin also warned that continued "provocations" 
such as the inclusion of people like Alan Parastayev -- a 
South Ossetian who was serving a term for an attempt on the 
life of the republic's "president" Kokoity, but escaped from 
the Tskhinvali jail August 8 and now was a Saakashvili 
supporter -- or Dmitriy Sanakoyev, the head of the 
Tbilisi-backed Provisional Administration in South Ossetia, 
or Malkhaz Akishbaya, head of the pro-Georgian 
government-in-exile for Abkhazia, could cause the talks to 
"freeze up" once again.  Karasin welcomed EU Special 
Representative for the Crisis in Georgia Pierre Morel's plans 
to travel to Sukhumi and Tskhinvali with Finnish OSCE Special 
Envoy Heikki Talvitie and UN Special Representative for 
Georgia Johan Verbeke, but worried that Georgia would not 
accept anything that might be agreed during the trip. 
 
¶6.  (C) Bryza promised to discourage the Georgians from 
including persons like Parastayev in the delegation, but 
warned that Georgia would not sit across from South Ossetian 
and Abkhaz Delegations as an equal.  He predicted, however, 
that Georgia's position would evolve over several iterations 
of meetings.  Bryza reported Morel's plans to start the 
November 18 Geneva meetings where the October 15 conference 
had left off -- with working group meetings, this time using 
only the Russian and English languages.  Karasin warned that 
the South Ossetian and Abkhaz sides would feel "cheated" if 
the November 18 conference were to start without their 
participation in a plenary session.  In response to the 
Ambassador's question about reports that Russia wished to see 
the Geneva process conclude in December, Karasin said the 
talks should be short and productive, without elaborating 
further. 
 
Russian stonewalling 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Karasin skirted Bryza's requests for Russia not to 
veto the composition of the Georgian delegation to Geneva, 
allow OSCE monitors into South Ossetia, allow for an OSCE 
Office in Akhalgori, extend the security zone patrolled by 
the EU Monitoring Mission into South Ossetia, and allow 
humanitarian aid into Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia 
proper.  He only said Russia held no sway over South Ossetia 
regarding OSCE monitors, allowed Russia might create 
transparent areas to observe in the separatist regions if the 
current security zone in Georgia proper proved peaceful, and 
advised to talk to authorities in Vladikavkaz regarding 
humanitarian access.  Karasin repeated Russia's usual 
concerns about the monitors' presence:  South Ossetia 
mistrusted the monitors because they had not warned 
Tskhinvali about the impending Georgian aggression; it was 
unclear who should provide for the monitors' security; the 
observer missions had to be renamed to lose any reference to 
Georgia, and maintain regional headquarters, not just in 
Tbilisi. 
 
August conflict 
--------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Karasin reiterated Russia's version of the August 7 
events, saying A/S Fried had told him August 7 that the U.S. 
had "turned off the oxygen" on Saakashvili, but that he had 
attacked anyway.  Bryza recounted his own version of the 
events on August 7, in which Georgian FM Eka Tkeshelashvili 
called saying Georgia had initiated a unilateral cease-fire, 
but later called again to say that South Ossetians continued 
shelling Georgian villages north of Tskhinvali while Russian 
troops were going through the Roki tunnel, forcing the GOG to 
defend its citizens.  Karasin said that Russian special envoy 
Yuriy Popov called at 8 pm to report that Georgian troops and 
special forces were moving on Tskhinvali, whereupon Karasin 
called Fried.  According to Karasin, Russian troops only 
entered the Roki tunnel "at dawn on the 8th."  Karasin 
claimed the GOR and its military at all levels never planned 
to take Tbilisi, even when they were 40 minutes from the 
capital.  Karasin claimed he had been ridiculed by the Duma 
as a "softie" for not pushing recognition of the regions 
sooner, which could have "avoided the war." 
 
"Saakashvili got the green light from Washington" 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶9.  (C) Bryza rejected Karasin's conclusion that Georgia had 
manipulated the U.S. and found willing ears in Washington for 
its plans of aggression.  Bryza noted that the latest rumor 
-- that a VPOTUS aide had allegedly given Georgia the green 
 
MOSCOW 00003289  003 OF 003 
 
 
light for armed action -- was ridiculous, as it insinuated 
Saakashvili listened to an advisor to the VP over the message 
of President Bush to avoid being provoked into a war.  Bryza 
advocated greater transparency on the ground, noting both 
sides' accusations that the other side was instigating new 
violence, Georgian sensitivities over the Russian presence in 
Akhalgori, and the need for Georgian troops at the four bases 
near Akhalgori to conduct regular movements without causing 
an alarm to go off in Moscow. 
 
"Redrawing borders is dangerous" 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Karasin disagreed with Bryza's depiction of the 
situation in Akhalgori, saying it had been part of South 
Ossetia since 1922, hence the borders could not be redrawn, 
as "that would be dangerous and create problems in other 
regions." 
 
¶11.  (C) In response to Bryza's question, Karasin discouraged 
Bryza from visiting Sukhumi or Tskhinvali, saying officials 
there were overwhelmed by humanitarian aid visits now.  The 
U.S. role was to convince Georgia that military revenge would 
be disastrous for Georgia.  Karasin said that the Russian 
ambassador would arrive before the end of the year and serve 
as Russia's coordinator for bilateral relations, while the 
GOR was considering stationing liaison officers to maintain 
contact with the EU observers in the border areas. 
 
¶12.  (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable. 
BEYRLE