VZCZCXRO1046
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1604/01 3070514
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 020514Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2211
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001604 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, NEA/ARP 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1577 
B) KHARTOUM 1524 
C) KHARTOUM 1468 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID will reach its target of sixty percent 
deployment by the end of the year, but only by temporarily 
positioning new troop arrivals in the transit camps within the super 
camps, rather than at their intended final destinations.  The offer 
to provide US airlift for  contingent-owned equipment will gain some 
time, but UNAMID officials are questioning whether it is worth the 
added cost.  The UN mission has focused almost exclusively on 
deployment at the expense of improving operational readiness and 
mapping out strategies to meet core mission objectives.  This has 
been compounded by the need to simultaneously plan for a full 
evacuation, as required under its current Phase IV security posture. 
 Nonetheless, the arrival of the new Indonesian and Nepalese formed 
police units (FPUs) will allow UNAMID to patrol additional IDP 
camps, and civilian police have some success stories in helping 
mediate tribal disputes.  Without military helicopters and with 
limited logistical capacity, the mission is not able to patrol over 
significant distances nor adequately investigate reports of 
fighting.  Officials agree with the need to create a new 
security/ceasefire monitoring mechanism but have few ideas on how to 
go about it. End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Polchief and Defense attach traveled to El Fasher from 
October 28-29 to meet with the following UNAMID officials: D/JSR 
Henry Anyihodo, D/JSR Hosan Medilli, Force Commander Lieutenant 
General Martin Luther Agwai, Deputy Force Commander Major General 
Karake Karenzi, COS John Allstrom, and J-5 Military Planning Chief 
Colonel Noddy Stafford. 
 
Deployment 
---------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) UNAMID is on track to meet its deployment goal of 
sixty-percent by the end of year, according to Stafford and Medilli. 
 However, this will come at a price, and will not necessarily make 
UNAMID any more effective in the short- term.  Because their 
permanent camps are not yet ready, large portions of the new 
battalions will be temporarily housed at the transit camps within 
the super camps in El Fasher and Geneina, although the Egyptians 
will deploy directly to Um Kadada (displacing the Rwandans who will 
move into the supercamp).  According to Medilli this will create 
significant extra work due to the additional logistics required to 
move them later to their onward locations.  Moreover, they will only 
be able to provide limited services while at the transit camps, such 
as security at the super camps and some patrols around the camps. 
Former AMIS camps still have not been upgraded and are in terrible 
condition.  Without their COE, the battalions cannot do the 
necessary work to expand and improve the camps. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Medilli said that COE is gradually making its way into 
Darfur via road and rail, and that over the next few months much of 
the backlog will be eliminated.  Medilli said that he and other 
senior members of UNAMID's leadership have questioned whether the US 
airlift of COE is required, given the estimated $20 million price 
tag.  Although UNAMID's estimated budget has ballooned from $1.4 
billion to $2 billion, according to Medilli, the additional cost of 
the airlift may only gain the mission "a few weeks" in deployment 
time.  Medilli said that DPKO is looking at the issue now, but he 
could not predict definitively whether the US offer would be 
declined or accepted. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Medilli and Stafford said that despite the fact that UNAMID 
will reach its year-end deployment target of 60% (by temporarily 
housing new troops in the supercamps for onward deployment later,) 
the mission and DPKO are taking a hard look at whether 80% 
deployment by the end of March is achievable or even desirable - 
given the risk that the mission will not be able to adequately 
support all the troops.  DPKO especially is concerned at the lack of 
a coherent plan for receiving and accommodating all of the troops. 
New or expanded camps will not be ready, not all COE will be in 
place, and there is a growing realization both in El Fasher and in 
New York that the mission will not be able to support the new 
battalions adequately.  Stafford complained that DPKO is now 
requiring a detailed plan showing how the mission will be able to 
deploy and support all new arriving troops.  Although he 
acknowledged that such a plan is useful, Stafford said he does not 
have the manpower to focus on current deployment issues while also 
creating detailed plans for all future arrivals.  (Comment: 
Stafford, a Colonel. from the British army, comes across as highly 
capable and is widely respected within the mission.  It was clear 
during this visit that he is overworked and under severe pressure, 
and does not have adequate qualified support staff to handle all of 
the demands being placed on him.  As in most offices at UNAMID, he 
 
KHARTOUM 00001604  002 OF 003 
 
 
is almost alone in his ability to write high-quality reports and 
analyses required by DPKO.  Although he has eight or ten support 
staff, their skills appear to be limited. End comment.) 
 
Mission Challenges 
------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) FC Agwai and D/FC Karenzi both noted that the requirement 
to deploy while simultaneously preparing evacuation plans (required 
under phase IV security) is having a negative effect on morale. 
D/JSR Anyidoho said that in effect UNAMID is being forced to "live a 
lie" in attempting to follow some requirements for phase IV 
(planning for an evacuation and limiting staff) while also deploying 
the mission.  He noted that UNAMID is being forced to cheat on 
civilian staffing while also being forced by DPKO to account for 
decisions on staffing.  Anyidoho said he expected that phase IV 
would remain in place due to the impending ICC process against 
President Bashir coupled with continued and increasing insecurity in 
Darfur. 
 
¶7. (SBU) COS Allstrom and J-5 Chief Stafford noted that some units 
are responding to the challenges of poor equipment, logistical 
support, and morale better than others.  They shared photos of camps 
in the field, first of a Rwandan camp that had adequate perimeter 
security, "hesco barriers" (large vertical fenced sandbags) and 
trenches, then of a Nigerian camp with poor fencing and empty hesco 
barriers with virtually no trenches.  They noted that there is a 
reluctance on the part of the Nigerian troops to perform duties such 
as filling hesco barrier sand bags and digging trenches.  Allstrom 
noted that FC Agwai (who is Nigerian) is almost to the point of 
ordering the Nigerian battalions to complete this work, which he 
said would probably work in this case since the troops are from his 
own country. 
 
¶8. (SBU) FC Agwai noted that the lack of military TCC helicopters 
continues to have a negative impact on UNAMID's ability to operate 
effectively.  He quipped that "very few of the assets in this 
mission are actually under my direct control."  The current 
transport helicopters are contracted and therefore belong to the 
administrative side of the mission, according to Agwai.  "Thankfully 
my colleagues are cooperative, but this is a very bad position to be 
in."  Allstrom noted that there is a very serious problem with 
logistics and operational readiness at most camps.  He said there 
are not enough serviceable vehicles at camps to be able to perform 
patrols safely; for example, at some camps the majority of the 
vehicles are out of service due to a lack of tires or batteries. 
UNAMID has begun purchasing more items locally, but not everything 
is available.  Allstrom said that some units are performing patrols 
with only the two or three functional vehicles available.  This 
leaves no back-ups to come get them if they encounter problems or 
come under attack.  He said some of these same units don't have 
effective or functional long-range radios.  Regular radios only work 
up to 7 kilometers, and many units do not have operable long-range 
radios, leaving them only with Thuraya phones in an emergency. 
Allstrom wants to put standard operating procedures and requirements 
in place that units will be measured against in order to force 
commanders to ensure certain requirements on security and 
operational preparedness are in place. 
 
FPUs and Civilian Police Making a Difference 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Despite these challenges, Allstrom noted that there has 
been recent progress in two areas - the performance of Formed Police 
Units (FPUs) and civilian police.  With the arrival of the 
Indonesian FPU in El Fasher, UNAMID will now be able to provide 
security at troubled Zam Zam and Anu Shouk IDP camps, where 
residents have long requested such protection due to their distrust 
of government forces.  The arrival of additional FPUs in the coming 
months will allow UNAMID to provide security at additional IDP 
camps.  Allstrom also noted that civilian police within UNAMID (now 
1700 strong) are making a difference on the ground, working 
alongside civil affairs officers, in resolving tribal disputes. 
Allstrom cited recent examples in October 2008 where civpols and 
civil affairs officers mediated between Zaghawa and Maaliya Arab 
tribesmen in the Muhajaria area of North Darfur, effectively 
preventing an escalation of fighting. 
 
Ceasefire Commission? 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) D/JSR Anyihodo and FC Agwai both acknowledged that a new 
ceasefire mechanism is required, but they lacked ideas on how to 
approach such a process.  Anyidoho noted that the GOS had kicked 
rebel CFC representatives out of El Fasher in May, but said 
hopefully that perhaps now with the much-improved level of 
 
KHARTOUM 00001604  003 OF 003 
 
 
cooperation from the GOS, some progress in this area would be 
possible.  Anyidoho agreed that it would be necessary to start small 
with a new commission with representatives from key armed groups 
that could coordinate on security issues.  Anyidoho was highly 
critical of JMST Chief Mediator Bassole "who spends almost no time 
in El Fasher."  Polchief pointed out that Bassole has only just 
begun his work, has focused by necessity on the main rebel leaders 
(including Khalil Ibrahim, who Bassole recently met in Darfur,) and 
now must focus on the Qatar process. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) As UNAMID gets closer to the arrival of significant 
numbers of troops, as opposed to merely planning for their arrival, 
it was evident during this visit that there is going to be 
significant strain on the mission in effectively supporting the new 
troops and meeting mission objectives at the same time. Except for 
the FPUs, there seems to be little correlation to date between 
increased numbers and increased capacity to do the much needed 
missions of patrolling, protecting and investigating violence in 
Darfur.  All of the logistical challenges still exist, and the fact 
remains that Darfur is an incredibly difficult place to operate. 
DPKO is probably wise to put pressure on UNAMID to show better 
planning on troop deployments, but should provide some capable staff 
- even if on secondment from headquarters - to make this happen. 
Given that the GOS is, for a change, currently cooperating on UNAMID 
visas, there is no reason not to be pro-active in providing the 
force with some surge administrative capacity.  Anyidoho's comments 
about Bassole reflect an inherent bias within the mission, which 
will require close watching, against the JMST, Based on recent 
meetings with him, DDDC Chair and acting UNAMID political chief 
Abdul Mohammed appears eager to move beyond discussions and 
coordination with just civil society to discussions with rebel 
actors (normally a JMST role, though UNAMID also must liaise with 
rebels).  Abdul Mohammed's dual role creates confusion, and we need 
to ensure that Adada and others (including at the UN secretariat) 
recognize the need to support Bassole and not undermine him. 
 
FERNANDEZ