O 210710Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7519
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T GENEVA 000997 
 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR HAYES 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII:  (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON 
COMPLETION OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING, NOVEMBER 17, 2008 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-012. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 17, 2008 
                Time:  10:40 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Working Group (WG) Meeting was held at the U.S. 
Mission on November 17, 2008, to discuss the completion of 
continuous monitoring (CM) at the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring 
Facility (VPMF).  All Parties were represented. 
 
¶4.  (S) Legal experts from the Russian and U.S. Delegations 
met prior to the WG to address Russian questions regarding 
legitimacy of the signatories on the U.S.-proposed letters to 
be exchanged between the Parties related to the continuance 
of cost settlement procedures and the existing ground 
transportation agreement when START expired or was superseded 
by a subsequent agreement.  Both legal experts agreed that 
the letters could be signed by representatives of each 
government and both documents would be legally binding and in 
force after the expiration or supersession of the START 
Treaty. 
 
¶5.  (S) Belarus raised questions about the number of 
additional ground transport missions that might be needed to 
support the completion of CM and if the United States 
anticipated transporting any hazardous materials through 
Belarusian territory. 
 
¶6.  (S) Ryzhkov made several preliminary observations 
regarding specific provisions within the draft JCIC Agreement 
and expressed the view that he was pleased with the document 
overall. (Begin Comment:  Complete text is contained in 
paragraph 27.  End Comment.) 
 
---------------- 
I WANT MY LAWYER 
---------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Ryzhkov opened the WG Meeting on November 17 at the 
U.S. Mission and asked that both sides' legal experts review 
their opinions regarding the U.S.-proposed JCIC Agreement and 
legally binding letters. 
 
¶8.  (S) Brown explained that the legal experts' discussions 
had focused on authorization to sign the documents and how to 
execute the documents.  Regarding authorization, both sides 
had different internal processes to follow in order to 
authorize individuals to sign such documents.  The expert's 
assessment was that the differences would not be a problem. 
Second, both sides agreed that the draft JCIC Agreement, 
Letters on Ground Transportation and Letters on Settlement of 
Accounts should be signed simultaneously at the JCIC and not 
through diplomatic channels.  Kotkova confirmed that the 
Russian Federation agreed with this approach. 
 
------------------------- 
YOU'RE BRINGING ALL THAT? 
------------------------- 
 
 
¶9.  (S) The Belarusian Delegation explained that they had 
thoroughly reviewed the proposed texts and had two questions. 
 First, how many ground transportation missions did the 
United States plan to use during the completion of CM? 
Second, would there be any hazardous material (HAZMAT) 
transported during those missions? 
 
¶10.  (S) Smith responded that the United States contemplated 
an increase in the amount of vehicle traffic focused on 
closure of CM, but a particular number had not yet been set. 
Smith opined the only increase might be the number of trucks 
in each mission in that four or five trucks might be used 
rather than one or two currently used during resupply 
missions. 
 
¶11.  (S) Smith then explained the current Ground 
Transportation Agreement had procedures in place to handle 
the transportation of HAZMAT and that these items were 
clearly identified on the cargo manifests.  He added that 
factory personnel from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant 
and U.S. monitors had already conducted a preliminary 
inventory of items located at the VPMF.  The only HAZMAT that 
remained on site was a few petroleum products that the United 
States intended to leave behind for Russian use. 
 
¶12.  (S) Smith explained that the United States intended that 
on the last day of CM operations there would be one final 
truck that would remove the last pieces of equipment from the 
VPMF and deliver them to Germany.  Because this process would 
take several days following expiration or supersession of the 
Treaty, it would be necessary to carry forward the provisions 
of the existing Ground Transportation Agreement. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
IT WAS BRILLIANT...THEN I READ IT AGAIN 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Ryzhkov remarked that the documents would not be 
ready to sign during this JCIC, and that the Russian 
Federation would provide their proposed text after both sides 
reviewed their positions.  He then began to review some 
preliminary observations the Russian Federation had with the 
draft JCIC Agreement. 
 
¶14.  (S) Ryzhkov said that Article I, Section III, Paragraph 
1 in the U.S. draft specifies that monitors and in-country 
escorts shall develop a list that specifies items and their 
disposition.  Ryzhkov explained that finalization of this 
list could not be completed on-site.  Representation was too 
low of a level.  There would be coordination needed between 
various agencies within his government to accomplish the 
activities related to closure.  He reminded the Delegations 
of the completion of CM under INF.  The U.S. and Russian team 
chiefs worked closely together, but much preparatory work was 
done in the Special Verification Commission (SVC) in advance. 
 
¶15.  (S) Smith responded that he understood, and that the 
United States did not mean to imply that monitors and escorts 
would be the sole coordinators of the list and that he 
expected that the list would be fully coordinated through 
appropriate levels within the government of the Russian 
Federation.  He explained that the monitors and escorts at 
Votkinsk had a good working relationship and understood the 
complexity of the task and should be the ones to produce the 
list.  He repeated that the U.S. intent was to leave as many 
of the items currently located at Votkinsk behind as 
possible, and minimize the amount of items to be removed. 
 
 
¶16.  (S) Ryzhkov explained that Article I, Section II, 
Paragraph 1(a)(iv) specifies that the inspected Party shall 
provide other support and assistance, not specified in 
earlier paragraphs, as agreed between the monitor and escort 
leaders.  Ryzhkov explained that the Russian Federation 
believed this paragraph was too general and needed to list 
specific kinds of support and assistance like the preceding 
three subparagraphs. 
 
¶17.  (S) Smith explained that this subparagraph was designed 
as a catch-all to capture unforeseen requirements, similar to 
the phrase "unless otherwise agreed" used throughout the 
Treaty. 
 
¶18.  (S) Ryzhkov stated that Article I, Section II, Paragraph 
1(b) specifies that the inspecting Party shall have the right 
to deliver structures and other equipment to the portal 
monitoring facility necessary for the completion of CM. 
Ryzhkov asked what was meant by the term structure. 
 
¶19.  (S) Smith explained that during the last few days or 
weeks of CM operations the existing buildings used by 
monitors may have been dismantled for shipment out of the 
Russian Federation, but the monitors might have the need for 
a tent or similar structure to provide workspace and 
environmental shelter.  He noted that there was no intent on 
the part of the United States to bring large structures or 
buildings into Votkinsk to support the closure on the 
facility.  Ryzhkov commented that this was another catch-all 
or just in case clause. 
 
¶20.  (S) Ryzhkov continued that Article I, Section II, 
Paragraph 1.(d) specifies that the inspecting Party shall 
have the right to use inspection airplanes to deliver and/or 
remove items related to completion of CM to or from the 
portal monitoring facility.  Ryzhkov explained that the draft 
JCIC Agreement identified this right as it applies to, among 
other things, structures.  The draft goes on to reference 
Paragraph 4, Section IV, of the Inspection Protocol which 
establishes the right of the inspecting Party to deliver 
cargo to the portal monitoring facility, but does not mention 
structures.  He explained that the language in the draft 
agreement should be consistent with the current language in 
the Treaty. 
 
¶21.  (S) Ryzhkov said that Article I, Section II, Paragraph 
2(c) specifies that the inspecting Party shall provide 
notification to the inspected Party of the intention to 
conduct flights of inspection airplanes related to completion 
of CM.  Ryzhkov again explained that the draft agreement 
language should be consistent with the current language in 
the Treaty. 
 
¶22.  (S) Ryzhkov said that Article I, Section I(c) specifies 
that the inspecting Party shall remove all items related to 
completion of CM and all items existing at the portal 
monitoring facility not intended to be left behind from the 
territory of the inspected Party at the expiration or 
supersession of the Treaty.  Ryzhkov commented that when he 
first read the proposed text he thought it was brilliant, 
but, after hearing the comments from the Belarusian 
Delegation he realized that all items would need to be 
removed from Belarusian territory as well prior to the end of 
the Treaty.  Because the ground transportation trucks used to 
remove remaining items from the VPMF would transit Belarus 
they should be included in the referenced paragraph.  Smith 
stated that the United States believed that in this case the 
items were in transit status but would investigate whether 
such a change was necessary. 
 
¶23.  (S) Ryzhkov continued that Article I, Section II, 
Paragraph 4 specifies that the inspected Party shall have the 
right to restore the appearance of the portal monitoring 
facility on its territory.  Ryzhkov explained that the 
Russian Federation believed this was redundant because it was 
sovereign Russian territory.  Russia could do with it as it 
pleased after U.S. monitors departed the site. 
 
¶24.  (S) Ryzhkov added that Article I, Section II, Paragraph 
3 specifies that monitors and in-country escorts shall 
arrange, by agreement, meetings between mass media 
representatives and monitors. Ryzhkov opined that the draft 
agreement did not need an obligatory, binding provision for 
dealing with mass media.  He explained that during the recent 
20th Anniversary Celebration at Votkinsk, media freely 
interacted with senior U.S. representatives and monitors 
without any legally binding agreements between the Russian 
Federation and the United States in advance. 
 
-------------------- 
HAVE YOU HAD ENOUGH? 
-------------------- 
 
¶25.  (S) Ryzhkov concluded his remarks by asking if the 
United States believed another WG was needed on the subject. 
The Russian Federation would be putting together their 
proposed text and would provide that to the United States 
after the current JCIC. 
 
¶26.  (S) Smith responded that he did not believe another WG 
to be necessary and that the United States looked forward to 
receiving the Russian-proposed text. 
 
¶27.  (S) Begin test of U.S. Proposed Draft Text JCIC 
Agreement, Principles and Procedures for Completion of 
Continuous Monitoring Activities: 
 
                                    JCIC-XXXIII 
                                    U.S.-Proposed Draft Text 
                                    November 13, 2008 
 
JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION 
AGREEMENT NUMBER 
RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION 
AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF JULY 31, 1991 
 
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 
FOR COMPLETION OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES 
 
The Government of the Republic of Belarus, the Government of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Russian 
Federation, the Government of Ukraine, and the Government of 
the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the 
Parties, 
 
In accordance with the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 
31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, 
 
To improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on 
Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to 
the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection 
Protocol, 
 
 
Have agreed as follows: 
                            Article One 
 
The following provisions shall constitute Annex 16 to the 
Inspection Protocol: 
 
"ANNEX 16 
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR COMPLETION OF 
CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO 
PARAGRAPH 14 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY 
 
¶I.  General Provisions. 
 
   The Parties agree that continuous monitoring activities 
conducted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Article XI of the 
Treaty shall be carried out in such a way so that, no later 
than the date of expiration of the Treaty, or no later than 
the date the Treaty is superseded by a subsequent agreement 
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty: 
 
       (a)  The monitoring team leader shall provide the 
in-country escort with an official written continuous 
monitoring report in the language of the inspecting Party, 
along with an unofficial translation of the report in the 
language of the inspected Party, signed by the monitoring 
team leader and a member of the in-country escort, for that 
month.  This report shall have the same content as the report 
specified in paragraph 2 of Section XVIII of the Inspection 
Protocol.  Each Party shall retain one copy of the report. 
 
       (b)  The monitoring team at the perimeter continuous 
monitoring area at Votkinsk shall cease its monitoring 
activity and depart the territory of the inspected Party. 
 
       (c)  The inspecting Party shall ensure that the 
buildings, structures, equipment, supplies, and other 
property located within the perimeter continuous monitoring 
area at Votkinsk, as specified in Section III of this Annex, 
as well as structures, equipment, supplies, and other 
property that was delivered and installed by subsequent 
agreement of the Parties, is dismantled if necessary and is 
removed from the territory of the inspected Party, conveyed 
to the inspected Party, or transferred to the inspected Party 
in accordance with this Annex. 
 
II.  Procedures for Completion of Continuous Monitoring 
Activities Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 14 of Article XI 
of the Treaty. 
 
  ¶1.  Provision of logistical, transportation, and other 
support. 
 
        (a) The inspected Party shall provide, at the request 
of the inspecting Party, support and assistance for the 
completion of continuous monitoring activities conducted 
pursuant to paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty at the 
perimeter continuous monitoring area on the territory of the 
inspected Party.  Such support and assistance shall include: 
 
             (i) provision of surface handling and other 
equipment needed for the dismantlement, packing, removal, and 
transport of structures, equipment, supplies, and other 
property from the perimeter continuous monitoring area; 
 
             (ii) provision of materials needed for packing 
and preparing for the transport of structures, equipment, 
supplies,  and other property from the perimeter continuous 
monitoring area; 
 
 
             (iii) provision of ground transportation 
vehicles and related services needed for the transport of 
structures, equipment, supplies, and other property to and 
from the perimeter continuous monitoring area; and 
 
             (iv) other support and assistance to be agreed 
between the monitoring team leader and the in-country escort. 
 
        (b) The inspecting Party shall have the right to 
deliver to the perimeter continuous monitoring area 
structures, equipment, supplies, and other property that are 
necessary for the completion of continuous monitoring 
activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Article XI 
of the Treaty.  Such additional structures, equipment, 
supplies, and other property shall be removed by the 
inspecting Party from the territory of the inspected Party no 
later than the date of expiration of the Treaty, or no later 
than the date the Treaty is superseded. 
 
        (c) Ground transportation and related services 
provided by the inspected Party pursuant to subparagraph 1(a) 
of this Section shall be provided in accordance with the 
provisions specified in the  Letters of the Representatives 
to the JCIC on the Procedures for Using  Ground 
Transportation Vehicles for the Transportation of Cargo 
Consisting of Equipment and Supplies to or from the Monitored 
Facility at Votkinsk, dated March 20, 2002, and the 
Attachment thereto, as well as the Letters of the 
Representatives to the JCIC dated June 7, 2005, and XXX XX, 
2009, hereinafter referred to as the Signed Letters of the 
Representatives to the JCIC. 
 
        (d) The inspecting Party shall have the right to 
conduct flights of inspection airplanes to deliver to, or 
remove from, the perimeter continuous monitoring area at 
Votkinsk, monitors, as well as structures, equipment, 
supplies, and other property associated with the completion 
of continuous monitoring activities.  Such flights shall be 
conducted into the airport associated with the monitored 
facility and shall be conducted in accordance with paragraph 
4 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol. 
 
 
        (e) The inspected Party shall examine structures, 
equipment, supplies, and other property to be removed from 
the perimeter continuous monitoring area.  This examination 
shall be conducted at the perimeter continuous monitoring 
area by the in-country escort and technical experts of the 
inspected Party  when such items are being dismantled and 
prepared for transport to the territory of the inspecting 
Party.  Monitors shall be permitted to be present during such 
examinations. 
 
  ¶2.  Notifications. 
 
        (a) The inspecting Party shall provide to the 
inspected Party a notification containing a request for 
support or assistance, as specified in subparagraphs 1(a)(i), 
1(a)(ii), and 1(a)(iv) of this Section, no less than 60 days 
prior to the date specified in the request for such support 
or assistance.  The inspected Party shall respond to such a 
request no less than 30 days prior to the date specified in 
the request for such support or assistance.  The Parties 
shall provide the notifications specified in this 
subparagraph through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and 
the National Agency for Verification and Inspections, using 
format number 144 ("Notification of Additional START 
Message"). 
 
        (b) Notifications associated with the provision of 
ground transportation vehicles and related services, pursuant 
to subparagraph 1(a) of this Section, shall be exchanged by 
the Parties in accordance with the Signed Letters of the 
Representatives to the JCIC. 
 
        (c) The inspecting Party shall provide to the 
inspected Party notification of an intention to conduct 
flights of inspection airplanes at the airport associated 
with the monitored facility pursuant to subparagraph 1(d) of 
this Section.  This notification, which shall be provided in 
addition to the notifications specified in paragraph 17 and 
paragraph 18 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol, shall 
be provided no less than 60 days prior to the date of arrival 
of the airplane at the airport associated with the monitored 
facility.  This notification shall include a detailed listing 
of the additional structures, equipment, supplies, and other 
property to be delivered to the perimeter continuous 
monitoring area.  This notification shall also include 
information specified in subparagraphs 17(a), 17(b), 17(c), 
17(d), 17(e), and 17(f) of Section III of the Inspection 
Protocol.  The information provided in this notification 
shall be updated in subsequent notifications provided by the 
inspected Party in acco 
rdance with paragraph 17 and paragraph 18 of Section III of 
the Inspection Protocol.  The inspecting Party shall provide 
the notification specified in this subparagraph through the 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and the National Agency for 
Verification and Inspections, using format number 144 
("Notification of Additional START Message"). 
 
  ¶3. Mass Media activities associated with the completion of 
continuous monitoring activities. 
 
        In addition to the provisions of paragraph 22, 
Section V of the Inspection Protocol, the monitoring team 
leader and the in-country escort shall, by agreement, arrange 
meetings between representatives of the mass media and 
monitors engaged in activities related to the completion of 
continuous monitoring activities conducted pursuant to 
paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty both at the 
perimeter continuous monitoring area and the point of entry. 
Such meetings shall be arranged so as not to interfere with 
the completion of continuous monitoring activities. 
 
  ¶4. Restoration of the Perimeter Continuous Monitoring Area. 
 
        (a) At the conclusion of the procedures for the 
completion of continuous monitoring activities, the inspected 
Party shall have the right to restore the external appearance 
of the perimeter continuous monitoring area located on its 
territory. 
 
        (b) The inspecting Party shall convey to the 
inspected Party all structures, equipment, supplies, and 
other property used by the inspecting Party within the 
perimeter continuous monitoring area that the inspecting 
Party does not remove from the territory of the inspected 
Party at the completion of continuous monitoring activities. 
Such structures, equipment, supplies, and other property may 
include those items that the inspected Party provided at the 
perimeter continuous monitoring area at the request and 
expense of the inspecting Party or structures, equipment, 
supplies and other property that the inspecting Party 
provided at the perimeter continuous monitoring area at its 
own expense.  The inspecting Party shall convey such 
structures, equipment, supplies, and other property to the 
inspected Party no later than the date of expiration of the 
Treaty, or no later than the date the Treaty is superseded by 
a subsequent agreement. 
 
       (c)  The inspecting Party shall ensure that the 
buildings used by the monitoring team at the perimeter 
continuous monitoring area at Votkinsk under the Treaty that 
were originally constructed by the inspected Party and first 
used by the inspecting Party under the Treaty Between the 
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and 
Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, which consist of 
the monitoring team headquarters ("Roosevelt Building"), the 
building for storage of equipment and supplies ("warehouse"), 
and the buildings used by the monitors for permanent lodging 
and workspace ("Washington Building," "Jefferson Building," 
and "Lincoln Building") are transferred to the inspected 
Party.  The inspecting Party shall transfer such buildings to 
the inspected Party no later than the date of expiration of 
the Treaty, or no later than the date the Treaty is 
superseded by a subsequent agreement. 
 
  ¶5. Taxes, Levies, Apportionments, and Assessments. 
 
     The inspected Party shall not place taxes, levies, 
apportionments, or assessments on the value of the following 
buildings, structures, equipment, supplies, and other 
property in connection with the completion of continuous 
monitoring activities in accordance with this Annex: 
 
        (a) structures, equipment, supplies, and other 
property of the inspecting Party that are conveyed to the 
inspected Party pursuant to Section I and subparagraph 4(b) 
of this Section; 
 
        (b) buildings that are transferred to the inspected 
Party pursuant to Section I and subparagraph 4(c) of this 
Section; and 
 
        (c) structures, equipment, supplies, and other 
property of the inspecting Party that are removed from the 
territory of the inspected Party pursuant to Section I of 
this Annex. 
 
  ¶6. Impounded Equipment. 
 
     The Parties understand that equipment, supplies, and 
other property controlled by the "dual key" system at the 
perimeter continuous monitoring area shall be returned to the 
territory of the inspecting Party, unless otherwise agreed by 
the monitoring team leader and the in-country escort. 
 
  ¶7. Financial Responsibilities of the Parties. 
 
        (a) Unless stipulated otherwise in this Annex, the 
inspecting Party shall bear the cost of goods and services 
provided by the inspected Party at the request of the 
inspecting Party in connection with the completion of 
continuous monitoring activities conducted pursuant to 
paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty. 
 
        (b) Unless stipulated otherwise in this Annex, the 
inspected Party and the inspecting Party shall use the 
procedures set forth in Annex 14 to the Inspection Protocol 
to settle accounts for costs incurred in connection with the 
completion of continuous monitoring activities pursuant to 
paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty. 
 
 
        (c) The inspected Party shall bear the costs 
associated with activities to restore the external appearance 
of the perimeter continuous monitoring area pursuant to 
subparagraph 4(a) of this Section. 
 
        (d) The inspected Party shall bear the costs 
associated with structures, equipment, supplies, and other 
property of the inspecting Party that are conveyed to the 
inspected Party after the completion of continuous monitoring 
activities pursuant to Section I and subparagraph 4(b) of 
this Section. 
 
        (e)  The inspected Party shall bear the costs 
associated with buildings that are transferred to the 
inspected Party after the completion of continuous monitoring 
activities pursuant to Section I and subparagraph 4(c) of 
this Section. 
 
        (f) The Parties shall use the procedures set forth in 
the Signed Letters of the Representatives to the JCIC to 
settle accounts for costs incurred in connection with the 
provision of ground transportation and related services 
pursuant to subparagraph 1(a) of this Section. 
 
        (g) The inspected Party and the inspecting Party 
shall agree on arrangements, based on the provisions of Annex 
14 of the Treaty, for the settlement of accounts remaining 
after the date of expiration of the Treaty or after the date 
the Treaty is superseded by a subsequent agreement. 
 
        (h) The monitoring team leader and in-country escort 
shall develop procedures on-site for keeping record of goods 
and services that are provided by the inspected Party at the 
request of the inspecting Party pursuant to the provisions of 
this Annex. 
 
III. List of Buildings, Structures, Equipment, Supplies, and 
Other Property. 
 
        ¶1.   The monitoring team leader, in coordination with 
the in-country escort, shall develop a list consisting of 
three sections that specifies the final disposition of 
buildings, structures, equipment, supplies and other property 
used by the monitoring team at the perimeter continuous 
monitoring area at Votkinsk. 
 
        ¶2.   Structures, equipment, supplies, and other 
property of the inspecting Party that are to be removed from 
the territory of the inspected Party pursuant to Section I of 
this Annex shall  be included in the first section of the 
list developed pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section. 
 
        ¶3.   Structures, equipment, supplies, and other 
property of the inspecting Party that are to be conveyed to 
the inspected Party pursuant to Section I and subparagraph 
4(b) of Section II of this Annex shall be  included in the 
second section of the list developed pursuant to paragraph 1 
of  this Section. 
 
        ¶4.   The buildings that are to be transferred to the 
inspected Party pursuant to Section I and subparagraph 4(c) 
of Section II of this Annex shall be included in the third 
section of the list developed pursuant to paragraph 1 of this 
Section." 
 
Article Two 
 
  ¶1. In subparagraph 1(a) of Section I of Annex 14 to the 
Inspection Protocol, the words and punctuation "Inspection 
Protocol; and" shall be superseded by the words and 
punctuation "Inspection Protocol;" 
 
  ¶2. In subparagraph 1(b) of Section I of Annex 14 to the 
Inspection Protocol, the words and punctuation "Annex 5 to 
the Telemetry Protocol." shall be superseded by the words and 
punctuation "Annex 5 to the Telemetry Protocol; and" 
 
  ¶3. The following provision shall constitute subparagraph 
1(c) of Section I of Annex 14 to the Inspection Protocol: 
 
"(c) The costs of goods and services associated with the 
implementation of Annex 16 to the Inspection Protocol" 
 
  ¶4. In subparagraph 12(a) of Section I of Annex 14 to the 
Inspection Protocol, the words "On-Site Inspection Agency" 
shall be superseded by the words "Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency". 
 
Article Three 
 
   The following provisions shall constitute paragraph 19 of 
Section II of Annex 14 to the Inspection Protocol: 
 
   "19. Support and assistance associated with the completion 
of continuous monitoring activities conducted pursuant to 
paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty: 
 
        (a) Surface handling and other equipment needed for 
the dismantlement, packing, removal, and transport of 
structures, equipment, supplies, and other property from the 
perimeter continuous monitoring area: 
 
            (i)   Type of equipment; 
 
            (ii)  Number of items of equipment of each 
                  type; 
 
            (iii) Dates on which the equipment was 
                  provided; 
 
            (iv)  Number of hours for which such equipment 
                  was provided; and 
 
            (v)   Estimated cost of the use of such 
                  equipment per unit of time. 
 
        (b) Material needed for packing and preparing for the 
transport of structures, equipment, supplies, and other 
property from the perimeter continuous monitoring area: 
 
            (i)  Description and quantity of the materials 
                 provided; and 
 
            (ii) Estimated cost of the materials (for each 
                 unit). 
 
        (c) Other goods and services provided by the 
inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party: 
 
            (i)    A description of the service provided; 
 
            (ii)   Dates on which services were provided; 
 
            (iii)  Estimated cost of services; 
 
 
            (iv)   Payment, if any, made when services were 
                   provided; 
 
            (v)    A description of equipment provided; 
 
            (vi)   Number of items of equipment of each type; 
 
            (vii)  Number of hours for which such equipment 
was 
                   provided; and 
 
            (viii) Estimated cost of the use of such equipment 
                   per unit of time (per day or per hour)." 
 
Article Four 
 
     This Agreement shall enter into force on the day of its 
signature and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty 
remains in force. 
 
     IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly 
authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this 
Agreement. 
 
     Done at Geneva on            , in five copies, each in 
the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally 
authentic. 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE 
 
 
End Text. 
 
¶28.  (U) Documents exchanged:  None 
 
¶29.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Brown 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Maj Edinger 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hanchett 
CDR Rust 
Mr. Yaguchi 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
BELARUS 
 
Ugorich 
Ponomarev 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Col Akhmetalin 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Bolotov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min 
Col Novikov 
Mr. Gusev (Int) 
 
¶30.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text