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S E C R E T GENEVA 000991 
 
 
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TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII:  HEAD OF DELEGATION MEETING ON THE 
EXTENTION OF THE START TREATY (ARTICLE XVII MEETING), 
NOVEMBER 17, 2008 (U) 
 
REF: A. STATE 112253 (JCIC-DIP-08-007) 
     ¶B. GENEVA XXXX (JCIC-XXXIII-014) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-013. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 17, 2008 
                Time:  3:45 P.M. - 5:15 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the 
U.S. Mission on November 17, 2008, to consider whether the 
START Treaty would be extended for a period of 5 years.  The 
Parties agreed that there was no requirement for a decision 
at this meeting of the Parties, which was, as provided for in 
Paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty, held "...no later 
than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period," 
i.e., before  December 5, 2009.  All the Parties were 
present; Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan lauded the 
role of START in promoting strategic stability and fulfilling 
Article VI provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) and encouraged continuation of work to maintain 
strategic stability after December 5, 2009, and to work 
toward a post-START agreement.  Russia agreed with the U.S. 
position, based on Paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the START 
Treaty, that no decision on extension was required at this 
meeting; the other three Parties did not press this issue. 
Ukraine, concerned about continuation of START, introduced 
the possibility of "reconsideration" of its 1994 commitments 
in connection with START entry into force and other 
international obligations, including NPT, which elicited 
requests for clarification and push-back from both the U.S. 
and Russian sides. 
 
---------------------------- 
CONSENSUS-START IS A SUCCESS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) U.S. JCIC Representative Taylor welcomed the 
Delegations and offered that the purpose of the meeting today 
was to discuss the Article XVII requirement to discuss 
whether the START Treaty would be extended for a period of 5 
years.  Belarusian HOD Ugorich, Deputy Director of 
International Security Division of the Belarusian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), noted that not only has the START 
Treaty made a genuine contribution to arms control, with an 
actual reduction of more than 30 percent of strategic nuclear 
armaments, but has also created an atmosphere of strategic 
stability, confidence, trust and verification that has stood 
the test of time.  He noted that through the Lisbon Protocol 
the Republic of Belarus renounced its right to nuclear 
weapons, a decision based on the continuation of nuclear 
disarmament, opining that it is important that a vacuum not 
be created after the expiration of START in December 2009. 
The Parties must take decisive steps either to extend the 
Treaty or work on a new treaty in order to guarantee the 
irreversibility of nuclear reductions and send a clear 
message to the international community with regard to 
strategic offensive arms.  Ugorich cited the April 6, 2008, 
Sochi declaration of President Bush and then-President Putin, 
praising the bilateral commitment to work toward a legally 
binding post-START agreement.  He urged a positive outcome, 
and as a consequence, early practical implementation of that 
declaration, adding that the new agreement should have 
effective verification.  Ugorich expressed willingness for 
Belarus to participate actively in such work. 
 
¶5.  (S) The Head of the Kazakhstani Delegation, Permanent 
Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to International 
Organizations in Geneva, Amazhol Zhankuliyev, reconfirmed his 
country's position that this agreement on strategic offensive 
arms needs to be maintained and developed, and that it has 
provided stability.  START is an important step towards 
nuclear disarmament and a tangible contribution to 
fulfillment of Article VI of the NPT; Zhankuliyev also 
welcomed the bilateral Sochi declaration on reducing weapons 
down to minimal levels and urged continued work on a 
legally-binding instrument to follow the START Treaty, noting 
that achieving this treaty would promote strategic stability. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
ANTONOV CLAIMS AMATEUR STATUS IN JCIC 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) While belaboring and excusing his status as a 
"novice" at JCIC meetings, Russian Head of Delegation, 
Director of the MFA's Department of International Security 
and Disarmament, Anatoliy Antonov, noted the constructive, 
pointed, and result-oriented discussions that are held among 
the Parties in order to find solutions.  According to 
Antonov, history will judge the full value of the START 
Treaty, but even so, no one, not even the harshest critics 
such as the New Agenda Coalition during the NPT Review 
Conference (RevCon), doubted the important role it played in 
reducing strategic offensive arms.  He noted that START 
achieved all of what we wanted to accomplish and served its 
purpose; all Parties have met their ceilings on schedule, 
having established a new atmosphere of trust among nuclear 
and non-nuclear treaty Parties.  He said that it was 
important to note that none of the non-nuclear Parties ever 
violated any of its obligations, adding that "we" have 
obtained commitments that those Parties would maintain their 
non-nuclear status.  He stressed that it is especially 
important that this result is not just based on Article VI of 
the NPT and that START strengthens basic elements of the 
nonproliferation regime.  This was also particularly 
important as we deal with questions of whether the Treaty 
will expire in 2009 or will be extended for 5 years, and the 
RevCon in 2010.  Antonov stated that Russia is committed to 
preserving an atmosphere of continued transparency, mutual 
trust, and predictability, as outlined in the provisions of 
the START Treaty; Russia is thus interested in continuing 
nuclear disarmament even after START expiration, pursuant to 
NPT Article VI, and on that basis approached the United 
States 3 years ago with the offer to conclude a treaty to 
supersede START.  He noted that we have engaged over time, 
admittedly with different approaches, and that while he saw 
nothing terrible in these differences in recent years, there 
was a presidential-level agreement on its status.  He assumed 
that the Obama team would be interested in pursuing a new 
understanding.  He acknowledged that Russia is in receipt of 
the U.S. draft text for a post-START agreement, as announced 
by Acting Under Secretary Rood, and that Russia had responded 
to the United States that it was studying it.  Once Russia 
decided on its position, it would be prepared to meet with 
U.S. colleagues to continue discussions.  He sought the views 
of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 
 
Noting that this meeting was the first official exchange 
among START Parties to consider the fate of the Treaty, in 
accordance with Paragraph 2 of Article XVII, Antonov agreed 
that there is no need to take a position while observing that 
he generally agreed with the U.S. position expressed in the 
2006 Rice-Lavrov Note Verbale (06State 78113) nor to make a 
decision today, and that there was still enough time.  He 
also thanked the United States for being straightforward in 
stating its belief that no position needed to be taken during 
the meeting.  Antonov opined that the comments of the 
Belarusian, Kazakhstani, and Ukrainian HOD revealed similar 
concerns, and on that basis, Russia is prepared to continue 
discussion in the context of informal events, away from any 
negotiating table, without reporting to capitals, and 
preferably over drinks.  Such an approach, in his opinion, 
would promote greater understanding.  Citing again his 
newcomer status, he realized that he may have breached 
formality while promoting an approach he considered conducive 
to resolving the concerns of all Parties at the table. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
UKRAINE MIGHT "RECONSIDER" NPT COMMITMENT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) Ukrainian Acting HOD, Anatoliy Shevtsov, of the 
National Space Agency of Ukraine, noted that regardless of 
its outcome, the act of holding today's meeting fulfilled the 
requirements of Paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty. 
He elaborated the Ukrainian position as follows:  1) Ukraine 
had complied fully with its Treaty obligations and those of 
the January 14, 1994, Trilateral Statement of the Presidents 
of the United States of America, Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation; 2) the full elimination of solid rocket motors 
(SRMs) of disassembled SS-24 ICBMs was expected in 2011, and 
until that time, such items continued to be accountable under 
the Treaty; 3) Ukraine called for an extension of the Treaty 
as a guarantee of elimination of SRMs; 4) absent Treaty 
extension, or under conditions of termination/supersession, 
uncertainty would emerge in connection with the 1994 
Trilateral Statement; and 5) Paragraphs 2-29 of Article V of 
the Treaty would still be valid in the future in any event. 
In summary, Shevtsov promoted extension of START for 5 years 
as the easiest means to attain these goals in a manner 
consistent with Ukrainian security requirements.  If a new 
understanding or agreement were to be worked out, Ukraine 
would wish to contribute to its negotiation and 
implementation.  If START were not to be continued, Ukraine 
would need reaffirmation of the December 1994 assurances from 
the nuclear weapon states in a legally-binding formulation, 
as these guarantees were required for Ukraine to agree to 
START and the Lisbon Protocol, and accede to the NPT as a 
non-nuclear weapon state.  Shevtsov said that if its 
interests were not observed, Ukraine reserved the right to 
reconsider its position vis-a-vis the NPT. 
 
------------------------------- 
U.S. POSITION, REACTION TO 
UKRAINIAN NPT "RECONSIDERATION" 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Taylor thanked all the Parties for their comments and 
views, noting that they would be reported back to Washington. 
 Deploying U.S. points and the substance of the referenced 
Note Verbale (Ref A), he stated that the U.S. believed that 
the START Treaty should not be extended, although some 
provisions of the Treaty might be carried forward, 
emphasizing that its views would be guided in the future by 
the results of senior level discussions regarding this issue. 
 He noted that today's meeting was being held to fulfill the 
requirement of Paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Treaty to 
meet prior to December 5, 2008, to "consider" whether the 
START Treaty will be extended for a period of 5 years.  He 
also noted that there is no Treaty requirement for the 
Parties to make a decision to extend the START Treaty at this 
meeting, and they would be at liberty to discuss this issue 
at future JCIC sessions, and that a decision on this issue 
could be made up until the date of expiration of the Treaty 
on December 5, 2009. 
 
¶9.  (S) Turning to the comments of the Ukrainian Delegation, 
Taylor noted his grave concern over the possibility of 
Ukraine reconsidering NPT, citing its central role in nuclear 
security.  The United States and Russia, as nuclear weapon 
states, continue to strive toward nuclear disarmament and 
take these responsibilities seriously; even to cite the 
possibility of reconsideration is frightening and should not 
be taken lightly.  Further informal assessments of the 
statement of the Ukrainian position, and attempts to clarify 
it, were expressed at the reception at the Mission of the 
Russian Federation later that evening (Ref B). 
 
---------------------------- 
RUSSIA ON UKRAINE'S POSSIBLE 
"RECONSIDERATION" OF NPT 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) In response to Taylor's deployment of points on the 
U.S. position, Russian Representative Antonov responded that 
naturally our political chiefs will take the correct 
position, but let's help them through the analysis and 
information that we will provide them.  He stated that he 
understood the U.S. position and he knew which START 
provisions were to be carried forward.  Turning to the 
Ukrainian statement, Antonov sought amplification, 
particularly regarding the possibility of uncertainty of the 
Budapest Memorandum of December 1994, if the Treaty were to 
cease to be in force, questioning the nature of such 
uncertainty.  Would those be economic problems, issues of 
political independence?  Shevtsov attempted to clarify the 
Ukrainian view that three simultaneous events were 
represented in the Budapest Memorandum, those being Ukraine 
submitting its instrument of ratification of START, its 
confirmation of the Lisbon Protocol as an integral part of 
the Treaty, and the Rada's decision to support accession to 
the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.  The Rada, however, 
views the security assurances from the nuclear weapon states 
as pre-conditions for these actions, as set forth in the 
Trilateral Statement.  Thus the question arises, what would 
be the future status of such assurances, would they be 
reconfirmed?  According to Shevtsov, with regard to START 
extension, there is an internal debate as to whether Ukraine 
did the right thing-should we have acceded to NPT and signed 
START? 
 
¶11.  (S) Antonov responded that the security assurances 
question is a simple one-Ukraine is a non-nuclear weapon 
state Party to the NPT, with all rights and obligations 
stemming from the spirit and the letter of that international 
instrument.  Ukraine received all positive and negative 
assurances from all NPT states Parties; with regard to the 
positive assurances, policy outlined in United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 984 still stands; it relates to 
Ukraine as well as to Belarus and Kazakhstan.  On that basis, 
in Russia's view, there should be no problem with security 
assurances, nor any uncertainty with regard to the Budapest 
Memorandum.  Antonov expressed his continued concern with the 
Ukrainian statement on reconsidering its status under NPT. 
The NPT is a sacred cow of international security and should 
not be underestimated, noted Antonov (while hoping that as a 
"novice" he was not boring session participants), and no one 
has the right to undermine it.  Antonov said that he proceeds 
from the understanding that Ukraine always complied with its 
Treaty obligations under the NPT, but that he would be 
concerned if Kyiv were even one one-thousandth of one percent 
serious about reconsideration of NPT status, especially given 
the current situation on nonproliferation issues with the 
DPRK, Iran and Syrian portfolios, noting that Russia was 
aware of U.S. concerns about Syria.  Any signal of 
reconsideration would be serious, and whatever the fate of 
START, we must reconfirm our commitment to nonproliferation 
and the importance of the NPT, particularly among START 
parties. 
 
------------------------------------- 
SHEVTSOV:  WHAT I MEANT TO SAY WAS... 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Shevtsov attempted to clarify yet again that Ukraine 
was not going to "reconsider" but just to examine the 
possibility of "exiting" from commitments, which would not 
affect NPT, noting that it had other obligations, such as the 
Lisbon Protocol and accompanying statements.  (Begin Comment: 
 Please see (Ref B) on the reception at the Russian Mission 
for elaboration on this issue.  End comment.) 
 
----------------------------------------- 
IMPROMPTU ANTONOV:  NEWBIE HAS MORE IDEAS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Changing the subject and identifying this as a 
"personal proposal," Antonov said that he wanted to "enliven" 
the  discussion of a post-START instrument, proposing again 
to hold meetings "without notes, and with smiles" in a 
workshop or seminar mode with the concerns of all Parties to 
be aired in order that they be effectively conveyed to 
capitals.  (Begin Comment:  Perhaps due to his "novice" 
status in JCIC, Antonov did not seem to notice his internal 
contradiction of informing capitals without taking notes. 
End Comment.)  He said that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine 
might wish to know what the United States and Russia are 
doing bilaterally, and this might make it easier in our 
efforts to work on a new instrument.  He posited that he 
might be fired for saying such things, as he was uncertain of 
what was happening at home while attending meetings in 
Geneva, but he did say that this was the position of his 
department.  (Begin Comment:  He did seem to be probing for 
an informal mechanism to apprise the three other Treaty 
partners of the course of any activity in bilateral 
post-START discussions, while not directly involving them. 
End Comment.) 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Representative Taylor thanked the Parties for their 
views at the session, and accepted Antonov's offer to attend 
the reception for all Delegations at the Russian Mission that 
evening, thus bringing the meeting to a close. 
 
¶15.  (U) Documents provided:  None. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Ms. Bosco 
Mr. Brown 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Maj Edinger 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hanchett 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mr. Miller 
Mrs. Nash 
CDR Rust 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Vogel 
Mr. Yaguchi 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
BELARUS 
 
Mr. Ugorich 
Mr. Ponomarev 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Mr. Zhankuliyev 
Mr. Kasenov 
Mr. Torekeldi 
Col Akhmetalin 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Antonov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Kashirin 
Mr. Bolotov 
Mr. Artem'yev 
Mr. Bolotov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Serov 
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min 
Maj Gen Nikishin 
Col Novikov 
Col Zaytsev 
Ms. Sorokina 
Mr. Cheykin (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Bondarenko 
Mr. Arguchinskiy 
MGen Fedotov 
Mr. Makhonin 
Mr. Galushchenko 
 
¶17. (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



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