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S E C R E T GENEVA 000983 
 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
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SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
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NSC FOR HAYES 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON 
THE RS-24 PROTOTYPE ICBM AND PEACEKEEPER SILO CONVERSIONS, 
NOVEMBER 14, 2008 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET 
 
REF: A. STATE 87779 ANC-STR 08-660/3 (U.S. NRRC 
        NOTIFICATION PK SILO CONVERSION) 
     ¶B. RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RE-DESIGNATION OF 
        PEACEKEEPER SILO LAUNCHERS OCTOBER 20 
        2008 (NO REPORTING CABLE) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-011. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 14, 2008 
                Time:  3:30 P.M. - 5:00 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation Meeting (HOD) was held at the 
Russian Mission on November 14, 2008, to discuss U.S. 
conversion of Peacekeeper (PK) ICBM silo launchers into 
Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers and, U.S. concerns 
regarding Russia's declaration of the RS-24 ICBM prototype as 
a new type of mobile ICBM.  All Parties were present. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian Delegation began by conveying Russia's 
concerns that the procedure used to notify Russia that 50 PK 
ICBM silo launchers had been converted to Minuteman III ICBM 
silo launchers were not in accordance with the Treaty.  Also, 
results of an inspection at F. E. Warren ICBM Base increased 
Russian concerns and created doubt as to whether the 
conversion process had taken place.  Russian inspectors 
viewed the interior of a silo launcher and observed elements 
of the silo launcher that it believed were characteristics of 
a PK ICBM silo launcher.  The U.S. side responded that it was 
still studying the issue, and would take the information 
provided by Russia back to Washington. 
 
¶5.  (S) The U.S. side outlined U.S. concerns regarding 
Russian plans to declare the RS-24 prototype ICBM as a new 
type.  The U.S. side explained that the original SS-25 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) data had been changed when 
the RS-12M Variant 2 (SS-27) was declared.  All of the data 
available to the United States indicated that the RS-24 was 
very similar to the RS-12M Variant 2.  The United States 
questioned the Russian Federation's Treaty basis for using 
the original versus updated MOU data as criteria for 
declaring the RS-24 as a new type of ICBM.  The Russian 
Delegation said its response to this question has not 
changed; however, requested a written copy of the points 
expressed by the U.S. Delegation to bring back to Moscow. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
PK SILO CONVERSION:  A VIRTUAL REALITY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Kashirin opened the HOD meeting at the Russian 
Mission on November 14, 2008, and clarified Russian concerns 
regarding a notification provided by the United States dated 
August 15, 2008 (Ref A), declaring that 50 PK silo launchers 
had been converted to Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers. 
These actions by the United States are contrary to the Treaty 
requirements (Paragraph 7 of Article III of the Treaty and 
Section IV of the Notification Protocol).  Specifically, the 
United States did not notify the Russian Federation of its 
intentions to begin the conversion process nor of its 
intentions to install an ICBM of a different type into the 
converted silos. 
 
------------------------- 
IF YOU LOOK AT THE TREATY 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.   (S) Kashirin reminded the U.S. Delegation of U.S. 
obligations under the Notification Protocol.  The Party 
carrying out such conversion is obligated:  In accordance 
with (IAW) Paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Protocol, to 
provide notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the 
initiation of the respective process of conversion, of the 
intention to carry out such procedures; IAW Paragraph 2 of 
Section IV of the Protocol, to provide notification, no later 
than 5 days after the initiation of the respective process of 
conversion, of the date on which the conversion process 
began; and, IAW Paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Notification 
Protocol, to provide notification, no less than 5 days in 
advance, of the intention to install an ICBM of a different 
type or a training model a different type in a silo launcher 
of ICBMs if, during the conversion of such silo launcher of 
ICBMs, the silo door was not removed.  Russia provided an 
aide-memoire on September 2, 2008 (Ref B), conveying these 
concerns but had yet to receive a response from the United 
States. 
 
------------------------ 
SO WHAT REALLY HAPPENED? 
------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (S) Kashirin then spoke about the results of a Reentry 
Vehicle Inspection conducted at F. E. Warren ICBM Base 
(September 19-20, 2008), which increased Russian concerns. 
As reported by Russian inspectors, a senior site official 
declared that modifications of the PK silos had not been 
carried out.  Furthermore, the DTRA escort team chief 
explained that the 50 silos had been re-designated as 
Minuteman III Silo Launchers and authorities have this 
information.  (Begin Note:  Upon further investigation by the 
U.S. Delegation it was determined that the Wing Commander at 
¶F. E. Warren actually made this statement during the 
pre-inspection procedures.  End Note.) 
 
¶9.  (S) Kashirin stated that Russian inspectors viewed silo 
launcher P6 which formerly contained a PK ICBM.  Russian 
inspectors were unable to see any signs that a conversion 
process occurred.  In fact, the launcher still contained a PK 
canister; the launch canister was braced by elements of the 
suspension system.  (Note:  The canister mentioned is 
actually a large sleeve placed within the PK silo to enable 
cold launch of the ICBM.  End Note.)  The upper portion of 
the metal shaft of the silo had been removed, which is a 
characteristic feature of a PK ICBM silo launcher.  (Begin 
Note:  PK silos were originally Minuteman silos.  Prior to 
START Treaty entry into force the USAF modified 50 Minuteman 
silos to accommodate PK ICBMs by removing a portion of the 
upper silo.  End Note.)  Therefore, Kashirin concluded, no 
conversion took place and the virtual declaration to 
Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers occurred in violation of 
the Treaty.  Kashirin asked for an explanation. 
 
¶10.  (S) Taylor responded that the United States understood 
and that it was still studying the issue.  Taylor said that 
the new information presented by the Russian side would be 
included in the U.S. evaluation of this issue. 
 
--------------------- 
THE RS-24 IS AN SS-27 
ONLY IF YOU USE LOGIC 
--------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Taylor stated that although the Russian Delegation 
had provided some additional information during previous JCIC 
sessions, the United States continued to have concerns with 
respect to Russia's declaration of a prototype as a new type 
of mobile ICBM and how the provisions of the Treaty would be 
applied to that missile once declared to be a new type 
missile.  With recent statements in the Russian press by the 
Chief Designer of the RS-24 ICBM, Yuri Solomonov, indicating 
that the RS-24 ICBM will enter service in 2009, the United 
States continued to seek additional information regarding 
Russian Federation plans for the testing and deployment of 
the RS-24. 
 
¶12.  (S) With respect to the Russian statement that the RS-24 
will be a new type of missile, and based upon the information 
provided by the Russian Federation to date, the United States 
did not see how the RS-24 ICBM could be sufficiently 
different from the current MOU data for the RS-12M to qualify 
as a new type.  This was further reinforced by the fact that 
the acceleration profiles provided by the Russian Federation 
for the flight tests of the RS-12M Variant 2 and the RS-24 
appeared to be very similar. 
 
¶13. (S) Considering that the Russian Federation changed the 
size criteria for the RS-12M in JCIC Agreement Number 22 in 
1994 and its throw-weight in 1999, all of which comprises the 
current MOU data for the RS-12M, the United States would like 
to better understand the Russian Federation's Treaty basis 
for using the initial MOU data declared for the RS-12M as the 
criteria for declaration of a new type of ICBM. 
 
¶14. (S) The United States also urged the Russian Federation 
to provide additional information regarding the physical 
differences between the prototype RS-24 ICBM and the SS-27 
ICBM beyond the transport cap being painted red and an 
"identifier" placed on the left side instead of a unique 
identifier on the right side of the missile canister so that 
U.S. inspectors and monitors can differentiate between the 
two missiles when the missiles are in an operational versus a 
transport configuration. 
 
¶15. (S) Additionally, the United States previously informed 
the Russian Delegation that the current MOU photographs of 
the SS-27 ICBM in its launch canister no longer corresponded 
to the configuration of these missiles as they currently 
exited Votkinsk and requested more updated MOU photographs to 
better assist U.S. monitors and inspectors in differentiating 
RS-24 and SS-27 ICBMs in the future.  However, updated MOU 
photographs had not yet been received. 
 
¶16.  (C) The United States looked forward to receiving 
additional information regarding these concerns and were 
prepared to work with the Russian Federation to find ways to 
address these issues. 
 
¶17.  (S) Kashirin requested that the United States provide 
Russia in writing the U.S points presented during the 
meeting.  Kashirin added that he would provide the U.S. 
comments to Solomonov (RS-24 missile designer) and everyone 
else concerned. 
 
¶18.  (S) Taylor agreed to provide the Russian Delegation with 
his comments. 
 
¶19.  (S) Below is the official translation of the points 
provided by the Russian Delegation on Re-declaration of PK 
ICBM Silo Launchers at Warren.  (Begin Comment:  The Russian 
Delegation paper was provided to the U.S. Delegation on 
November 17, 2008, and is provided for clarity purposes.  End 
Comment.) 
 
Begin text: 
                                    Official Translation 
 
                                    JCIC-XXXIII 
                                    Text of the Remarks 
                                    by the Representative of 
the 
                                    Russian Federation at the 
                                    Plenary Meeting 
                                    November 14, 2008 
 
Re-declaration of Peacekeeper ICBM 
Silo Launchers at Warren 
 
      On August 15 we received START notification ANC-STR 
08-660/3 from the United States of America through NRRC 
channels; according to that notification 50 Peacekeeper ICBM 
launchers are being reattributed as launchers converted for 
Minuteman III ICBMs. 
 
      These actions by the United States of America are 
contrary to the Treaty requirements (paragraph 7 of Article 
III and Section IV of the Notification Protocol). 
 
      Specifically, the U.S. did not notify the Russian side 
of its intention to carry out such conversion, of the 
initiation of conversion, or of its intention to install 
ICBMs of a different type in the converted launchers. 
 
      We would remind you that in accordance with the 
Notification Protocol, the Party carrying out such conversion 
is obligated: 
 
      ¶1.  Based on paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Protocol, 
to provide notification, no less than 30 days in advance of 
the initiation of the respective processes of conversion, of 
the intention to carry out such procedures. 
 
      ¶2.  Based on paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Protocol, 
to provide notification, no later than 5 days after the 
initiation of the respective processes of conversion, of the 
date on which the conversion process began. 
 
      ¶3.  Based on paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Protocol, 
to provide notification, no less than five days in advance, 
of the intention to install an ICBM of a different type or a 
training model a different type in a silo launcher of ICBMs 
if, during the conversion of such silo launcher of ICBMs, the 
silo door was not removed. 
 
      The Russian side presented its concerns regarding this 
problem in the document provided to the United States of 
America through diplomatic channels on September 2, 2008. 
However, there has thus far been no response to that document. 
 
      On September 19, 2008, the Russian side conducted a 
reentry vehicle inspection of deployed ICBMs at Warren 
Missile Complex ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, under 
paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. 
 
      The results of that inspection only reinforced the 
Russian concerns.  We are referring to the following. 
 
      During the pre-inspection briefing the senior facility 
representative responsible for Treaty implementation at the 
base stated that no modification of the Peacekeeper ICBM silo 
launchers at the base was conducted.  This was noted by all 
the Russian inspectors.  The senior escort, an official from 
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, noted in this connection 
that the U.S. side had simply "redesignated" these 50 silo 
launchers and that only the diplomatic authorities have 
complete information in this regard. 
 
      During the inspection of one of the launchers, 
designated on the site diagram of the base as R-6, which had 
previously contained a Peacekeeper ICBM, no signs were 
detected that any conversion work had been done on the 
launcher.  In the silo the presence of a Peacekeeper launch 
canister was noted; the launch canister was braced by 
elements of the suspension system.  The upper portion of the 
metal shaft of the silo had been removed, which is a 
characteristic feature of a Peacekeeper ICBM silo launcher. 
 
      Thus, the results of this inspection confirmed that 
there had been no conversion of the launchers in question and 
their "re-declaration" as launchers of ICBMs of a different 
type (Minuteman III) was carried out in violation of the 
provisions of the Notification Protocol and is contrary to 
the requirements of paragraph 7 of Article III of the START 
Treaty.  In view of this, we do not understand what is meant 
by the following comment in the aforementioned notification: 
"Silo launchers for Peacekeeper ICBMs were converted to silo 
launchers for Minuteman III ICBMs so that they are now 
incapable of launching an ICBM of the previous type. 
 
      We would ask the U.S. side to provide appropriate 
clarification. 
 
End text. 
 
¶20.  (U) Documents exchange:  None. 
 
¶21.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Ms. Bosco 
Mr. Brown 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Maj Edinger 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Kuehne 
LTC Oppenheim 
CDR Rust 
Mr. Smith 
Col Summers 
Mr. Vogel 
Mr. Yaguchi 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
BELARUS 
 
Mr. Ponomarev 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Col Akhmetalin 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Kashirin 
Mr. Bolotov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min 
Maj Gen Nikishin 
Col Novikov 
Col Zaytsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Bondarenko 
 
¶22.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



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