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S E C R E T GENEVA 001009 
 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII:  WORKING GROUP MEETING ON UKRAINIAN 
PROPOSAL AND B-1, NOVEMBER 20, 2008 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 0998 (JCIC-XXXIII-015) 
     ¶B. GENEVA 1005 (JCIC-XXXIII-017) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-020. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 20, 2008 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Working Group (WG) Meeting was held at the U.S. 
Mission on November 20, 2008, to discuss the Ukrainian 
proposal on converting eliminated ICBMs to formerly declared 
types of ICBMs and Russian concerns with the conversation of 
the B-1 heavy bomber to a heavy bomber equipped for 
non-nuclear armaments.  Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Russia, and the 
United States were represented. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Ukrainian Delegation offered to answer questions 
on their proposal to change the designation of existing types 
of ICBMs which have been completely eliminated to the 
category of former types of ICBMs under the START Treaty. 
The U.S. and Russian Delegations sought clarifications on the 
benefits to the proposed change.  The U.S. Delegation stated 
that a detailed analysis was needed during the intersession 
to further discuss the issue. 
 
¶5. (S) The U.S. and Russian sides discussed their respective 
views regarding the conversion of the B-1B from a heavy 
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long range 
nuclear air launched cruise missiles (LRNAs) into a heavy 
bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.  The U.S. 
Delegation explained the U.S. view was that the conversion 
should render the aircraft incapable of carrying nuclear 
armaments so that such armaments could not be "operationally 
deployed."  The Russian Delegation explained that 
"operational deployment" was not in the Treaty and stated 
that they would study the U.S.-Proposed JCIC Joint Statement 
to facilitate resolution at the next session. 
 
-------------------------- 
HIT ME WITH YOUR BEST SHOT 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) At a WG Meeting on November 20, 2008, Comeau said 
that the Ukrainian Delegation had introduced a proposal at 
the Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting on November 18, 2008 
(Ref A), to change the designation of SS-24 and SS-17 ICBMs 
to former types as defined under the START Treaty.  Comeau 
asked whether the Ukrainian Delegation could provide any 
further explanation of the proposal.  Shevtsov began by 
saying he had provided text reflecting this proposal.  He 
solicited comments and preliminary reactions from the Parties 
present and promised to answer right away if possible or 
later after study, if the questions were more in-depth. 
 
¶7.  (S) Comeau asked the Ukrainian Delegation three 
clarifying questions about its proposal:  1) Did Ukraine 
intend to  reference the SS-17 ICBM as a former type in its 
proposal; 2) What benefit would be realized in re-designating 
the eliminated types of ICBMs as former types of ICBMs; and 
finally 3) What the link was between eliminated types and 
former types? 
 
¶8.  (S) Shevtsov confirmed the SS-17 was a correct reference 
because even though it was never deployed it was produced at 
the "Uzhmash" plant, and therefore, it would be useful to 
include the SS-17 with the SS-24.  He added that each Party 
could determine for themselves their non-deployed missiles to 
add to the list of former types, noting that he could have 
included more types that had been produced in Ukraine, but 
since those types are being used by Russia, Ukraine decided 
against doing that. 
 
¶9.  (S) Shevtsov clarified that the main idea was to have an 
updated list of existing types and mentioned that Ukraine 
would not be converting one type of ICBM to another; he did 
not want to change the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) 
Protocol.  He continued that Ukraine did not want to change 
its program with the United States, stressing that what was 
left was listed as non-deployed but in fact they were just 
solid rocket motors that Ukraine wanted to finish the process 
and eliminate them.  He said that even once they are 
destroyed they could be considered "former types." 
 
¶10.  (S) Kuehne noted that the Ukrainian paper had stated 
that the Treaty did not apply to former types of ICBMs.  He 
noted, however, that under certain circumstances the Treaty 
did apply to former types, for example, as in Paragraph 6 of 
Article X concerning telemetry.  Kuehne said the United 
States would have to look at the proposal and carefully 
analyze its impact on the Treaty. 
 
¶11.  (S) Shevtsov agreed that Ukraine still needed to conduct 
a thorough analysis and hoped that such an analysis would 
help to resolve the issues. 
 
¶12.  (S) Ryzhkov said he wanted to understand why Ukraine 
believed it could re-designate  missiles as former types, 
specifically the SS-24 and SS-17.  Referring to the 
definition of "former type" in the Definitions Annex, he 
stated that both these ICBMs were deployed at the time of 
entry into force (EIF), and asked whether the Ukrainian 
position was that the definition should be changed.  He noted 
that there were types of ICBMs that were deployed in both 
Russia and Ukraine, so, before the JCIC attempted to reach 
consensus on the Ukrainian proposal, he suggested a bilateral 
meeting with Ukraine to reach an understanding of the 
proposal and its effect on ICBMs which were both deployed in 
Russia and Ukraine at EIF of the Treaty. 
 
¶13.  (S) Shevtsov explained that Ukraine had not intended to 
provide another definition of former type, but wanted to 
provide another understanding of the term.  Concerning the 
SS-17, he indicated that it was important to specify when 
they were deployed, and he did not believe that any such 
missiles were produced after EIF.  He agreed that it would be 
good to meet with Russia bilaterally to discuss the issue 
further. 
 
----------------------------- 
EURO HEART BREAKER (HB) - B-1 
----------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S) Ryzhkov opened the discussion on the B-1 heavy 
bomber conversion by stating that his comments were very 
preliminary as there had not been much time to study the 
U.S.-Proposed Joint Statement (Ref B).  He believed that the 
United States understood the basic Russian concern of 
converting the B-1 in a manner that ensured that it was 
incapable of carrying nuclear armaments.  He said that he 
suspected the conversion of the B-1 heavy bomber, taken from 
external observation, was "notional" ("uslovnyy kharakter" in 
Russian).  He brought up comments previously made by Shevtsov 
about a "process equivalent to welding" and previous 
conversion techniques for pylons to demonstrate his point. 
 
¶15.  (S) Ryzhkov addressed the U.S.-proposed Joint Statement 
stating it introduced a new concept - "operational 
deployment."  Russia believed there were technical aspects 
regarding conversion that needed to be addressed, and that 
the notion of "operational deployment" was an abstract 
concept and that without technical characteristics it would 
hardly address Russian concerns.  He stated that he did not 
see how the measures taken conformed to the final objective 
of the conversion, and proposed that the sides develop an 
approach similar to what Russia did with respect to the SS-25 
RVOSI:  it is up to the inspected Party to remove the 
concerns of the inspecting Party.  He summarized the Russian 
position by stating that what is needed are technical 
characteristics that would determine whether the aircraft is 
or is not capable, and only this would be sufficiently 
convincing. 
 
¶16.  (S) Shevtsov added that he also did not like the phrase 
"operational deployment" in this context. 
 
¶17.  (S) Comeau tried to clarify the concepts of operational 
capability, deployment and delivery as it related to the 
ability to carry nuclear armaments in a converted B-1 and 
requested from Ryzhkov the precise Treaty reference to 
"irreversibility," a concept that the Russians had raised 
earlier in the session.  Comeau also stated that he was aware 
that the Treaty was old and did not include the concept of 
operational deployment.   However, the operational deployment 
concept was inherent in the fact that the Treaty allowed for 
the conversion of a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear 
armaments other than LRNA to the category of heavy bombers 
equipped for non-nuclear armaments. 
 
¶18.  (S) Ryzhkov insisted that the United States must provide 
proof, based on technical characteristics, that the B-1 heavy 
bomber could not carry nuclear weapons.  He conceded it was a 
complex issue and acknowledged that one can equip anything, 
with anything, given enough money and resources, but that 
merely "transporting" a nuclear weapon on a civilian 
aircraft, for example, was not enough to consider that 
aircraft "capable of carrying" nuclear weapons.  Comeau said 
that this was how the phrase "operationally deployed" should 
be understood:  the civilian aircraft could not operationally 
deploy the nuclear weapon, and asked whether the word 
"delivery" would assist in the Russian understanding of this 
concept. 
 
¶19.  (S) Ryzhkov said that he did not question the right of 
the United States to decide on how to do the conversion.  All 
the United States had to do was convince the other side that 
this type of heavy bomber is incapable of carrying nuclear 
weapons.  Concerning the earlier Russian comment about 
"irreversibility," he said that what he meant to say was that 
any re-conversion would have to be done as provided for in 
the Treaty.  (Begin Comment:  The impression of the U.S. 
Delegation was that Ryzhkov was falling off the concept that 
the conversion process must be irreversible.  End Comment.) 
 
¶20.  (S) Comeau introduced again the idea of a civilian 
aircraft that was large enough to load a nuclear weapon but 
did not have the ability to use it operationally.  Ryzkhov 
agreed that without a technical conversion, one could not 
load a missile and release it, because specialized equipment 
was needed.  He repeated the Russian concern as being that 
the B-1 can carry nuclear weapons even after the conversion, 
and Russia needed to know that this was not possible. 
Claiming that the United States must have some additional 
information available, he referred back to the heavy bomber 
distinguishability exhibition and asked why the United States 
did not show the Russian experts a converted heavy bomber 
beside one that had not been converted, because without that 
comparison the Russian experts could not see the 
incompatibility between the two.  Ryzhkov added that this 
would have been the simplest way, had this been done. 
 
-------------- 
TAKIN' IT BACK 
-------------- 
 
¶21.  (S) After the meeting, Smith conducted a side bar 
discussion with Ryzhkov and Kuz'min about the B-52 Data 
Update Inspections at Davis-Monthan CorE facility.  He asked 
if it would be helpful to the Russian Federation if the 
United States made a unilateral statement during the closing 
plenary concerning the status of the B-52 heavy bombers 
located at Davis-Monthan.  Specifically, that as a result of 
the heavy bombers going through an ageing and surveillance 
process, they were in various stages of disassembly yet were 
still able to be inspected in accordance with Joint Statement 
10 of the Treaty.  Smith believed that perhaps this would 
help clarify to all the Parties that these bombers were in a 
special status and were not being eliminated. 
 
¶22.  (S) Ryzhkov stated that although he had not cleared this 
idea with his delegation, he believed it may help.  Ryzhkov 
said that he and Kuz'min had discussed something like this 
between themselves and were trying to decide what the best 
format might be.  He stated that a unilateral statement would 
be an appropriate format. 
 
¶23.  (U) Documents exchanged:  None 
 
¶24.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Lt Col Comeau 
Ms. Bosco 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Maj Edinger 
Mr. Hanchett 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Yaguchi 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Col Akhmetalin 
Mr. Kasenov 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Col Ryzhkov 
Ms. Kotkova 
 
 
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min 
Mr. Serov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Chikin (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Bondarenko 
MGen Fedotov 
Mr. Makhonin 
 
 
¶25.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



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