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S E C R E T GENEVA 001005 
 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII:  (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON 
THE B-1 HEAVY BOMBER CONVERSION AND BASING OF U.S. HEAVY 
BOMBERS, NOVEMBER 19, 2008 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 0590 (JCIC-XXXII-013) 
     ¶B. STATE 120346 (JCIC-XXXIII-GUIDANCE-001) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-017. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 19, 2008 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 11:40 A.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the 
U.S. Mission on November 19, 2008, to discuss the B-1 heavy 
bomber conversion and basing of U.S. heavy bombers.  All 
Parties were represented. 
 
¶4.  (S) The U.S. and Russian sides presented their respective 
views regarding the conversion of the B-1B from a heavy 
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long range 
nuclear air launched cruise missiles (LRNAs) into a heavy 
bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.  The U.S. 
Delegation explained the U.S. view was that the conversion 
should render the aircraft incapable of carrying nuclear 
armaments so that such armaments could not be operationally 
deployed.  In contrast, the Russian Delegation explained the 
Russian view that the conversion of the B-1 heavy bomber was 
grounded in the irreversibility of the conversion process. 
The U.S. Delegation proposed a draft JCIC Joint Statement 
that would facilitate understanding of the term "incapable of 
carrying" as used in Paragraphs 10 and 11 of Section VI of 
the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Protocol.  The Russians 
stated that they would study the document. 
 
-------------------- 
YOU'RE NOT LISTENING 
-------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Koshelev opened the HOD Meeting on November 19, 2008, 
at the U.S. Mission and stated that the issue of conversion 
of the B-1 heavy bomber was discussed in detail at the last 
JCIC session (Ref A), and Russian concerns had been stated in 
a October 23, 2008, aide-memoir (Ref B).  Russia continued to 
have concerns about the U.S. process to convert the B-1 to a 
heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments in terms of 
both its sufficiency and ensuring the irreversibility of the 
conversion.  Additionally, the Russian Federation view of the 
U.S. interpretation of the word "carry" was not supported by 
the provisions of the Treaty.  The use of the phrase 
"operational deployment of nuclear armaments" by the United 
States meant applying a new concept or definition that was 
not provided for in the Treaty instead of the clear 
requirement of the Treaty that "all weapons bays equipped to 
carry nuclear armaments be modified so as to render them 
incapable of carrying nuclear armaments." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
INSPECTORS CONFIRMED, BUT THEY WEREN'T SUPPOSE TO 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶6.  (S) Koshelev stated that the distinguishability 
exhibition provided for in Paragraph 12 of Article XI of the 
Treaty was one of the obligatory elements of the Treaty. 
However, the conduct of an exhibition was insufficient to 
consider the change in the status, and that a Russian 
inspection team did not have the power to assess the 
sufficiency of the differences presented by the United 
States.  The inspectors participating in this exhibition 
could only state in the inspection report what they saw and 
what was specified in the relevant Format 90 notification of 
what was converted.  As a result of Russian Federation 
analysis of the conversion inspection and exhibition at Dyess 
Air Force Base in February 2008, the Russian Federation in 
accordance with the 17th Agreed Statement believed that the 
distinguishing features presented by the United States and 
declared as having been converted for non-nuclear armaments 
were not sufficient to put it into this category. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
TO BE OR NOT TO BE, SEE THE DEFINITION FOR AIR BASE 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶7.  (S) Koshelev reiterated the Russian Federation concern 
about basing heavy bombers of different categories at the 
same base, which conflicted with the requirements of 
Paragraph 23 of Article V.  While the Russian Federation did 
not have an issue with the presence of aircraft at Davis 
Monthan (DM), it did not include deployment of the B-1 at DM. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Taylor stated that the Treaty provided for the 
conversion of a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments 
into a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.  The 
Treaty also contained a definition for a heavy bomber 
equipped for non-nuclear armaments.  The implication of these 
provisions was that the Treaty clearly allowed for a 
converted heavy bomber to operationally deploy non-nuclear 
armament. 
 
¶9.  (S) Koshelev responded by stating that the Russian 
Federation experts focused on the definition of 
"irreversibility," but asked whether this was an issue better 
left for the experts to discuss within a working group. 
 
¶10.  (S) Taylor said that the Russian Federation should focus 
on what the Treaty term "incapable of carrying" means with 
regard to a converted heavy bomber.  Taylor opined that 
following the Russian Federation logic, a Boeing 737 was 
capable of carrying a nuclear armament, and would need to be 
captured under the Treaty even though it had no way of 
operationally deploying the weapon. 
 
¶11.  (S) Taylor stated that it was clear that the United 
States and the Russian Federation did not have the same 
understanding on the term "incapable of carrying."  The 
method used for establishing a common understanding of Treaty 
terms has been through the use of a JCIC Joint Statement. 
While working groups were helpful, the focus must be on 
developing a mutual understanding about the term "incapable 
of carrying."  Taylor provided the other parties with a draft 
JCIC Joint Statement on the term "incapable of carrying." 
 
¶12. (S) Begin text of U.S.-Proposed Joint Statement: 
 
                                    JCIC-XXXIII 
 
 
 
                                    U.S. Proposed Text 
                                    November 19,2008 
 
JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION 
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 
 
ON THE CONVERSION OF A HEAVY BOMBER SO THAT IT IS NO LONGER 
EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS 
 
With respect to the Treaty between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 
31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties 
understand the expression, "incapable of carrying nuclear 
armaments," as used in paragraph 11 of Section VI of the 
Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or 
Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty, to mean that, 
for modifications to convert a heavy bomber so that it is no 
longer equipped for nuclear armaments, all weapons bays 
equipped to carry nuclear armaments shall be modified, and 
all external attachment joints for nuclear armaments and 
external attachment joints for pylons for nuclear armaments 
shall be modified or removed, so that they are no longer 
usable for the operational deployment of nuclear armaments. 
 
        (United States of America) 
        (Republic of Belarus 
        (Republic of Kazakhstan) 
        (Russian Federation) 
        (Ukraine) 
 
End text. 
 
¶13.  (S) Koshelev thanked Taylor for the draft JCIC Joint 
Statement and stated that Russia would take this back for 
analysis.  After taking a short break, Koshelev stated that 
the Russian Federation also had a presentation on the topic 
and would provide it during a working group in the coming 
days. 
 
¶14.  (U) Documents Exchanged: 
 
U.S.:  U.S.-Proposed JCIC Joint Statement On The Conversion 
Of A Heavy Bomber So That It Is No Longer Equipped for 
Nuclear Armaments, dated November 19, 2008. 
 
¶15. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Ms. Bosco 
Mr. Brown 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Maj Edinger 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hanchett 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mrs. Nash 
CDR Rust 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Vogel 
Mr. Yaguchi 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
 
 
BELARUS 
 
Mr. Ugorich 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Col Akhmetalin 
Mr. Kasenov 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Artem'yev 
Mr. Bolotov 
Mr. Kashirin 
Ms. Kotkova 
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min 
Col Novikov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Serov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Mr. Gusev (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Bondarenko 
 
¶16.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



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