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S E C R E T GENEVA 001004 
 
 
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TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: WG MEETING ON MM III RVOSI, NOVEMBER 
18, 2008 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 0976 (JCIC-XXXIII-010) 
     ¶B. GENEVA 2551 (JCIC-XXXI-011) 
     ¶C. STATE 120343 (JCIC-XXXIII-GUIDANCE-002) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-016. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 18, 2008 
                Time:  15:30 P.M. - 16:30 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶3.  (S) A Working Group (WG) Meeting was held at the Russian 
Mission on November 18, 2008, to explore the possibility of 
conducting a one-time Minuteman III (MM III) demonstration to 
resolve Russian concerns over the number of reentry vehicles 
loaded on MM-III ICBMs.  All Parties were represented. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Parties discussed the Russian Delegation's four 
main points introduced at the previous meeting on MM III 
RVOSI regarding the potential demonstration of the MM III 
ICBM front section (Ref A).  The meeting concluded with the 
United States agreeing to study the problem and respond to 
the Parties on the results during the intersessional period. 
 
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PLEASE CLARIFY YOUR CONCERNS AGAIN 
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¶5.  (S) Ryzhkov opened the Working Group (WG) Meeting at the 
Russian Mission on November 19, 2008, and turned the floor 
over to Kuehne.  Kuehne said that the purpose of this WG was 
to determine what the Russian Federation expected to see and 
to explore the organizational, procedural, and technical 
possibilities for a MM III front section demonstration.  He 
noted that the details of the proposed demonstration had to 
be "checklist perfect" because of the seriousness of working 
around nuclear weapon systems.  He said that the United 
States wanted to be sure it fully understood Russia's 
concerns on the issue. Kuehne said the U.S. Delegation had 
received the Russian Paper with its four main points on a 
one-time demonstration of a front section of MM III. 
 
Begin text of Russian Paper on One-Time Demonstration of the 
MM Front Section: 
 
                                   Official Translation 
 
                                          JCIC-XXXIII 
                                          November 17, 2008 
 
      Main Points of the Russian Side's Position Regarding 
a One-time Demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM Front 
Section 
 
      ¶1.  The Russian side is interested in a one-time 
demonstration of the Minuteman III ICBM front section in 
order to ascertain that the space inside the lower portion of 
the missile front section cannot contain items commensurate 
with reentry vehicles.  We are prepared to participate in 
this event. 
 
      ¶2.  In the Russian side's view, it does not appear 
possible to resolve this concern without holding a one-time 
demonstration. 
 
      ¶3.  The mere fact of conducting a demonstration, 
without analyzing its results, cannot guarantee resolution of 
the problem.  The U.S. side acted in a similar fashion with 
respect to the demonstration of the front section of the 
SS-25 ICBM at Vypolzovo ICBM Base. 
 
      ¶4.  Based on the results of the demonstration, the 
Russian side is also prepared to consider the U.S. position 
that any additional devices (for example, mirror-type 
devices) used during the demonstration will not be used in 
future inspections. 
 
      The Russian side requests clarification of the U.S. 
plans to arrange a one-time demonstration of the Minuteman 
III ICBM front section.  We express our readiness to further 
discuss any issues in order to move forward on resolving this 
problem.  We are also prepared to take part in further 
discussion of this issue in the working group format, so as 
to consider in detail, with the participation of experts--and 
if possible reach agreement on--the procedural, technical, 
and organizational aspects. 
 
End text. 
 
¶6.  (S) Kuehne noted that organizationally, the Parties had 
conducted demonstrations before and the United States 
envisioned, but was not wedded to, the one-time MM III 
demonstration being part of a normal RVOSI.  He asked the 
Russian side for its thoughts. 
 
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WANTS HIS CAKE AND EAT IT TOO 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Ryzhkov said that the MM III demonstration should be 
separate from a regular RVOSI since demonstration activities 
were different from inspection activities and he did not want 
to forfeit one of Russia's quota inspections.  Additionally, 
the other Parties wanted to participate in the demonstration 
which could affect the flow of subsequent inspections, i.e., 
sequential inspections.  Ryzhkov said the Russian Federation 
would have to think about and remain flexible on this aspect 
of the demonstration. 
 
¶8.  (S) Kuehne noted that START inspections were limited to 
ten people, as had been the case for past demonstrations.  He 
asked Ryzhkov how many people he envisaged for the 
demonstration. 
 
¶9.  (S) Ryzhkov believed that ten people should be sufficient 
for a demonstration and noted that the Russian Federation 
organized demonstrations in the past using that number. 
Kuehne agreed that more than ten people would make crowd 
control difficult and people may not see what they needed to 
see if the crowd was too large.  Ryzhkov said that he 
understood the sensitivity of a nuclear facility and the 
United States would need to determine the procedures for the 
demonstration based on security, safety, and ability to view 
the object. 
 
¶10.  (S) Kuehne asked what else should be considered 
regarding organizational aspects of a demonstration.  Ryzhkov 
said it depended on where the demonstration would take place, 
such as at the RVOSI site or another location. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
MORE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF REDUNDANCY DEPARTMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶11.  (S) Kuehne noted that the procedural and technical 
aspects of the demonstration blended together.  He asked the 
Russian Delegation to clarify what the Russian side 
considered the "inside lower portion of the missile front 
section" to be.  He used a photograph of the lower portion of 
the MM III front section that had previously been shown in a 
MM III RVOSI briefing from JCIC-XXXI (Ref B).  Ryzhkov 
confirmed that it was important for the demonstration to show 
the portion underneath the front section. 
 
¶12.  (S) Kuehne said that the points provided in the Russian 
document (Ref A) included a comment about a "mirror-type 
device."  He asked Ryzhkov to explain what was meant by that 
phrase and to determine the size of such a device.  Ryzhkov 
said that the idea of using a mirror was merely a suggestion. 
 He said the principle was simple; there needed to be enough 
of a view to ascertain that the space inside the lower 
portion of the front section did not contain reentry vehicles. 
 
¶13.  (S) Kuehne asked Ryzhkov whether shrouding portions of 
the underside of the front section would be a problem. 
Ryzhkov noted that he could not give a proper answer to the 
question.  He highlighted the principles of the demonstration 
included a random choice of ICBM base, random choice of 
launch site (silo), and that any shrouding should not be 
large enough to cover a warhead.  He said that small items 
that were shrouded would not be a problem. 
 
¶14.  (S) Ryzhkov said that Russia provided suggestions to 
address the conduct of this demonstration and would analyze 
the results of the demonstration before it provided a 
response as to its success.  This would be similar to the 
work done by the United States after Russia provided a 
demonstration of SS-25 RVOSI procedures at Vypolzovo. 
 
------------------------------- 
IT'S YOUR PROBLEM SO YOU FIX IT 
------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (S) Ryzhkov said that it was up to the inspected Party 
to show that an item of inspection did not contain more 
reentry vehicles than declared for the system.  He said it 
was up to the United States to determine the demonstration 
procedures and present options at the JCIC.  Russia merely 
stated there was a problem; inspectors were not able to view 
the lower portion of the MM III front section and confirm it 
didn't contain reentry vehicles.  He suggested that the 
United States could organize the demonstration similar to the 
Peacekeeper front section inspection or use devices similar 
to those used in previous demonstrations. 
 
¶16.  (S) Kuehne told Ryzhkov that he was trying to determine 
what device would be acceptable if a direct viewing was not 
possible.  He wanted to know whether a video camera would be 
acceptable even though it was not on the inspection list. 
Ryzhkov said a camera might be more interesting but the 
Russian side was not stuck on particular equipment or items 
on the Treaty list.  He returned to his point that the 
objective was to randomly select a missile to determine it 
did not contain more reentry vehicles than declared. 
 
¶17.  (S) Kuehne said that demonstrations are usually 
scheduled.  He said it would be expensive to have all three 
ICBM bases standing by for a visit.  He said that perhaps it 
would be better to have the United States select a base and 
Russian inspectors select the launcher so as to minimize the 
disruption to the base.  Ryzhkov said this could be proposed 
and discussed at the JCIC. 
 
¶18.  (S) Kuehne said that the United States would study the 
problem and determine a proposal.  He said that after review, 
it could be possible that a demonstration may not be possible 
or a completely different approach could be discovered.  The 
ball was in the U.S.'s court. 
 
¶19.  (U) Documents Exchanged:  None 
 
¶20.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mr. Brown 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dunn 
Maj Edinger 
Mr. Hanchett 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Vogel 
Mr. Yaguchi 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
BELARUS 
 
Mr. Ponomarev 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
 
Col Akhmetalin 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Col Ryzhkov 
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min 
Col Novikov 
Mr. Bolotov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Gusev (Int) 
 
UKRAINE 
 
MGen Fedotov 
Mr. Makhonin 
 
¶21.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
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