O 211557Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7542
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T GENEVA 001003 
 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR HAYES 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII:  (U) RUSSIAN FEDERATION HOSTED 
RECEPTION, NOVEMBER 17, 2008 
 
REF: KYIV 1285 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-014. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  Monday, November 17, 2008 
                Time:  6:00 - 7:50 p.m. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The Russian JCIC Delegation hosted a reception on 
November 17, 2008, at the Russian Mission.  U.S. JCIC 
Delegation members engaged members of the other Parties' 
Delegations in discussions on a wide variety of topics that 
included:  Ukraine's possible reconsideration of Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations if START is not 
extended, the U.S.-proposed post-START Treaty, JCIC issues, 
the Russian invasion of Georgia, and the deployment of 
Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.  The general impression of 
the U.S. Delegation was that the delegates from Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan did not avoid conversation 
with their U.S. counterparts and were not reluctant to engage 
on substantive issues. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
UKRAINE MIGHT RECONSIDER NPT OBLIGATIONS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S) Taylor asked Shevtsov (acting Ukrainian Head of 
Delegation) to explain his comment during the JCIC meeting to 
consider START extension regarding Ukraine reserving the 
right to reconsider the obligations it undertook when it 
agreed to give up its nuclear weapons and join the NPT. 
Shevtsov explained that Ukraine sought reassurances of 
respect of its sovereignty and of cooperative economic 
relations.  Once the START Treaty expired, what assurances 
would Ukraine have in this regard?  Such assurances were 
conditions of ratification by Ukraine's Duma.  Ukraine had 
given up a great deal to obtain such assurances and if these 
assurances were no longer in effect, then Ukraine would 
necessarily have to reconsider what it gave up.  Taylor, 
pointed out that indeed Ukraine's HOD Nykonenko had passed 
the question of the Trilateral Statement to our embassy 
officials in Kiev (Ref) indicating Kiev would like to discuss 
this in a bilateral meeting with the United States.  Instead, 
Ukraine was not only raising the issue of the trilateral 
statement in the plenary session, but was making very 
troublesome statements about its obligations with regard to 
the NPT.  In Taylor's opinion, this was not the best way to 
address this concern.  Even mentioning the possibility of 
reconsidering such actions regarding the NPT was 
inflammatory.  Shevtsov acknowledged that he could have 
approached the issue in a more diplomatic manner, but the 
issue was no less serious in his view.  Taylor explained that 
in his quick reading of the Trilateral Statement and 
following discussions with his legal advisor, there was 
nothing in the statement that would cause the statement to 
expire with the expiration of the START Treaty.  In this 
regard, it was Taylor's view that the statement stood. 
Shevtsov stated that this was what Ukraine needed to hear. 
 
¶5. (S) Koshelev approached Taylor asking what his thoughts 
were following the statement by Ukraine at the JCIC meeting 
to consider START extension.  Taylor informed Koshelev that 
while it was important to recognize and adress Ukraine's 
concern, he felt that Shevtsov had overstepped his bounds in 
making the statement that Ukraine reserved the right to 
reconsider the obligations it undertook in giving up its 
nuclear weapons, signing the START Treaty and joining the NPT 
as a nuclear-weapons free state.  Koshelev believed that 
Shevtsov was under strict instructions to raise the issue in 
its entirety and that this was a calculated move.  Ukraine 
wanted the START Treaty to continue, or instead, wanted to 
participate in a new strategic arms reduction agreement with 
the United States and Russia.  Such participation was seen as 
a status symbol and would permit Ukraine to remain at the 
table with the United States and Russia.  Koshelev stated 
that the United States and Russia must now find a way to 
address the issues Ukraine and Belarus had raised without 
including them in the negotiations of any post-START 
agreement.  Koshelev was not certain why Belarus was 
supportive of extending START, but their concerns must now be 
addressed also. 
 
¶6. (S) Taylor asked Antonov what his impression was with 
Shevtsov's comments during the JCIC meeting to consider START 
extension.  Antonov stated that the United States and Russia 
must work with Ukraine and Belarus to address their concerns. 
 It seemed as if Ukraine was seeking some sort of second tier 
status as an NPT member.  While it was important to address 
Ukraine's concerns, it was unacceptable to permit two levels 
of non-nuclear weapons parties to the NPT.  Moreover, Antonov 
was opposed to having Ukraine join the United States and 
Russia in a treaty about nuclear warheads and delivery 
vehicles.  In Antonov's opinion, Ukraine had fulfilled its 
obligations under the START Treaty and it was now a 
non-nuclear weapons state.  If it needed some security 
guarantees or assurances of cooperative economic relations, 
then we could provide such assurances.  Antonov stated that 
he was preparing his Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Ryabkov, to 
discuss this with Mr. Rood at their meeting in December and 
asked Taylor to be sure and prepare Mr. Rood for such a 
meeting.  Taylor assured that he would do so.  Taylor asked 
Antonov if he knew whether the meeting date had been 
confirmed and Antonov stated that he did not know as he had 
been in Geneva this week and was not up to date on the 
schedule. 
 
¶7. (S) Kotkova mentioned to Miller that the Russian 
Delegation was generally aware that Ukraine would raise 
concerns about how the termination of START would affect the 
1994 Budapest Trilateral Agreement.  However, she stated they 
were surprised by the statements the acting Ukrainian Head of 
Delegation made with respect to Ukraine potentially 
reconsidering its commitment to the NPT.  She lauded Mr. 
Antonov's response to Ukraine. 
 
---------------------- 
FOR DISCUSSION DURING 
A ROOD-RYABKOV MEETING 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (S) Antonov told Brown that he was responsible for 
preparing comments for his deputy minister to deliver at the 
upcoming meeting with Acting Under Secretary Rood in Moscow 
and that he wanted to alert the U.S. side in advance that the 
Ukrainian comments regarding reexamining commitments taken in 
1994 prior to START entry-into-force made at the JCIC meeting 
to consider START extension would be one of the subjects. 
Antonov explained that his concern was that this was an 
official Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) position 
and not just at the level of the JCIC Delegation, and that it 
was important for both Russia and the United States to do 
what was necessary to change that position. 
 
¶9. (S) Miller asked Kotkova if she had seen the U.S.-proposed 
text for a post-START agreement.  She replied she had not 
seen the document yet, because it was still with Mr. 
Antonov's staff.  However, she stated she expected to review 
the document soon, and she thought Russia would have a 
written response prepared for the December meeting between 
Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov and Acting Under Secretary 
Rood. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
POST-START TREATY:  ONLY U.S. CONCERNS CAPTURED 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶10. (S) Antonov told Brown that he had gone through the 
U.S.-proposed post-START text and saw "nothing new" and that 
he was preparing an analysis for his deputy minister. 
 
¶11. (S) Serov, from the Russian MFA, spoke with Dunn about 
the results of the U.S. election, and expressed optimism 
about the Russian Federation being able to engage an Obama 
Administration more productively.  He stated that from the 
Russian perspective it seemed the United States had failed to 
listen to Russian concerns under the Bush Administration, 
using the recently-provided U.S. draft post-START Treaty as 
an example.  Serov stated that Russia had made its objectives 
for such a document well known, including, for example, 
capturing delivery systems under a new agreement, but that 
none of the components that Russia was interested in were 
included in the U.S. draft.  He characterized the U.S. 
approach as "Moscow-plus," and the Russian approach as 
"START-minus."  In any follow-on agreement Russia would want 
to limit not just warheads that could be re-categorized very 
quickly from reserve to operational status, but instead 
Russia wanted to capture "strategic potential" more broadly. 
 
¶12. (S) Yaguchi and DeNinno joined Dunn and Serov to discuss 
Russia's reaction to the post-START text provided by the 
United States.  After reiterating that Russia did not like 
the U.S. draft because it did not take into account areas of 
interest previously expressed by Russia, Serov questioned 
what the point would be for Russia to respond to the current 
Administration.  Yaguchi replied that it would be much better 
for Russia to provide a Russian draft document that 
definitively covered Russian interests that the new 
Administration could consider than it would for U.S. experts 
to prepare a document that they thought captured Russian 
interests, but perhaps did not.  Dunn further noted that in 
terms of engaging the new Administration a document provided 
by the Russian Federation would get more attention and 
consideration than a document being pushed from the bottom up 
within the U.S. Government.  Serov expressed reluctance even 
to make this effort without first knowing whether the new 
Administration was going to engage Russia more seriously than 
had the current Administration.  Serov stated that he 
believed it was important to agree on a broad strategic 
framework with the new Administration, and then move forward 
on specific issues once it was understood how the United 
States and Russia were going to engage. 
 
¶13. (S) Yaguchi asked Ryzhkov if he had seen the U.S. draft 
of the post-START Treaty.  Ryzhkov replied that he had, but 
nothing in it surprised him.  Yaguchi opined that it would be 
important for the Russian Federation to respond with their 
points, especially with the new Administration coming. 
Ryzhkov replied that the United States would receive 
something back.  Yaguchi replied that this was good, 
reiterating that it was better for Russia to present their 
own views on these matters rather than depending on the 
United States to infer exactly what Russia desires in a 
post-START Treaty.  Yaguchi asked if Ryzhkov was working on 
the post-START Treaty too, to which Ryzhkov responded by 
nodding his head yes. 
 
---------------------------- 
KAZAKHSTAN WANTS TO PLAY TOO 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14. (S) Kasenov told Brown that it was important for 
Kazakhstan to be brought into discussions of a post-START 
Treaty because of Kazakhstan's continued interest in 
strategic stability.  He said that Kazakhstan's decision to 
become a non-nuclear-weapon state was a wise decision made by 
his president but that it was also important that Kazakhstan 
had become a START Party and had participated in the 
implementation of the Treaty. 
 
----------- 
JCIC ISSUES 
----------- 
 
¶15. (S) Kotkova told Miller that she understood the United 
States could extend START for 5 years by executive decree, 
without requiring ratification by the Senate.  Miller 
confirmed, adding that any extension for other than the 
Treaty-prescribed 5 years would require Senate ratification. 
Kotkova stated any extension, including the Treaty-prescribed 
5-year extension, would require ratification by the Duma. 
 
¶16. (S) Kotkova asked Miller several questions about how 
Russia and the United States could legally transition from 
START to a post-START agreement.  Kotkova was particularly 
interested in how to legally terminate START upon entry into 
a post-START agreement (the legal mechanism to be used), in 
order to avoid having both START and the post-START agreement 
in force simultaneously.  Miller advised her he could not 
provide a legal opinion and directed her to speak with the 
U.S. JCIC Legal Advisor, Mr. Brown. 
 
¶17. (S) Kuehne asked Ryzhkov for his ideas on how the Parties 
could solve the SS-27Reentry Vehicle On-Site Inspection 
(RVOSI) problm.  Ryzhkov smiled and stated that the problem 
wuld be solved in December 2009 when the START Treay 
expired.  Then, the Russian Federation could leally place 
more than one reentry vehicle (RV) onthe SS-27 ICBM. 
Ryzhkov said that Russian news rports about plans to place 
more than one RV on te SS-27 in 2009 were incorrect, and 
that Russia ad no intention of violating the START Treaty 
whie it was in force. 
 
¶18. (S) Rust and Kuz'min disussed the most recent B-1 
conversion inspection t Davis-Monthan AFB in which a Russian 
inspection team arrived in the United States on the last day 
of the 20-day inspection window.  The Russian team was 
permitted to inspect the bomber after the 20-day window had 
expired.  Kuz'min stated that future inspection teams would 
arrive no later than day 19 at the point of entry allowing 
time to inspect the bomber before the end of the 20-day 
window.  Rust reminded Kuz'min that Russian teams had been 
allowed to inspect bombers whose 20-day window had elapsed 
only because the inspections did not operationally impact the 
bomber schedules.  He also told Kuz'min this would not always 
be the case since the Treaty allowed converted bombers to 
depart the viewing site immediately upon completion of the 
20-day window. 
 
---------------------------- 
WE'RE NOT HERE FOR THE PARTY 
---------------------------- 
 
¶19. (S) Serov questioned DeNinno, Yaguchi, and Dunn about the 
impact of the new Administration on the composition of the 
U.S. JCIC Delegation and experts who work issues related to 
strategic stability.  Serov wondered whether the composition 
of the U.S. Delegation was based on political party lines. 
DeNinno replied that, at the expert level such as that on the 
JCIC Delegation, a change in Administration should not affect 
the composition of the U.S. Delegation.  Individuals may 
leave for new assignments, but that was based on career 
choices and not because of political party affiliation. 
 
------------------------------------ 
WANTED:  EXPERIENCED RUSSIAN EXPERTS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶20. (S) Artem'yev told Brown that, with the death of 
Ambassador Lem Masterkov, there were very few people left in 
the Russian Government who had participated in START 
negotiations and who were therefore able to easily understand 
or analyze START language or language based on START 
precedents.  Artem'yev said that he had been out of Antonov's 
directorate for a number of years since START negotiations 
(he had moved to the North American Directorate) but was now 
back dealing with disarmament issues.  He mentioned that he 
had seen Mikhail Polyakov at Masterkov's funeral but that 
Polyakov (who had been a very competent military expert on 
the Soviet START Delegation) was no longer involved in START 
issues.  Similarly, former Soviet lawyer Mikhail Lebedev was 
now a deputy director of an office in the MFA dealing with 
humanitarian issues and did not appear to have any interest 
in returning to disarmament. 
 
--------------------------------- 
RRW:  A RUSSIAN TOPIC OF INTEREST 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (S) Serov initiated a discussion with Dunn about the 
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program.  Serov inquired 
whether Dunn expected the RRW Program to move forward under 
the Obama Administration, noting the opposition expressed 
among democrats for this program.  Dunn replied that he did 
not know.  One of the reasons democrats objected was that 
they wanted the Department of Defense to first conduct an 
updated Nuclear Posture Review to provide a framework for 
considering U.S. strategic force structure, and how an RRW 
might fit within this assessment.  Depending on the results 
of the NPR, there could be support for the program.  Support 
would also likely depend on other issues as well, including 
future steps in such areas as arms control.  Responding to a 
question about the need for an RRW, Dunn replied simply that 
something needed to be done to ensure the long-term 
reliability of the U.S. stockpile as long as nuclear weapons 
existed. 
 
------------------ 
GEORGIA ON MY MIND 
------------------ 
 
¶22.  (S) DeNinno, Yaguchi, Nash, and Dunn raised the Russian 
invasion of Georgia with Serov.  DeNinno asked Serov what 
provoked Russia to go into Georgia.  Serov became passionate 
about the subject and asked for permission to speak frankly, 
to which he was invited to be honest in his opinion.  Serov 
believed that Russia was provoked by the fact that weapons 
used in Georgia came from the United States and the Ukraine, 
adding the United States had also trained Georgian soldiers. 
DeNinno asked if there were other factors involved in the 
decision, such as missile defense or NATO.  Serov immediately 
responded that it had nothing to do with missile defense, 
adamantly proclaiming that U.S. and Ukrainian weapons were 
found in Georgia and used by Georgians, and Russia had 
evidence to support that.  (Begin Comment:  Serov had 
consistently been easy-going and willing to openly discuss a 
variety of issues with U.S. Delegation members.  Georgia was 
the only topic that he became visibly agitated about 
discussing.  End Comment.) 
 
----------------------------------------- 
ISKANDER A RESPONSE TO A PERCEIVED THREAT 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶23.  (S) DeNinno asked Serov if Russia was really putting the 
Iskander Missile Complex in Kaliningrad as a response to 
missile defense (MD) in Europe.  Serov said the Iskander 
would not be put into Kaliningrad if the United States does 
not put MD in Europe.  Nash inserted that MD was not aimed 
at, nor does it pose a threat to, Russia.  Serov replied that 
the deployment of Iskander missiles would be a response to 
what Russia perceived as a threat.  DeNinno asked Serov if he 
thought that the deployment of Iskander missiles in 
Kaliningrad created tension in Europe, to which Serov 
responded that Europe does not want MD either.  When asked 
whether Russia was looking for more cooperation or simply to 
get rid of MD, Serov replied that Russia had provided a long 
list of steps to increase confidence with regard to MD, but 
the United States appeared not to take Russian suggestions 
under serious consideration by not adopting any of the 
Russian suggestions. 
 
------------------- 
BIOGRAPHIC TIDBITS 
------------------- 
 
¶24. (S) Regarding Kuzmin's retirement plans, Kuz'min told 
Hanchett that he had hoped to retire prior to the next 
session (typically scheduled in the spring) but his superiors 
had other ideas.  Therefore, he believed his retirement would 
be delayed. 
 
¶25. (S) Yaguchi asked if Ryzhkov would be retiring soon 
because it would be good to continue working issues with him. 
 Ryzhkov stated that he did not think he was retiring soon, 
but that it is still up in the air. 
 
¶26. (S) In discussion with Artem'yev and interpreters Gusev 
and Cheykin, Brown was told that Kashirin was born in 
Rostov-on-the-Don and was an ethnic Cossack.  In response to 
Brown's questions about Cossacks in the Russian military, 
Gusev and Cheykin stated that while there is no strictly 
Cossack military component in the Russian Army, the Cossacks 
do have a uniformed border unit.  They also stated that an 
(unidentified) Cossack unit took part in military operations 
in South Ossetia. 
 
¶27. (S) Kotkova indicated to Miller that she had spent 
significant time working on President Medvedev's proposal for 
a new European security arrangement.  She stated that she 
helped prepare the draft agreement presented by President 
Medvedev earlier this year (to either the European Union (EU) 
or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), she couldn't recall which organization).  She said 
President Medvedev only delivered a three-page draft treaty, 
rather than the 20 plus page document her office had 
prepared.  The 20 plus page document included a series of 
draft "articles."  Kotkova also stated she was in Astana, 
Kazakhstan, for a week in mid-November 2008 working on issues 
related to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  She 
said this was her second trip to Astana, having gone once 
last year.  Kotkova told Brown that she has worked in the MFA 
for 14 years. 
 
¶28.  (S) General Major Nikishin told DeNinno that he is 
General Buzhinskiy's Deputy and is responsible for 
non-strategic treaties and security agreements, such as OSCE. 
 Nikishin also informed DeNinno and Yaguchi that he attended 
the Harvard Senior Officers Executive Course.  Nikishin 
freely offered this information as well as the names of U.S. 
flag officers who he has previously met, such as General 
Shinseki, General Wesley Clarke, and Admiral Delaney. 
Nikishin said he met Admiral Delaney during a Pacific Fleet 
military-to-military exchange. 
 
¶29.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text