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C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 001000 
 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
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NSC FOR HAYES 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018 
TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ
 
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII:  (U) U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT, 
NOVEMBER 21, 2008 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative 
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. 
Reasons:  1.5(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-025. 
 
¶2.  (U) At Paragraph 3 below is the text of the U.S. 
Statement that was delivered at the Closing Plenary Meeting 
of the Thirty-third Session of the START Treaty's Joint 
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), held at the U.S. 
Mission on November 21, 2008. 
 
¶3.  (S) Begin text: 
 
STATEMENT 
BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO 
THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION 
AT THE CLOSING PLENARY MEETING 
OF THE THIRTY-THIRD SESSION 
 
November 21, 2008 
 
      The U.S. Delegation joins with the Representatives of 
the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the 
Russian Federation, and Ukraine in closing the Thirty-third 
session of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission. 
 
I 
 
      The progress we continue to make toward resolving 
issues on the Commission's agenda is indicative of our 
Governments' commitment and ability to work together 
constructively during the intersessional period, in concert 
with the business-like manner in which we approach these 
issues here in Geneva.  The United States appreciates the 
work of our colleagues in this regard.  Some issues, however, 
will require sustained - and perhaps renewed - effort to 
resolve. 
 
II 
 
      The United States continues to be extremely concerned 
regarding the use of very large covers on missile front 
sections during SS-27 silo and road-mobile ICBM reentry 
vehicle on-site inspections (RVOSIs).  The use of these large 
covers prohibits our inspectors from ascertaining that the 
front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the one 
warhead attributed to these missiles.  We urge the Russian 
Federation to work to resolve this issue as soon as possible. 
 
III 
 
      The U.S. remains concerned with respect to the Russian 
intention to declare the RS-24 prototype ICBM as a new type. 
The U.S. reiterates its request that the Russian Federation 
provide a clear explanation of the START Treaty basis for 
declaring the RS-24 as a new type based on the existing type 
of missile, the SS-25, rather than the SS-27, which is a 
declared variant of the SS-25. 
 
IV 
 
      With respect to the stated Russian concerns regarding 
Minuteman III RVOSIs, the Delegations had a useful exchange 
of views on notional procedures and technical aspects of a 
possible one-time demonstration of the lower portion of a 
Minuteman III missile front section.  The United States will 
study the feasibility of conducting such a demonstration and 
will communicate a proposal to the other Parties. 
 
V 
 
      The Parties again discussed Russian concerns with the 
Courtland Missile Assembly Facility, including those 
elaborated in the Russian Aide-memoire of October 20, 2008. 
The United States emphasizes that the Trident I SLBM first 
stage motors are brought to Courtland to undergo activities 
that are consistent with work done at production facilities, 
including stage assembly.  The technical information required 
by Joint Statements 21 and 31 for ICBMs or SLBMs used to 
deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, will be 
provided to the other Parties at the appropriate time.  The 
U.S. emphasizes that, in accordance with paragraph 3(a) of 
Article III, any Trident I SLBM first-stage remains 
accountable as a Trident I SLBM and, therefore, would be 
subject to all the relevant provisions of the START Treaty as 
a Trident I SLBM. 
 
VI 
 
      Russian concerns with the conversion of the B-1 heavy 
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other that long-range 
nuclear ALCMs to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear 
armaments were again discussed at this session.  The United 
States believes that the fundamental cause for the 
differences of views on this issue is that there is not a 
common understanding regarding the meaning of the phrase 
"incapable of carrying nuclear armaments."  Accordingly, the 
United States has proposed a draft JCIC Joint Statement that 
if agreed would record the Parties' common understanding of 
that phrase.  We were encouraged by the discussions of this 
issue by our experts, and urge the Parties to continue to 
study the U.S. proposed text and to communicate their views 
in diplomatic channels during the intersessional period. 
 
VII 
 
      The United States appreciated hearing the views of the 
other START Treaty Parties as we begin to consider the 
extension of the Treaty in accordance with Article XVII.  Our 
meeting on November 17 fulfilled the requirements of the 
Treaty to meet to consider this issue prior to December 5, 
¶2008.  The United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian 
Federation, and Ukraine will continue discussion of this 
issue, noting that a decision on this issue can be made up 
until the date of expiration of the Treaty on December 5, 
¶2009. 
 
VIII 
 
      With respect to the closing of the Votkinsk Portal 
Monitoring Facility, the Parties held extremely productive 
discussions regarding the U.S.-proposed draft documents 
relating to the closing of that facility. The United States 
notes that there are many logistical issues that must be 
resolved and that those details must be worked together with 
the other Parties.  We are encouraged by the positive 
discussions we have had on the draft documents and look 
forward to receiving substantive comments on these texts 
through diplomatic channels as soon as possible. 
 
IX 
 
      The United States notes the concerns expressed by the 
Russian Federation relating to the U.S.-declared conversion 
of 50 Peacekeeper silo launchers to Minuteman III silo 
launchers.  The United States will study the Russian concerns 
and will respond as appropriate. 
 
      The United States notes the explanation provided by 
Ukraine regarding its proposal that the Parties consider the 
possibility of concluding a JCIC Agreement that would 
re-establish, as of December 2009, the types of former ICBMs 
listed in Article III, paragraph 10(c), and will study the 
Ukrainian proposal. 
 
X 
 
      The United States notes the concerns expressed by the 
Russian Delegation with respect to a number of heavy bombers 
located at the Davis-Monthan Conversion or Elimination 
Facility.  The United States would like to inform the other 
Parties that there are a number of heavy bombers undergoing 
aging and surveillance activities at the Davis-Monthan 
Conversion or Elimination Facility.  As a result of these 
activities, these heavy bombers are in various stages of 
disassembly.  These heavy bombers remain accountable under 
the Treaty and are subject to inspection, as provided for  in 
the Tenth Agreed Statement.  The United States assures the 
other Parties that if a decision is made to eliminate these 
heavy bombers in the future their elimination shall be 
conducted in accordance  with the provisions of Section VI of 
the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, including all 
required notifications. 
 
      The United States has attached this unilateral 
statement as an unclassified Annex to this plenary statement. 
 
XI 
 
      We once again encourage our Treaty partners to 
communicate through diplomatic channels their views on agenda 
items, as well as any related information in support of those 
views, well in advance of our next JCIC session. 
 
XII 
 
      Thank you all for your work here in Geneva.  I look 
forward to continuing to work together during the 
intersessional period. 
 
      Once again, I'd like to thank our translators and 
interpreters for their exceptional work.  Without them, we 
could not function. 
 
      Have a safe journey home. 
 
End text. 
 
¶4.  (U) Taylor sends. 
TICHENOR 
 
 
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