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                  ------------------FB0319  141006Z /38    
R 140958Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
SECDEF WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC 1182
COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
ARCENT INTEL FT MCPHERSON GA
COMUSARCENT KU INTEL CAMP DOHA KU
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
AMEMBASSY KABUL 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
DIA WASHDC 0134

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001396 
 
 
ARCENT PLEASE PASS TO IMA; DEPT FOR SCA; DIA FOR DHO-2; OSC 
FOR OSD/P; JOINT STAFF FOR J-5; CENTCOM FOR CCJ5; SOCCENT 
FOR J33 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2018 
TAGS: AF MAS MCAP OVIP PGOV PREL TI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ARCENT COMMANDER LTG LOVELACE,S 20 
NOVEMBER VISIT TO DUSHANBE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Tracey A. Jacobson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U) Embassy Dushanbe looks forward to the upcoming visit 
of LTG Lovelace.  Since Tajikistan,s limited defense 
capability consists primarily of Russian-influenced ground 
forces, the position of the ARCENT Commander is ideal to 
pursue basic and sorely needed reforms as well as further 
joint Tajik-Afghan security cooperation programs.  Following 
is a brief overview of the current situation in Tajikistan 
and our thoughts on the key issues LTG Lovelace should 
discuss during his visit. 
 
POLITICAL OVERVIEW - STAGNATION IN THE FACE OF ADVERSITY 
 
¶2. (C) Tajikistan approaches its next winter ill-prepared for 
the inevitable power shortages and intensified food 
insecurity.  The GOTI claims it has stockpiled food and fuel, 
but we cannot verify this and other donors report a 
continuing unwillingness by the GOTI to coordinate with them. 
 The global financial crisis has yet to hit ordinary Tajiks, 
as the remittances from Russia which support so many continue 
to pour in.  However, a downturn in the Russian construction 
sector could have serious impact on Tajikistan.  If this 
happens in the next few months, it could hit Tajikistan 
simultaneously with less money for food during the difficult 
winter period, and possibly more unemployed Tajiks returning 
home with no job prospects. 
 
¶3. (C) If the Government is feeling any effects from the 
financial crisis and the decline of world aluminum prices by 
over a third since July, it is not yet evident.  The 
Government continues to make payments for construction of the 
massive $300 million presidential palace in the center of 
Dushanbe, which will be complete in December.  Work on other 
presidential dachas around the country goes on. 
 
¶4. (C) Tajikistan's political leadership continues to 
stagnate, with some signs of increased intolerance of 
alternate viewpoints.  The Government appears to be 
increasing pressure on foreign religious organizations, by 
deporting religious NGO staff and banning activities of some 
churches, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses.  For other 
motivations, namely property expropriation, the Mayor of 
Dushanbe is forcing the U.S. affiliated Grace Sun Min Church 
out of property it legally acquired several years ago.  The 
Mayor has reportedly told his staff he is "unafraid" of the 
U.S. Embassy, which has sent diplomatic notes on behalf of 
the Church and monitored legal proceedings in the case. 
Observers of the case use it as an example of the Mayor's 
willingness and ability to manipulate the court system, 
getting the judge in the case to make rulings that contradict 
the facts and the law.  There has been a U.S. congressional 
inquiry concerning this case.  In other fields, the Foreign 
Ministry has refused to meet with Department officials that 
it invited to Tajikistan to discuss the Nuclear Smuggling 
Outreach Initiative, and the Ministry of Justice has rebuffed 
efforts by donors to assist in rewriting the criminal 
procedure code. 
 
POLITICAL SONG AND DANCE 
 
¶5. (C) Rahmon has attempted to firm up his control of the 
Q5. (C) Rahmon has attempted to firm up his control of the 
regions in the face of opposition which has been violent on 
at least one occasion.  In response to demonstrations last 
spring against government activities in Badakhshan, and the 
February killing of the national police special unit 
commander during an attempted arrest in Gharm, Rahmon 
recently traveled to both regions, bringing clothing, 
computers, tractors, and other "gifts" for the local 
population (he also has brought hundreds of dancers and 
singers on these regional visits).  In the case of 
Badakhshan, contacts there report that the President's July 
visit was a success, in that it undermined any legitimacy 
that local protest organizers had (they were reportedly drug 
smugglers angry at government  pressure on them, despite the 
ostensibly political reasons for the demonstrations).  The 
early October visit to Gharm is harder to assess.  The region 
is generally anti-government, but Rahmon showed that he could 
go there and get some results; the local police officer and 
ex-oppositionist who was behind the killing of the police 
special unit commander agreed to step down and have his unit 
disbanded.  He also turned in several weapons, although 
sources in Gharm dismiss the handover as small in comparison 
to the numbers of illegal weapons floating around the area. 
President Rahmon's nascent personality cult was on display 
during the Rasht visit; excessive and repetitive television 
coverage of his public meetings there featured locals calling 
him "king of kings" and saying there was no need for any 
further elections in Tajikistan. 
 
¶6. (C) Tajikistan's long-term political and developmental 
challenges have not gone away. Economic flight of Tajiks to 
Russia continues, and in rural areas embassy contacts report 
that boys as young as their mid-teens are now leaving to look 
for work abroad.  More women are leaving as well, as are 
those with higher education.  The embassy does not see an 
imminent threat from conservative Islamic movements, but the 
Government's fear of fundamentalist Islam is obviously 
increasing.  In mid-October the Government announced that the 
Salafi movement would be banned, and Salafis are now barred 
from mosques (as are women and boys under eighteen years 
old).  Identifying Salafis is a mysterious process, but to 
the degree that they exist in Tajikistan they will certainly 
be driven underground and further radicalized by this measure. 
 
ECONOMIC STEPS, AND MISSTEPS 
 
¶7. (C) The Government says it plans to develop domestic 
sources of alumina to supply the giant Talco aluminum plant 
at Tursunzade, however this plan is years away from 
execution.  As noted above, low aluminum prices are likely 
reducing revenues from Talco.  The international press has 
reported extensively on the lawsuit involving Talco in 
London. Tajikistan has reportedly spent over $150 million 
(approximately 5% of the country's 2007 GDP) pursuing a case 
that experts give it very little chance of winning.  Trial 
proceedings have commenced in the case, in which Tajikistan 
is pursuing the old Talco management for stealing Talco 
revenue, and the old management team has lodged counter 
accusations of massive fraud.  An audit of Talco is in the 
offing, as part of the Government's agreement with the IMF to 
resolve the latest misreporting scandal; but whether the 
audit will encompass the offshore company through which 
Talco's revenues reportedly flow is still in doubt.  The 
audit and staff monitoring program at the Central Bank is due 
to conclude by November 10, with a preliminary report to come 
out by the end of the month. 
 
¶8. (U/FOUO) In late-August Tajikistan and Afghanistan signed 
a Power Purchase Agreement for  electricity supplies from 
Tajikistan to Afghanistan, opening the door to ADB financing 
to construct a 220 kv transmission line to Kunduz by spring 
¶2010.  The Government is funding  construction of the giant 
Rogun Dam project, to the tune of $50 to 100 million per 
year, but it has so far been unable to secure international 
involvement in the project. 
 
¶9. (C) Reform of the agricultural sector continues to be 
Q9. (C) Reform of the agricultural sector continues to be 
largely rhetorical; farmers are still forced to grow cotton, 
students are forced to pick it, and a few well-connected 
investors continue to squeeze everyone else with unfair labor 
practices and below-market prices.  State Department's Office 
of Global Affairs Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP) recently 
visited Tajikistan, and expressed concern about students 
forced to pick cotton.  The New York Times has also picked up 
on abuses in the Tajik cotton sector.  The cotton sector is 
headed for serious troubles; disruptions last year due to 
extreme cold and financial uncertainties stemming from delays 
in land reform legislation, have led to a low harvest this 
year. Cotton investors will likely respond to this situation 
by squeezing farmers even more. 
 
THE ECONOMY - TAJIKS LOOK FOR THE EXITS 
 
¶10. (C) Estimates are for inflation to reach 20% this year, 
and prices for basic foodstuffs are often double last year's 
prices.  With few legitimate business opportunities in 
Tajikistan, and deteriorating education and other public 
services, much of the population relies on remittances from 
Tajiks working abroad.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
percentage of Tajiks who move abroad to seek permanent or 
temporary work (estimated at 50 percent of the working 
population) is increasing.  Tajik social indicators are 
declining, health care and educational systems are 
degenerating, and young Tajiks are arguably worse prepared 
for life than those who grew up under the Soviet Union.  The 
business climate is not improving.  Tajikistan remains a 
remarkably difficult place to do business, and the climate 
shows few signs of improving. 
 
¶11. (C) Last year's unusually harsh winter damaged crops and 
seed stores. It was followed by drought and locust 
infestations in spring and early summer, resulting in lower 
food production this year.  Combined with mounting 
agricultural debts and rapidly increasing food prices, rural 
families who sold their tools and livestock to survive last 
winter are headed into the next winter in poor shape to deal 
with its difficulties.  Tajikistan is highly dependent on 
imports for its food supply and is vulnerable to the ongoing 
worldwide food price increases.  We expect food insecurity to 
worsen. 
 
¶12. (C) International investors do not view Tajikistan as a 
viable place to do business.  Would-be investors, large and 
small, find themselves stymied by corruption at all levels, 
and local investors have been the targets of property grabs 
by the well-connected.  Foreign investors must also overcome 
restrictive visa rules, lack of air connections, and the 
government's suspicion of foreign involvement in any sphere. 
What little foreign investment exists is state-sponsored or 
directed from Iran, China, and Russia.  The President has 
formed an Investment Council, including participation of 
foreign investors, and attended a meeting with American 
businesses in New York during the UNGA.  While the meeting in 
New York saw some frank comments from would-be investors, it 
is too soon to tell whether they will have any impact on 
Rahmon. 
 
¶13.  (C) In general, the political and economic background of 
your security-related agenda is not positive.  Constriction 
of political space, intolerance of religion, obstruction of 
foreign assistance and investment, a leadership 
single-mindedly committed to personal enrichment, short-term 
gain, and control of the economy at the expense of economic 
growth; these factors have retarded Tajikistan's development 
and driven hundreds of thousands of Tajiks to emigrate. 
Embassy's earlier analyses predicted these would lead to an 
eventual breakdown, but not 
for several years.  We are watching closely to see whether 
the global financial crisis should change our time calculus. 
Tajikistan's banking sector is isolated, but the country is 
highly food-insecure and vulnerable to disruptions in the 
Russian economy or decline in the world price of aluminum. 
 
COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES 
 
¶14. (C) Bridge: Use of the Tajikistan-Afghanistan bridge at 
Nizhny Pyanj is growing.  About 200 trucks a day now cross 
QNizhny Pyanj is growing.  About 200 trucks a day now cross 
the bridge going north.  However, obstacles to full use of 
the bridge remain; there are still no provisions for 
pedestrian traffic, and it remains difficult for Afghans to 
obtain a Tajikistani visa, both because of bureaucratic 
delays and demands for bribes from Tajikistani consular 
officials.  The inspection facilities at the Tajikistan end 
of the bridge are complete, and the Customs Agency has 
assumed responsibility for that location. However, the Agency 
has stated it will not occupy the facilities until several 
outstanding construction projects are complete, such as 
parking lots, lighting, and pedestrian walkways.  The Army 
Corps of Engineers (Kabul District) is addressing these 
needs, albeit slowly. 
 
¶15. (C) Narcotics: Cooperation on narcotics continues to be a 
relative bright spot, but only superficially.  While 
Tajikistan's law enforcement and security services seize more 
narcotics than other Central Asian states (and overall 
narcotics seizures were up 19% over 2007), they are not 
willing to take on the arrest and prosecution of narcotics 
smuggling ring leaders, some of whom are politically 
well-connected.  Three successful interdiction missions on 
the Tajik-Afghan border in August by the SOCCENT-trained 
Border Guard Separate Group for Special Reconnaissance are 
examples of recent operational highlights.  We promote and 
see active and productive cooperation between the Tajik, 
Kyrgyz, and Afghan drug agencies.  In a mid-October speech, 
President Rahmon called for joint Tajik-Afghan law 
enforcement training.  While we welcome and will vigorously 
pursue this opening, Border Guard and Committee on National 
Security generals have obstructed any forward movement on 
joint training of their service personnel in the past. 
 
¶16. (C) Security Cooperation: Security Cooperation remains a 
strong part of our relationship, as we pursue shared 
interests in building stability in Afghanistan.  The 
Tajikistani Ministry of Defense is opening up to cooperation 
with Afghanistan.  The Tajikistani Military Institute began 
training 30 officers from Afghanistan in November.  This 
seems to be a sincere effort to assist in the process of 
building stability in Afghanistan, and stands in sharp 
contrast to Tajikistan's Border Guards' refusal to allow 
joint training with Afghan counterparts.  Tajikistan has also 
accepted the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative 
(GPOI), funded at $2.5 million. The Ministry of Defense 
received a CENTCOM GPOI delegation in late June, and with 
CENTCOM,s advisory assistance and limited infrastructure 
upgrades, is committed to deploying a company of peacekeeping 
troops by 2010. GPOI provides an opportunity to build a 
critical capability that will not only allow Tajikistan to 
"show the flag" on an international scale, but will also 
offer training and reform opportunities to other cadre within 
the Ministry of Defense.  The embassy is working closely with 
the Ministry of Defense to synchronize training and support 
to make this unit a reality.  After overcoming a series of 
delays in obtaining Tajik visas for the Afghan contractor, 
the rebuild of three border outposts has begun along the 
Tajik-Afghan border. 
 
¶17. (C) Regional Integration: Efforts to spark regional 
integration between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and more 
broadly between Central and South Asia, have seen some recent 
successes.  In August Tajikistan signed a commercial power 
purchase agreement with Afghanistan, paving the way for sales 
of seasonal hydroelectricity to the Afghan grid starting in 
spring 2010.  In late-October the USG hosted a conference of 
Central and South Asian aviation sector officials and 
companies, to foster quicker integration of their markets. 
USTDA and State Department are following up on this 
conference to implement a consultative mechanism to address 
issues raised there.  However, Tajikistan's relations with 
Uzbekistan remain poor, and there has been no progress toward 
resolution of Uzbekistan's opposition to construction of the 
Rogun Dam. 
 
PROPOSED TALKING POINTS 
 
 
¶18. (U//FOUO) During your bilateral meetings with Mobile 
Forces Commander General-Major (U.S. 1-star equivalent) 
Faziyev and the Commandant of the Military Institute 
General-Major Teshaev, Embassy Dushanbe recommends 
emphasizing the following points. 
 
For GEN-MAJ Faziyev, Mobile Forces Commander: 
 
--(U//FOUO) I appreciate Tajikistan's continuing support to 
the United States in the CENTCOM's area of responsibility. 
The generous SOFA, blanket overflight clearances and 
emergency divert agreement granted to DoD are a significant 
gesture of support, save valuable time and resources, and 
significantly contribute to the development of a stable 
Afghanistan. (Background note: On 11 NOV post submitted the 
diplomatic note for the renewal of CY09 over flight 
clearances. CJCS ADM Mullen also sent a letter to his Tajik 
counterpart GEN-LT (U.S. 2-star equivalent) Nadirov 
emphasizing the importance of this privilege.  Because the 
Tajik government is currently deciding this issue, your 
emphasis on this point is very timely.) 
 
 
--(U//FOUO) I am very encouraged by the Ministry of 
Defense,s acceptance of the Global Peacekeeping Operations 
Initiative.  The battalion-sized installation that the 
Ministry of Defense offered for the PKO unit is in excellent 
condition.  We look to Tajikistan to fully man and equip the 
unit and then wisely focus other available security 
assistance program funds on the formation of this discrete 
PKO unit.  CENTCOM will use GPOI funds for training the PKO 
cadre as well as for limited upgrades to the unit facility. I 
encourage you to actively participate in the January Action 
Officer Working Group in Dushanbe to help shape the FY 2010 
military to military plan.  This is your forum to ensure that 
you receive the necessary support for establishing the PKO 
unit.  Our planners at CENTCOM are working diligently to 
provide you with feedback from the July assessment visit. 
 
--(U//FOUO) I understand Tajikistan faced numerous food and 
energy shortages this past winter.  I am concerned that 
Tajikistan may encounter similar problems this winter, which 
could have consequences for regional cooperation efforts with 
Afghanistan.  How do you plan to address this potential 
crisis and will the Tajik military play any role in its 
solution? 
 
 
For GEN-MAJ Teshaev, Commandant of the Military Institute: 
 
--(U//FOUO) I welcome the steps taken by Tajikistan to build 
Afghanistan's capacity. Specifically, I am pleased that the 
Tajikistani Ministry of Defense's Military Institute is 
currently training 30 Afghan officers.  What is the program 
of instruction?   Are the U.S-provided generator and 
furniture meeting your needs?  This is the second time 
you,ve trained Afghans (they trained Afghan cadets in 2004). 
 Do you have plans for more joint training in the future? 
More joint initiatives with Afghanistan are welcomed in the 
security arena and your suggestions are welcomed in how we 
can help you build on this initiative. 
 
--(U/FOUO)  Thanks in advance to the Ministry of Defense for 
hosting Exercise Regional Cooperation 09 (AUG 09). 
Specifically, thanks to you for providing some of your 
facilities as a forum for the exercise.  I hope that the 
national disaster response/medical scenario and the 
exercise-related construction are beneficial to your long 
term efforts here at the institute. 
 
¶19. (U) POC:  Lieutenant Colonel Dan Green, USA, Defense and 
Army Attache, USDAO Dushanbe, Voice: (992)(37) 229-2701, 
Cell: (992) (90) 700-7030, classified email: 
digredy(AT)dia.smil.mil or GreenDR2(AT)state.sgov.gov. 
Unclass email: GreenDR2(AT)state.gov. 
JACOBSON