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Viewing cable 08DAMASCUS773, CORRECTED COPY: ANYTHING BUT CONCILIATORY: SARG

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08DAMASCUS773 2008-11-03 09:19 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Damascus
VZCZCXRO1451
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0773/01 3080919
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 030919Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5527
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000773 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ELA 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/MCDERMOTT 
PARIS FOR WALLER 
LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2018 
TAGS: PREL PTER PINS ASEC IZ IR SY
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY:  ANYTHING BUT CONCILIATORY: SARG 
FOCUSED ON IRAQ, REVOKING AMSCHOOL STAFF VISAS 
 
REF: A. DAMASCUS 756 
     B. LONDON 2755 
     C. IIR 6 891 005 09 
     D. 07 DAMASCUS 1080 
     E. DAMASCUS 107 
     F. DAMASCUS 677 
 
Classified By: Classified by CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5 b and d 
. 
 
Corrected classification (Damascus 772). 
 
 1.  (S)  Summary: Several Embassy sources suggest Iran and 
Hizballah are pressuring the SARG not only to lobby PM 
Maliki's government to alter the U.S.-Iraqi bilateral 
security framework and SOFA, but also to participate in joint 
attacks against U.S. military targets in Iraq and elsewhere. 
As reported Ref C, Iran is also reported to be pushing 
Russian Embassy reps here to provide Syria with advanced air 
defense systems to protect its eastern border.  Up to now, 
President Asad appears reluctant to involve Syria in a 
military strike against the U.S., but the SARG announced 
November 2 it moving security troops from the Iraqi-Syrian 
border.  FM Muallim, who reportedly was working to convince 
President Asad that Syria risks putting Syrian-U.S. relations 
in the "deep freeze" well into the future, is now saying 
publicly that Syria may resort to more "painful" measures. 
In a message passed through a visiting American academic, 
Muallem assured us the SARG did not want to escalate the 
situation and would increase Embassy security.  Many Syrians 
tell us the SARG restrictions on Embassy operations may in 
fact be reversible if the USG is willing to explain its 
alleged 10/26 actions in a way that allows both sides to save 
face and defuse further confrontation.  On November 3 
(today), however, the Ministry of Education and Immigration 
authorities have canceled the visas of American School 
teachers and given them until midnight November 4 to be out 
of the country.  End Summary 
 
 
--------------------- 
THE SOFA IS THE ISSUE 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (S)  As initially suggested ref A, a growing number of 
Embassy sources suggest that Syria is focused on Iraq in 
responding to the alleged 10/26 U.S. attack at Abu Kamal. 
Moreover, we are hearing Iran and Hizballah are urging Syria 
to collude in attacks against U.S. military targets in Iraq 
and elsewhere, in addition to lobbying Iraq to insist on 
security framework and SOFA language explicitly forbidding 
U.S. attacks on foreign targets from Iraqi soil.  Mohammad 
Musli (strictly protect), a Palestinian-American academic who 
enjoys access to Syrian officials, commented that "there 
isn't much the Syrians can do on their own in this regard, 
but they can strengthen Iranian efforts to lobby the GOI." 
Musli warned Iran and Hizballah were goading Syrian 
counterparts by arguing "the Americans are not hitting us 
because they know we will respond." 
 
3.  (S) Former Minister of Telecommunications Amre Salem 
(strictly protect) confirmed this assessment, saying he had 
heard the President is wary of Iranian designs that might 
lead Syria into war.  "Asad had to demonstrate he was capable 
of responding," but the Syrian President remained doubtful of 
those who argue America's influence is in irreversible 
decline.  Asad, added Salem, would be likely to respond 
positively to a USG message that conveyed the intended 
purpose and the actual results of the U.S. military raid, 
expressed condolences for any innocent fatalities and 
injuries, and mentioned an interest in discussing the 
incident with Syrian authorities.  Asad, said Salem, 
understood that the U.S. was in a dominant position, but it 
was not necessary to stress this point because it would only 
embarrass him. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
DESPITE MUALLIM'S EFFORTS, DCS TEACHERS ORDERED TO LEAVE 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
 
DAMASCUS 00000773  002 OF 003 
 
 
4.  (S)  Returning to Syria after his trip to London (Ref B), 
FM Muallim reportedly has been working to convince Asad to 
contain U.S.-Syrian tensions and find a face-saving exit. 
According to Musli, SARG officials are at a loss to explain 
why the U.S. launched the alleged 10/26 raid after the 
Secretary's and NEA A/S Welch's recent meetings with FM 
Muallim in New York.  Reflecting a limited understanding of 
the U.S. political scene, many regime insiders have concluded 
the purpose of the alleged raid was to influence the U.S. 
Presidential elections, Musli said.  (Note:  Syrian 
Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustafa made these arguments in a 
recent "Newsweek" interview.)  A few Syrians have told Musli 
they believe the current administration is using its 
remaining days in office to sabotage the possibility of 
better U.S.-Syrian relations in the future. 
 
5.  (S)  According to Musli, Muallim has expressed a strong 
desire to contain the current situation and prevent it from 
escalating.  Above all, Muallim wants to avoid provoking a 
U.S. decision to expel Ambassador Mustafa because "it will 
take months before the SARG could replace him."  Muallim, 
says Musli, is mindful that closing the American School 
represents a punishment that will affect the broader 
diplomatic and international community in Damascus, and he is 
reportedly trying to reverse the decision.  A number of 
diplomatic missions and international organizations, led by 
Canada, requested MFA appointments to protest the SARG's 
closure of the school.  They will meet with D/FM Faisal 
Miqdad at 1200 local November 3.  (Note:  We received word 
November 3 (today) that the Ministry of Education has issued 
an order for DCS teachers to leave Syria by midnight November 
4.  The school has notified parents that it will be closing 
its doors today.) 
 
6.  (S)  Former Minister Salem, who has a daughter in DCS, 
told us the SARG response was not well conceived and probably 
reflected the negative influence of the Ministry of 
Education.  He predicted (correctly) the Ministry of 
Education would attempt to move forward quickly to head off 
any efforts by others to reverse the decision.  Many Syrians, 
he said, were  weighing in privately, and there was some hope 
that the President could be persuaded to reverse his 
position.  The President and a minority of his inner circle 
"surely understood what target the U.S. was after," but had 
no choice but to respond publicly.  According to Salem, the 
regime may have been caught flatfooted by Syrian press 
reports that broke the story of the U.S. raid.  Once the 
incident became public and it was clear there were 
eyewitnesses, "the regime lost its ability to deny the 
incident."  At the same time, Salem was hearing Asad wanted 
to prevent further escalation and avoid any moves that would 
put bilateral relations in the "deep freeze" for some time to 
come.  But it was clear that SARG insiders with an axe to 
grind against the school and cultural center "had the 
President's ear at the moment."  Again, suggested Salem, a 
face-saving message from the U.S. would help SARG insiders 
arguing for a more moderate approach. 
 
----------------------------------- 
MOVEMENT AT THE SYRIAN-IRAQI BORDER 
----------------------------------- 
 
7.  (S)  Meanwhile, regional and Syrian media reported a SARG 
decision to withdraw border security troops from the east and 
re-deploy them to Syria's border with Lebanon.  According to 
various report from Embassy contacts, including defense 
attaches who participated in an October 31 SARG-organized 
trip to Abu Kamal, some 200 Syrian border guards had been 
moved.  During the Abu Kamal briefing (Ref C), Syrian 
officials reportedly told the attaches that they understood 
repositioning border forces would lead to terrorist attacks 
in Iraq and argued such attacks would be "justified" in light 
of the alleged 10/26 U.S. attack.  The Iranian Embassy, which 
received a separate SARG briefing along with Russian and 
Chinese reps, reportedly is pushing Russian dips here to 
provide enhanced air defense systems to protect Syria's 
border with Iraq.  According to Salem, the U.S. might be able 
to score public diplomacy points on this issue by suggesting 
a pull back of Syrian border guards would leave the U.S. no 
choice but to consider future cross-border operations in the 
absence of any expressed will to cooperate. 
 
DAMASCUS 00000773  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
8.  (S)  Comment:  Our assessment of SARG decisionmaking 
begins and ends with the assumption that regime survival and 
prestige matter most to President Asad   An American attack 
on Syrian soil would represent the latest in a long series of 
foreign incursions against Syrian sovereignty and national 
dignity.  These include the September 2007 Israeli bombing of 
al Kibar, the February 2007 assassination in Damascus of Imad 
Mugniyah, and the September 28 bombing against a Syrian 
Military Intelligence facility (Refs D-F). In the current 
situation, the SARG's responses of anti-U.S. bromides and 
orders to close the American School and Cultural Center 
appear meant to reaffirm evidence of Bashar's backbone while 
stopping short of retaliating in a way that could pose real 
retaliatory threats to Damascus and end the prospects for 
better relations with the U.S. and the West in the future. 
These responses appear aimed at annoying, rather than 
threatening.  This is a distinction lost on the 450-plus 
parents of children attending the American School and the 
some 2,000 American Language Center students (mostly Syrian) 
who find themselves in the role of innocent victims. 
 
9.  (S)  If anything, the SARG's position is hardening.  Even 
so-called regime moderates such as Muallim are now warning 
the SARG may resort to more "painful" responses if the U.S. 
does not explain its actions.  Iran's behind-the-scenes 
actions appear intended to push Syria toward confrontation 
with the U.S. and the West.  Maintaining Washington silence 
will no doubt continue to keep the SARG guessing, frustrate 
friendly governments who would otherwise be willing to make 
our case, and befuddle ordinary Syrians who still are trying 
to process the SARG's unchallenged allegations of a U.S. 
attack on Syrian soil.  Within the SARG, however, regime 
hacks are citing U.S. silence as a sign of weakness and are 
pushing Bashar to take bolder, more confrontational steps. 
Any U.S. explanation that we could share with Syrian and 
other contacts should clearly highlight the potential costs 
to future U.S.-Syrian relations if Syria continues its 
involvement with FF facilitators and takes steps to reduce 
border security that result in increased attacks against 
Coalition forces. 
CONNELLY