P 190754Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0546
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL MELBOURNE PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL PERTH PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL SYDNEY PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

S E C R E T CANBERRA 001172 
 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM AND EAP 
PACOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2028 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA'S DEFENSE WHITE PAPER UPDATE 
 
REF: CANBERRA 1027 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel A. Clune. Reasons: 1.4 (a 
)(b)(c) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1. (S/NF)  Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon has directed that 
Australia's Defense White Paper be completed no later than 
April 2009, despite internal pressures to delay its release 
owing to the global financial crisis, according to the senior 
Department of Defence official heading the White Paper team. 
While there were no major surprises, he disclosed that the 
White Paper argues for Australia to maintain its previous 
level of engagement with the U.S. missile defense (MD) 
program, while seeking to enhance MD collaboration through 
its Aegis weapons system.  On force structure, the Australian 
Army would not undergo radical restructuring, but would need 
to increase the capacity of regular forces to take on more of 
the tasks previously assigned to special forces, freeing up 
the latter to undertake more difficult missions.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) At a November 18 lunch hosted by the DCM, Deputy 
Secretary of Defence for Strategy Michael Pezzullo and the 
three-member White Paper Ministerial Advisory Panel -- 
Professor Ross Babbage, Major General Peter Abigail (ret'd) 
and Dr. Mark Thomson -- provided an overview of the White 
Paper's development that closely tracked with that provided 
in the October 9 U.S.-Australia Pol-Mil Talks (reftel).  The 
DCM queried Pezzullo on timing of the report's release, in 
light of press accounts that Defence Minister Fitzgibbon had 
convened a seven-hour meeting of senior defense officials and 
the Ministerial Advisory Panel on November 14 to address ADOD 
concerns that more time was needed to assess the impact of 
the global financial crisis on the White Paper's cost 
figures.  Pezzullo said the Minister had directed that the 
paper be completed as originally scheduled in the March-April 
timeframe, expressing confidence that the paper would be 
delivered by the deadline.  The March-April timing was driven 
primarily by the GOA budget cycle, he added.  Unlike previous 
white papers, he said, the current product was fully costed, 
to include not only the cost of the defense items themselves, 
but costs for personnel, training, maintenance, warehousing 
and all other associated costs.  Pezzullo and Abigail noted 
that the White Paper would not recommend against any major 
weapons system because of cost considerations. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Pezzullo confirmed that the White Paper contained 
sections on space and missile defense.  On the latter, the 
White Paper recommended continuing engagement with the U.S. 
MD program, at least at the level maintained during the 
former Howard administration.  Moreover, Australia would seek 
to employ its Aegis weapons system, selected for the Air 
Warfare Destroyer (AWD) to further its MD collaboration with 
the United States.  Pezzullo noted that ministers understood 
the importance and benefits of MD cooperation but the 
Australian Labor Party had outdated perceptions of missile 
defense dating from the Reagan "star wars" concept that 
impeded the GOA's ability to move forward at a faster pace. 
A "redline" for the Labor Party and the Rudd government would 
be the development of the capacity to eliminate Russian or 
Chinese "second strike" capability. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Deputy Secretary Pezzullo, noting China had 
Q4. (S/NF) Deputy Secretary Pezzullo, noting China had 
expressed its displeasure with Prime Minister Rudd's 
September 9 speech on Australia's long-term defense, 
predicted Beijing would be "very unhappy" with the White 
Paper's identification of China's military modernization as a 
potential threat and with its endorsement of MD cooperation 
with the United States.  He added that Russian diplomats had 
approached him on different occasions during the Howard 
administration to bluntly complain that U.S. plans to deploy 
MD in Europe were aimed against Russia. He responded that he 
accepted the U.S. explanation, but even if the accusation was 
true, Russia should be talking directly to the United States, 
rather than trying to "peel off" Australia. 
 
¶5. (C/NF) Dr. Thomson gave an overview of China's military 
modernization, arguing that it sought to develop the 
capability not only to have its way with Taiwan, while 
blocking a U.S. response, but also to assert its hegemony 
over the region.  The annual U.S. DOD Report to Congress on 
China's Military Modernization failed to make this point 
clearly and strongly enough, he observed.  In Thomson's view, 
"transparency" is not the issue.  China's intentions are 
transparent, but problematic. 
 
¶6. (C) Turning to force structure, Maj. Gen. Abigail said the 
recommendations for the Australian Army were neither to lean 
toward heavy mechanization nor to move towards a more special 
forces-type army.  Instead, the report called for a package 
of changes, including additional light armor, but increasing 
the capability of regular ground forces to assume more 
traditional roles that had been assigned to special forces by 
risk-averse Australian politicians in recent years.  This 
would free up special forces to perform more difficult, risky 
missions. 
 
MCCALLUM