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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 001745 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/ERA JEFFREY GIAUQUE, NATHANIEL DEAN, EUR/RPM 
FOR LAURA LUCAS, PETER CHISHOLM, PM/ISO FOR CAPT. JEFF 
FREDERICK, AF/RSA FOR CHRISTOPHER POMMERER AND MICHAEL 
BITTRICK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018 
TAGS: EAID EUN EWWT PHSA PREF PREL XA XO XW ZP
SUBJECT: EU PREPARING FOR PIRACY MISSION, NO PLAN FOR 
CAPTURED PIRATES 
 
REF: A. USEU BRUSSELS 1720 
     ¶B. 1716 
     ¶C. 1575 
     ¶D. 1568 
     ¶E. 1533 
     ¶F. 1476 
     ¶G. 1370 
     ¶H. 1139 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristen Silverberg for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
. 
 
¶1. (C//NF) Summary:  The EU expects to launch its first naval 
operation by mid-December, when it will begin counter-piracy 
operations off the Horn of Africa.  The operation, dubbed 
Atalanta, will be commanded from an Operational Headquarters 
at Northwood, UK, with a Force Headquarters afloat.  The 
force should comprise at least three ships at any given time 
throughout the operation's one-year mandate, with the most 
likely contributors being France, the UK, Spain, Germany, 
Greece, the Netherlands, Belgium, probably Sweden, and maybe 
Italy.  A logistics hub and base for maritime patrol aircraft 
will be housed in Djibouti, probably at the French base.  The 
EU is also establishing pragmatic liaison arrangements with 
NATO at multiple levels -- a development that USEU recommends 
we quietly encourage so as not to raise a Turkey-Cyprus 
roadblock.  The thorny legalities of detaining and disposing 
of captured piracy suspects remain unresolved, although USEU 
contacts appear open to considering the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts convention as a legal mechanism that would 
obviate the need for new, potentially ad hoc, arrangements. 
End Summary. 
 
Ready to Approve the Mission 
 
¶2. (C)  French, UK and EU Council Secretariat contacts tell 
 
BRUSSELS 00001745  002 OF 006 
 
 
us that Operation Atalanta, the EU's counter-piracy mission 
off the Horn of Africa, will be ready to kick off by 
mid-December.  With the approval of the Joint Action 
authorizing the mission by the GAERC on November 10, the 
mission has the necessary political guidance.  Meanwhile, the 
military concept of operations is being reviewed in Brussels 
and should be ready for Political and Security Committee 
approval soon, UK First Secretary Duncan McCombie told PolOff 
on November 6.  McCombie also said that the official force 
generation conference would be on November 17 and 18, with an 
informal force generation conference to precede.  Greek 
pol-mil counselor Stavros Kyrimis told PolOff on November 14 
that force generation on November 17 would focus on filling 
out the operational headquarters, while official pledges of 
ships could be arranged through an exchange of letters. 
 
¶3. (C//NF)  Although the EU so far has avoided the 
Turkey-Cyprus roadblock to NATO-EU cooperation, McCombie 
(protect) told us that the UK and the French Presidency on 
November 5 had to steamroll last-minute Cypriot objections to 
the standard language on information sharing that was 
included in the Joint Action.  Nicosia wanted to substitute 
language requiring case-by-case approval by all 27 Member 
States for information exchange with third countries. 
McCombie warned that, while the UK and France had stopped 
Cyprus this time -- aided by the fact that the Cypriot 
proposal was unworkable -- they would not be able to 
strong-arm another Member State many more times. 
 
C2 and Force Structure 
 
¶4. (C//NF)  Operational planning is already underway at the 
mission's Operational Headquarters at Northwood, UK, under 
British Rear Admiral Philip Jones.  In addition, the EU last 
week agreed to an afloat Force Headquarters (FHQ) which would 
be led on a rotational basis first by Greece, followed by 
 
BRUSSELS 00001745  003 OF 006 
 
 
Spain, and rounded out by the Netherlands.  On November 12, 
Greek Commodore Antonios Papaioannou was named the first 
force commander.  McCombie said the UK was concerned about 
Greece taking up FHQ command first, so much so that the 
British Ambassador in Athens emphasized to the Greek 
Government the importance of a clean start to the mission. 
(Comment: McCombie did not provide specific reasons for the 
UK concerns, but we presume the British are worried about the 
Greeks raising political flags that might prompt a dispute 
with the Turks, after so much effort went into finding a 
workable NATO-EU liaison arrangement.)  Didier Lenoir, head 
of the Operations and Exercises Unit in the Defense Issues 
Directorate of DG E VIII, Thomas Bertin of the French 
Permanent Representation, and Stavros Kyrimis of the Greek 
delegation, confirmed that the FHQ would be afloat and would 
probably be staffed on a 4-month rotational basis by Greece, 
Spain, and the Netherlands. 
 
¶5.  (C)  USEU contacts each offered different portraits of 
the size of the force, probably because force generation has 
not officially begun.  All contacts confirmed that the 
contributing Member States would include France, the UK, 
Germany, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands, probably Sweden, and 
possibly Belgium.  On November 13, French counselor for 
political-military issues Thomas Bertin confirmed that 
France, the UK, Germany, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, and 
Belgium were expected to offer frigates, with Spain adding a 
tanker and maritime patrol aircraft.  France also noted that 
Italy is considering offering a frigate, and Sweden may offer 
two corvettes and a support ship. 
 
¶6.  (C)  However, not all of those countries will provide 
ships throughout Atalanta's year-long mandate.  Bertin 
offered the most specific description of the force 
requirements, saying that the mission would require at least 
three ships at all times: one to accompany World Food Program 
 
BRUSSELS 00001745  004 OF 006 
 
 
ships, one to accompany commercial ships in the Gulf of Aden, 
and a third for surveillance of the zone, particularly 
important fishing areas.  Bertin said that the mission could 
have more than three ships operating at any given time, but 
that would depend on the rotation and force generation.  The 
UK's McCombie said he expected about four "ship years," 
suggesting that the overall contributions would be the 
equivalent of four ships for one year.  Greece's Kyrimis said 
he expected four to six ships to be engaged at any one time. 
Claude-France Arnould, Director of Defense Issues in the 
Secretariat's DG E VIII on November 5 described a six-ship 
mission to PDAS Ries.  (Comment: Arnould was probably 
counting the total number of ships rather than the number of 
ships on station at any given time.) The mission will also 
include maritime patrol aircraft and a logistics hub in 
Djibouti.  USEU cannot confirm definitively that the 
logistics hub and aircraft will draw on the French base in 
Djibouti, but French Navy Captain Jean Hausermann said that 
would probably be the case, noting that a naval operation 
would not require a large land-based logistics base. 
 
Liaison with NATO 
 
¶7.  (S//NF)  EU officials say they have already established 
productive, practical liaison arrangements with NATO at 
multiple levels.  Arnould told PDAS Ries on November 5 that 
she, the EU Military Committee Chairman, French Gen. Henri 
Bentegeat, and Deputy SACEUR Gen. McColl had already been 
discussing the mission, and that McColl recommends keeping 
communication open at lower levels without raising flags that 
would elicit a Turkey-Cyprus roadblock.  Didier Lenoir, who 
reports to Arnould, said that the next meeting of Arnould, 
McColl, and Bentegeat would be on November 14 and that he had 
traveled to SHAPE on November 5 to lay the groundwork for 
that meeting. 
 
 
BRUSSELS 00001745  005 OF 006 
 
 
¶8. (C)  The EU is also establishing liaison channels to NATO 
at Northwood, where the EU Operational Headquarters will 
share information through NATO's headquarters, and at the 
liaison cell in Bahrain.  USEU contacts do not envision any 
further role for Bahrain in the mission, although a UK naval 
representative told us on November 6 that there is a 
possibility that the EU will request technical support like 
intelligence from the U.S. 
 
¶9. (S//NF)  Comment: USEU is pleased with the pragmatic 
EU-NATO liaison arrangements being established at multiple 
levels.  These arrangements will permit the two organizations 
to cooperate without subjecting that cooperation to the 
Turkish-Cypriot dispute that often makes other Berlin-Plus 
provisions unworkable.  We should encourage these 
arrangements without raising flags that would prompt Cyprus 
and Turkey to intervene.  End Comment. 
 
Legalities Still A Challenge 
 
¶10. (C)  Member State and Council Secretariat contacts admit 
that the legal question of what to do with suspects captured 
in the act of piracy is a thorny one.  At present, there is 
no central EU policy on what to do with captured pirates, and 
each Member State may end up acting along nationally 
determined lines.  Both Arnould and the UK indicated, 
however, that the EU is exploring the possibility of signing 
an agreement with a regional state -- probably Kenya -- to 
permit delivery of suspects for prosecution there.  Concerns 
about human rights make the EU loathe to hand suspects over 
to other regional states such as Yemen. 
 
¶11. (U)  The Joint Action adopted on November 10 allows EU 
naval forces participating in the operation to transfer 
detained suspects to the flag Member State or participating 
third state that took them captive, or alternatively to 
 
BRUSSELS 00001745  006 OF 006 
 
 
deliver them to a third state wishing to exercise its 
jurisdiction over the detainees.  Member States are 
prohibited from transferring detainees to a third state 
unless that state has agreed to conditions for the transfer 
that are consistent with international human rights law. 
Specifically, the EU wants to guarantee that no detainee is 
subject "to the death penalty, to torture or to any cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment." 
 
¶11. (C)  The UK, Greece, and Arnould were receptive to the 
U.S.'s presentation of the UN Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(SUA) as an existing mechanism that would obviate the need 
for new, potentially ad hoc, arrangements.  USEU is following 
up with the UK, France, Greece, the Secretariat, and other 
Member States to provide further information on SUA and to 
encourage the EU to consider assisting regional states that 
may struggle to cope with an influx of detained pirates. 
 
MURRAY 
.