VZCZCXRO8463
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1525/01 3291948
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241948Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2983
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7221
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4793
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5940
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4294
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 6701
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4039
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7594
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2657
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0721
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8747
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6923
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3119
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BRASILIA 001525 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR L/LEI JOHNSON, WHA/BSC, WHA/CHRIS MCMULLEN, 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR SWARTZ AND OIA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KJUS KCRM CJAN PREL CVIS SNA
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: MOVING FORWARD ON A NEW EXTRADITIONS 
FRAMEWORK 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 1069 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 1035 
     ¶C. STATE 79928 
     ¶D. BRASILIA 999 
     ¶E. STATE 76939 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: From October 27-29, Clifton Johnson, 
Department of State Assistant Legal Adviser for Law 
Enforcement and Intelligence, Thomas Black, Associate 
Director for South American affairs of the Department of 
Justice,s Office of International Affairs (OIA), and 
Magdalena Boynton, and Nicolette Romano from OIA visited 
Brasilia in order to address with issues that had been 
complicating the successful execution of extraditions from 
Brazil to the United States, particularly Brazilian requests 
for assurances that fall outside the scope of the bilateral 
extradition treaty (reftels).  The delegation met with 
Federal Police officials, Ministry of Justice, Public 
Ministry officials, members of the Brazilian Congress, 
Ministry of External Relations (Itamaraty) officials, and 
Supreme Court (STF) justices and found a receptive audience 
that, at least rhetorically, expressed a willingness to work 
with the United States to prevent Brazil from becoming a 
safehaven for criminals seeking to avoid punishment.  The 
delegation accomplished its four main objectives, which were 
to reinforce the need to continue our strong law enforcement 
partnership; to sensitize Brazilian audiences to the problems 
Brazil,s extra-treaty requests impose on the U.S. legal 
system; to seek out ways to ameliorate some of the legal 
hurdles by negotiating new standard language to be used in 
extradition cases; and finally, to develop a long-term 
engagement strategy towards lowering Brazilian barriers to 
the extradition of nationals.  End summary. 
 
--------------- 
Assurances 
--------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) A principal objective of the delegation was to find 
a way to minimize Brazilian requests for assurances in 
extradition cases.  As indicated in reftels, a series of 
recent extradition cases were jeopardized by Brazilian 
requests for assurances that were not necessary, beyond the 
scope of the bilateral treaty, and/or inconsistent with our 
extradition practice with other countries around the world. 
The discussions focused on the following six assurances that 
Brazil has been requesting as a routine matter in all 
extradition cases: 
 
-- That United States guarantee that a person extradited from 
Brazil will not serve more than 30 years. 
 
-- That the United States agrees to comply with the five 
provisions of Article 91 of Brazilian Law 6815/80, which 
states that countries requesting extradition will: not charge 
the extradite with a crime not included in the extradition 
request; compute the time in prison that the extradite served 
in Brazil; commute to a life sentence any death penalty 
sentence, except in cases where Brazilian law allows its 
application (superseded by STF requirement to commute to 30 
years sentences longer than that); not extradite to a third 
country without Brazil,s consent; and not consider any 
political motive to aggravate the sentence. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
30 Years Limit on Sentencing: Stuck for Now 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Of the various assurance requests currently impeding 
the smooth processing of extraditions, the most difficult one 
to resolve relates to the STF,s decision to require an 
assurance that persons extradited from Brazil will not serve 
 
BRASILIA 00001525  002 OF 006 
 
 
a sentence of more than 30 years.  (Note: The Brazilian 
constitution gives the power to allow extraditions to the 
STF. After the STF rules on the legality of the extradition, 
and allows it to proceed, the decision to authorize the 
extradition itself resides with the President. End note.) 
The STF based its decision on the constitution,s prohibition 
of life sentences (though the constitution is silent on the 
maximum term of years that can be imposed) and a provision in 
the penal code providing a 30 year maximum on the time a 
person can serve in prison. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The penal code limit of 30 years dates back to law 
decree passed in 1940 (2.848/40) when life expectancy in 
Brazil was 42 years.  It was not until 2004, however, when 
the STF decided to apply the 30-year maximum term to 
extradition cases.  (Note: The 30-year limit applies to time 
served, not to the sentence.  In Brazil, someone can be 
sentenced for longer than 30 years, but they cannot serve 
more than that. End note.)  Since then, the STF has been 
imposing, as a condition for approving extraditions, that the 
requesting country had to commit to commute a sentence that 
exceeded 30 years.  Several bills have been proposed over the 
years raising this limit to 40 or 45 years, but there has 
been little enthusiasm or motivation for extending the 
maximum term, and they have not been enacted. 
 
¶5. (SBU) During the delegation,s meeting with National 
Secretary of Justice Romeu Tuma Jr., the number two official 
in the Ministry of Justice, he noted that, although these 
requests for assurances fall outside the bilateral 
extradition treaty, the STF ultimately decides whether 
extradition requests comply with Brazilian law.  As a result, 
the executive,s hands are tied if the STF imposes conditions 
based on the STF,s understanding of Brazilian law and the 
constitution.  Asked about the STF,s decision to apply the 
30 year maximum to extradition cases, STF justice Ellen 
Gracie Northfleet observed that it was justice Celso Mello, 
whom she called the STF,s extraditions expert, who wrote the 
decision based on the constitutional principle of treating 
Brazilians and non-Brazilians equally (i.e., if the person 
would be subject to a maximum penalty in Brazil, then that 
limit should apply to wherever he is extradited). 
 
¶6. (SBU) The delegation explained that assurances with 
respect to 30 years are particularly difficult for the United 
States because they are not provided for in the bilateral 
treaty and sentencing is largely at the discretion of the 
judge.  The delegation noted that U.S. prosecutors and judges 
had a difficult time understanding why a Brazilian constraint 
on sentencing in Brazil, that was not provided for in the 
treaty, should apply to a U.S. trial of a non-Brazilian for 
serious crimes committed against U.S. victims in the United 
States.  The delegation indicated that the U.S. was prepared 
to note in its extradition requests when the eligible 
sentence for the underlying offense was below 30 years -- 
thereby obviating the need for an assurance request in such 
cases.  The delegation also noted that, to the extent Brazil 
was able to reduce its routine request for multiple 
assurances in most cases, it would be easier to seek 30-year 
assurances in those cases where they were truly necessary. 
As discussed below, Brazilian interlocutors were receptive to 
decreasing the routine request of assurances where the 
relevant information could be provided to Brazil through 
separate means that enabled them to satisfy their domestic 
legal requirements. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Article 91: A Way Forward in Short Term 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The remaining assurances often sought by Brazil 
arise from the requirement contained in Law 6815/80 
 
BRASILIA 00001525  003 OF 006 
 
 
("Estatuto dos Estrangeiros" or Foreigners Law) obligating 
countries to abide by the terms of Article 91 of that law. 
During talks with Secretary Tuma, the delegation discussed 
the difficulty that these conditions created for U.S. 
authorities, particularly since the United States cannot 
enforce a commitment to abide by foreign law.  Instead, these 
commitments have to be provided using either the terms of the 
extradition treaty or U.S. law. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Tuma stated maintaining and strengthening the 
relationship was most important to him, and that he would be 
happy to work with the United States on any changes in 
language that would facilitate extraditions.  The delegation 
urged Brazil to reduce the number of routine requests for 
assurances so as to focus requests on exceptional cases.  The 
delegation noted that the United States was prepared to 
consider ways to provide Brazil with the information 
necessary to show how the various provisions of Article 91 
were met so as to obviate the need for separate assurance 
requests.  One approach proposed by the delegation would be 
for the United States to issue a diplomatic note or document 
that described the provisions in the treaty and U.S. law that 
applied to all extradition cases and satisfied multiple 
requirements of article 91.  Extradition cases could then, as 
needed, reference this note.  The United States could also 
include in its original extradition requests statements, when 
applicable, confirming that the charges at issue did not 
involve the death penalty and/or life (or 30 year) sentences. 
 Such an approach would reduce the number of assurances 
sought; allow the USG to more effectively focus on, consider, 
and consult with prosecutors and courts with respect to 
assurances not addressed by these mechanisms (e.g. 30 year 
assurances); create a routine way of handling these cases; 
and avoid frenzied last minute negotiations on the eve of an 
extraditee's transfer, as was the case in the Juan Carlos 
Ramirez Abadia case.  Tuma was receptive to such an approach 
and the delegation agreed to prepare a draft of a diplomatic 
note along the lines described.  The idea of crafting a 
diplomatic note to address some of the assurances was also 
brought up in meetings at Itamaraty with Counselor Ralph 
Peter Henderson, head of Itamaraty,s Immigration Division, 
and with STF Justice Ellen Gracie Northfleet, and both agreed 
that it would be worthwhile approach. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Extradition of Nationals: Impossible, but... 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU)  Over the course of the delegation's meetings, 
various interlocutors explained the difficulty of changing 
the prohibition against extradition of Brazilian nationals 
that is contained in the Brazilian constitution.  Article 60 
of the Brazilian constitution lays out the process for 
amending the constitution; but it also limits, or outright 
prohibits, amendments from being made to certain clauses of 
the constitution known as the "Clausulas Petreas" 
(essentially, inalterable clauses).  One of these clauses is 
the bill of rights which includes the protection against 
extradition.  As a result, the only way to alter the 
fundamental individual right of Brazilians not to be 
extradited from Brazil is for a new constituent assembly to 
be convened to draft a new constitution.   A simple amendment 
to the constitution, a difficult process to begin with, will 
not do. 
 
¶10. (SBU)  The issue of extradition of nationals arose in 
nearly every meeting with the delegation in the context of 
Brazilian suggestions that the existing 1960,s era 
extradition treaty be updated to modernize the covered 
offenses.  The delegation said that, while the United States 
shared an interest in expanding the scope of the treaty, any 
such initiative was contingent on changes in Brazilian law 
 
BRASILIA 00001525  004 OF 006 
 
 
that would permit the extradition of nationals.  The 
delegation noted that the regional and world wide trend in 
extradition was towards extraditing nationals and that this 
was a fundamental element of U.S. extradition policy.  The 
delegation noted that recent notorious cases of fugitives 
living in the United States for many years, holding U.S. 
nationality, committing serious crimes in the United States 
against other Americans, and then fleeing to another country 
where they sought to claim foreign nationality to shield 
themselves from extradition created a very negative 
impression in the United States and the Congress.  The 
delegation made particular reference in this context to the 
case of Claudia Hoerig, who fled to Brazil after killing her 
husband in Chicago.  As a result, it was not conceivable that 
the U.S. Senate would approve a new or amended treaty that 
did not provide for an extradition partner to extradite its 
nationals in the same manner that the United States was 
prepared to extradite its citizens. 
 
¶11. (SBU) All of the delegation's interlocutors agreed that 
the issue of changing the constitution to permit the 
extradition of Brazilian nationals is highly unlikely to 
happen anytime soon.  Itamaraty was the most negative, with 
Counselor Henderson stating matter-of-factly with regard to 
the issue of extraditing nationals, "we don,t really have an 
issue, because it is, in fact, impossible, therefore, there 
is nothing to discuss."  Most interlocutors, however, 
recognized that it was a problematic provision in the 
extradition context and suggested ways that its impact could 
be moderated.  Itamaraty encouraged the United States, in 
cases involving naturalized Brazilians, to provide 
information, if available that might provide a basis for the 
GOB to revoke an individual's Brazilian nationality, based on 
differential treatment afforded natural-born and naturalized 
Brazilians.  For example, both Counselor Henderson and 
Federal Prosecutor Oliveira de Almeida, noted that a 
naturalized Brazilian could have his citizenship removed upon 
provision by the United States of information that the 
citizen committed crimes prior to obtaining Brazilian 
citizenship, or committed narcotics-related crimes, even 
after obtaining the citizenship.  Another instance that could 
result in a favorable extradition of a Brazilian to the 
United States would be in a situation where a Brazilian 
national obtained a second citizenship and in the process 
gave up Brazilian citizenship.  If the United States can 
document that the person took steps that amounted to a 
voluntary surrender of Brazilian citizenship at the time of 
obtaining U.S. citizenship, the Ministry of Justice and make 
a determination that their Brazilian citizenship was 
renounced, and thus the person becomes eligible for 
extradition. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Long-Term Hope Moving Forward 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Several of the meetings shone a light on a possible 
way forward in the long-term that could further reduce 
complications stemming from the 30 year assurances, and from 
some extradition cases involving naturalized Brazilians. 
According to Marcio Pereira Pinto Garcia, a Senate aide, the 
Supreme Court,s decision requiring 30 year assurances in 
extradition cases was not compelled by the constitution and 
involved an overly expansive interpretation of the penal 
code.  In fact, he noted that their interpretation could 
violate Brazil,s commitments to the International Criminal 
Court, which allows life sentences.  Further, he noted that 
there is some room to play around with legislatively both on 
the 30 years and the extradition of nationals.   For one, the 
Congress could update the 30 year limit to conform to 
today,s longer life expectancies.  Congress could also carve 
out an exception in the penal code that excludes extradition 
 
BRASILIA 00001525  005 OF 006 
 
 
cases from complying with the 30 years, or otherwise permits 
extraditions pending an assurance that the country requesting 
extradition will only apply a term of years sentence -- a 
longer one than 30 years, but not a life sentence -- which 
would not be ideal, but would improve the situation for the 
United States somewhat. 
 
¶13. (SBU) On the issue of naturalized Brazilians, Garcia also 
noted that naturalized Brazilians can be extradited if they 
committed a common crime before being naturalized or if they 
were involved in a crime involving narcotics, according to 
the constitution, and as set down in law.  Perhaps, he 
suggested, this can be further fleshed out in legislation to 
take the broadest possible view of what constitutes a 
narcotics-related crime, hence expanding the universe of 
crimes for which citizenship can be revoked. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Three other interlocutors suggested a variation on 
an idea for engaging on this issue in the long term.  Jorge 
Barbosa Pontes, head of Interpol at the Federal Police, 
agreed with the delegation that Brazil,s restrictions on 
extraditing nationals and its imposing of 30 year limits on 
prison terms was wrongheaded and sent the wrong message 
regarding Brazil,s tolerance of international crime.  He 
observed that it would be extremely difficult to change the 
extradition of nationals, but that a movement or conferences 
should be organized that could begin discussing these issues. 
 Separately, former head of Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) 
and now Senator Romeu Tuma (PTB, Brazilian Labor Party, 
government coalition; of Sao Paulo; and father of National 
Secretary of Justice Tuma), and Federal Deputy Marcelo 
Itagiba (PSDB, Brazilian Social Democracy Party, opposition; 
of Rio de Janeiro), also a career DPF officer and formerly 
Rio de Janeiro,s State Public Security Secretary suggested 
holding a symposium on extradition issues. Finally, STF 
Justice Ricardo Lewandowski suggested that a bi-national 
commission might be an appropriate venue to hash out some of 
these issues. 
 
-------------------------- 
Comment:  Seeds Planted 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) The message exchanged between the delegation and 
Brazilian officials from Supreme Court Justices, to Ministry 
of Justice officials, to Senators and Federal Deputies, to 
Federal Prosecutors and the Federal Police, was consistent: 
the United States and Brazil have a good law enforcement 
relationship and it is in both countries interests to do 
everything possible to improve it.  There was also agreement 
among all parties on next steps.  The State/L/LEI-DOJ/OIA 
delegation agreed to craft language that hopefully will serve 
as the basis for a diplomatic note or other official USG 
communication that would front-load several assurances 
issues, particularly those related to Article 91. 
Additionally, in individual extradition cases the United 
States will front-load information related to sentencing, 
thus obviating (or at least minimizing) the need for Brazil 
to request assurances at the back end of the process.  While 
such an approach will not address assurance issues in all 
cases -- particularly with respect to 30 year assurances -- 
it should make Brazilian assurance requests more exceptional. 
 Its effectiveness will depend on how receptive the Ministry 
of Justice is to the proposed note and its ability to bring 
other players in the Brazilian extradition process on board. 
We are optimistic that the GOB will be able to move forward 
with us on this, as the delegation succeeded in the laying 
the groundwork for such an approach in all of its meetings 
and received preliminary buy-in to move ahead with it. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Comment, continued.  For meeting our longer term 
objectives, the idea of holding conferences or symposia 
 
BRASILIA 00001525  006 OF 006 
 
 
merits consideration.  During Post,s meetings with legal and 
law enforcement contacts as well as during the delegation,s 
visit, Post perceived that some of the issues involving 
extraditions are not necessarily well understood even within 
Brazilian legal circles.  To wit, most of our interlocutors 
(including National Justice Secretary Tuma, Federal Deputy 
Itagiba, and Federal Prosecutor Oliveira de Almeida) 
mistakenly stated that the sentence limitation of 30 years is 
constitutional limitation, rather than a penal code one, and 
some did not realize that it applied to extraditions via a 
fairly recent STF decision, rather than being long-standing 
precedent.  Taking into account Senate aide Garcia,s 
analysis, a symposium could bring to light for legislators 
and other legal experts how there is, in reality, plenty of 
room either to lift the restrictions legislatively, or bring 
them up to date from their almost 70-year old framework.  For 
the symposium to be effective, however, it has to have a 
regional presence, with experts from other countries that are 
similarly affected and have found ways to change their laws 
and/or constitutions to remove such constraints and comply 
with their ICC obligations.  Such a conference would have to 
be carefully structured and focused, however, to avoid 
highlighting the inconsistencies in international practice, 
rather than the growing trend toward more consistent practice 
regarding terms of extradition and extradition of nationals. 
Embassy will begin to explore the possibility of a symposium 
(or several) where broader issues relating to extradition of 
nationals and the extradition practice of other countries can 
be explored in a way that might encourage Brazil to 
reconsider its own approach.  The fact that STF and the 
Federal police offered somewhat similar concepts, suggests 
that there will be a willing cohort of law enforcement and 
legal figures who could participate in such a forum and that 
there could be receptive and broader audience for the message 
the State/L/LEI-DOJ/OIA delegation brought to Brasilia.  End 
comment. 
 
¶17. (U) This cable was cleared with State/L/LEI and DoJ/OIA. 
 
KUBISKE