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Viewing cable 08BEIJING4168, TIBET TALKS CONCLUDE; OBSERVERS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BEIJING4168 2008-11-07 09:37 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXRO5443
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #4168/01 3120937
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 070937Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0785
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 004168 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2033 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KIFR CH IN
SUBJECT: TIBET TALKS CONCLUDE; OBSERVERS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT 
PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor 
Aubrey Carlson.  Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) The most recent round of talks between representatives 
of the Dalai Lama and the Communist Party's United Front Work 
Department (UFWD) ended on November 5, with Embassy contacts 
unanimously predicting the discussions will fail to achieve 
measurable progress.  The precise content of this latest 
round of talks remains unclear.  On November 6, the Dalai 
Lama's Special Envoy Lodi Gyari issued a statement detailing 
the Tibetan delegation's schedule in China, but he did not 
reveal the talks' substance.  The same day, China's Xinhua 
news agency released a toughly worded statement by UFWD 
Minister Du Qinglin urging the Dalai Lama to "change his 
political views" and not support Tibet independence.  In 
discussions with PolOff, Chinese observers believed 
compromise by China on the borders and governance of a future 
"Greater Tibet" autonomous region is next to impossible.  Two 
contacts, however, remained hopeful that China may make 
symbolic gestures, such as prisoner releases, to demonstrate 
goodwill.  China's central leadership is preoccupied with 
economic problems and Taiwan and thus is not making a serious 
effort to negotiate with the Dalai Lama, one observer noted. 
China's leaders are waiting for the Dalai Lama to die, 
several Embassy interlocutors asserted, at which point 
Beijing expects the Tibetan movement to fracture and lose its 
international influence.  End Summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2. (U) Personal representatives of the Dalai Lama Lodi Gyari 
and Kelsang Gyaltsen visited China October 30-November 5 for 
the eighth round of talks with the Communist Party's United 
Front Work Department (UFWD).  The visit included a meeting 
with Du Qinglin, Minister of the UFWD, a full day of talks 
with UFWD Executive Vice Minister Zhu Weiqun and Vice 
Minister Sita (Sithar), and a trip to the Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region.  China's official media announced the 
arrival of the Dalai Lama's envoys on October 30 but did not 
provide details of the itinerary or discussions until 
November 6, when the official news agency Xinhua issued an 
article stating that UFWD Minister Du had "received" the 
Dalai Lama's "private representatives," giving an overview of 
the discussions while stressing the tough line that Du had 
urged the Dalai Lama "to not support, plot or incite violent 
criminal activities or propositions aimed at 'Tibet 
Independence'."  (Note:  Du Qinglin was Sichuan Party 
Secretary in 2007 when local officials implemented an 
extensive political education campaign in the Ganzi Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture in the west of the province.  During 
Du's tenure, a comprehensive security crackdown was also 
launched in Ganzi in August 2007 following a large public 
demonstration in the city of Litang.)  Meanwhile, in New 
Delhi on November 6, Lodi Gyari issued a statement that 
provided a general outline of the talks but neglected to 
comment on whether progress was made.  Lodi Gyari's statement 
noted that, as a "special general meeting of the Tibetan 
people" will be convened later this month, he has been 
"advised not to make statements about our discussions before 
this meeting." 
 
MANY TIBETANS IN CHINA KNOW LITTLE OF TALKS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) In discussions with PolOff, contacts in Beijing 
remained universally pessimistic that the latest round of 
dialogue between the Dalai Lama's representatives and the 
Communist Party's UFWD will bring any real results, with some 
noting that many Chinese were unaware that the talks were 
even being held.  Deqing Wangmu (strictly protect), an ethnic 
Tibetan English instructor at the Central University for 
Nationalities in Beijing, said on November 6 that her Tibetan 
students are largely ignorant of the dialogue because of the 
lack of media coverage in the PRC and the "intense blocking" 
of Tibet-related foreign websites.  Deqing Wangmu, who is a 
native of Kangding in Sichuan Province, said her family and 
friends are all pessimistic about the dialogue process 
because China "is not prepared to give Tibetans what we 
want."  The dialogue is primarily a "show" for the 
international community.  Tibetans inside China, she said, 
are even more skeptical than Tibetan exiles "because we 
understand the Chinese Government better." 
 
TIBET "LOW PRIORITY" FOR CHINESE LEADERSHIP 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Ma Rong (protect), a Tibet expert at Beijing 
 
BEIJING 00004168  002 OF 003 
 
 
University and an advisor to the UFWD, told PolOff November 6 
that the Dalai Lama, by abandoning independence, denouncing 
violence and supporting the Beijing Olympics, has "done all 
he can" to meet China's preconditions for progress.  The core 
problem, Ma asserted, is that Tibet remains a "low priority" 
for President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao.  While the 
March unrest hurt China's international image, the security 
challenges in Tibet are "manageable" given the small size of 
the Tibetan population and the sheer manpower available to 
Chinese security forces.  The top PRC leadership, Ma argued, 
is preoccupied, not with Tibet, but with the problems of 
slowing economic growth, maintaining social stability in 
China as a whole and negotiations with Taiwan. 
 
5. (C) Ma said he meets regularly with UFWD Vice Ministers 
Zhu Weiqun and Sita (Sithar) to advise them on Tibet policy. 
Nevertheless, Ma said, the fact that the Party has appointed 
such low-level officials as Zhu and Sita to lead the dialogue 
shows the "lack of attention" at the top to Tibet.  Zhu and 
Sita have "no authority" to conduct a real negotiation and 
thus only "recite existing policies" to the Dalai Lama's 
representatives.  Ma said he recently was invited by the 
Tibetan government in exile to meet with the Dalai Lama in 
Dharmsala.  Such a visit would have offered an opportunity to 
explore possible compromise through unofficial channels. 
When Ma sought permission for the trip from the UFWD, 
however, he received no response.  Ma cited this as evidence 
of the UFWD's "weak authority" and of the lack of interest in 
Tibet at higher levels of the Chinese Government.  With Hu 
and Wen's attention focused elsewhere, hard-line local 
leaders of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), including Party 
Secretary Zhang Qingli, maintain strong influence over Tibet 
policy, according to Ma. 
 
POWER GAP IS GROWING 
-------------------- 
 
6. (C) Wang Chong (protect), an international affairs 
columnist for the China Youth Daily, told PolOff on November 
4 that China's Central Government does not view the dialogue 
as a real two-party negotiation because China is in a 
"clearly superior" position.  In the eyes of Chinese 
officials, the Dalai Lama is the leader of a loose group of 
exiles with no military or territory.  The Tibetan government 
in exile thus ranks "several rungs below Taiwan" as a 
negotiating partner.  This "power gap," Wang said, will 
continue to grow along with China's international stature, 
while China's expanding influence with its southern 
neighbors, especially India, will give the Tibetan exiles 
even less room to maneuver in the future.  Wang said there is 
no room for agreement on "greater Tibet" or "true autonomy." 
The most that China could agree to, Wang said, would be 
additional symbolic goodwill gestures, perhaps including a 
visit by the Dalai Lama to Beijing (though not to a Tibetan 
region).  Wang said he personally hopes the "Dalai Lama will 
live a long time," because his death would make the Tibet 
problem "more complicated." 
 
HOPE FOR PRISONER RELEASES 
-------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Tibetan poet and blogger Weise ("Oser") (strictly 
protect) and her husband, dissident writer Wang Lixiong 
(strictly protect), told PolOff November 7 that they believe 
"no progress" has been made in this latest round of talks and 
that the Tibetan side will likely "shut down" the dialogue as 
a result.  Any compromise by China on core issues is 
impossible, Wang said, but he is hopeful that China, in an 
attempt to demonstrate "flexibility," might release a few 
Tibetan political prisoners in the coming weeks and make it 
easier for "sensitive" Tibetans like Weise to travel abroad. 
(Note:  Weise was unable to participate in the FY 08 State 
Department International Visitor Program because authorities 
denied her application for a passport.  Weise has filed a 
lawsuit against the Public Security Bureau of Changchun, 
Jilin Province, to overturn the denial.) 
 
TIBETAN EXILE MEETING A "PRESSURE TACTIC" 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Beijing University's Ma Rong said the Dalai Lama's 
recent comments to the media that he is "losing patience" 
with the dialogue process and his plan to call a large 
meeting of Tibetan exiles later this month were aimed at 
putting pressure on the Chinese Government.  (Note:  Chinese 
newspapers, including the nationalistic Global Times, have 
echoed Ma's belief that the Dalai's recent statements are 
merely a "pressure tactic.")  Ma, however, felt that the 
Tibetan exiles will continue to stick to the "Middle Way" 
approach of seeking autonomy rather than independence as long 
as the Dalai Lama is alive. 
 
BEIJING 00004168  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
9. (C) Dissident writer Wang Lixiong largely echoed Ma's 
analysis that the announcement of the November meeting served 
mainly to pressure the Chinese side.  Delegates to the 
upcoming Tibetan meeting, Wang asserted, are mainly old-guard 
Tibetan exiles unlikely to criticize the Dalai Lama's 
policies.  More radical Tibetan independence groups, he 
added, are already complaining that they do not have enough 
representation at the meeting.  The Dalai Lama has thus 
"designed" the conference to encourage debate but not to 
completely overturn the "Middle Way" approach.  "The Dalai 
Lama says he wants to remove himself from politics," Wang 
said, "but in fact he is still very much involved." 
 
WHEN THE DALAI LAMA DIES 
------------------------ 
 
10. (C) Ma Rong said the Chinese leadership is "not hoping" 
for the Dalai Lama's death, but they are "well prepared" for 
it.  Ma said "arrangements have already been made" for an 
officially sanctioned search party to select the Dalai Lama's 
next reincarnation within China.  Ma predicted that there 
will be a repeat of the situation with the Panchen Lama, with 
the PRC Government backing a candidate that is rejected by 
Tibetan exiles.  Chinese authorities expect violence to break 
out in the period surrounding the death and reincarnation of 
the Dalai Lama, but the PRC Government nevertheless has the 
security resources to maintain control.  China's leaders 
anticipate the Tibetan exiles will quickly lose international 
influence once they no longer have a charismatic, Nobel 
Prize-winning leader who is regularly received by world 
leaders.  With the current Dalai Lama gone, more Tibetan 
refugees will seek citizenship abroad and the community will 
grow more "diffuse and fractured."  To the extent some 
Tibetan groups grow more radical and violent, Ma opined, this 
will only serve to further dilute international sympathy. 
Deqing Wangmu, the English teacher, separately agreed the 
movement will likely take a "radical and violent turn" once 
the Dalai Lama dies.  Young, frustrated and under-educated 
Tibetans, she said, are less likely to adhere to Buddhist 
teachings against violence, especially after the current 
Dalai Lama is gone. 
 
11. (C) Grassroots democracy activist Xiong Wei (protect) 
asserted to PolOff November 5 that waiting for the Dalai Lama 
to die is the "core of China's strategy."  When the Tibetan 
movement abroad radicalizes, Xiong predicted, this will 
strengthen the hand of "hardliners" in China, who will then 
be able to justify even harsher repression.  Xiong believes 
that Premier Wen Jiabao is more liberal and "open-minded" on 
Tibet, though he is clearly not driving Tibet policy. 
Rather, President Hu Jintao, together with the entire 
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), is setting the course on 
Tibet, with Zhou Yongkang (a fellow PBSC member and China's 
senior security official) being the "key hardliner," 
according to Xiong.  (Note:  Zhou Yongkang is another former 
Sichuan Party Secretary who was reportedly known for being 
tough on the Tibetan minority during his tenure there.) 
RANDT