VZCZCXRO2430
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3764/01 3351655
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301655Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0623
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEPMNF/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003764 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CENTCOM PLEASE PASS TO NAVCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2028 
TAGS: PBTS PREL MARR MOPS IZ KU
SUBJECT: IRAQI-KUWAITI BILATERAL ISSUES 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 3367 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 2944 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 2427 
 
Classified By: Senior Advisor Gordon Gray for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (S/REL MNFI) In a November 26 meeting, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Haj Hamoud told Senior Advisor Gordon Gray that the 
proposed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for notifying 
Kuwait prior to undertaking a wreck-clearing project in the 
Khor Abdullah (KAA) waterway remained mired in the 
bureaucracy of the Prime Minister's office.  Citing the 
poisonous relationship between Foreign Minister Zebari and 
the Prime Minister, Hamoud said that it was a serious problem 
for the Ministry, even down to the working level.  Hamoud 
rejected the idea of the MFA notifying Kuwait on its own and 
discussed the historical basis for Iraq's claim to the Khor 
Abdullah. 
 
¶2. (C/REL MNFI) Hamoud also discussed the continued problem 
of removing a small structure (which he said had been built 
by British forces) on the Iraq-Kuwait border, which has 
adversely affected the entire discussion of border issues 
between the two countries.  Hamoud expressed hope that the 
Kuwaiti Prime Minister will still visit Iraq in the near 
future, but was less hopeful on the topic of naming an 
Ambassador to Kuwait any time soon.  Hamoud decried the fact 
that the MFA would soon face an "experience deficit" as 
senior diplomats retired just as Iraq needed to send 
ambassadors to many "important countries," including Kuwait. 
End summary. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
MOU: STUCK IN BUREAUCRACY OF PM'S OFFICE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C/REL MNFI) Senior Advisor Gray and pol-mil officer 
(notetaker) met with MFA Deputy Foreign Minister Haj Hamoud 
on November 26.  Asked about the long-standing issue of 
providing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to the Kuwaiti 
government on wreck clearing in the KAA, Hamoud - as he has 
done on several previous occasions (reftels) - reverted to an 
explanation of the inter-ministerial committee charged with 
addressing all issues related to Kuwait.  The committee, 
comprised of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Oil, 
and Interior, as well as Hamoud, agreed two months ago to 
send Hamoud to Kuwait to prepare for the visit of the Kuwaiti 
Prime Minister.  In the interim, however, the Prime 
Minister's cabinet decided to send a Minister instead and, 
therefore, the Minister of Finance went rather than Hamoud. 
"The result was very limited," Hamoud said, because the 
Kuwaitis insist on starting discussions with two issues he 
described as "very sensitive": compensation and the Khor 
Abdullah waterway. 
 
------------------------------ 
KUWAIT CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION 
------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C/REL MNFI) On the subject of compensation, which Hamoud 
called the easier of the two problems, he said there were two 
figures being discussed: the amount of USD 4 billion was 
agreed upon for environmental claims and the amount of USD 24 
billion was discussed for personal, corporate and 
governmental compensation.  However, he felt it was likely an 
agreement would be reached "under the umbrella of the United 
Nations." 
 
---------------------------------------- 
KHOR ABDULLAH:  THE MORE DIFFICULT ISSUE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C/REL MNFI) Hamoud said the issues dealing with KAA were 
Q5. (C/REL MNFI) Hamoud said the issues dealing with KAA were 
going to be more difficult to resolve.  He tried to assert 
that the UN technical committee charged with determining the 
border between Iraq and Kuwait was initially charged with 
determining the land border only, not maritime boundaries, 
and therefore stopped at pillar 106, the Port of Um Qasr. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00003764  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶6. (C/REL MNFI) In what Iraq saw as proper placement of the 
maritime border, the chairman fixed it along the west side of 
the Khor al-Zubair (a waterway north of Um Qasr) but in the 
Khor Abdullah, he fixed the border at the midline.  Hamoud 
claimed such placement was "contrary to custom," ignored the 
ratification of the land and maritime boundaries in UN 
Security Council resolution 833, and asserted that "in fact, 
all of the KAA is Iraqi territory."  Hamoud quickly added 
that the GOI knew the Kuwaitis would not be pleased by such a 
position and, therefore, the GOI refrained from raising it 
with the GOK, aware that it would surely have a negative 
impact on their bilateral relationship. 
 
¶7. (S/REL MNFI) When Gray again raised the topic of the GOI 
providing an MOU to the GOK to do wreck-removal in the KAA, 
Hamoud reverted to what has become a standard response:  "We 
have studied the MOU, we commented on it, we sent it to the 
cabinet.  We sent it months ago and now we are waiting," he 
said in exasperation.  Hamoud asked that his following 
comments be regarded as "off the record" and said that there 
was a poisonous relationship between Prime Minister Maliki 
and Foreign Minister Zebari, which permeated down to the 
working level.  This MOU is "frozen" in the bureaucracy of 
the Prime Minister's office, he concluded. 
 
¶8. (C/REL MNFI) Highlighting the intent of UN Security 
Council Resolution 833 to guarantee freedom of navigation for 
both countries, Gray urged the Iraqi MFA to notify the GOK on 
its own, even without use of the MOU.  Hamoud was not 
supportive of the idea, insisting that the work start under 
the terms of the MOU since it clearly stated there would be 
no prejudice to either's claims regarding the border. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
THE BUILDING ON THE BORDER NEEDS TO GO 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C/REL MNFI) In response to a question about the Iraqi 
farmers straddling the Iraqi/Kuwaiti border (ref C), Hamoud 
noted the problem of the small concrete structure (which he 
claimed had been built by British forces) between pillars 105 
and 106 needed to be resolved first.  He explained that 
resolution of the problem lay with the governor of Basra - 
who had done nothing despite repeated letters from Hamoud 
asking him to remove the building.  Gray replied that he 
would visit Basra on November 30 and would explore the issue 
with the governor; he also asked if there were any reason why 
British soldiers could not remove the structure.  Hamoud said 
there was not.  "This small issue affects the entire 
discussion about the border," Hamoud said.  He explained that 
once this matter was resolved, the Iraqis wanted to build a 
road that will run parallel to the border for its entire 
length, which the Kuwaitis have already done on their side. 
 
------------------------------- 
NAMING AN AMBASSADOR TO KUWAIT? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C/REL MNFI) Gray asked Hamoud whether there had been any 
progress in naming an Ambassador to Kuwait and noted USG 
disappointment that Kuwait was not on the list of six 
countries in the region for which ambassadors were recently 
announced.  Hamoud responded that there were internal 
struggles among various interests vying to see one of their 
own nominated to high-level MFA postings, which he said 
Qown nominated to high-level MFA postings, which he said 
"affected everything."  He explained that Iraq needed more 
than 50 ambassadors - some in "important countries" including 
the U.K. and Egypt as well as Kuwait.  He commented that many 
senior MFA officials were at, or nearing, retirement age 
(including him) and that the level of expertise and 
experience at the ministry was soon to diminish greatly. 
 
------------------------------------- 
KUWAITI PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT IRAQ? 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C/REL MNFI) In asking Hamoud for his assessment of the 
likelihood of a visit by the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, Gray 
noted that the USG has encouraged the visit to proceed 
without pre-conditions.  Hamoud pointed to the current 
political "crisis" in Kuwait which might lead to the 
dissolution of the Kuwaiti parliament.  Iraq was in a 
position of waiting to see what would happen.  He said the 
GOI was aware that members of the Kuwaiti Parliament learned 
 
BAGHDAD 00003764  003 OF 003 
 
 
that some Iraqi politicians called Kuwait Iraq's nineteenth 
province and this had naturally angered them.  "This affected 
our relationship in a very bad way," he said.  He added that 
some sensitive issues - including compensation for Kuwaiti 
airways - were very difficult to resolve.  "They went to the 
British tribunal and got a good position from them and this 
will also affect our relationship."  Hamoud concluded that 
the argument was "all about money," and money should not 
affect the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait noting 
Kuwait's vast income from oil and other revenue sources. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (C/REL MNFI) Iraq's unwillingness to address the GOK on 
the upcoming work in the Khor Abdullah does not bode well for 
a successful endeavor to clear the wrecks or to survey the 
seabed.  We will continue to impress upon the highest levels 
of the GOI the need to send the MOU to Kuwait forthwith, as 
work is now ready to start by the contracted company.  We 
also hope that the November 11 "KAA Interoperability 
Protocols" signed by the GOI and GOK navies may prevent any 
incidents.  End comment. 
CROCKER