VZCZCXRO0033
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3598/01 3181332
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131332Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0366
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0530
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY 0027
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0073

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003598 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2028 
TAGS: IZ TU PREL PTER KSEC MARR MOPS
SUBJECT: GOI AGREES UPON MODALITIES FOR IRAQ-TURKEY-USA 
TRILATERAL ON SECURITY ISSUES 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1933 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 3509 
 
Classified By: POLMIL MINISTER COUNSELOR MICHAEL C. CORBIN 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1.  (S) Summary:   GOI spokesman told Ambassador and MNF-I 
CG November 11 that GOI needs more time to make arrangements 
for the security trilateral with Turkey and the U.S.  He 
explained the idea is the GOI's and that the goals are to 
both achieve tangible results (absent from Turkish visits to 
Baghdad and discussions with KRG) and to avoid a strong 
Turkey-KRG track on issues that are important for Iraq's 
central government.  Ambassador and CG proposed technical 
committees as a way to ensure movement and emphasized that 
the GOI needs to work with the KRG to ensure the Iraqi side 
will speak with a unified voice and will not turn the forum 
into a squabble between GOI and KRG in front of the Turks. 
Al-Dabbagh agreed.  Ambassador noted it might help the 
strategic, bilateral process if the PKK issue could be 
removed and dealt with in the trilateral format.  On the 
substance, al-Dabbagh agreed that perhaps two standing 
technical committees could be formed: one would focus on 
trilateral intelligence exchanges and the  other would focus 
on Turkish actions on the Turkish side of the border and 
Iraqi actions on the Iraqi side to control PKK movement and 
supply.  CG Odierno stressed that this is a very emotional 
issue for the Turks and the GOI has to be sure that it is 
ready to be fully involved in the process.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (S)  GOI spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh (who is still 
coordinating the Iraq-Turkey-U.S. trilateral until Minister 
of State for National Security Affairs Shirwan al-Waeli -- 
just returned from Egypt -- can take over the operational 
details as GOI delegation head) met with Ambassador and MNF-I 
Commanding General Raymond Odierno November 11 to brief them 
on GOI thinking on the trilateral. 
 
¶3.  (S)  Al-Dabbagh said the trilateral is a GOI idea and 
that the Iraqi side needs to convince a reluctant GOT that 
there is merit to the proposal as this format had gone 
nowhere in the past.  Al-Dabbagh said he argued to the GOT 
that nothing concrete came from envoy Murat Ozcelik's visits 
to Iraq and his meetings with all parties.  Al-Dabbagh said 
once the Turks agreed to the concept, he argued for the 
trilateral, rather than bilateral format for the meeting.  He 
then asked the GOT if it would halt all cross-border 
operations (CBOs) in the lead-up to the trilateral meeting. 
The Turks responded that that is impossible due to intense 
domestic pressure to respond to terrorism in the run up to 
the Turkish elections.  Al-Dabbagh said he asked whether at 
least the GOT would consider giving the GOI more than 
one-hour notice on CBOs, noting that by the time the 
information got to PM al-Maliki the operations were always 
over.   The Turks had responded with operational security 
concerns, al-Dabbagh said, but he noted this remains very 
important for PM al-Maliki.  He asked if there is some way 
the U.S. could help set up a secure channel that would allow 
direct GOT-GOI notification. 
 
¶4.  (S)  Remaining on the subject of GOI concerns, al-Dabbagh 
said while PM al-Maliki had encouraged PM Erdogan to enter 
into direct contacts with KRG figures such as Prime Minister 
Nechirvan Barzani, the PM is concerned about too much direct 
KRG-GOT contact.  He said the PM wants to avoid a parallel 
track between the KRG and the GOT:  the GOI should deal with 
the Turkish Government.  CG Odierno noted that the GOI needs 
to be aware that if it takes on the security issue of the 
PKK, the GOI opens itself up to strong criticism from the 
Turks if the PKK continues to act.  Al-Dabbagh acknowledged 
the point but said the KRG needs to show commitment to 
tackling the PKK.  The GOI is already under criticism on 
allegations that PM al-Maliki had agreed to Turkish CBOs and 
the GOI needs to fulfill its responsibility to help counter 
the PKK.  He mentioned specifically PKK members' use of 
airports in the KRG and their access to logistics such as 
fuel supplies.  While the GOI needs to be responsible, 
al-Dabbagh continued, the GOT needs to "be reasonable" in its 
demands of the KRG. 
 
¶5.  (S)  Turning to the timing of the trilateral, which had 
originally been proposed for November 14-15 to get the 
process going as soon as possible, al-Dabbagh noted that the 
GOI has yet to invite the key KRG representative to 
participate in the GOI delegation to the talks.  He said that 
former KRG Interior Minister Sinjari had been replaced by a 
new PUK figure (note:  Othman Hajji Mahmoud--former PUK 
Minister of Interior in Suleymaniyyah. End note) and that 
MSNSA Waeli would now invite him to attend the talks. 
 
BAGHDAD 00003598  002 OF 002 
 
 
Al-Dabbagh asked if the U.S. could participate next week, if 
the talks could be organized then.  Ambassador explained that 
given the short notice it is too late to get a representative 
from Washington but that he would participate in the talks 
for the U.S. side.   He noted that there are two important 
considerations for the GOI to take into account:  first, that 
an appropriate trilateral agenda be developed with tangible 
outcomes; and second, that the forum not turn into an 
occasion for differences between the KRG and the central 
government to be exposed.  On the first point he said that 
certain items, such as the bilateral GOI-GOT security 
agreement might not be appropriate for this setting.  That 
could be worked directly between the two sides.  Issues that 
might be appropriate included intelligence sharing and 
notifications of cross border operations.  On the second 
point he said it is vital that the GOI work with the KRG on 
the trilateral process and ensured that the KRG 
representative would act absolutely in concert with the rest 
of the delegation. 
 
¶6.  (S)  Al-Dabbagh acknowledged both points stating that he 
agrees completely about the agenda.  The bilateral security 
agreement would be more appropriate for the Strategic 
Cooperation Council meeting that Erdogan and al-Maliki had 
agreed to and that al-Maliki wants to be held before the end 
of the year.  Al-Dabbabgh would be coordinating that effort 
which also needs to address important Iraqi energy issues. 
The Ambassador noted it might help the strategic, bilateral 
process if the PKK issue could be removed and dealt with in 
the trilateral format.  On the substance, al-Dabbagh agreed 
that perhaps two standing technical committees could be 
formed.  One would focus on trilateral intelligence exchanges 
and the other would focus on Turkish actions on the Turkish 
side of the border and Iraqi actions on the Iraqi side to 
control PKK movement and supply.  Al-Dabbagh noted this is a 
good means of combating GOT complaints, for example, that the 
KRG was allowing PKK members to be treated in KRG hospitals, 
"the Turks complain directly to the KRG about this," he said, 
and not to the GOI.  "How can we determine if this is true or 
not, if we are not told?"  In response to the Ambassador's 
question about where the technical committees should meet, 
Baghdad or Irbil, al-Dabbagh said emphatically that the 
Committee's should meet in Baghdad but could make site visits 
to Irbil as needed. 
 
¶7.  (S)  CG Odierno reiterated his point that this is a very 
emotional issue for the Turks and the GOI needs to be sure 
that it is ready to be fully involved in the process.  The 
Turks would be measured until the PKK made another deadly 
attack on Turkish soil, he emphasized, then the GOT would 
have to act because of enormous domestic pressure. 
Al-Dabbagh said he understood, and had to convince the GOT 
that the time is not right to publicize the trilateral 
process until the first meeting is held.  He had made a short 
statement in Istanbul in response to Turkish pressure, but it 
is important not to say anyting more until the trilateral 
meets.  He said he would brief MSNSA al-Waeli and understands 
Embassy and MNF-I would do the same.  He confirmed an MOD rep 
would join the GOI delegation in response to the Ambassador's 
question and said he would look at timing on November 17 or 
later. 
 
¶8.  (S) Comment:  Embassy and MNF-I will meet with MSNSA 
al-Waeli and closely watch to ensure GOI-KRG coordination in 
advance of the trilateral.  We will also work to provide some 
substance to technical committee ideas discussed with 
al-Dabbagh.  The delay in the meeting allows more time to 
work on both issues. 
CROCKER