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Viewing cable 08ANKARA1898, TURKEY: RESPONSE TO INFORMATION GATHERING REQUEST:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ANKARA1898 2008-11-03 05:04 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #1898/01 3080504
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 030504Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7856
INFO RUEHSS/OECD POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 4919
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001898 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EEB FOR DAS NELSON, EEB/OMA FOR MARLENE SAKAUE, ALEX 
WHITTINGTON 
TREASURY/IMB FOR BULL MURDEN, WILBUR MONROE AND CAROL CARNES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2018 
TAGS: EFIN ECON TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: RESPONSE TO INFORMATION GATHERING REQUEST: 
SUMMIT ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 114420 
     B. ANKARA 1872 
     C. ANKARA 1864 
     D. ANKARA 1855 
 
Classified By: Economic Counselor Dale Eppler for reasons 1.4 b, d 
 
 Turkey's Key Objectives and Priorities/Desired Outcomes 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
1. (C) The GOT  has not yet publicly offered any ideas on 
reform of Bretton Woods institutions.  GOT contacts say that 
they are awaiting the Summit agenda before meeting to discuss 
Turkey,s position on the specific agenda items.   The Prime 
Minister and Treasury Minister have publicly said that 
Turkey,s 2001-02 banking reforms insulated Turkey from being 
directly affected by the crisis, and they may offer their 
experience to other G-20 members.  Privately, the Treasury 
Ministry has indicated its view that the outcome of the 
Summit should be a coordinating mechanism in the G-20, using 
an improved IMF as its implementing organization.  The crisis 
has macroeconomic imbalances at its core and these need to be 
addressed through better coordination.  The G-20 is an 
inclusive platform for this coordination.  The IMF should be 
the G-20 coordination implementing organization, but the IMF 
toolkit will need to expand, and it will need to do a much 
better job of surveillance of developed countries and on a 
multilateral basis (e.g., US-China).  There are transparency, 
governance, funding and other issues at the IMF that may also 
need to be addressed.  (Note: Treasury's views have not yet 
been presented to the Prime Minister, who will have the final 
say.  End note.) 
 
2. (C) The GOT is approaching the Summit as an opportunity to 
confirm their self-image as a regional power with assured 
access to the world stage.  They already point to their 
recent election to the UN Security Council as evidence of 
their heightened status.   GOT Summit positions also will be 
colored by the domestic politics surrounding future GOT ) 
IMF relations.  The last IMF Standby Agreement ended in May. 
The IMF is not popular with the Turkish public, and the Prime 
Minister,  a longtime  opponent of the IMF, sees political 
victory in March 2009 local elections and vindication of his 
economic policies in Turkey,s ability to get through the 
financial crisis without another IMF program.  In response to 
business sector requests that the GOT sign a new Standby 
Agreement with the IMF, the Prime Minister said October 26 
that &during a crisis, we will not bury our future in 
darkness by bowing to the demands of the IMF.8    The major 
point of contention is IMF fiscal constraints.  The GOT wants 
the IMF at most to set general, overall financial targets and 
give the GOT maximum flexibility in budget, fiscal policy and 
spending matters. 
 
Key Turkish Concerns/Reform Recommendations 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
3. (C) The GOT has not proposed any changes to the global 
financial system.  The GOT is likely to emphasize national 
sovereignty and responsibility in its positions, and seek 
opportunities to discuss Turkey,s extensive 2001-02 banking 
reforms as an example of the sort of national leadership that 
could have prevented the crisis. 
 
Key Concerns 
-------------- 
 
4. (C) Turkey,s  two primary concerns are maintaining access 
to foreign capital and avoiding FX liquidity problems.  While 
there are no immediate liquidity problems, Turkey faces 
potentially serious foreign exchange problems in coming 
months.  The Central Bank estimates that USD $14 billion 
(net) left Turkey in the first three weeks of October, much 
of that carry trade investments that unwound. FX is in demand 
and large FX debt payments coming in the next few months 
promise to keep FX demand high.  The Central Bank,s reserves 
are about $77 billion gross, and $58 billion net, less than 
foreign investment in Turkish bonds ($23 billion) and 
equities (approximately $50 billion).   The lira depreciated 
about 37% against the dollar from October 1 to October 24. 
Thus far, there has not been any indication that Turks are 
moving out of lira and into FX.  On the contrary, the latest 
data indicates that Turks continued to sell FX as the lira 
depreciated in October. 
5. (SBU) Turkey is highly dependent on imported capital ) 
its capital needs have been estimated at USD $100 to 145 
 
billion over the next 12 months.  The Current Account Deficit 
is expected to be about 7% of GDP this year, or about USD $51 
billion.  The Turkish private sector has about USD 80 billion 
in foreign currency debt outstanding (USD 100 billion in 
2009).  This debt will be difficult to rollover in the 
current environment. Banks, while not highly leveraged, will 
still face difficulties renewing their external credit lines, 
and the domestic banking sector does not have the resources 
to substitute for the low-interest financing Turkish 
companies have received offshore.  The banking sector is 
well-capitalized but it still faces credit risk (as its 
formerly credit worthy borrowers see their export orders 
vanish), FX risk (from borrowing abroad and lending at home) 
and maturity mismatch problems as interest rates rise. 
Key Concerns for Prime Minister Erdogan 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The Prime Minister will welcome being included in this 
select grouping, and will see this as reinforcement that 
Turkey under his leadership is being recognized as a key 
regional power.  His attention will be focused in part on how 
the Summit plays to domestic Turkish audiences, in light of 
nationwide local elections scheduled for March 2009.  He also 
will be looking for opportunities to tell the world how his 
government,s banking reforms, financial policies and 
economic management  have allowed Turkey to avoid being 
directly affected by the crisis. 
 
Impact of the Financial Market Crisis on the Financial Sector 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
7. (SBU) As discussed above, Turkey faces a potential FX 
liquidity problem in coming months.  This is mainly the 
result of heavy FX borrowing by the Turkish private sector in 
recent years (about $100 billion), taking advantage of low 
interest rates offshore and, until October, the strong lira. 
 
 
8. (SBU) The Turkish private sector will bear the brunt of 
the financial crisis.  The corporate sector will have 
difficulty rolling over its offshore credit lines.  Most 
Turkish production relies on imported inputs, and the recent 
lira depreciation will increase costs of production.  At the 
same time,  Turkey,s major export markets (Europe, Russia 
and the GCC) are all slowing down, making it more difficult 
to export even though Turkish goods are more price 
competitive with a depreciated lira. 
 
9. (SBU)  This weakening of the corporate sector,s financial 
health threatens to undermine Turkey,s well capitalized 
banks, which face increasing credit and FX risks as well as 
maturity mismatch problems if interest rates increase.  Seven 
banks account for 79% of Turkish banking assets. While 
Turkish banks are only lightly leveraged by international 
standards, they still rely on foreign credit lines, and 
several of these major banks face large FX debt rollovers in 
coming months.  A failure to rollover these credits or other 
financial problem at one of these major banks could easily 
provoke a systemic crisis. 
 
GOT Actions Taken to Address the Financial Crisis 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
10. (SBU ) While assuring the public that the crisis will not 
affect the Turkish financial sector because of the 2001-02 
banking reforms, the GOT is proposing several measures to 
deal with the secondary effects of the crisis.  To deal with 
declining exports, the GOT says it will propose a new 
incentives package for exporters who expand to new markets. 
The GOT also is proposing a tax amnesty for offshore funds, 
allowing Turks to repatriate some of the estimated USD 100 
billion they hold offshore over a three month period with no 
questions asked. The GOT also plans to restart a commercial 
loan guarantee mechanism and will do away with the 10% 
withholding tax on domestic investments. The Finance Minister 
recently rejected business calls for increasing Turkey,s 
bank deposit insurance (currently YTL 50,000, approximately 
$29,000), but there is an ongoing effort in the Parliament to 
give the GOT the discretionary authority to increase deposit 
insurance if necessary. 
11. (SBU) The Central Bank has taken several actions to try 
to head off a liquidity problem.  On October 9, it entered 
the interbank FX market as a broker and effectively took on 
counterparty risk. On October 22, it doubled the amount of FX 
that banks could borrow directly from the Central Bank on a 
short term (up to two week) basis, to $10.8 billion.  These 
 
 
 
loans are priced higher than prevailing rates on the 
interbank market.  The Central Bank restarted daily FX 
auctions the same day but then cancelled them on October 28 
because FX liquidity conditions had improved. 
 
Current Economic Situation/Near-Term Outlook 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
12. (SBU) Turkey,s GDP growth is highly dependent on 
exports, the majority of which go to the EU (51%). With 
Europe going into recession and other key markets (Russia and 
the GCC) slowing down, GDP growth projections are being 
slashed.  2008 GDP now is expected to be around 2.5-3%, 
versus a 4-4.5% growth expectation just a few months ago. 
The GOT seems to be in denial about this, with the 2009 
budget based on rosy 4% GDP growth (private estimates range 
from 1.9 to 2.5%, with risks to the downside) and 7.5% 
inflation (private estimates are rising in response to the 
recent lira devaluation). 
12. (SBU) 2009 promises to be an even more difficult year if 
the crisis continues.  In addition to $100 billion in private 
sector FX debt, the GOT will need to make USD $11.6 billion 
in foreign debt payments, its largest FX debt payment level 
of the next five years.   This will be offset somewhat by the 
sharp drop in energy prices, as Turkey,s Current Account 
Deficit (CAD) is essentially equal to its energy imports. 
While natural gas prices are tied to long-term contracts, the 
drop in oil prices will reduce Turkey,s external financing 
needs (analysts are estimating the 2009 CAD will fall to USD 
$32-40 billion). 
13. (SBU) Investment is very likely to slow substantially, 
but no one seems to be sure yet by how much.  The GOT,s 
ambitious privatization program is likely to be hard hit. 
Two recently completed privatization deals have come 
unraveled after banks withheld promised financing for the 
deals. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
WILSON