VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAM #3189/01 3300731
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250731Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3879

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 003189 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA/ELA AND NEA/IPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG KPAL SY IS LE AE MO JO
SUBJECT: GOJ LEADERS TALK AID, REFORM, PALESTINIANS, LEVANT 
WITH DAS HALE 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 3167 
     ¶B. AMMAN 3122 
 
Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
David Hale, who was in Amman to participate in the 
U.S.-Jordan Political Dialogue (Ref A), spent November 18 in 
separate meetings with King Abdullah, Royal Court Chief 
Nasser Al-Lozi, Foreign Minister Salah Al-Bashir, Senate 
President Zeid Al-Rifai, and Minister of Planning and 
International Cooperation Suhair Al-Ali.  Hale urged his 
interlocutors to develop a needs assessment for Iraqi 
refugees in preparation to justify continued U.S. aid on that 
issue.  He said the present Administration will be handing 
its successor an intact Palestinian-Israeli peace process. 
End Summary. 
 
U.S. Aid to Jordan; Fallout from Global Economic Crisis 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶2.  (C) Bashir and Ali asked whether the global economic and 
financial crisis, coupled with transition to a new U.S. 
Administration, would lead to a decrease in aid to Jordan. 
Bashir noted that the recent G-20 meeting had affirmed the 
importance of maintaining aid levels.  Ali said the GOJ is 
"confident our partners will continue to step up to the 
plate, but the media is skeptical."  Hale told both that 
Jordan in general remains in good standing but that it should 
keep a couple of issues in mind as it seeks to maintain 
strong support among American lawmakers: first, Washington 
wants to see more data showing that U.S. assistance for Iraqi 
issues has been well spent, and second, that Jordan continues 
to improve its human rights record.  The King has been saying 
the right things on human rights but concrete steps have not 
always followed, for example in the areas of trafficking in 
persons. 
 
¶3.  (C) Hale urged the GOJ to make it easier for Iraqis in 
Jordan to earn their own income.  While expressing 
understanding for Jordan's experience with Palestinian 
refugees and attendant wariness of absorbing many more 
refugees, he questioned why it should be so difficult to make 
sure Iraqis had a right to work.  He suggested that offering 
Iraqis a protected status might make them more comfortable 
registering their children in school and using the health 
care system. 
 
¶4.  (C) Hale encouraged Jordan to develop a strategy to 
protect economic gains through the current global crisis, to 
define Jordan's goals and expectations for the next 2-5 
years, and to explain how Jordan is coping with economic 
developments.  Ali said that no formal study has been 
completed, but Jordan expected to take a hit on remittances 
from Jordanians abroad and foreign direct investment, and 
imports would likely drop.  The Minister expressed strong 
interest in holding an economic dialogue with the U.S., 
similar to the November 17 political session, as soon as 
possible and before the end of the year.  She predicted 
Jordan would be better able to quantify the projected impact 
of the economic crisis at the first session of the economic 
dialogue and asked what else the U.S. might be interested in 
hearing about.  Ali estimated that Jordan's real growth would 
decline from about 6 percent to 4-4.5 percent in the first 
half of 2009, chronic unemployment challenges would continue, 
and there would be noteworthy decline in tax revenue.  She 
assessed that improved relations with Qatar (Ref B) would 
mean Jordanian workers would be more likely to remain there, 
adding that Jordanians were facing layoffs throughout the 
other Gulf States where they tended to occupy middle and 
upper management positions. 
 
¶5.  (C) Ali urged the USAID mission to be more flexible, 
saying she senses micromanagement out of Washington.  People 
on the ground know best, she argued, adding that Jordanians 
working on the ground know what the priorities are.  Having 
specific sectoral allocations mandated from Washington were 
in neither the U.S. nor Jordan's interest. 
 
Governance and Reform 
--------------------- 
¶6.  (C) Upper House President Rifai noted that MPs elected in 
November 2007 are more qualified than the last batch, but 
that the continued absence of real, organized political 
parties means candidates run and lose as independents and 
often are not around long enough to develop parliamentary 
professionalism.  He saw PM Nader Dahabi doing a good job and 
cited greater harmony between the Palace and the Government. 
He praised the selection of Nasser Lozi to head the Royal 
Court given his capacity to maintain good relations with 
everyone and his non-confrontational nature. 
 
¶7.  (C) Speaking of the controversial Law on Associations, 
Rifai anticipated some minor adjustments, but overall he was 
dismissive of demands from the NGO sector in Jordan for 
greater freedom for associations.  "I see no reason for it," 
he said of further amendments, arguing that Jordanian NGOs 
need to understand that "democracy without controls becomes 
chaos.  It doesn't mean that every person does what he wants 
to do."  "Pressure groups," he continued, are complaining 
about problems that are not real.  If a journalist breaks a 
law, he must be tried, Rifai argued, noting that "people want 
journalists to have total immunity - that's not the way it 
works."  That said, he allowed that a reporter should not be 
put on trial just "because he has expressed an opinion." 
 
Syria, Lebanon, Iran 
-------------------- 
¶8.  (C) Rifai observed that even as things seemed to be 
settling down in Lebanon, in reality nothing fundamental had 
changed: Hizballah held the winning cards, and Syria was not 
giving up on its efforts to influence the course of politics. 
 His main concern was the coming election where Hizballah 
would likely boost its strength.  Some of this might come 
from increased power of Christian groups allied with the Shia 
party, particularly as Michel Aoun was gaining strong support 
among a divided Maronite community.  Foreign Minister Bashir 
described the spring elections in Lebanon as "when we will 
know who won last May," referring to the outcome of the Doha 
Accords. 
 
¶9.  (C) On Syria, Rifai said Bashar Al-Asad's regime was 
behaving more tactically than strategically, mainly because 
the Syrians "think they are winning."  Bashar was just 
waiting for the end of the Bush Administration.  Former 
Syrian VP (and leader of the expatriate opposition National 
Salvation Front) Abdel Halim Khaddam had told Rifai that the 
only thing that Bashar had inherited from his father, Hafez, 
was the acceptance that political assassination was an 
appropriate way to rid oneself of rivals.  (Note: Rifai 
speculated that Hizballah operations chief Imad Mughniyah and 
Syrian Presidential security aide Brigadier General Muhammad 
Sulayman had been targeted by the regime in an effort to 
dispatch anyone with links to former Lebanese President Rafiq 
Al-Hariri's death.  "If the court convenes, there won't be 
anyone left to testify," he concluded.  End Note.) 
 
¶10.  (C) Rifai said he thought dialogue with Iran was good, 
but ultimately fruitless, arguing that if the U.S., the EU, 
and the Arab states agree that under no circumstances should 
Iran be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon, military force 
was the only option.  "Bomb Iran, or live with an Iranian 
bomb.  Sanctions, carrots, incentives won't matter," he 
offered.  And while Rifai judged a military strike would have 
"catastrophic impact on the region," he nonetheless thought 
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would pay 
enough dividends to make it worth the risks. 
 
Peace Process, Palestinian Politics 
----------------------------------- 
¶11.  (C) FM Bashir said that the November 26 Arab Foreign 
Ministers meet in Cairo would focus beyond the subject of 
Palestinian reconciliation and would express a consensus view 
that no Palestinian elections should be held unless they are 
simultaneously for President and the Legislature.  The Arabs 
intend to use their meeting to back Mahmoud Abbas.  Bashir 
added that he has discussed with at least two of his peers, 
Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed and Moroccan FM 
El-Tayeb Fassi-Fihri, the possibility of the three of them 
visiting Abbas in Ramallah as a further show of support after 
the November 26 meeting.  (Note: Bashir said he might also 
meet Israeli Kadima Party leader and Foreign Minister Tzipi 
Livni at that time.  He said she had told him that she would 
be cautious during the election campaign about saying "good 
things" about the peace process.  Bashir was concerned that 
she would be unable to form a government, even if her party 
won the most seats.  End Note.)  On Mughrabi Gate, Bashir 
said he had escalated the matter recently by raising Jordan's 
concerns directly with Livni.  He said Jordan is not becoming 
radicalized, but urged Israel not to "push us" and said what 
Israel was doing to Jordan was "not right." 
 
¶12.  (C) Rifai describe Abbas as "very down and frustrated" 
and continuing to hint that if things continued as they were, 
he would quit.  Abbas described himself as a failure because 
he could not stop settlements, the separation wall, extension 
of Israeli control over the territory.  Neither had he 
secured a significant release of Palestinian prisoners from 
Israeli custody.  Rifai speculated that Israel would prefer 
that Hamas take over the West Bank, obviating the need to 
deal meaningfully with a moderate leadership.  He called for 
greater pressure on Israel to give Abbas something to show 
his people.  It is no longer enough to just have a peace 
process.  There must be tangible results on the ground.  DAS 
Hale, pointed out that the Palestinian forces trained in 
Jordan had impressed the Israeli security establishment and 
that Palestinian PM Salam Fayyad was more upbeat on economic 
conditions than previously. 
 
¶13.  (C) Regarding Abbas's control of Fatah, Rifai cited an 
urgent need to reorganize the party's leadership.  If there 
is to be a gathering of the Fatah Sixth Party Congress, it 
must be held in the West Bank, allowing Abbas to better 
control the proceedings, Rifai asserted.  Holding the 
conference "inside" - rather than in Amman or Cairo, for 
instance - would keep attendance at more manageable levels 
and keep out disruptive elements like Tunis-based PLO 
"Foreign Minister" and Fatah Central Committee bigwig Farouq 
Qaddumi. 
 
¶14.  (C) King Abdullah, who had just ended a meeting with 
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, reiterated his readiness 
to support efforts to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace as 
well as help the Lebanese Armed Forces and moderate, 
anti-Syrian elements in Lebanon. 
 
 
Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman 
Beecroft