O 191540Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4722
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 000822 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGVO KDEM EAID IV
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT GBAGBO DISCUSSES ELECTION DELAY, DDR 
ISSUES 
 
REF: A) ABIDJAN 595 B) ABIDJAN 817 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Wanda Nesbitt for Reasons 1.5(B/D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In a November 13 meeting with Ambassador, 
President Gbagbo said he was disappointed that elections have 
been postponed again but does not see what he can do to speed 
up the process; the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) 
needs to work more quickly and effectively. He was calm and 
matter of fact about the delay but did not appear to be 
overly worried about it.  Gbagbo confirmed that DDR remains 
stalled while negotiations over how to resolve the issue of 
grades/ranks continue, and indicated his opposition to two of 
the Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) key proposals: the transformation 
of the existing national army (FANCI) into a new structure 
comprising both forces, and the integration of 5,000 FAFN 
soldiers into a national force.  End Summary 
 
2.(C) Ambassador called on President Gbagbo to discuss the 
November 10 CPC (Permanent Consultative Framework) meeting in 
Ouagadougou and when he thought elections might be 
rescheduled. Gbagbo said the CPC meeting was not at all 
contentious; the participants readily agreed that the 
election had to be postponed because the voter registration 
process was nowhere near complete.  Gbagbo said that no one 
had tried to defend the CEI, and his analysis was that the 
CEI had made the mistake of trying to create an entirely new 
structure of its own instead of drawing on existing 
structures, such as the INS (National Institute of 
Statistics) and civil servants posted around the country. 
Gbagbo claimed that CEI president Mambe had made no effort to 
solicit the assistance of the regional prefects until 
October. He expected the CEI to work more closely with local 
officials now that the CPC had encouraged them to do so. The 
president reminded Ambassador that the electoral commission 
is comprised mainly of politicians who do not have a lot of 
technical expertise (see ref A), and is dominated by the 
opposition.  He said he had not insisted that the CEI work 
more closely with the Ministry of Interior, the department 
that oversees the prefectural system (and is headed by one of 
Gbagbo's closest allies), because he had not wanted to appear 
to be imposing conditions or accused of trying to compromise 
the electoral commission's independence. 
 
¶3. (C) President Gbagbo would not speculate about when the 
election might take place. He told Ambassador that he was 
disturbed by the delay but did not see that he could do much 
about it.  Ambassador stressed to Gbagbo that the US wants to 
see elections take place as soon as possible, noting that 
Cote d'Ivoire could not move forward on many development 
issues as long as there is a perception that the country is 
still in crisis.  Gbagbo agreed and said that one of his 
greatest frustrations is that he cannot truly govern with a 
national unity cabinet; too many of the ministers pay 
allegiance to the opposition and have no desire to help the 
current government succeed.  Ambassador told Gbagbo that she 
had met the previous week with Finance Minister Diby to 
discuss HIPC debt relief and the improvements that Cote 
d'Ivoire needed to make to reach the decision point. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the president appeared to view it as a 
technical issue and merely encouraged Ambassador to continue 
her discussions with the Finance Minister. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ambassador asked the president if any progress had 
been made on DDR issues at the CPC. Gbabgbo's response was 
that negotiations are continuing.  He said that he does not 
agree with the Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) that the country needs 
a "new" army. (Note: the FAFN's position has been that it 
will join a new army but will not 'return' to the FANCI.) 
"We already have an army", Gbagbo said.  The president also 
said that the FANCI could not absorb 5,000 soldiers, the 
number the FAFN wants to contribute to a new force.  Gbagbo 
said that the ethnic composition of the army would be skewed 
too heavily towards northerners were the FANCI to take in 
5,000; he though 2,500 might be reasonable.  Gbagbo also 
reiterated his view that the Comzones must depart before the 
election and that disarmament should be largely completed 
before the election as well.  He did not, however, explain 
how this could happen if the grades/ranks issue is not 
resolved soon. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment: The president seemed very relaxed and 
talkative but deliberately skirted the quesion of when an 
election might take place.  He congratulated the US on 
holding an exemplary and historic election, and gave 
Ambassador the text of an article he wrote himself on the 
importance of the US election.  Although he said all the 
right things, Gbagbo did not appear to be genuinely concerned 
about the election delay.  Nor did he appear to be interested 
in discussing HIPC debt relief. In fact, Gbagbo gave the 
impression of being satisfied that things were going very 
much his way. The creation of a new army has been a critical 
issue for the Forces Nouvelles and Gbagbo's rejection of the 
concept could prove to be a serious stumbling block to 
progress on DDR.  End Comment 
 
 
NESBITT