VZCZCXRO7311
PP RUEHAST RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0249/01 2901509
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161509Z OCT 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5980
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0609
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1164
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1104

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000249 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR HAYES 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
EUCOM FOR J-5 
CENTCOM FOR J-5 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC OCTOBER 15: RUSSIA SAYS SOUTH OSSETIA/ABKHAZIA 
ELIGIBLE FOR OSCE 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Russian deputy director for export controls 
and nonproliferation Petr Litavrin told Georgia he had no 
official information about arms transfers to separatists in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia prior to the outbreak of war in 
August.  However, he added, Russia can provide information on 
arms provided to sovereign states, including South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia since their recent declaration of independence. 
Later, Russian head of delegation Ulyanov, responding to 
Georgia's demand that OSCE monitors be given access to South 
Ossetia, declared it and Abkhazia were eligible for 
membership in the OSCE and the Vienna Document as they were 
now de jure independent nations. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Only Belarus supported the Russian proposal for an 
arms embargo of Georgia.  The U.S., the EU, and the FSC Chair 
have told Russia the proposal is unnecessary and will not be 
supported. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ambassador Roberto Moritan, the chair of the Group 
of Government Experts (GGE) on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), 
described the work of the group and the ongoing discussions 
over the feasibility and scope of legally binding 
international standards for arms transfers.  The U.S. noted 
its participation in the GGE and the need for further 
consideration of the complex issues surrounding the ATT. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The draft decision on a cyber security workshop was 
forwarded to the plenary.  Editing continues on the Chair's 
draft Ministerial decisions on SALW and FSC issues, and on 
draft decisions on trafficking of SALW by air, a revised Code 
of Conduct Questionnaire, an overview of melange disposition. 
 End summary. 
 
Arms Trade Treaty 
----------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Argentine Ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritan, the 
chair of the Group of Government Experts on the Arms Trade 
Treaty, reviewed the work of the GGE and described the next 
steps in negotiating the ATT. The GGE was created by the UN 
General Assembly with 28 Member States represented, although 
over 60 had asked to participate.  The group was formed to 
examine the feasibility, scope, and parameters of a legally 
binding instrument to regulate arms transfers.  The group met 
three times in 2008 but concluded that these matters require 
further discussion.  The UNGA and First Committee will 
develop a road-map for further work, including increased 
participation in the discussion group. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The GGE recommended that the seven categories of 
weapons found in the UN register of Conventional Weapons and 
small arms and light weapons be regulated by a global treaty. 
 Moritan said the treaty is not intended to qualify the right 
of states to defend themselves per Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.  The ATT will also address other UN Charter 
provisions including those on human rights.  One issue still 
under discussion is reconciling ATT requirements with 
stricter national arms transfer regulations. 
 
Yes, But Will It Cure the Common Cold? 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) France (Fournier) for the EU endorsed the ATT as a 
 
USOSCE 00000249  002 OF 006 
 
 
panacea for armed conflict, terrorism, organized crime, and 
abuses of international humanitarian law.  The treaty needs 
to incorporate international standards at the highest level 
while still respecting state sovereignty.  The EU will 
organize several conferences on the ATT in 2009 to encourage 
further support. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The UK (Gare) noted its early support for the 
treaty. The ATT will not duplicate normative work done at the 
OSCE and elsewhere but rather will close the gaps in extant 
national and regional standards and help to counter terrorism 
and human rights abuses.  The ATT will provide an 
international standard that can be enforced nationally.  Gare 
noted over 150 states support the ATT, including Finland (the 
CiO and FSC chair). 
 
U.S.: Engaged but Cautious 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The U.S. (Malzahn) has made three recommendations to 
the GGE for its future work.  First, further discussion of 
the ATT should be a careful step-by-step analysis of the 
feasibility and scope because of the complexity of the 
subject matter and the differences in levels of comfort with 
the treaty among states.  Malzahn noted the U.S. had voted 
against the treaty in the UNGA in 2007 as it believed it 
would not be possible to create an international instrument 
that matched the high standards of some states, including the 
U.S., but would instead be a "lowest common denominator" 
instrument. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Second, Malzahn said, the GGE needed to consider 
the different motivations for production and acquisition of 
conventional arms.  Third, the obligations of exporters and 
importers need to be balanced in any treaty.  The ATT should 
not be just an export controls arrangement. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Turkey noted it was not a member of the GGE but 
liked being informed. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Moritan concluded by thanking the EU for its 
support and said he hoped for an eventual "yes" vote from the 
U.S. as the treaty will benefit all. 
 
Russia on Arms Transfer Norms after Georgia War 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Peter Litavrin, the Russian MFA deputy director for 
export controls and nonproliferation, described the impact of 
current events on implementation of extant arms transfer 
norms.  Exporters need to consider the actual level of 
tension in a region before agreeing to a transfer.  The EU, 
for instance, should not export weapons if there was chance 
they would be used to support international aggression or 
domestic repression. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Litavrin complained of insufficient transparency in 
arms transfers. Some, he said, complain that arms transfers 
to Kosovo or Georgia heighten tensions; others believe it 
ensures stability and sovereignty.  Some want human rights 
violations to be considered before exporting to Syria and 
Iran, while others believe these matters are irrelevant to 
export decisions.  The U.S. does not arm China and 
 
USOSCE 00000249  003 OF 006 
 
 
discourages other states from doing so, yet the U.S. arms 
Taiwan, which is not recognized by the UN. 
There was less disagreement over these issues within 
homogenous structures, e.g., the EU. 
 
¶15. (SBU) However, Litavrin said, Russia had for several 
years expressed its concern to the EU and others over arms 
transfers to Georgia, which Russia considered excessive and 
destabilizing.  The reply was that there was no UN arms 
embargo, so the transfers were permitted.  Yet, he asked, if 
UN embargoes were the sole criterion, why have these other 
export control standards like Wassenaar and the OSCE?  Russia 
is owed answer to the question how transfers to Georgia are 
consistent with these other export control standards. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Litavrin asserted Georgia's own transparency over 
its arms imports did not contribute to stability in the 
region.  It was time to review critically the OSCE documents 
on SALW in order to devise measures of stopping such 
destabilizing arms transfers. 
 
Who Armed South Ossetia? 
------------------------ 
 
¶17. (SBU) Georgia (Giorgadze) asked if Litavrin had data on 
Russian arms transfers to the separatist movements in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Giorgadze also asked why "one 
participating State" (pS) was preventing "another pS" from 
visiting these separatist regions?  Litavrin answered that 
independent South Ossetian and Abkhazia could be the 
legitimate recipients of arms transfers.  He had no official 
information on transfers to separatist movements, although he 
conjectured that had Russia been supplying South Ossetia 
before the war then events might have turned out differently. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Giorgadze recalled that Georgia had urged military 
monitors be allowed access to the separatist regions but 
Russia had refused.  Georgia had also urged international 
monitoring of the Roki tunnel but Russia had blocked that 
too.  Giorgadze referred delegations to his October 1 
statement in the FSC on arms transfers (FSC.JOUR/564, Annex 
2). 
 
U.S. on Arms to Georgia 
----------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbor) upheld the right of states to 
provide for their own defense.  The U.S. has an arms transfer 
policy that recognizes this right while taking account of 
U.S. interests and regional tensions.  These considerations 
underlay U.S. arms transfers and other military assistance to 
Georgia, which facilitated Georgia's deployment of forces to 
Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
re-establishment of government control over the Pankisi 
Gorge.  U.S. arms transfers to Georgia have not been in 
excess of its legitimate security needs.  Neighbour also 
referred delegations to the U.S. statement on the same 
subject at the October 1 FSC (FSC.JOUR/564, Annex 6). 
 
¶20. (SBU) The Chair, Finland Kangaste noted with approval the 
withdrawal of Russian forces from the security zones per the 
Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement.  However, OSCE monitors have 
reported Russian forces have not withdrawn from Akhalkalaki. 
 
USOSCE 00000249  004 OF 006 
 
 
Kangaste requested Russian support for monitor access to this 
area.  He added that talks underway in Geneva are to address 
restoration of security and stability in the region and the 
plight of displaced persons. 
 
Russian Proposal for Embargo of Arms to Georgia 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶21. (SBU) France, speaking for the EU, declared that EU arms 
transfers to Georgia were complaint with its own and other 
international norms and there was no need for the Russian 
proposal to embargo arms to Georgia (FSC.DEL/155/08).  Russia 
(Ulyanov) acknowledged that most EU Member States have not 
exported arms to Georgia, but some, mentioning the Czech 
Republic by name, have contributed to the instability and 
violence in the region.  Ulyanov said these arms were used by 
Georgia for internal repression: "Entire villages were wiped 
out."  Countries that continue to arms Georgia will be 
politically and morally responsible for any violence that 
ensues. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Ulyanov said the Russian proposal to embargo arms 
to Georgia was meant to supplement apparently deficient OSCE 
and EU norms and ensure the return of peace to the area, "for 
the good of the Georgians themselves."  Georgia (Giorgadze) 
denied it had violated any OSCE norms, nor had its suppliers. 
 It was clear, he added, who was responsible for the 
instability in the Caucasus. 
 
¶23. (SBU) The Czech Republic (Reinohlova) said it was still 
waiting for an answer from Russia to the question of who 
supplied the South Ossetian separatists.  Ulyanov, echoing 
Litavrin's remarks earlier, said Russia did not have any 
information, although if it had armed South Ossetia perhaps 
war would not have occurred. 
 
Russia: South Ossetia/Abkhazia Eligible for OSCE 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶24. (SBU) Georgia again demanded that OSCE monitors be 
allowed into South Ossetia: perhaps they could determine 
where South Ossetia got its arms.  Ulyanov replied that this 
request should be put to the authorities in the de jure 
independent South Ossetia and Abkhazia, adding that they were 
now eligible for membership in the OSCE and the Vienna 
Document.  Giorgadze replied that South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
were still part of Georgia and, as such, should be 
inspectable.  Georgia thanked the EU for declining to support 
the Russian call for an embargo. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Later, in the working group, Russia returned to the 
arms embargo proposal and accused the U.S. of breaking its 
promise to Russia that U.S.-trained Georgian forces would 
never turn their arms against Russia but were to be employed 
only to restore government control in the Pankisi Gorge. 
This had led Russia to include a ban on training in OP2 of 
the draft decision.  Belarus (Pavlov) described the Russian 
proposal as a "valid response to recent events" and described 
OSCE normative documents as inadequate. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Separately, the U.S. (Silberberg) told Ulyanov his 
paper was unnecessary and would not be supported.  The Chair 
(Kangaste) told Ulyanov there was virtually no support for 
 
USOSCE 00000249  005 OF 006 
 
 
the embargo proposal; although it can remain on the working 
group agenda, Kangaste will urge Ulyanov to withdraw it 
"after a decent interval." 
 
Cyber Security 
-------------- 
 
¶27. (SBU) The draft decision on a cyber security workshop in 
March 2009 (FSC.DD/12/08) was approved in the working group 
and forwarded to the plenary. 
 
MC.DD on SALW 
------------- 
 
¶28. (SBU) Spain, Slovakia, Canada, Sweden, and Greece 
supported the German edits (FSC.DEL/161/08) to the chair's 
Ministerial draft decision on SALW )MC.DD/7/08).  The U.S. 
(Silberberg) reprised earlier comments on the draft: avoiding 
reference in the preamble to need for further work on 
stockpiles and resisting the language in OP2 tic one calling 
for a review of the "scope and content" of the OSCE Document 
on SALW.  Azerbaijan supported the U.S. on the OP2 issue. 
Germany (Schweizer) noted the phrase "scope and content under 
regular review" appeared in the OSCE Document on SALW and 
asserted any review should be not just of the document but 
all aspects of SALW work in light of current conditions to 
determine if further norms were needed.  Turkey requested 
"requires" be changed to "encourages" in OP3 on the 
establishment of national legal frameworks for SALW 
brokering.  The Chair plans to issue a revised text and will 
attempt to find language acceptable to all. 
 
MC.DD on FSC Issues 
------------------- 
 
¶29. (SBU) Switzerland supported the Russian edits 
(FSC.DEL/163/08) to the Chair's Ministerial draft decision on 
FSC issues (MC.DD/6/08).  The U.S. requested, again, that 
reference to specific progress reports be dropped from OP3. 
Georgia objected to the absence of any mention of the 
"Georgia-Russia" war and proposed language to remedy this 
that would omit the reference to "South Ossetia/Georgia." 
Latvia and Canada supported the Georgian edits. 
 
¶30. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) countered that the Georgian 
language did not reflect the facts on the ground.  It was 
Georgia that was responsible for all the untoward events of 
August.  Russia was only "enforcing the peace."  Ulyanov said 
he could not see the point of the U.S. recommendation for 
OP3: last year the Ministers had told the FSC on what to 
report, which is as it should be.  There was no reason to 
change this arrangement. 
 
SALW by Air 
----------- 
 
¶31. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) still prefers to go beyond the 
Wassenaar norms on preventing destabilizing transfers of SALW 
by air that could be incorporated into OSCE practice by the 
revised draft decision (FSC.DD/10/08/Rev.1) that features, 
according to Schweizer, "uncritical use of documents coming 
from another organization."  While Germany generally supports 
the latest version, it reserves the right to make additional 
 
USOSCE 00000249  006 OF 006 
 
 
suggestions. 
 
Melange "Overview" 
------------------ 
 
¶32. (SBU) Ukraine, Sweden, and Kazakhstan supported the draft 
decision welcoming the "overview" of melange disposition 
methods (FSC.DEL/148/08), formerly known as a "Best Practice 
Guide." Germany wants to see further revision.  The U.S. 
announced it had passed comments from technical experts to 
the paper's author, Finland. 
 
Code of Conduct 
--------------- 
 
¶33. (SBU) Yet another version of the revised Code of Conduct 
Questionnaire (FSC.DEL/98/08/Rev.4) was distributed by the 
FSC Code coordinator, Colonel Anton Eischer (Austria). 
Eischer has called for discussion of the draft in the October 
22 working group.  He noted that the revised Questionnaire 
needs to be adopted by the late-November Ministerial if the 
first set of replies are to be submitted by April 15, 2009. 
Kazakhstan supported the latest version of the revised 
Questionnaire. 
 
¶34. (SBU) Russia (Geyvandov) said it had further edits to the 
questions on the political-military commitments of pS. 
Geyvandov also cautioned that the revision required careful 
inter-agency review by Moscow that could take some time. 
 
Other CSBMs 
----------- 
 
¶35. (SBU) Cyprus and Turkey announced the cancellation of 
military exercises as part of renewed discussions between the 
"two communities" on the island. 
 
Next Meeting 
------------ 
 
¶36. (SBU) The Next meeting of the FSC will be on October 22 
and will feature a presentation on the Montreux Declaration 
on Private Military and Security Companies by Ambassador Paul 
Seger, director of international law, Swiss Department of 
Foreign Affairs. 
SCOTT