VZCZCXRO5890
OO RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0247/01 2890624
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 150624Z OCT 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5975
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
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RUCNOSC/OSCE COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000247 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM, 
NSC FOR HAYES, JCS FOR J5/NORWOOD/CAMPBELL, 
OSD FOR ISA/PERENYI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2018 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: OCTOBER 14 -- GEORGIA CALLS OUT RUSSIA, 
RECEIVES BROAD SUPPORT 
 
Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour, 
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary:   At October 14 JCG, Georgia accused 
Russia of violating core principles of the CFE Treaty 
(non-use of force, host nation consent) and non-compliance 
with Treaty provisions.  In a surprisingly lengthy give and 
take (which included seven different interventions by 
Russia), the U.K., Ukraine, France, Romania, Germany, Turkey, 
the U.S., and the Czech Republic expressed support for the 
Georgian statement.  In response, Russia accused Georgia of 
not fulfilling its Istanbul commitments, justified Russian 
action during the August conflict as necessary to protect 
peacekeepers and civilians, and compared Russian recognition 
of Abkhazia/S. Ossetia with others' recognition of Kosovo. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  Russia also provided a long dissertation on how it 
believes its suspension of CFE is in accordance with 
customary international law and the Vienna Convention on 
Treaties.  The Russian interventions provoked subsequent 
additional interventions by the Czech Republic, Moldova, 
Georgia (twice more), Netherlands, Germany, Ukraine, Romania, 
Canada (twice), Turkey, the U.S., Britain, and Luxembourg. 
While these interventions by no means offered absolute 
backing for Georgia, there was not a word of support for 
Russia.  Germany and the U.K. pleaded for all to let the past 
go, and focus on the future for ways to solve the current CFE 
impasse.  End summary. 
 
MODERATE GEORGIAN APPROACH GARNERS BROAD SUPPORT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Georgia (Dolidze) delivered a relatively moderate 
statement, which had been toned down substantially after 
consulting the United States and a number of other 
delegations, against Russia's invasion, calling it a "clear 
violation" of one of the core principles of the CFE Treaty as 
stated in the Preamble to "recall their obligation to refrain 
in their mutual relations, as well as in their international 
relations in general, from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State."  The Georgian statement emphasized the CFE Treaty as 
a "cornerstone of the European security system" and asserted 
that Russia's recent actions further undermine the Treaty and 
its principles. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  The United Kingdom, Ukraine, France, Romania, 
Germany (Richter), Turkey, the United States, and the Czech 
Republic expressed various levels of support for the Georgian 
statement, particularly taking up the USG theme that recent 
events have made the impasse on CFE more complicated.  The 
U.K. (Gare), Ukrainian (Herasymenko), and Romanian 
(Neculaescu) delegations noted their concerns for further 
"erosion" of the Treaty.  The German, UK, and U.S. 
delegations recalled NAC statements on August 19th and 27th 
in which Allies expressed their grave disapproval of Russia's 
activities.  France (Simonet) noted that the fundamental 
principles in the CFE Treaty's preamble have been "greatly 
weakened by actions in Georgia" and added, with satisfaction, 
the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory as 
an "important step" to fulfilling the agreement reached 
between Presidents Sarkozy and Medvedev. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  Germany (Richter) said Russia's recognition of the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has made the 
overall situation worse.  Turkey (Begec) stressed that no 
State Party should have an interest in the collapse of CFE 
and raised its concern that there are currently no means by 
which to verify whether or not numerical limitations for 
Russia are being abided by.  Ukraine, the Czech Republic 
(Reinohlova), and Romania raised Russia's failure to uphold 
the Istanbul Commitments. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  The United States (Neighbour) noted that Georgia's 
statement was appropriate and timely for discussion in the 
JCG.  Inter alia, he reiterated the U.S. commitment to 
 
USOSCE 00000247  002 OF 004 
 
 
resolve the impasse that began with Russia's decision last 
year to stop implementing its CFE obligations, expressed hope 
that Russia would comply fully with the host nation consent 
requirement of the CFE Treaty, and commented that the 
situation has now become more complicated by Russia's recent 
military actions in Georgia. 
 
RUSSIA CHARGES "DOUBLE STANDARDS" ON ISTANBUL 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7. (SBU)  Russian Chief Arms Control Delegate Ulyanov before 
attempting to respond in detail to the points raised by other 
delegations first suggested that his colleagues from Ukraine, 
the Czech Republic, and Romania had "selective memory" in 
recalling the Istanbul Commitments.  He suggested that during 
JCG meetings until now he had not heard any other delegations 
question Georgia's upholding of its commitments and accused 
these countries of having "double standards" in their 
policies.  He mentioned instances where Russia had met the 
deadline proscribed by the Istanbul commitments but that 
Georgia had failed to fulfill similar obligations. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Ulyanov then presented several arguments, at times 
in an unstructured and incoherent manner, to defend Russia's 
actions, including the U.S. military action against Iraq in 
¶2003.  He suggested that Russia used force not against the 
political or territorial integrity of Georgia, but rather 
against "aggressor" Georgia," which had "ferociously attacked 
innocent civilians and peacekeepers  He said that Russia's 
recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
came only after the recognition of Kosovo and that Russia, in 
fact, had supported the territorial integrity of Georgia for 
almost a decade and a half.  He asserted that Russia's 
decision on recognition is "not subject to review" and not up 
for discussion. 
 
¶9. (SBU)  Ulyanov was particularly strong in his comments 
against the United States, noting that the Georgians have 
repeated the "American slogan" that the Treaty does not 
provide for the possibility of moratorium, or suspension. 
Ulyanov suggested that the real "deadlock" occurred when the 
United States, Georgia, and others, linked ratification of 
the Adapted Treaty to "secondary issues," making it a 
political decision.  He called this a "strategic oversight" 
on the part of the United States and said that resuming CFE 
would depend on the willingness of others around the table in 
making progress on the parallel actions package. 
 
RUSSIA CLAIMS IT HAS A LEGAL BASIS FOR SUSPENSION OF CFE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10. (SBU)  Ulyanov then launched a lengthy monologue on the 
legal basis for suspension, recalling its July 30 note to the 
Netherlands as depository of the Treaty in which Russia put 
forth its case for suspension.  Ulyanov argued that Article 
57 of the Vienna Convention allows States Parties to suspend 
a treaty temporarily.  He also said that paragraph 2 of 
Article 19 of the CFE Treaty gives States Parties the right 
to suspend the treaty in light of "extraordinary events." 
 
¶11. (SBU)  Russia then took issue with the U.S. position, 
calling it "not valid" and cited an article by article 
analysis prepared by the Department of State for a 
presidential address to the Senate on July 2, 1991 wherein 
the Department noted the "right of withdrawal" is in addition 
to "any other rights of States Parties including suspension." 
 He questioned what has made American legal circles change 
their minds and suggested the United States is applying 
"legally flimsy judgment" in its current analysis related to 
CFE. 
 
U.S. AND OTHERS REPLY TO RUSSIAN MISPERCEPTIONS 
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
USOSCE 00000247  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶12. (SBU)  The exchange between delegations lasted almost two 
hours.  Ulyanov's interventions managed to provoke subsequent 
additional interventions, some quite challenging of Russia's 
actions, by the Czech Republic, Moldova (Kuk), Georgia 
(twice), the Netherlands (Kleinjan), Germany, Ukraine, 
Romania, Canada (Gosal - twice), Turkey, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg. 
 
¶13. (SBU)  For its part in reply to Russia's accusations, 
USDel (Neighbour) recalled that the Istanbul Commitments were 
part of a package deal to which all had agreed.  This had 
already been explained in detail in the JCG as recently as 
last year.  He added that thousands of Russian troops were 
now within Georgia's internationally recognized borders, 
borders that had been recognized by many UN and OSCE 
documents, and recognized by Russia itself until very 
recently.  Neighbour said he was not aware of Georgia giving 
host nation consent to this large troop presence; to say that 
this made resolving the impasse on CFE more difficult was an 
understatement.  The U.S. reaffirmed Russia,s noncompliance 
with the CFE Treaty in continuing to refuse inspections and 
provide data, and said the CFE Treaty is not an instrument 
that can be implemented "a la carte."  USDel also reserved 
the right to reply in greater detail during a later meeting 
to Russia's assertions regarding the legality of suspension. 
 
¶14. (SBU)  Germany (Richter), echoed by the United Kingdom 
(Gare) and Luxembourg (Pilot), stressed that debates on both 
past activities and the legal basis for suspension would not 
move us forward.  The Germany delegate particularly 
emphasized the political will needed to break the impasse. 
He said that fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments were to 
be upheld for ratification of the Adapted Treaty.  He 
stressed the importance of the parallel actions package and 
said that any new demands by Russia make matters complicated. 
 
 
GEORGIANS ELATED, APPRECIATIVE FOR U.S. ROLE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶15. (C)  After the Plenary, the U.S. delegation was 
approached by a beaming Georgian Ambassador Dolidze, who told 
USDel that he was very appreciative for U.S. editing 
suggestions for Georgia's statement (to keep it CFE-related) 
and for urging Allied delegations to intervene.  USDel 
declined to accept any credit, but did note that many Allied 
delegations, including France and Germany, had said they 
would not have offered any support for Georgia if it had used 
its first (maximalist) statement.  In fact, USDel was 
informed by France during a meeting of the Quad on October 13 
that France, before having seen the revised/toned-down 
Georgian statement, was under instructions to urge Georgia to 
say nothing at all. 
 
QUAD, JCG-T CONSIDER SUPPORT FOR GEORGIAN STATEMENT 
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶16. (C)  On October 13 the Quad met to consider support for 
the planned Georgian statement during the JCG Plenary this 
week.  France initially raised concern that the JCG has not 
yet reached any conclusions on Georgia's assertion of 
Russia's "violations."  The U.S. (Neighbour), with support 
from Germany (Richter) and the United Kingdom (Gare), 
suggested that delegations could lend support to the Georgian 
statement without agreeing to the allegations of violations. 
The U.K. representative said she would not support anything 
beyond NATO's current position.  The German delegate 
(Richter) echoed the UK's remarks and suggested that he would 
refer to NAC statements on the 19th and 27th of August, which 
he did the next day. 
 
¶17. (C)  The Quad also revisited the issue of Russia holding 
the JCG chairmanship prior to the Helsinki Ministerial and on 
its anniversary of suspension of implementation of CFE.  The 
UK (Gare) strongly cautioned the PR message that this would 
 
USOSCE 00000247  004 OF 004 
 
 
send if the JCG meetings were in fact chaired by Russia 
during these two important events.  France (Simonet) and 
Germany (Richter) were uncomfortable with the notion of 
artificially inventing something purely for the sake of 
delaying the meetings, but would welcome the opportunity of 
something coming in handy that could be used for grounds to 
delay the meetings.  The other French delegate (Fournier) 
suggested scheduling a HLTF on a Tuesday to provide an 
undisputable reason for cancelling a JCG. 
 
¶18. (C)  The JCG-T met briefly on 14 October, i.e., 
immediately prior to the JCG Plenary.  Germany gave a heads 
up that Georgia would make a statement against Russia's 
actions, closely tying them to CFE.  A number of delegations, 
including the United States, noted that it would support 
Georgia's statement during the Plenary.  The USDel 
(Neighbour) mentioned that Russia had informed him that it 
would raise the issue of a legal basis for suspension either 
at this week's Plenary or in a future JCG meeting. 
 
¶19. (C)  On the matter of the JCG Chair's letter for the 
Ministerial, the Netherlands (Kleinjan) informed the group 
that Ulyanov appeared very satirical suggesting that since 
"we haven't done much this year, what is there to report?" 
Ulyanov said that he would raise the issue with Moscow, but 
Kleinjan wasn't convinced of Ulyanov,s sincerity. 
Delegations, noted the usefulness of having a letter for the 
Ministerial, but recognized the value in waiting the outcome 
of this week's HLTF.  They agreed to reconsider the letter 
once again at the next JCG-T meeting. 
 
¶20. (U)  The next JCG Plenary will take place on Tuesday, 
October 21, chaired by Norway.  The next JCG-T will be on 
October 20 under Icelandic chairmanship. 
SCOTT