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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000353 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/30/2018 
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PREL AF
SUBJECT: UNAMA HEAD KAI EIDE DISTANCES HIMSELF FROM NATO 
DURING BRIEF TO PERMREPS, 29 SEPTEMBER 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR KURT VOLKER.  REASONS: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (U)  SUMMARY:  During a September 29 briefing to NATO Perm 
Reps, UN Special Representative for Afghanistan Kai Eide 
painted a gloomy picture of the deteriorating security 
situation in Afghanistan, which he said was detracting 
international attention away from development agenda.  He 
criticized nations for focusing development aid on "their" 
provinces and urged greater focus on building police, and 
provincial governments.  Eide also stressed the differences 
between the UN and ISAF and indicated that he wanted to keep 
his distance from ISAF, saying repeatedly that he did not see 
it as part of his job to coordinate between the UN and NATO. 
He rejected the idea of joint investigations into civilian 
casualty incidents, saying it would hurt the UN's 
"impartiality", indicated he did not want to use the new 
media center that is also used by ISAF, and stressed the 
importance of civilian agencies like the UN and NGOs not 
being confused in Afghan eyes with the military.  When 
pressed by the U.S. and other Perm Reps at an informal lunch 
on the necessity of his fulfilling the coordination role as 
part of the comprehensive approach necessary in Afghanistan, 
Eide stuck to his earlier positions on the importance of 
maintaining UN impartiality.    END SUMMARY. 
 
NOT A ROSY PICTURE 
 
¶2. (C)  Special Representative of the UN Secretary General 
and head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) Kai Eide met informally with NATO 
PermReps on September 29 at NATO headquarters.  In his 
briefing, Eide said that at the time of the June 12 Paris 
Donor's Conference the situation in Afghanistan seemed to be 
"sliding a little," but that now, according to most 
indicators, it is "sliding a lot."  He noted that the 
security situation in the South and East has for a long time 
been difficult, but that now the instability has spread to 
areas around Kabul and is affecting the functioning of 
international organizations (IOs).  He said he senses more 
pessimism and resignation in Kabul, particularly due to the 
increase in the number of serious attacks such as the Serena 
Hotel bombing and Afghan Independence Day parade attack. 
Additionally, the increase in attacks against food aid 
convoys and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and the 
fact that the UN itself is no longer spared from attacks )- 
as evidenced by the killing of three UN doctors in south 
Afghanistan and recent credible threats to UN offices -- make 
it difficult to argue security has improved. 
 
¶3. (C)  Eide relayed that the feeling of uneasiness in Kabul 
is sapping the momentum produced by the Paris conference, and 
everyone is struggling to "get back on the Paris track."  He 
stated that the next six months are critical to gain 
initiative and demonstrate success in order to be in a better 
situation prior to the next fighting season in the Spring. 
He said institution building should take priority and that 
President Karzai had some tough decisions to make in this 
area.  He also commented that the need for further work to 
fight corruption was obvious. 
 
¶4. (C)  Regarding security forces and Afghan National Army 
(ANA) expansion, Eide rhetorically asked, "How many 
international troops do we need?"  He stated that focus 
should be concentrated on the police since they &hold8 
territory and are critical to providing the security 
necessary for development.  He said the police are in a 
"miserable state," however, and the international community 
and, more importantly, the Afghans need to figure out what 
they really want in their police force. 
 
¶5. (C)  Eide suggested that President Karzai needs to provide 
more support to the Provincial governments, including 
providing guidance as well as political and monetary support. 
 Eide felt this was the best way to foster economic growth, 
which he noted was greatly needed. 
 
¶6. (C) Eide discussed coordination of aid and how to gain 
more effectiveness in this area.  He stressed the need to 
define criteria and measurements to support the 
implementation of the Afghan National Development Strategy 
(ANDS).  He chastised nations for spending too much money in 
"their provinces" which leads to the ANDS being 
 
USNATO 00000353  002 OF 003 
 
 
"un-implementable."  Although he understood the political 
need for nations to support provinces where they had troops, 
he argued for a more "nationwide perspective" and allocation 
of resources. 
 
¶7. (C)  Turning to civil-military coordination, Eide asked 
rhetorically, "What does it mean?"  He noted the "shape, 
clear, hold, build" military strategy, but then pointed out 
that there was no one on the civilian side to accomplish the 
"hold."  He urged a look at the totality of resources and 
where to use those resources to the best effect.  He 
suggested more investment in the "swing provinces" and less 
in areas where significant resources are accomplishing little 
progress.  He also noted that civ-mil coordination has not 
been easy recently due to the issue of civilian casualties. 
He highlighted the different mandates of ISAF and UNAMA, and 
argued UNAMA was the most important defender of human rights 
in Afghanistan.  He added that his task was to bring 
Afghanistan and the international community together. He also 
stated that he was ready to "move on" from the debate over 
the Shindand civilian casualty incident and develop a method 
to coordinate a quick response to civilian casualty events. 
He also highlighted the different viewpoints of UNAMA and 
ISAF in relation to the recent "Peace Day."  ISAF had 
strongly criticized the Taliban for not living up to their 
assurances to refrain from attacks while UNAMA's view, in 
contrast, was that the day was a resounding success due to 
the distribution of over a million vaccinations on that day. 
 
QUESTIONS LEAD TO DISAPPOINTING ANSWERS 
 
¶8. (C)  NATO PermReps raised many questions for SRSG Eide 
concentrating on civilian casualties, the need for a "civil 
surge", regional/border issues, UNAMA coordination with other 
actors, counter-narcotics, progress on governance, level of 
support from the UN, political reconciliation, and 
suggestions to increase effectiveness in Afghanistan. 
 
¶9. (C)  Eide stressed that there was no need for new funding 
mechanisms to affect the "nationwide" approach to development 
he had advocated because nations "had their commitments from 
the Paris conference and they should live by them."  He 
opined that there could be no success in Afghanistan if 
nations continue to work individually in provinces, and 
suggested that this approach was not supportive of the ANDS. 
 
¶10. (C) Eide then moved on to civilian casualties, where he 
stressed the need for the international community and the 
Afghan authorities to jointly form a quick reaction to any 
future events.  He stressed that UNAMA could not coordinate 
such a response, but that each entity should make the others 
aware of what they saw, correct mistakes, and inform each 
other of their findings.  He emphatically rejected the idea 
of joint investigations, which he feels would compromise the 
UN's impartiality and would cause the human rights community 
to "riot."  He relayed that he meets regularly with COMISAF 
but it has been difficult in the past weeks.  He stated that 
Afghanistan needs a strong international military presence, 
but one that is popular in the communities.  He said 
incidents such as the Shindand civilian casualty incident, 
house searches, detention policies, and day-to-day 
inconveniences created by the presence of international 
forces were eroding ISAF's support.  He said COMISAF's 
statements after the Shindand incident had been unnecessary 
and unhelpful. 
 
¶11. (C)  Eide stated that a military surge would not help, 
and that the international community should focus more on 
political development.  Responding to a question on a UN 
surge, Eide expressed his dismay with the "mind-boggling" 
bureaucracy at the UN, which he said is both frustrating and 
draining him.  He said these bureaucratic obstacles had made 
it impossible to bring all the humanitarian players together. 
 He noted the success of a UN office in Ghazni and said he 
wants to increase the nine current UN provincial offices by 
six in the future.  He relayed that the central and northern 
provinces provided more chance for success than does the 
south, due to the security situation.  In reference to rule 
of law, Eide noted the need to support Karzai's 
anti-corruption plan, and emphasized that if Karzai makes the 
appropriate ministerial changes, it would show the Afghan 
leader's commitment to fight corruption. 
 
USNATO 00000353  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶12. (C)  On development, Eide said it would take time to 
integrate private investment, but that this process was 
beginning.  He noted the tender for two natural gas fields in 
the north as potentially huge projects.  In regard to 
regional relationships, Eide stated Pakistan is very 
sensitive regarding its relationship with Afghanistan, but 
has asked for some contact with Eide's office. 
Interestingly, he stated that the UN's best contacts are with 
Tehran, because they provide priorities for their activities. 
 Regarding reconciliation, Eide said the issue was not 
forgotten, but is an issue that does not lend itself to 
public conversation.  He noted that there may still be 
Pakistani intelligence agency spoilers, but the agreement by 
the Quetta Shura to respect Peace Day showed the potential of 
future talks. 
 
ISAF: KEEP YOUR DISTANCE 
 
¶13. (C)  Notably, Eide expressed a desire to distance himself 
from ISAF and several other organizations.  On the recently 
opened Kabul Media Operations Center, he stated he did not 
want to be bound to use this facility and said he will 
continue to have weekly press meetings elsewhere.  He 
stressed that this should not be "THE press center" in 
Afghanistan.  Additionally, Eide completely dodged all 
questions related to counter-narcotics.  When asked about the 
potential to expand cooperation, such as recent ISAF 
assistance to a World Food Program convoy, Eide said he would 
only consider it where absolutely necessary.  In addition, he 
specified that the UN must try to "keep its distance when it 
can." Finally, he noted the recent signing of the UN-NATO 
declaration does not make a difference to him on the ground. 
 
EIDE:  IT'S NOT FOR ME TO COORDINATE NATO AND THE UN 
 
¶14.  (C)  During a lunch discussion with Perm Reps that 
followed, Ambassador Volker along with Canadian PermRep McRae 
and Dutch PermRep Schaper stressed to Eide that NATO Heads of 
State had agreed at that last Summit in Budapest to pursue a 
Comprehensive Approach that coordinated the efforts of all 
international organizations in Afghanistan.  UN 
Secretary-General Ban had attended that summit and UNAMA had 
a key role to play in making the Comprehensive Approach work. 
 The PermReps stressed that it was not constructive for Eide 
to say he needed to keep his distance from ISAF or that he 
would not coordinate between NATO and the UN, since that was 
an essential part of the approach agreed by the world 
leaders. Eide defended his earlier statements and said it was 
important that civilian agencies in Afghanistan not be 
confused with the military.  Seen from UN HQ in New York, 
NATO was a "party" in the fighting in Afghanistan and UNAMA 
needed to maintain its "neutrality." 
 
¶15.  (C)  COMMENT:  SRSG Eide's briefing was disappointing, 
not merely for its dour outlook on the situation in 
Afghanistan, but also for Eide,s contention that he needed 
to keep his distance from ISAF and his defense of keeping 
civilian and military efforts separate.  While he blamed UN 
HQ in New York for the attitude that NATO was another "party" 
to the conflict in Afghanistan rather than an integral part 
of the international community effort, he echoed the theme 
himself and has adopted courses of action based on this view, 
such as refusing to be closely associated with ISAF.  Eide's 
unwillingness to work with ISAF as a fellow UN-mandated 
partner may have significant impact on the ability of the 
international community to provide comprehensive support to 
the government of Afghanistan. 
 
¶16.  (C)  COMMENT CONTINUED: Eide's upcoming visit to 
Washington provides an important opportunity to underline to 
Eide the importance of UNAMA's coordination role.  We should 
also urge him to step up to this role and work as closely as 
possible with ISAF, the Afghan government, and international 
partners.  He needs to be a forceful advocate of a single, 
comprehensive approach where civilian and military efforts 
are closely coordinated and seen as serving the same 
objectives.  He can also play a key role in encouraging 
President Karzai to show more visible ownership and 
leadership in the eyes of the Afghan people and the 
international community.  END COMMENT. 
VOLKER