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FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8511
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0012
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0154
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 UNVIE VIENNA 000546 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2018 
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA UN IS EG
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: MIDEAST MELTDOWN, TAKE 3 
 
REF: A) UNVIE 460 AND PREVIOUS B) STATE 105812 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
Summary and Comment 
-------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) For the third consecutive year, Middle East issues 
nearly derailed the IAEA General Conference (GC).  After a 
hard-fought Plenary floor fight consuming 15 hours of debate, 
the GC adopted a more balanced Middle East Safeguards (MES) 
resolution than in the past by a vote of 82-0-13 (U.S., 
Israel).  A "no action" motion made by Canada also narrowly 
blocked consideration of the Israeli Nuclear Capabilities 
(INC) resolution by a vote of 46-43-7.  For the first time, 
the MES resolution included Israeli amendments on safeguards 
compliance and the relevance of the peace process to a NWFZ, 
which Iran, Syria and other Arab states voted against.  The 
days preceding this showdown saw EU-Egyptian consultations on 
the MES text run aground while efforts by the GC President to 
broker a compromise "package" met with continued Arab Group 
intransigence.  The successful campaign by the U.S. and other 
Western states to block Syria's re-election to the Board 
clouded the negotiating atmosphere even further.  Although we 
met 
our immediate objective of preventing a substantive outcome 
on the INC in this year's GC, any victory may be short-lived. 
 Many Arabs took heart from the narrow defeat of the 
"no-action" motion and vow to fight even harder next year. 
Prospects for a return to a consensus "package" identical to 
past practice are nil.  While the successful Israeli 
amendments will give Egypt/Arabs pause, the narrow margin on 
the "no action" motion and the Arab Group success in securing 
majority NAM support for their position, means we will need a 
new playbook for 2009.  The parliamentary "no action" 
maneuver would not have succeeded were it not for a surprise 
"yes" vote by India, key abstentions from Russia and 
Kazakhstan, and the early departure of some NAM delegations, 
which we engineered by delaying the floor vote. 
 
¶2. (C) Success on Middle East issues came at the expense of 
disrupting the core technical work of the GC.  The Plenary 
debate stretching past midnight for two days was hijacked 
almost entirely by the Middle East debacle.  In the Committee 
of the Whole (COW), Egypt (with Iran's support) spearheaded 
efforts to block consensus on annual GC resolutions on 
nuclear security and safeguards, while the U.S. and 
like-minded blocked consensus on technical cooperation for 
tactical reasons.  Only a last minute deal to move all three 
resolutions in parallel in the Plenary allowed for their 
passage.  Massive Arab group abstentions on nuclear security 
and safeguards resolutions did not reflect well on their 
commitment to the Agency's work in these areas.  Perceived 
U.S. obstructionism on technical cooperation also met with 
criticism, though we were primed to ultimately support a 
consensus resolution.  This year's debate demonstrates that 
the General Conference is increasingly at risk of devolving 
into a political forum on the Middle East out of step with 
the IAEA's technical mandate.  Mission recommends very early 
engagement with Israel, Arabs, the EU, and as necessary the 
Secretariat to find the basis for a new equilibrium at the GC 
on Middle East issues.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
The Opening Salvo: General Committee 
-----------------  ------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) As was expected, the Arab Group, backed by the NAM, 
used the first General Committee meeting on September 29 to 
insist on the inclusion of the Supplementary agenda item on 
"Israeli Nuclear Capabilities."  Arab Group Chair Morocco, 
seconded by Iran, Syria, Cuba, Venezuela and Indonesia, cast 
this item as indispensable and enjoying broad support from a 
majority of delegations.  Kenya also noted it would be 
"discriminatory" given the IAEA investigations of Iran, 
Syria, and Libya not to address Israel as well.  Brazil took 
a principled stance in support of any agenda item relevant to 
the Agency's work.  It was readily apparent that the 
15-member General Committee was stacked against us.  Only the 
U.S., Canada and Iceland spoke in support of a single agenda 
item on the Middle East.  USDEL registered a strong protest 
against the inclusion of the INC as prejudicial, 
discriminatory, and ignoring the real risks of proliferation 
in the region, but noted U.S. support for a Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Free Zone and the proposed IAEA-sponsored forum 
in support of a prospective ME NWFZ.  USDEL cautioned that 
inclusion of the INC agenda item would politicize the GC. 
The fact that no action had been taken on a similar item in 
the last two General Conferences, and no anti-Israel 
resolution had been adopted since 1991, also argued against 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000546  002 OF 006 
 
 
its inclusion.  To avoid a pointless agenda fight (and in the 
slim hope of returning to consensus), USDEL acquiesced on 
adding the INC to the agenda but advised that we would 
vigorously oppose any resolution singling out Israel. 
 
¶4. (C) Consistent with past tactics, the Arab Group also 
insisted in the General Committee that the item be debated in 
a "timely" manner, i.e. ahead of other agenda items, while 
Canada and the U.S. pushed for adherence to the agenda order. 
 GC President Ghisi (Italy) noted the need to allow 
sufficient time for consultation, and sought to delay the 
debate as long as possible. 
 
The "Package" is Dead 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The EU spent most of the week of the GC and much 
political capital negotiating with Egypt on EU-proposed 
amendments that would have allowed the EU to support the 
Egyptian-sponsored ME Safeguards resolution.  Under pressure 
from a coterie of EU members, led by Germany, the French EU 
Presidency engaged in a "good faith" effort that was not 
predicated on the traditional linkage with the INC agenda 
item, a linkage rejected out of hand by Egypt since 2006. 
Norway also strongly supported this approach.  Proposed EU 
amendments focused on safeguards compliance, reference to the 
Middle East peace process, and a call for states to adhere to 
the Additional Protocol.  After repeated attempts to agree on 
a formulation, Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi finally declared in 
a late October 2 meeting of the parties called by President 
Ghisi that "no words in the English language" could be 
acceptable. "I am not willing to discuss any more language 
from this moment up to the vote on Middle East Safeguards," 
Fawzi stated, lowering the curtain on the EU negotiation 
effort.  Egypt likewise rejected similar "killer amendments" 
floated by Israel to the MES resolution as a basis for a 
consensus "package," i.e. if the INC resolution were 
withdrawn. 
 
¶6. (C) With the EU so diverted, support for a "package" 
approach was weakened.  Although EU members continued to pay 
lip service to the GC President's efforts in this regard, 
many saw the package as "dead" and/or hoped that a positive 
outcome on the MES resolution would have salutary effect on 
the INC debate.  Almost no one in the EU was prepared to 
countenance the breakdown of EU-Egypt negotiations.  During 
WEOG sessions, the U.S., Canada and Australia continued to 
argue for a "package," and failing that a "no-action motion" 
for adjournment of debate on the INC resolution.  However, 
Canada was extremely anxious about the prospects of a "no 
action motion" in light of EU wobbliness and NAM support for 
the Arab League position.  Canada was not prepared to proceed 
absent a "reasonable" chance of success, lest the Arab League 
pocket two victories -- defeat of the "no action" motion and 
secondly, potential adoption of the INC resolution (Note: It 
was possible that some opponents of "no action" would split 
their vote and abstain on a vote on the resolution, were one 
to occur. End note.)  When EU-Egypt talks finally, and 
probably inevitably, collapsed on the afternoon of October 3, 
Egypt's "bad faith" helped solidify EU support for the "no 
action motion." 
 
¶7. (C) Meanwhile, GC President Ghisi, in consultation with 
the Lebanese former GC President, attempted to broker a 
package early in the week.  The Moroccan Arab Group Chair 
seemed amenable to private reassurances, including from 
USDEL, that no one sought to cut off debate under the INC 
agenda item though we opposed a resolution.  However, the 
Arab League had taken ownership of the INC resolution and 
ruled out any Presidential Statement as the conclusive action 
on the agenda item, consistent with an early September Arab 
League Ministerial decision.  Ghisi floated a draft 
"President's Summary/Conclusion" that would encapsulate both 
sides of the debate, as a possible compromise in lieu of an 
INC resolution.  Israel was open to this proposal since such 
a summary, unlike a PRST, would not be a formal decision of 
the GC and thus have no standing.  The Arab League 
representative flanked by Arab Group members descended on 
Ghisi's office and rejected such a compromise as 
"humiliating," saw nothing to be gained, and refused to 
withdraw the INC resolution.  Ghisi kept the draft 
Presidential summary in his "drawer" where it never saw the 
light of day. 
 
¶8. (C) In a last ditch effort to find a way back to 
consensus, ISN Deputy Assistant Secretary Hayward met with 
Egyptian Deputy Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs for 
Disarmament Affairs Khaled Shamaa.  Hayward presented Shamaa 
changes to the MES resolution, the adoption of which would 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000546  003 OF 006 
 
 
allow the U.S. to support Egypt's text, if Egypt would agree 
to lead the Arabs to agree to the deal being put forth by 
President Ghisi. (Note:  These changes largely mirrored what 
was later tabled as proposed amendments by Israel-- see 
below. End note.) After arguing that he was "surprised by 
this late approach," Shamaa indicated that we should discuss 
any proposed changes with Egyptian Ambassador Fawzy. 
Ultimately, the Egyptians did not respond to the U.S. 
proposed amendments. 
 
Syria Withdraws Board Candidacy 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The positioning on the MES and INC resolutions prior 
to and during the General Conference occurred also in the 
context of awkwardness in the Arab camp about Syria's 
candidacy for the IAEA Board.  The U.S., UK, France and other 
Western states succeeded over several weeks in pressing the 
point to Member States that a country under investigation for 
possible violations of its safeguards agreement should not be 
added to the Board.  That Syria was seeking a seventh term in 
competition with regional group member Afghanistan (which 
served once on the Board more than forty year ago) seems also 
to have undercut Syria's support among some non-Arab 
countries.  In the twenty-four hours before a potential vote 
on Board membership, USDEL received several indications, 
including from Arab dels, that the pressure from several 
sides would drive Syria to beat a face-saving retreat.  This 
came only after Syria gained a postponement of the ongoing 
election process before the Friday lunch break.  (Comment: We 
read Syria's last-minute call for further consultations 
within the regional group as a gambit to raise the market 
value of its withdrawal, announced two hours later.  Syria 
may face intra-Arab resistance if it makes a claim on one of 
the two MESA seats opening in 2009.  Yet, for all that argues 
objectively against Syria's election, many Member States 
bristled as well at perceived U.S. "interference" in a 
regional group's prerogative.  End comment.) 
 
Israel Amends MES Resolution 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Determined to hold the MES/INC debates as early as 
possible; the Arab Group used every ploy to move up 
consideration of the twin Middle East agenda items.  Part of 
their calculus (as openly stated by the Cuban Chair of the 
NAM) was that some smaller NAM delegations would depart the 
GC by Friday.  As happened last year, Egypt (with support 
from Iran and others) held up consideration of omnibus 
nuclear security and safeguards resolutions in the Committee 
of the Whole (COW).  This was also consistent with the 
September Arab League Ministerial decision, which threatened 
to undermine Western priorities at the GC if the INC were 
blocked.  With the DPRK agenda item delayed at China's 
request late Friday, the GC President had no choice but to 
proceed with the MES agenda item. 
 
¶11. (C) Just before Egypt's introduction of the MES 
resolution, and pursuant to tactical consultations with 
USDEL, Israel tabled three amendments, in part to demonstrate 
to Egypt that two can play the game of winning changes to any 
non-consensus text.  This was a high stakes gamble on 
Israel's part, as amendments from the Plenary floor require a 
waiver of the "24-hour rule" which once waived opens all 
resolutions for amendment.  Israel explained that it had 
sought to no avail to reach agreement with Egypt on a 
consensus text.  Two of these amendments were similar to 
those the EU had sought.  The first new OP, under which the 
GC "Calls upon all States in the region of the Middle East to 
comply with their international obligations and commitments 
relating to safeguards, and to cooperate fully with the 
IAEA," passed by a vote of 46-38-22 with EU, U.S. and 
like-minded support and Arab League/NAM standard bearers, 
including Iran and Syria, voting against (Russia, China, 
India and several GRULAC abstained.)  A second Israeli 
amendment to change "calls upon" to "invites" states in the 
region not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons or take 
steps undermining a NWFZ, failed by a vote of 5(Israel, 
U.S)-38-64, with the EU and all like-minded abstaining.  The 
third amendment added an OP that "Emphasizes the importance 
of the peace process in the Middle East in promoting mutual 
confidence and security in the region, including the 
establishment of a NWFZ"; this passed by a vote of 45-34-28, 
along the same lines as the first amendment. 
 
¶12. (C) To counter Israel's feat and add "balance" to the 
resolution, Algeria proposed a new OP "Calls upon all States 
in the region to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty", 
which passed by a wide margin of 92-1-7.  Only Israel voted 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000546  004 OF 006 
 
 
against with the U.S., Canada, India and Georgia among the 
few abstentions. (Note: Israel could have accepted an earlier 
version of this amendment which cited "nuclear 
nonproliferation conventions" rather than the NPT, but the 
Arab Group showed no interest in compromise/ consensus.  End 
note.)  Arab delegations also sought to counter the 
successful Israeli amendment on the relevance of the peace 
process to establishment of a NWFZ.  In a maladroit October 4 
attempt to broker consensus, Director General ElBaradei 
floated language which would have placed the peace process 
and establishment of a NWFZ on equal footing, with parallel 
tracks.  Israel was adamant it could never accept language 
that ran counter to its core policy that peace must come 
before any NWFZ.  The IAEA Secretariat's premature 
circulation of the ElBaradei language doomed this effort at 
compromise, which otherwise was drawing strong support from 
among the EU.  Arab delegations, on the other hand, also 
rejected the DG's proposal as the basis for of any return to 
a "package deal" on a consensus MES text in exchange for 
withdrawal of the INC.  A high-profile appeal by the DG to 
the Arab Group during an impromptu caucus of the Arab group 
on the floor of the Plenary failed to secure the necessary 
compromises.  Algeria (with Morocco's support) withdrew a 
further attempt to insert the DG's proposed language absent 
any package deal when the Legal Advisor clarified that a vote 
on such an amendment would constitute reconsideration of the 
Israeli amendment that had already been adopted and therefore 
would require a two-thirds majority. 
 
¶13. (C) As consideration of the MES resolution dragged past 
midnight and into the next day with the Arab Group 
threatening several more amendments in their back pocket, 
more and more delegations (including Russia and Chile) became 
frustrated with the prolonged procedural debate.  The Arab 
Group finally acquiesced in a losing battle, and the MES 
resolution was adopted by a vote of 82-0-13, with the U.S., 
Canada, Israel and a few Arab delegations (Syria, Iraq, 
Libya) abstaining.  (Note: Full text of the resolution 
available at www.iaea.org and emailed to the Department. End 
note).  Egypt and the majority of the Arab Group supported 
the resolution but voiced strong reservations on the Israeli 
amendments in their EOVs - the irony of Iran and Syria citing 
opposition to safeguards compliance was not lost.  Several 
notable Arabs, to include Saudi Arabia and the UAE, walked 
out before the vote.  In an EOV, Israel attributed its 
abstention to the lack of linkage to the INC and explained 
that the redundant new OP on the NPT had prompted it to 
request a vote on the MES resolution.  (Comment:  Israel's 
willingness to work toward consensus, in sharp contrast with 
the Arab Group's stance, was positively received. End 
Comment.)  Ambassador Schulte delivered an EOV that 
reaffirmed the U.S. position on the universality of the NPT 
and support for a ME WMDFZ in the context of a comprehensive 
regional peace.  The U.S. regretted the failure of efforts to 
reach consensus but voiced strong support for the 
resolution's call on all states in the region to comply with 
safeguards obligations.  Ambassador Schulte advised violators 
to take note of this.  (Comment: The Syrian representative, 
sitting nearby, visibly bristled. End Comment.) 
 
Barely a No Action Motion 
------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Canada, the U.S. and other like-minded had decided 
early on to allow debate on the INC so as to inoculate 
ourselves against criticism of being undemocratic.  We had 
hoped that allowing the debate, as happened in the 2007 GC, 
would persuade Arab Group members to withdraw the resolution 
or failing that, would build support for a "no action 
motion."  Arab Group Chair Morocco introduced the item citing 
the "real threat" Israel's failure to adhere to the NPT posed 
in the region and noted the "revised" AL resolution (full 
text in para 20.)  A litany of Arab Group/NAM interventions 
including Cuba, Venezuela, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Sudan, 
Lebanon, Syria, Algeria and Saudi Arabia condemned the double 
standard policy as regards Israel.  Iran criticized the 
"shameful silence" of the U.S. on the issue and the provision 
of nuclear technology to Israel.  Speaking for the EU, France 
supported universality of the NPT and a WMDFZ in the Middle 
East but advised that the INC resolution "goes well beyond 
this objective. 
" 
 
¶15. (C) Once the speakers' list was exhausted, Canada, which 
had been closely coordinating with USDEL, took the floor and 
called for adjournment of debate, i.e. "no action motion," 
under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure.  Canada regretted 
the failure of a consensus package and noted that it had no 
objection to debate on the issue.  France and Albania 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000546  005 OF 006 
 
 
seconded the "no action motion" while Cuba and Libya spoke 
against it.  Canada's nervousness about the success of a "no 
action motion" proved justified by the narrow vote in favor, 
46-43-7.  In addition to the EU and JUSCANZ, Norway, 
Switzerland, Iceland, ROK, Israel and a handful of Eastern 
European countries (Croatia, Albania, Georgia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Moldova, and Ukraine) voted in favor.  In a 
surprise move, India, which had reportedly blocked a NAM 
consensus on the INC, also voted in favor of "no action." 
The seven abstentions were Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, 
Mexico, Uruguay, Ethiopia and Zambia.  (Note: Kazakhstan's 
abstention may have been prompted by a reminder from USDEL 
that the Secretary was en route to Astana. End note.)  All 
other Arab League, NAM, and GRULAC delegations and China 
voted against "no action."  The fact that we successfully 
held off the INC agenda item until Saturday night when a 
number of NAM delegations had already left also helped secure 
passage. 
 
¶16. (C) Comment: Only through such brinksmanship, and the 
Arab proclivity to telegraph its inflexibility, did we 
prevent a vote on the INC resolution.  The Arab Group had 
bolstered its position with NAM support, and could have won 
the "no action" vote and may have secured passage of the INC. 
 Our conversations with Arab representatives in Vienna in the 
ensuing days indicate this narrow "miss" has emboldened Arab 
Group members to try again next year.  Should they continue 
to improve their tactical approach --certainly aimed at 
splitting the EU -- there is no telling the outcome of any 
future no action motions.  End Comment 
 
The Fallout for the GC 
---------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) With the Plenary debate on the Middle East concluded, 
the COW Chairman reported the unprecedented  failure to reach 
consensus on all three core technical resolutions on nuclear 
security, safeguards and technical cooperation (Note: Egypt 
forced a vote on the Safeguards resolution in the 2007 GC. 
End note.)  Unhelpful amendments by Egypt and Iran had tied 
up COW working groups on security and safeguards, while the 
U.S., Canada and like-minded held up the technical 
cooperation resolution as leverage.  The EU finally brought 
the nuclear security and safeguards resolutions to the 
Plenary floor, thus opening them up to potential amendments. 
The G-77 agreed to accept the nuclear security resolution, 
which was first on the agenda, in exchange for consensus 
adoption of the technical cooperation resolution.  Egypt 
refrained from tabling floor amendments but called roll call 
votes on both nuclear security and safeguards resolutions. 
Nuclear security was adopted by a vote of 77-0-10, with 
Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, Sudan, Syria, 
Tunisia and Yemen abstaining.  Among the Arab Group, only 
Morocco and Lebanon voted in favor.  The Safeguards 
resolution was also adopted by a vote of 82-0-18 with massive 
Arab Group abstentions.  During the debate, Egypt professed 
commitment to Agency safeguards but complained of "imbalance" 
in their application.  Arab states also voted against a 
soundly defeated Indian amendment to the Safeguards 
resolution which would have urged only "concerned" States to 
conclude Safeguards agreements (septel). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶18. (C) The Middle East debate entirely overshadowed the 
meager results of the General Conference, with only marginal 
changes on the safeguards and security resolutions from 2007. 
 Holding the GC annually has become pointless, except to 
approve the budget, as is required under the Statute pending 
the ratification of an Amendment of Article XIV.  One 
suggestion is that the GC convene only a pro-forma 
administrative session every other year to approve the 
budget.  This would be a cost-savings for the Agency, though 
it may not be practicable for the next GC which will also 
approve the election of the next Director General. 
 
¶19. (C) If the current trend continues, the General 
Conference is at risk of becoming just another politicized 
forum on the Middle East.  Ambassador Schulte is reaching out 
to key parties immediately to try to start afresh, but the 
refusal of Egyptian Ambassador Fawzy to accept the invitation 
is telling in regard to the work ahead.  Mission recommends a 
reconsideration of our strategy heading into next year's GC 
and will be looking to contribute further analysis and 
reporting to help serve as a basis for such a strategic 
reconsideration.  The goal would be to find a different 
approach that achieved a new equilibrium on the issue without 
further politicizing the GC.  We should also clearly signal 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000546  006 OF 006 
 
 
to Egypt our disappointment at the AL's uncompromising 
approach -- had they been willing to change the words "NPT 
treaty" to "conventions," Israel would have joined consensus 
on the amended MES resolution.  Our discussions throughout 
the week with the Israeli delegation, including after the GC 
outcome was achieved, made clear that Israel also feels the 
imperative to find such a new equilibrium. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Begin text of Arab Group resolution on Israeli 
Nuclear Capabilities: 
 
Israeli Nuclear Capabilities 
 
Draft resolution submitted by Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab 
Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen 
 
The General Conference 
 
(a) Recalling the relevant resolutions of the General 
Conference and the presidential statements endorsed by the 
General Conference on this issue. 
 
(b) Recalling also UN Security Council resolution 487 (1981), 
which - inter alia requested Israel to submit all its nuclear 
facilities to the Agency's safeguards system, 
 
(c) Bearing in mind the resolution on the Middle East adopted 
by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 
in which the Conference noted with concern the continued 
existence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in the Middle 
East, 
 
(d) Recalling the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which welcomed 
the fact that all States in Middle East with the exception of 
Israel, are States parties to the NPT and reaffirmed the 
importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and of the 
placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive 
IAEA safeguards for realizing the universality of the NPT in 
the Middle East and 
 
(e) Recognizing that joining the NPT and submitting all 
nuclear facilities in the region to the comprehensive IAEA 
safeguards is a prerequisite for establishing a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, 
 
¶1. Expresses concern about the threat posed by the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and 
stability of the Middle East: 
 
¶2. Expresses concern about the Israeli nuclear capabilities 
and calls upon Israel to accede to the NPT and place all its 
nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards; 
 
¶3. Urges the Director General to work with the concerned 
States towards achieving that end; and 
 
¶4. Decides to remain seized of this matter and requests the 
Director General to report on the implementation of this 
resolution to the Board of Governors and the General 
Conference at its fifty-third regular session under an agenda 
item entitled "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities". 
 
End Text. 
SCHULTE