VZCZCXRO0763
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHC #6629/01 3052133
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 312122Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 9462
INFO GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 2049
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 3908
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8436
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6125
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2689
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1558
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 9009
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 6158
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 4055

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 116629 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2018 
TAGS: ENRG PARM TRGY PREL JO
SUBJECT: GOJ OFFICIALS CONFIRM TO ISN PDAS JORDAN,S 
COMMITMENT TO NONPROLIFERATION MEASURES 
 
REF: AMMAN 2770 
 
Classified By: Acting Assistant Secretary for ISN Patricia 
McNerney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: International Security and 
Nonproliferation PDAS Patricia McNerney, during her October 
13-14 visit to Jordan, discussed Iran, the full range of 
nonproliferation issues, and bilateral cooperation with 
Government of Jordan (GOJ) officials including Foreign 
Minister Salah Al-Bashir, Minister of Industry and Trade Amer 
Hadidi, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Khaldoun 
Qteishat, and Chairman of the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission 
Dr. Khaled Toukan.  GOJ counterparts shared U.S. views on the 
threats posed by Iran, including its nuclear aspirations, and 
expressed concern about a lack of Arab consensus on dealing 
with the Persian Gulf neighbor.  They confirmed their 
commitment to counterproliferation, agreed that a strategic 
trade and export control law could serve as a barrier to Iran 
and others illicitly obtaining material and equipment for 
their nuclear programs.  They confirmed such a law had been 
drafted, but commented that parliamentary passage required 
careful coordination.  The officials further encouraged 
expedited interagency review of the 123 Agreement, asserting 
Jordan would abide by all international nuclear agreements 
and only seek partners from responsible countries.  Bashir 
welcomed the idea for a bilateral Counterproliferation Task 
Force (CTF) dialog and promised to comment on the U.S. 
proposal.  The GOJ officials also reported the cabinet had 
approved the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) needed to 
launch the Megaports initiative and looked forward to a 
November signing ceremony.  End Summary. 
 
Jordan Committed to Countering Iranian Threat 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) Across meetings, McNerney and GOJ officials 
discussed the threats posed by Iran,s continued nuclear 
aspirations and the importance of compliance with United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) engagement in light 
of a recent IAEA assessment that Iran could produce 
sufficient enriched uranium for a nuclear explosive by 2010. 
With oil prices dropping, McNerney reported Iran is more 
likely to attempt to circumvent UNSCRs and abuse the 
international financial community to meet its needs.  Strong 
domestic export controls, border security, and cooperation 
through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and 
Global Initiative (GI) are essential.  Foreign Minister 
Bashir agreed that Iran is a shared threat, and particularly 
dangerous for the Gulf countries.  He cited as challenges to 
maintaining pressure on Iran the lack of an Arab consensus 
(blaming Qatar and Oman), and a weak European position with 
regard to Iran,s nuclear energy program and gas pipelines. 
He voiced concern that an exclusive focus on Iran,s nuclear 
program undervalued other Iranian threats in the Middle East. 
 He called for a peaceful solution to the Iranian problem and 
further said more pressure needed to be placed on Israel 
which he accused of contributing to the arms race.  McNerney 
countered the greatest threat was not Israel, but rather the 
resulting proliferation of nuclear weapons if Iran were not 
thwarted. 
 
Export Controls Key to Jordanian and Regional Security 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶3.  (C) McNerney advised Minister of Industry and Trade 
Hadidi that a strong strategic trade control law could be an 
effective barrier to Iran obtaining material for its nuclear 
program.  Such a law, she explained, is the basis of 
nonproliferation activities and with the U.S.-Jordan Free 
Trade Agreement set to come into full force in 2010, 
continuing discussions on the 123 Agreement, and Jordan 
poised to begin uranium mining, it is essential that the 
necessary controls be in place to safeguard the transfer of 
nuclear and dual-use material and equipment.  She added that 
 
STATE 00116629  002 OF 003 
 
 
U.S. companies and investors looked for strong export 
controls and counseled that Jordan,s law should be broad and 
flexible and include strong criminal penalties for export 
control violations, robust control lists, and allow for the 
implementation of the letter and spirit of the UNSCRs. 
Hadidi responded that Jordan is very proactive with these 
issues and that an export control law had been drafted, but 
cautioned that parliament could be obstructionist so great 
care was needed both in when and how the law was presented. 
Nevertheless, he asserted the law would &soon8 be submitted 
to parliament and that the GOJ would share the draft with the 
U.S.  He welcomed McNerney,s offer of expert advice and 
technical training for adopting and drafting regulations and 
training prosecutors and judges on handling export violation 
cases. McNerney also opined that Jordan needed a &border 
control team8 to better manage issues related to WMD 
proliferation and the import and transshipment of dual-use 
items. 
 
Strengthening Bilateral Dialogs on Nuclear Issues 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) GOJ Officials expressed hope for "expedited 
progress" on the 123 Agreement currently under interagency 
review.  Atomic Energy Commissioner Toukan explained Jordan 
was preparing to offer tenders for site selection for a 
future nuclear reactor and having the agreement in place was 
important to the process, especially in obtaining U.S. 
technology.  McNerney said the U.S. was sympathetic to 
Jordan's energy needs, but that nonproliferation concerns 
required thoughtful consideration before the Agreement could 
be sent forward for presidential certification.  She 
emphasized the need for movement on adopting an export 
control law to protect nuclear and dual use material, 
equipment and technology and written assurances that Jordan 
would only engage in cooperation with parties to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty.  She further urged caution in 
Jordan's development of uranium mining, citing Iranian 
interest in seeking new sources for yellow cake.  Toukan 
asserted Jordan will abide by all international and 
multilateral agreements on nuclear energy; is interested in 
building strategic relationships with P-5 powers and has no 
desire to consider bilateral cooperation with countries that 
are not party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and 
"will not jeopardize our long-term interests for short term 
gain." 
 
GOJ,s International Approach to Address Energy Needs 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Toukan said part of Jordan,s nuclear energy approach 
included consulting widely ) U.S., France, Canada, Korea, 
and others ) so as not to be held hostage by one country. 
He explained the recently signed agreement with the French 
company Areva included long-range projects and the September 
MOU on uranium mining with China was in exchange for 
development projects (reftel).  Toukan added that Jordan,s 
first two reactors would be for domestic needs, but that 
excess power could be sold to neighboring countries, 
including Israel.  Toukan also explained that in Jordan,s 
uranium deal with Areva, it included the requirement that 
Areva guarantee supply of nuclear fuel (through an option to 
be exercised at Jordan,s discretion) to Jordan,s nuclear 
power program for as long as the uranium deal remains in 
effect. In a separate meeting, Energy Minister Qteishat said 
that a regional project might be necessary because the 
nuclear reactors they would be reviewing are large relative 
to Jordan,s needs. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Commenting on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
(GNEP), Toukan welcomed engagement, but looked for more 
traction on uranium banks and waste management.  He expressed 
concern that GNEP has yet to devise a mechanism for ensuring 
adequate fuel supplies for non-nuclear states at a fair price 
in a regulated and transparent manner. 
 
Counterproliferation Initiatives 
--------------------------------- 
¶7.  (C) Stressing the importance of international cooperation 
to nonproliferation efforts, McNerney praised Jordanian 
participation in PSI and GI. McNerney suggested that Jordan 
 
STATE 00116629  003 OF 003 
 
 
initiate a plan of work program in the Global Initiative and 
they agreed to try to work on this issue regionally with 
other interested countries, such as the UAE, Bahrain, and 
Saudi Arabia.  She cited a successful bilateral CTF dialogue 
with the United Arab Emirates on counterproliferation and 
proposed to Bashir that the U.S. and Jordan establish a 
similar dialogue.  She noted that a CTF would provide a more 
focused forum to discuss legal and policy elements of 
counterproliferation and passed a proposal to Bashir. Bashir 
responded the GOJ appreciated the existing bilateral dialogue 
and would review the proposal for more focused discussions, 
but inquired whether the establishment of a CTF was part of 
the 123 Agreement process.  McNerney clarified that while it 
was not a requirement for the 123 Agreement, it would 
certainly demonstrate that Jordan takes its nonproliferation 
commitments seriously, which will be important when Congress 
considers the 123 Agreement. 
 
Progress on Megaports 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Will Tobey informed all GOJ representatives 
of USG interest in concluding the agreement necessary to 
launch the Megaports initiative to enhance radiation 
monitoring and detection at Jordanian ports of entry.  Hadidi 
reported the cabinet had approved the MOU and the GOJ 
welcomed both U.S. technical and financial assistance.  NOTE. 
 In a separate discussion, Jordan Nuclear Regulatory 
Commissioner Dr. Jamal Sharaf confirmed to EconCouns that the 
cabinet had approved the MOU, although he had not yet 
received written notification.  He said the GOJ hoped to sign 
the bilateral agreement in early November.  End Note.  Tobey 
also offered radiological response training which Hadidi 
generally welcomed, noting it was premature for Jordan to 
identify specific training needs. 
 
Cooperative Monitoring Center 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) On October 14, McNerney visited the Cooperative 
Monitoring Center (CMC), a joint venture between Sandia 
National Laboratories and the Jordanian Royal Scientific 
Society (RSS).  The CMC staff briefed her on the variety of 
export control and border security related training that the 
CMC supports, including a successful recent United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1540 workshop.  Additionally, 
they noted that the CMC hosts Iraqi scientific scholars 
participating in the Iraqi Scientist Engagement Program 
(ISEP).  McNerney inquired whether the CMC could support 
additional Iraqi scientists.  The CMC staff agreed to work to 
expand the numbers of scientists at the CMC and noted that 
physical space should not be an issue, as the scientists 
could use the broader facilities of the RSS.  McNerney 
responded positively.  CMC staff noted that getting Jordanian 
visas for visiting Iraqis is still an issue, although it is 
less of an issue that it had been.  Tobey noted that the CMC 
had hosted a lot of USG export control and border security 
training programs. 
RICE