Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08STATE116304, U.S. AND EU DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST ASIA

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08STATE116304.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE116304 2008-10-31 14:10 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO0208
PP RUEHAG RUEHDT RUEHPB RUEHROV
DE RUEHC #6304/01 3051422
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311410Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 3217
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 116304 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/23 
TAGS: PREL FR EU XB NK CH
SUBJECT: U.S. AND EU DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST ASIA 
 
REF: USEU 0356 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY EAP PDAS GLYN T. DAVIES.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: U.S. and EU officials held their biannual discussions 
on East Asia (termed COASI, or Consultations on Asia) in Washington 
on October 3.  In addition to a general review of developments in the 
region, this session included an exchange of views on the future of 
India, China, and ASEAN in the evolving global architecture and next 
steps for cooperation with Central Asia.  Under new Japanese PM Aso, 
Japan's foreign policy and the current trajectory of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance are likely to remain broadly consistent with past trends. 
According to the EU, the new Taiwan administration is "step-by-step" 
in dealing with China to gain more formalized representation in 
international organizations.  Pending assurances from the DPRK on 
distribution and monitoring, the EU remains interested in better 
coordinating food aid in the DPRK with the United States and other 
donors and exchanging information on the NGOs operating in the DPRK. 
The United States and EU concurred on the lack of progress in Burma 
and the UN's current role, but disagreed on alternative policy 
measures such as sanctions.  EU representatives saw increased 
sanctions as ineffective in Burma's case.  U.S. and EU officials also 
discussed developments elsewhere in Southeast Asia such as Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the future 
trajectory of ASEAN.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
STRATEGIC ISSUES: INDIA, CHINA, AND ASEAN 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) REGIONAL ISSUES: EU officials opened the working lunch (joint 
with EAP and SCA officials) by asking how the United States organized 
its South and Central Asia policy and how Afghanistan fit into U.S. 
policy towards Central Asia.  SCA PDAS Donald Camp acknowledged that, 
after establishing the SCA Bureau, some officials in Central Asia 
initially had seemed disappointed to be subsumed into the bureau that 
covers South Asia.  Both U.S. and EU officials discussed the next 
steps for economic cooperation with Central Asia, with an expected 
upcoming regional conference on food and energy security convened by 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in November 2008.  EU 
officials sought U.S. views of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) and potential U.S. observership. 
 
3. (C) Moving to Southeast Asian regional organizations, EU 
Commission Director James Moran noted that Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) officials had visited the EU many times to 
better understand two critical achievements of the EU: reducing 
historic animosities and opening a common market.  ASEAN's new 
charter was far from creating an EU-style common market, but 
intra-ASEAN trade had now reached a critical mass -- roughly 
one-third of trade of member countries is among ASEAN nations (the 
same level of European countries in the 1970s).  There might now be 
real opportunities for economic integration. 
 
4. (C) INDIA AND GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE: In discussing the great powers 
of Asia - India, China, Japan - an EU official lamented that most 
European leaders thought only in economic, not geostrategic, terms. 
French Director for Asia Francois Descoueyte wondered whether India 
would follow China's path of integration into the global system and 
onto the world stage.  More broadly, EU officials proffered that an 
emerging global system would have six major groups - a "P-6" 
involving the EU, United States, China, India, Japan, and Russia. G 
etting to that future global architecture, all agreed, would be 
extremely difficult. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
JAPANESE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, TAIWAN and CHINA 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5. (C) JAPAN: Descoueyte opined that, under new Japanese PM Aso, 
Japan's foreign policy would be somewhat similar, but perhaps more 
pro-active and right-wing.  How Aso balanced the Japanese political 
elites and the will of the public would remain essential for his 
success.  Descoueyte also queried U.S. officials on whether the 
U.S.-Japan alliance might change under Aso. 
 
6. (C) EAP PDAS Glyn Davies and EAP DAS Alex Arvizu noted "all eyes 
are now on Aso."  While Aso sought longevity in his Prime 
Ministership, the turbulent Japanese political system might not allow 
for a long tenure.  "Small things" could introduce serious political 
controversy into the system, and many in the Japanese public did not 
trust some of the political elites.  The United States was in the 
midst of a major realignment of forces in Japan and in the region and 
would continue to work closely with the GOJ on that effort.  DAS 
Arvizu noted that since Japan would likely continue to have weak 
 
STATE 00116304  002 OF 003 
 
 
governments in the near term, we could not expect major new 
diplomatic initiatives from Tokyo.  He suggested that the United 
States and EU focus on small, practical regional issues when dealing 
with the Japanese.  Participants observed that if Japan were to 
obtain a permanent Security Council seat, Tokyo might be surprised by 
how tough some of the decisions would be, especially in authorizing 
the use of force. 
 
7. (C) TAIWAN: Descoueyte noted that the new Taiwan administration 
was "step-by-step" trying to gain more formalized representation in 
international organizations.  Moran felt that perhaps Taiwan could 
find some level of representation in the WHO.  Some in the 
international community, and certainly China, worried that Taiwan 
might abuse its new international space and "make an issue" out of 
its limited role once it was defined.  EAP Acting DAS John Norris 
noted that unless China showed more flexibility on the issue of 
international space, there would likely be no movement by others in 
the international community.  Norris also took the opportunity to 
preview for the EU the pending announcement of U.S. arms sales to 
Taiwan to occur later that day. 
 
8. (C) S/P staff James Green spoke to the need for EU help in urging 
China to coordinate its foreign assistance more in places like 
Africa.  Descoueyte felt trilateral cooperation between donors could 
provide an opening for greater coordination and transparency. 
 
---------------- 
KOREAN PENINSULA 
---------------- 
 
9. (C) Descoueyte relayed known French details about the health of 
Kim Jong-il.  The EU remained interested in better coordinating food 
aid in the DPRK with the United States and other donors and 
exchanging information on the NGOs operating in the DPRK.  Descoueyte 
stated that the North Korean people are devastated and hurting.  He 
wondered why the international community made "so much noise" about 
Burma, but less so about the DPRK.  Moran noted that this year's 
harvest in the DPRK is rumored to be less plentiful than in years 
past.  The EU needed assurances from the DPRK regarding the 
distribution and monitoring of food aid before EU commitments of aid. 
 
10. (C) In response to Descoueyte's relay of the Chinese view that 
the Six-Party Talks process is "up to Washington," Davies responded 
that we must continue to gain movement from the DPRK on key issues. 
The United States had shown flexibility throughout the process. 
EAP/K Director Kurt Tong noted that the World Food Program and U.S. 
NGOs, supported by the United States, had negotiated over the past 
year a monitoring program to facilitate U.S. food aid of 500,000 tons 
over 10 months.  The EU was welcome to operate under the agreement. 
The United States would likely reexamine its food aid commitments in 
the spring of 2009, following the results of the 2008 harvest.  Tong 
also updated the EU on U.S. and ROK legislative processes in 
approving the U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement. 
 
------------------------ 
BURMA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 
------------------------ 
 
11. (C) BURMA: The United States and EU concurred on the lack of 
progress in Burma, but diffed on the utility of policy measures such 
as sanctions.  In discussing the role of the UN, both parties held 
that UN special representative Ibrahim Gambari's activities did not 
seem to produce significant results in pressing for political 
dialogue and political prisoner releases. 
 
12. (C) Internally, EU member-states did not agree on the utility of 
sanctions or their effectiveness.  Descoueyte claimed that sanctions 
in the past had not borne any fruit and Moran mentioned it could even 
hurt business interests.  Czech Director for Asia and the Pacific 
Jiri Sitler argued that sanctions held a symbolic meaning.  Despite 
this, the EU did not have a position on an alternative approach to 
increasing sanctions.  Still, Moran wondered how a foreign 
assistance-oriented approach focusing on Millenium Development Goals 
would unfold in the future.  Descoueyte was not convinced of the 
merits of the non-paper proposed by UK for a new diplomatic approach, 
including what he characterized as the UK's overly high expectation 
for free and fair elections by 2010.  The EU would discuss Burma 
topics with Asian countries during the Asia-Europe Summit at the end 
of October in China. 
 
13. (C) EAP/MLS Director Steve Blake gave a brief overview of U.S. 
views on the situation in Burma.  PDAS Davies maintained that 
sanctions work when a clear target is defined; they send a clear 
message, and they prevent Burma from pursuing nefarious deals. Aung 
San Suu Kyi's demand for continued sanctions made a case for their 
utility as well. 
 
14. (C) SOUTHEAST ASIA: On Thailand, Moran said the new prime 
minister seemed credible although the People's Alliance for Democracy 
 
STATE 00116304  003 OF 003 
 
 
(PAD) still "made some noise" regarding his appointment.  Descoueyte 
said Thailand would stabilize as long as the current king, now 81 
years old, stayed in power and retained unanimous support from the 
public and the army.  On Vietnam, Moran said that remnants of the old 
regime, including human rights issues, made it difficult for foreign 
countries to engage Vietnam economically.  Descoueyte congratulated 
the United States on recently providing funds to the Khmer Rouge 
Trials in Cambodia.  Speaking to the situation in Aceh, Moran said it 
might be difficult to hold elections peacefully without an 
international monitoring team.  However, it might be inappropriate 
for the EU to participate in an election monitoring team due to the 
EU's high degree of involvement in the peace process.  Moran 
speculated on the possibility that the Aceh Peace Agreement might go 
"belly up" if elections went poorly. 
 
15. (C) PDAS Davies pointed out the important role of Thailand's 
military as key for the country to accept any fundamental political 
shifts.  On peace efforts in the southern Philippines, EAP/MTS 
Director Kamala Lakhdir attributed the recent breakdown of the peace 
agreement in Kuala Lumpur to the failure of parliamentarians, local 
leaders, and President Arroyo.  The decision about whether to accept 
an agreement now resides with the Philippine Supreme Court.  On 
upcoming elections in Indonesia, Lakhdhir acknowledged Indonesia's 
record of holding elections successfully in the recent past.  The 
United States would take that record into account when considering 
whether to provide U.S. assistance for the elections. 
 
16. (C) REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND ASEAN: Moran maintained that 
discussions on regional frameworks made sense so long as there was 
seriousness on the part of ASEAN member countries, and that 
substantial matters would continue to be dealt with on a bilateral 
basis.  PDAS Davies spoke favorably of ASEAN Secretary-General Surin 
Pitsuwan and the improving cooperation between ASEAN and the United 
States.  EAP/RSP Director Blair Hall mentioned that Indonesia and 
Thailand, the last two countries that had not ratified the ASEAN 
Charter, would soon overcome legislative delays in ratification. 
This would pave the way for the Charter's passage at the December 
ASEAN Summit.  The United States hoped to cooperate closely with 
ASEAN, but in the background, on the design of its Human Rights Body. 
 Hall also mentioned there was a general sense that the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) should move beyond traditional security issues 
and focus more on concrete transnational security issues including 
disaster relief, maritime security and nonproliferation. 
 
17. PARTICIPANTS 
 
United States: 
Glyn Davies, EAP PDAS 
Alex Arvizu, EAP DAS 
Scot Marciel, EAP DAS 
John Norris, EAP DAS, Acting 
Blair Hall, EAP/RSP Director 
Kamala Lakhdir, EAP/MTS Director 
Steve Blake, EAP/MLS Director 
Kurt Tong, EAP/K Director 
David Shear, EAP/CM Director 
James Green, S/P Staff 
Donald Camp, SCA PDAS 
Evan Feigenbaum, SCA DAS 
George Krol, SCA DAS 
Jack Spillsbury, SCA/RA Director 
 
European Union Troika: 
-- French Presidency: 
Francois Descouetye, Director for Asia and Oceania 
Jean-Noel Ladois, European Cooperation Bureau 
Etienne de Gonneville, French Embassy 
 
--EU Commission: 
James Moran, Director DG Relex Asia 
Denis Chaibi, Desk Officer for India 
Laszlo Deak, Political Counselor, EC Delegation in Washington 
 
-- EU Council Secretariat: 
Francesco Presutti, Asia Task Force, Acting Head of Unit 
Tim Eestermans, Counselor for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Horizontal Issues 
 
-- Incoming Czech Presidency 
Jiri Sitler, Director for Asia and Pacific 
RICE