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INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 9613
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 9058
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3590
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0520
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5538
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 6100
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 9485
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 6094
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 7196
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 7372

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 STATE 115017 
 
SIPDIS, NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AS:  10/28/18 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO IR
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE 
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS 
MEETING (GAERC) 
 
¶1. (U) Classified by Bill Lucas, Director, EUR/ERA. 
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶2. (U) This is an action request.  See paragraph 18. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Summary:  EU Foreign Ministers will hold two 
meetings in early November: an informal gathering 
(Gymnich) in Marseille on November 3 and a formal 
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) 
meeting in Brussels November 10-11.  Although the 
agendas for both meetings may change somewhat, as of now 
we expect discussion topics to include:  the future of 
transatlantic relations (Gymnich), Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process (Gymnich and GAERC), Afghanistan/Pakistan 
(Gymnich), Syria/Lebanon (Gymnich), Iran (Gymnich), 
Russia/Georgia (Gymnich and GAERC), the Doha Round 
(GAERC), and the planned EU anti-piracy mission off the 
Horn of Africa (GAERC).  A background section covering 
some of these issues is provided prior to a section 
containing talking points. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Talking Points only are to be delivered as 
soon as possible at the appropriate level to EU members 
only.  Other posts should not/not deliver these points. 
Posts are requested to place particular emphasis on our 
points on Russia/Georgia (don't resume PCA negotiations 
until Russia meets its commitments under the Georgia 
ceasefire agreement), Iran (need more sanctions 
pressure), and Syria/Lebanon (engage with Syria only as 
reward for real policy changes).  The Russia points are 
relevant not only for the Gymnich and GAERC meetings, 
but also of course for any discussion of the EU-Russia 
summit scheduled for November 14.  Posts are requested 
to include the SIPDIS caption on their response cables 
and to reference this cable. End Summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
IRAN 
 
¶5. (SBU) We are pleased that the EU finally reached 
agreement on a Common Position to complete 
implementation of UNSCR 1803 in early August. 
Thereafter, EU experts struggled for weeks to reach 
consensus on the Council Regulation giving effect to the 
Common Position.  They argued chiefly over the listing 
of names of individuals and entities in the annexes and 
the handling of breaches of contracts resulting from the 
new regulations.  Negotiations were difficult due to EU 
countries' economic concerns, given the regulation's 
direct impact on EU members' vessels, cargo, export and 
financial interests.  EU Council working groups have now 
finalized the draft annexes to the Common Position that 
are required to put it into practice, and we expect the 
text to be approved by ministers without further 
discussion in early November.  Finally finishing work on 
1803 should make it easier to get the EU to focus on new 
steps. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Unfortunately, there are currently no EU 
proposals on the table for new autonomous sanctions 
going beyond existing UNSCRs.  Given how acrimonious and 
grueling the negotiations were over the text simply to 
complete implementation of 1803, there is little 
appetite for further autonomous EU measures at present. 
EU Member States seem to be leaning toward giving the 
1803 legislation time to be adopted and "digested" 
before going further.  Despite these difficulties, we 
need the EU to remain fully engaged in all aspects of 
the dual-track strategy towards Iran.  The French MFA is 
concerned that the P5+1 may "lose a year" waiting for 
the new U.S. administration to learn the ropes, during 
which time Iran would continue enriching uranium.  The 
French are thus interested in discussing the issue with 
the new U.S. administration as early as possible, not 
least so that the Europeans can get a sense of where 
 
STATE 00115017  002 OF 008 
 
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE 
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS 
MEETING (GAER 
Washington would like to go with regard to sanctions and 
engagement.  In the interim, the French intend to 
continue to push their EU partners to go further on 
sanctions, particularly on additional designations, and 
we understand that the U.K. is on board with this 
effort. 
 
¶7. (SBU) High Representative Solana has remained in 
contact with the Iranians, but Tehran has still failed 
to provide a clear, positive response to the latest P5+1 
offer.  As a result, the UN Security Council unanimously 
adopted UNSCR 1835 on September 27, demonstrating 
continued international resolve and unity in our 
commitment to the dual track strategy. 
 
¶8. (C) Our emphasis continues to be on multilateral 
diplomacy through the P5+1, but we will also seek to 
increase pressure on Iran by working with the EU, and 
bilaterally with likeminded countries.  We thus continue 
to urge the EU to adopt a series of additional 
autonomous measures that go beyond existing EU policy. 
Options include additional designations under existing 
EU policy, further tightening of inspection provisions, 
and tightening of export credits.  A strong set of new 
EU sanctions would not only send a clear signal of EU 
resolve, but also weaken other countries' excuses for 
not acting against Iran.  At the national level, we are 
already coordinating with individual EU Member States 
(France, UK, Germany and Italy) and other like-minded 
countries to explore other means to increase pressure on 
Iran, including measures to be taken in the areas of 
finance, energy and insurance.  Other countries do 
follow Europe's lead on Iran; on October 15 Australia 
imposed new financial and travel sanctions on 20 
individuals and 18 organizations " including Bank Melli 
and Bank Saderat " and ended government-financed export 
credits in an effort to "match and deliberately go 
beyond" the EU Common Position on UNSCR 1803. 
 
SYRIAN ENGAGEMENT 
 
¶9. (C) The French have been forward leaning on European 
engagement with Syria and assert that this openness has 
resulted in a number of positive Syrian actions, 
including the October 15 announcement of diplomatic 
relations with Lebanon, the recent meetings of the joint 
Syrian-Lebanese committees on delineating the border and 
returning prisoners, and Bashar al-Asad's commitment to 
President Sarkozy to continue negotiations with Israel. 
Although these initiatives would be positive steps if 
fully implemented, we have seen little, if any concrete 
action to fulfill them. 
 
¶10. (C) The U.S. has used recent meetings with Syrian 
Foreign Minister Muallem to reiterate our key issues of 
concern.  These include Syria's continued defiance of 
United Nations Security Council resolutions, support to 
terrorist groups and their leaders, non-cooperation with 
the IAEA, efforts to procure nuclear technology and non- 
conventional weapons, harboring of foreign fighter 
facilitators, and oppression of human rights activists. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Any future engagement between the U.S. and the 
Syrian government will be conditioned on meaningful 
Syrian efforts to change its behaviors and promote peace 
and stability in the region. 
 
EU SOMALIA ANTI-PIRACY EFFORTS 
 
¶12. (S) The European Union is in the operational 
planning stages for an anti-piracy ESDP mission that 
would start in December.  We expect approval for the 
mission at the November GAERC.  The ESDP mission lead is 
the United Kingdom, which plans to establish operational 
headquarters in Northwood, UK, with forward headquarters 
afloat.  The UK is looking at a small coordination cell 
(6 or fewer existing people) in Bahrain who would be 
designated as the EU coordination cell.  This EU cell 
could work through existing Coalition and U.S. officers 
in Bahrain who are likewise designated NATO liaison 
officers.  The UK has suggested, and we support, a daily 
meeting between the two groups to preserve the NATO-EU 
link.  This is a case where our preference to engage the 
 
STATE 00115017  003 OF 008 
 
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE 
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS 
MEETING (GAER 
EU on military issues through NATO has been maintained, 
as both NATO and the EU will be present in both 
Northwood and Bahrain, and it can serve as a model for 
future NATO-EU cooperation and coordination. 
 
¶13. (SBU)  Separately, we understand that the European 
Commission is working to launch a Critical Maritime 
Routes Initiative intended to help improve security 
along key shipping corridors, including the HOA and the 
Malacca Straits.  The initiative will provide aid to 
third countries to enhance vessel tracking and 
information sharing between ports.  We welcome this 
initiative as a useful complement to the ESDP anti- 
piracy mission and hope to be able to obtain additional 
information on the initiative as it moves forward. 
 
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 
 
¶14. (SBU) "Transatlantic relations" will be on the 
agenda for the November 3 EU Foreign Ministers' Gymnich 
meeting in Marseille.  This is the second extended 
Gymnich review (following the September 5-6 Gymnich 
discussion in Avignon) of a French paper likely to be 
shared with this and the next U.S. Administration.  The 
paper is intended to be a political assessment of U.S.- 
EU relations in view of the upcoming U.S. presidential 
elections, and an inventory of subjects on which the 
U.S. and EU will need a shared vision.  While we have 
not seen a revised version, the original draft covered 
Middle East issues, Iran, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Russia, 
the multilateral system, climate change, human rights, 
and non-proliferation. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Papers circulated by EU Member States in 
preparation for the discussion on transatlantic 
relations have also focused on issue areas and revised 
structures for our consultations.  We understand that 
the ideas proposed have included inviting the Secretary 
of State to the occasional Gymnich meeting, returning to 
two U.S.-EU summits per year (with one being Gymnich 
style), and addressing such subjects as financial market 
stability, food security, and development policy 
coordination.  As part of the broader ferment on 
transatlantic relations outside the EU's Gymnich 
discussions, former French PM Balladur and others even 
suggest regular meetings of virtually all U.S. cabinet 
secretaries with their EU troika counterparts. 
 
DOHA ROUND 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  The central trade priority of the United 
States remain achieving a successful conclusion to the 
Doha Round negotiations - one that opens markets and 
creates new trade in agriculture, industrial goods, and 
services, particularly from the advance developing 
countries (Brazil, China and India).  Although a 
breakthrough was not achieved during the meetings in 
Geneva in July, WTO Members made tremendous progress in 
moving the Doha negotiations forward on multiple fronts. 
The impasse resulted from some specific issues - most 
notably with regard to the agriculture "Special 
Safeguard Mechanism" (SSM).  But it is important to 
underscore that key open issues in agriculture, NAMA and 
in services are indicators as to what remains the 
linchpin to Doha success: securing meaningful market 
access from key emerging markets. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) The U.S. government continues to work with 
WTO Members to advance the negotiations and achieve an 
ambitious outcome that results in new trade flows. 
Senior officials meetings have resumed in Geneva on 
agriculture and industrial goods.  We believe a 
modalities deal in agriculture and NAMA is still doable 
by the end of the year if all parties want that goal in 
good faith.  Achieving a modalities package on 
agriculture and industrial goods will also set the stage 
shortly thereafter for new revised offers in the 
services negotiations. 
 
¶18. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Please deliver the following 
points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as 
possible (in advance of the November 3 Gymnich and the 
November 10 GAERC). 
 
STATE 00115017  004 OF 008 
 
 
RUSSIA/GEORGIA 
 
-- We welcome EU Special Envoy Pierre Morel's skillful 
launching of the Geneva talks on October 15, and applaud 
his ability to bring the parties together. 
 
-- We also welcome the consensus within the plenary 
session in Geneva -- albeit with the absence of one 
delegation -- to support Georgia's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. 
 
-- We regret that the separatists walked away from the 
table and that neither they nor the Russians were 
willing to accept any of the procedural compromises that 
Ambassador Morel proposed and that the Georgian 
delegation was willing to accept in order for the 
discussions to continue. 
 
-- As we clearly stated in Geneva on October 15, Russia 
still has not fulfilled its commitments with respect to 
the August 12 ceasefire or the subsequent September 8 
agreement negotiated by French President Sarkozy, which 
both clearly state that Russia must withdraw its forces 
to their positions prior to the outbreak of hostilities. 
 
-- Russian forces remain in the Kodori Valley in 
Abkhazia and in the Akhalgori region in South Ossetia, 
both of which were controlled by Georgia prior to the 
conflict.  Russia also has far more troops in the 
separatist regions than it did prior to the start of the 
conflict. 
 
-- Civilian populations in these and other regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain vulnerable to 
marauding militias and irregulars, and reports of 
harassment and intimidation continue to come in.  Russia 
has been unwilling or unable to provide for the security 
of these regions and has blocked international 
humanitarian aid, most recently by temporarily denying 
access to the World Food Program at Perevi, just outside 
of the South Ossetian administrative boundary. 
 
-- In our dealings with Russia, we must speak with one 
voice and condemn its failure to abide by these 
commitments, which run directly counter to the August 12 
and September 8 agreements that Russia signed. 
 
-- We fully support Ambassador Haber's call for access 
inside Abkhazia and South Ossetia for the EU Monitoring 
Mission, just as we support OSCE Special Envoy 
Talvitie's call for access inside South Ossetia for OSCE 
monitors, members of ODIHR, and the OSCE High 
Commissioner for National Minorities. 
 
-- International access to the separatist regions would 
help protect the vulnerable populations living there and 
would help restore security so that internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) can return to their former places of 
residence.  As winter approaches, the task of securing 
the return of IDPs is becoming increasingly urgent. 
 
-- Given reports of human rights violations and violence 
in the conflict zones, the need for an international 
presence inside these regions remains critical. 
 
--We encourage the European Union to continue to 
postpone negotiations with Russia on a new EU-Russia 
partnership agreement (PCA) until Russia has met all its 
commitments under the ceasefire agreement, including 
allowing access for humanitarian assistance and 
international monitors in the breakaway regions and 
withdrawal of forces to positions held prior to the 
outbreak of hostilities, which entails a complete 
withdrawal from such areas as the Upper Kodori valley 
and Akhalgori. 
 
--We would also encourage the European Union to refrain 
from further discussion on President Medvedev's proposal 
for a new European Security Treaty.  President 
Medvedev's endorsement in Evian of five principles of 
 
STATE 00115017  005 OF 008 
 
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE 
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS 
MEETING (GAER 
such a new European security architecture, including 
respect for sovereignty and preservation of 
international law, rings hollow, particularly given 
continued Russian occupation of Georgian territory. 
 
IRAN 
 
        --Our emphasis continues to be on multilateral diplomacy 
through the P5+1, but we will also seek to increase 
pressure on Iran by working with the EU and like-minded 
countries to adopt autonomous national measures. 
 
--We appreciate the EU's August adoption of a new Common 
Position to implement fully UNSCR 1803 and understand 
the process of putting the new Common Position into 
practice will be completed very soon. 
 
--Iran is counting on a period of international 
inaction. We would also like to see the EU continue 
pressuring Iran by adopting a series of truly new 
autonomous measures that go beyond existing UNSCRs and 
existing EU policy.  A strong set of new EU autonomous 
sanctions would not only send a clear signal of EU 
resolve, but also weaken other countries' excuses for 
not acting against Iran. 
 
--The EU's measures, such as the designation of Bank 
Melli, do have an impact on Iran's decision-making.  We 
also know that many Arab and Asian countries look to the 
EU for leadership on Iran and are likely to follow its 
lead on any additional steps taken regarding Iran.  We 
note that on October 15 Australia imposed new financial 
and travel sanctions on 20 individuals and 18 
organizations ? including Bank Melli and Bank Saderat ? 
and ended government-financed export credits. 
 
--Beyond sanctions, we urge EU member states to approach 
their domestic insurance firms that supply maritime and 
aviation insurance, or reinsurance, to end all business 
with Iranian entities or individuals. 
 
--We would welcome EU reinforcement of the message to 
countries of key importance in the shipping arena to 
robustly implement the inspection provision in UNSCR 
1803 on Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), 
including China, South Korea, and the UAE.  We are 
interested in hearing about any effects that have come 
about as a result of the adoption of the EU Common 
Position on 1803, which specifically placed additional 
reporting requirements on IRISL and Iran Air Cargo. 
 
--We urge the EU to implement and build upon measures 
imposed in existing UNSCRs to increase the pressure on 
Iran.  Iran has already adapted its evasion tactics to 
circumvent existing designations and has moved to using 
its other state-owned banks to conduct proliferation- 
related transactions and expanding its intra-banking 
network.  Iran's illicit finance is a systemic problem 
that demands action beyond simply targeting specific 
banks.  As the Financial Action Task Force noted this 
month, Iran's weak anti-money laundering and 
counterterrorism finance mechanisms also highlight that 
countries should take action to strengthen preventive 
measures to reduce the risk to their financial systems. 
 
--Time is of the essence.  Sanctions are working but 
need moretime; meanwhile, Iran is advancing in its 
uranium enrichment and other sensitive nuclear 
activities in a bid to present the international 
community with a fait accompli that we cannot accept. 
 
--In addition to its proliferation activities, Iran 
continues to be an egregious sponsor of terrorist 
activity, both through training and direct financial 
support.  Iran's support to terrorists, particularly in 
Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq, is a threat to these 
fragile democracies and a direct violation of UNSCR 
¶1747. 
 
SYRIAN ENGAGEMENT 
 
--Syria must be held accountable on all of its public 
pledges.  These include delineating the Syria-Lebanon 
 
STATE 00115017  006 OF 008 
 
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE 
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS 
MEETING (GAER 
border and exchanging embassies between Syria and 
Lebanon, and cutting off completely the flow of foreign 
fighters to Iraq. 
 
--The October 15 announcement that Syria and Lebanon 
would establish diplomatic relations was a positive 
step; however, we await the concrete actions needed to 
implement this agreement.  Syria's long track record of 
destabilizing involvement in Lebanese affairs should not 
be forgotten because of one diplomatic gesture. 
 
--Robust engagement with Syria could work to undermine 
our allies in Lebanon, who remain concerned about Syrian 
intentions and any signs of wavering international 
support for a sovereign, independent Lebanon.  These 
concerns are especially significant in the context of 
Lebanon's spring 2009 elections, which will serve as a 
watershed for the country's fledgling democratic 
institutions. 
 
--The international community must remain united in 
pressing for Syrian action on clearly identified 
benchmarks, including compliance with UN Security 
Council resolutions, preventing Palestinian rejectionist 
groups from undermining the Palestinian Authority, 
ending support for terrorist groups, interdicting 
foreign fighters entering Iraq, ceasing to allow illicit 
weapons shipments from being transported across its 
borders, complying with IAEA investigations into the 
clandestine procurement of nuclear technology, and 
ending the harassment and detention of political 
dissidents and human rights supporters. 
 
--The Syrian regime must not be rewarded for low-cost 
actions that do not represent a significant change in 
Syria policies and actions.  Our view is that 
engagement, including any progress on the EU-Syria 
Association Agreement, is an appropriate reward only 
when real change occurs and Syria demonstrates its 
willingness to play a constructive role in the region. 
 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE 
 
--Annapolis launched the first substantive negotiations 
in nearly a decade. 
 
--The absence of public agreements or a flurry of press 
releases should not be mistaken for a lack of progress. 
 
--The Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not have 
endured for 60 years if the obstacles to peace were few 
and the solutions easily reached. 
 
--The framework for negotiating a final resolution of 
the conflict is before us: Determined, professional 
negotiations between the parties; consistent yet 
constructive international engagement; and a vigorous 
effort to improve conditions on the ground. 
 
--This formula has resulted in several key advances: 
 
--Israel and the Palestinians now express common 
aspirations. 
 
--They underscore their commitment to reaching a 
comprehensive agreement on all issues, without 
exception, as agreed at Annapolis. 
 
--They pledge to continue their bilateral, 
confidential, and continuous negotiations until 
this goal is achieved. 
 
--They both attest that the negotiating structure 
is effective and productive and that they intend to 
keep it in place. 
 
--President Bush's vision of a Palestinian state at 
peace with Israel will not come in a single dramatic 
moment, but rather as the result of a methodical, 
sincere commitment by the parties to conclude a lasting 
agreement that benefits both their people. 
 
--Ongoing, high-level U.S. engagement on this issue is 
 
STATE 00115017  007 OF 008 
 
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE 
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS 
MEETING (GAER 
sustained not by false hope or an unrealistic assessment 
of the challenges but by our belief in the sincerity of 
the parties' commitment to the negotiations, by the 
recognition of the progress they have made, and by the 
genuine possibility of a breakthrough if the current 
negotiating structure remains intact. 
 
--The seriousness of the process is illustrated by the 
sensitivity of the issues under negotiation.  The 
international community must ensure that its actions are 
supportive of the negotiations rather than 
interventionist.  The United States has steadfastly 
respected the parties' request to maintain the bilateral 
and confidential nature of the dialogue and urges other 
international actors to do the same. 
 
--The Quartet has played a vital role in coordinating 
international support and limiting unhelpful or 
unfocused activism.  It is imperative that the 
international community continue to adhere to this 
formula, which has proven to be effective.  The Quartet 
has also worked to promote sustainable political 
arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza, which will only 
be based on the Quartet principles: renunciation of 
violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of past 
agreements between the parties. 
 
EU SOMALIA ANTI-PIRACY EFFORTS 
 
--We welcome the ongoing planning by the European Union 
to deploy an anti-piracy operation intended to escort 
World Food Program vessels and merchant shipping off the 
Horn of Africa. 
 
--We are pleased to be close to establishing pragmatic 
NATO-EU cooperation in both Northwood and Bahrain 
through which the U.S. may engage with the ESDP mission. 
We believe this operation may provide the two 
organizations with a model for future coordination. 
 
--We also welcome the European Commission's plans to 
launch a Critical Maritime Routes Initiative intended to 
help improve security along key shipping corridors, 
including the HOA and the Malacca Straits.  We look 
forward to learning more about this initiative as it 
moves forward. 
 
--We would like to work closely on a longer term plan to 
strengthen regional judicial and maritime capacity and 
are interested in EU planning in this regard. 
 
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN 
 
--The United States remains concerned about the security 
situation along Pakistan's western frontier, 
particularly in and around the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) that allows extremists to 
orchestrate operations across the border in Afghanistan 
and beyond. 
 
--Signs of bilateral improvement between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan create a fresh opportunity for better 
cooperation between the two countries.  The United 
States remains committed over the long-term to helping 
Pakistan alleviate problems along its border with 
Afghanistan.  Without a collective international effort, 
however, it will be difficult to contain the existing 
threat emanating from the Tribal Belt. 
 
--We believe the international community, including the 
European Union, can and should do more to support and 
fund Pakistani efforts to stabilize the border area. 
 
--We urge EU support for our proposal for Pakistan to 
appoint a high-level government official to oversee a 
World Bank-administered Frontier Trust Fund (modeled on 
the Afghan Reconstruction Fund) so that donors can write 
checks for frontier development.  Many donors are eager 
to provide assistance for the border, and this is a 
mechanism to help them achieve that. 
 
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS 
 
 
STATE 00115017  008 OF 008 
 
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE 
NOVEMBER 3 GYMNICH AND THE NOVEMBER 10-11 FOREIGN MINISTERS 
MEETING (GAER 
-- We understand transatlantic relations will be on the 
Gymnich agenda once again, to include an assessment of 
priorities in view of the upcoming U.S. elections.  We 
expect that maintaining strong transatlantic relations 
will be a key priority for whichever administration 
succeeds the current one. 
 
--We think that new global security and economic 
challenges will require faster, more coherent responses 
from all of us.  We should make sure that transatlantic 
cooperation structures are up to these challenges, since 
a strong transatlantic partnership is the cornerstone of 
our security.  We would appreciate your perspective on 
which issues will most require a joint approach. 
 
DOHA ROUND 
 
--We stress the U.S. commitment to achieving a 
successful Doha outcome.  We are prepared to work right 
through the end of the year to reach a breakthrough. 
 
--The linchpin to achieving a successful conclusion to 
the Doha Round remains securing meaningful new market 
access from key emerging markets in agriculture, NAMA 
(non-agricultural market access) and services. 
 
--The economics are real ? Doha will set the terms of 
trade through the next decade and beyond.  We note an 
April 2008 IMF economic outlook projection that 50% of 
global economic growth between now and 2013 would be 
provided by China, India, Brazil, Argentina and ASEAN. 
 
--The United States remains willing and able to 
negotiate.  Senior officials are currently engaging 
through capital to capital contacts and in Geneva. 
 
--We are looking for senior officials to bring new 
creativity to addressing the many key open issues in 
agriculture, NAMA and in services. 
 
--In NAMA, we need participation in sectoral tariff 
elimination agreements by major exporters/producers - 
including advanced developing countries like Brazil, 
China and India ? to balance July's poor formula and 
flexibilities result.  We need the EU to step up and 
engage on pushing sectorals and China/India/Brazil 
participation.  We hope to see the Commission put new 
energy into sectorals. 
 
--In agriculture, US negotiators have returned to Geneva 
to try to move forward on SSM and the other unresolved 
agriculture issues (e.g. tariff simplification). 
 
--We believe a modalities deal in agriculture and NAMA 
is still doable by the end of the year if all parties 
want that goal in good faith. 
 
--The United States is continuing to work, as we have 
done on previous rounds carrying through administration 
changes. 
 
END NON-PAPER TEXT 
RICE