VZCZCXRO1595
OO RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHC #8064/01 2822005
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 081959Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 3084
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 8876
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3431
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 9847
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5109
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0946

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 108064 
 
SIPDIS, SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EUN PHUM PREL PGOV ZI UZ BO GG RS SIPDIS
SUBJECT: APPROACHING THE EU IN ADVANCE OF THE OCTOBER 
13 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING (GAERC) 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  See paragraph 12. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary:  EU Foreign Ministers will hold their 
next General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(GAERC) meeting in Luxembourg on October 13.  We expect 
the formal agenda to include:  Zimbabwe, Georgia/Russia, 
Belarus, and Uzbekistan.  A background section covering 
these issues is provided prior to a section containing 
talking points.  Points are to be delivered as soon as 
possible at the appropriate level to EU members only. 
Other posts should not/not deliver these points.  Please 
note that while Uzbekistan is expected to be on the 
GAERC agenda and background material on Uzbekistan is 
provided in this cable for posts' awareness, there are 
no Uzbekistan talking points to deliver to the EU at 
this time.  Posts are requested to include the SIPDIS 
caption on their response cables and to reference this 
cable. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
ZIMBABWE 
 
¶3. (SBU) The agreement signed by the parties on 
September 15 provides an opportunity to put Zimbabwe on 
the path to democratic reform and economic prosperity. 
Though far from ideal, it serves as a framework for 
sharing power.  There are plenty of holes in this 
document, including no division of ministries, the 
possibility that Mugabe will retain control over the 
police and/or security services, and no mention of 
amnesty or transitional justice.  There also is no 
timeline for implementation, only language requiring 
ratification of relevant constitutional amendments by 
the Parliament.  Nevertheless, if implemented in an 
approximation of good faith, the deal offers the people 
of Zimbabwe a chance to live in peace and to begin to 
move down the road towards political openness and 
economic stability.  The agreement notes the Zimbabwean 
state's responsibility to ensure that all citizens have 
access to humanitarian and food assistance. 
 
¶4. (SBU) We welcome the agreement signed by the parties 
and are standing by to see if it will bear fruit by 
giving greater voice to the aspirations of the 
Zimbabwean people.  The agreement promises executive 
authority for Morgan Tsvangirai and the Movement for 
Democratic Change, reflecting in part the will of the 
Zimbabwean people as expressed in the first round of 
presidential elections on March 29.  The test of the new 
arrangement will be in the implementation. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The U.S. remains concerned about the welfare of 
the Zimbabwean people as a result of reports of 
incidents of government-sanctioned violence and 
intimidation in some areas of the country.  There are 
reports that so-called war veterans and youth "militia," 
previously organized and funded by the government, have 
not been disbanded and continue to assault and harass 
segments of the population. The Mugabe Government also 
continues to harass opposition supporters and leaders. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Although we are encouraged by the government's 
decision to lift the suspension on the operations of 
organizations providing humanitarian assistance, we 
remain seriously concerned by reports that democratic 
governance and human rights organizations may still face 
significant challenges to their operations. 
Furthermore, the imposition of certain reporting and 
monitoring requirements on humanitarian organizations 
could potentially obstruct humanitarian and other 
assistance programs.  We will monitor closely the re- 
activation of the food and medical assistance so 
desperately needed by millions of Zimbabweans. We hope 
that under the new inclusive government, civil society 
will be able to operate freely so that Zimbabweans can 
access greatly needed assistance and safely exercise 
their political rights. 
 
¶7. (SBU) As part of our commitment to help the people of 
Zimbabwe in their time of greatest need, we have 
 
STATE 00108064  002 OF 004 
 
 
provided over $170 million in food aid and other support 
inside Zimbabwe in FY 2008.  In addition, we have 
provided $2.5 million for refugees and asylum seekers in 
neighboring countries in FY 2008.  We strongly encourage 
commitment to the agreement by all parties, so that the 
Zimbabwean people can experience relief and begin 
recovery. 
 
GEORGIA 
 
¶8. (SBU) High Representative Solana and EU Special 
Representative for the Crisis in Georgia Pierre Morel 
traveled to Georgia on October 1 to launch the EU 
Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia with a visit to 
mission headquarters in Tbilisi as well as to the Gori 
field office.  Solana also met separately with President 
Saakashvili, FM Tkeshelashvili, Interior Minister 
Merabishvili, opposition leaders and NGOs.  All 225 EU 
civilian monitors are now in place at the HQ in Tbilisi, 
as well as at field offices in Zugdidi, Gori and Poti. 
Once all support staff arrive by the end of October, the 
total international staffing for the mission will be 
¶352.  22 EU member states have contributed personnel to 
the mission.  On October 1, three patrols successfully 
passed Russian checkpoints in the area adjacent to South 
Ossetia.  The mission will not seek to enter South 
Ossetia or Abkhazia proper until after October 10, when 
the Russians will have left undisputed Georgian 
territory.  The European Commission will host the 
Georgia Donors' Conference on October 22 in Brussels. 
The World Bank has agreed to co-chair, and invitees will 
include 65-70 countries.  EUSR Morel met with A/S Fried 
and DAS Bryza on the UNGA margins to review planning for 
the October 15 Geneva conference on the political 
situation in Georgia; there were no significant 
differences in our thinking. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Georgian President Saakashvili recently 
publicly committed his government to working with the 
opposition to reform and reinforce democratic 
institutions in a participatory fashion.  We need to 
encourage and support these efforts, as well as his 
commitment to non use of force in resolving the South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia crises. 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In response to  the killing by Uzbek forces 
of hundreds of civilians in the context of a jail break 
and hostage taking that occurred  in the city of Andijon 
in May 2005, and the refusal of the Uzbek authorities to 
allow an impartial investigation of the incident, the EU 
imposed a visa ban on senior Uzbek officials - including 
the defense minister and national security chief - 
involved in human rights abuses in the country.  In 
October 2007, EU Foreign Ministers, facing pressure from 
Germany and other member states, agreed to suspend the 
sanctions for six months, provided that certain 
conditions demonstrating progress in human rights 
standards and democracy were met.  "With a view to 
encouraging the Uzbek authorities to take substantive 
steps to improve the human rights situation and taking 
into account their commitments," FMs in April 2008 noted 
progress on human rights and extended the ban for 
another six months.  The October 13 GAERC will again 
take up the extension of the visa ban.  Reports from 
Brussels indicate that the GAERC may drop the visa ban 
against Uzbekistan and maintain but "downsize" its arms 
ban to get rid of prohibitions on selling equipment and 
other items that are not weapons.  Contacts say that EU 
Special Representative for the Georgia Crisis Pierre 
Morel predicts there will be a diplomatic offensive by 
Russia in coming weeks to engage its neighbors-including 
Uzbekistan.  Many in the EU want to increase their own 
outreach to Russia's neighbors to provide balance. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In June 2008, the U.S. implemented travel 
restrictions under a provision of the Department of 
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 
Appropriation Act which could limit the U.S. visa 
eligibility of current or former Uzbek government 
officials responsible for human rights abuses in 
Uzbekistan.  The Department continues to closely monitor 
the human rights situation in Uzbekistan and is working 
closely with the Government of Uzbekistan to encourage 
discussions and progress on this issue. 
 
 
STATE 00108064  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Please deliver the following 
points to the appropriate MFA official(s) as soon as 
possible (in advance of the October 13 GAERC). 
 
BEGIN NON-PAPER TEXT 
 
ZIMBABWE 
 
-- We welcome the EU's close coordination with the U.S. 
so that the international donor community speaks with 
one voice with respect to the imperfect power sharing 
agreement signed September 15. 
 
-- We believe it is important to make clear to the 
Mugabe regime that no economic reengagement will occur 
until a transitional government implements concrete 
democratic reforms. 
 
-- Sanctions will remain in place to maintain pressure 
on the regime.  The U.S. has a new, expanded set ready 
to go if Mugabe fails to join with the MDC to follow 
through on the letter and spirit of the September 15 
agreement.  We urge the EU to maintain current sanctions 
as well until genuine change begins. 
 
GEORGIA 
 
--We welcome the full deployment of the EU Monitoring 
Mission in Georgia on October 1.  We greatly appreciate 
the unprecedented speed with which the EU deployed the 
225 monitors from 22 EU member states. 
 
--We strongly support the EU position that the mission's 
mandate covers all of Georgia, including Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.  It is vital that the EU, the OSCE, the 
UN and other objective outsiders gain full access to 
South Ossetia as soon as possible. 
 
--We need to hold Russia to its September 8 and August 
12 commitments.  This means that we must hold Russia to 
its August 12 commitment to withdraw its forces "to 
their positions prior to the outbreak of hostilities". 
Keeping 7,600 troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
violates that commitment. 
 
--The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia and the OSCE MMOs 
are the international mechanism referenced in the 
ceasefire and supplemental agreements.  There is nothing 
in the August 12 or September 8 agreements authorizing 
any long-term Russian deployments outside of the 
separatist regions, and there should not be any Russian 
or South Ossetian patrols in the areas adjacent to South 
Ossetia nor any Russian patrols in areas adjacent to 
Abkhazia after October 10. 
 
--The U.S. and EU should agree to impose travel 
restrictions on high-ranking Abkhaz and South Ossetian 
officials, and we welcome EU thinking on how to penalize 
Russian firms operating illegally in those regions.  The 
international community - particularly the EU - has 
leverage here, and we need to remain united in support 
of Georgian territorial integrity. 
 
--We thank the European Commission for hosting the 
international Georgia donors' conference in Brussels on 
October 22, and we look forward to participating.  We 
applaud the Commission on its significant contribution 
of 500 million euros and encourage similarly generous 
bilateral pledges. 
 
--We hope to continue the close coordination on 
preparations for the October 15 meeting in Geneva, 
keeping it focused on the long-standing Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia conflicts.  Consultations with EU Special 
Representative Morel last month showed that our ideas 
for the meeting are very closely aligned, with no 
significant differences between us. 
 
--The U.S. and EU need to work together to press 
President  Saakashvili to implement his pledges to 
reform and reinforce democratic institutions, and to do 
his part to fulfill his no use of force pledge. 
 
BELARUS 
 
--We understand the EU is considering responses to 
Belarus' release of the remaining political prisoners. 
 
STATE 00108064  004 OF 004 
 
 
The U.S. responded to the prisoner release by issuing 
licenses on September 4 allowing transactions for six 
months for two previously-sanctioned enterprises.  This 
action was thus proportional and limited in time. 
 
--We would encourage the EU to take a similar measured 
approach.  While we were heartened by the prisoner 
release, we have failed to see a real improvement in 
basic rights and freedoms. 
 
--The September 28 parliamentary elections were a 
particular disappointment in this regard.  Prior to the 
elections, both the U.S. and EU made clear that the 
conduct of the elections would be a key benchmark in our 
ability to build a closer relationship.  Notwithstanding 
these warnings, the OSCE has determined that despite 
minor improvements, the elections fell significantly 
short of OSCE standards and pledges to make the vote 
count more transparent were not met. 
 
--It is important that we continue to use the tools at 
our disposal to seek positive change.  We would thus 
encourage that any lifting of sanctions be partial and 
limited in time.  Extensions of sanctions waivers and 
moves to relax sanctions further should be made 
contingent on demonstrable, positive change, not on 
promises. 
 
--Possible conditionality could include the removal of 
the Central Election Commission head and the inclusion 
of significant numbers of opposition and independent 
representatives on the CEC and on election commissions 
at all levels.  We should also consider requiring 
Belarus to repeal the recently passed media law which 
further restricts Belarus' few remaining press freedoms, 
particularly regarding the internet, and to pass one 
that is in line with OSCE commitments. 
 
--We also want to continue to encourage Belarus to adopt 
a more Western orientation.  It is clear that the 
Georgia crisis has provided Lukashenka with an 
opportunity to approach the West and ask for concessions 
and heightened engagement lest he be "forced" into the 
arms of the Russians. While encouraging distancing from 
Russia, we should be wary of Lukashenka playing us all 
off with little real commitment to the U.S./EU 
position.. 
 
--It is encouraging that Belarus has thus far refrained 
from recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and we 
should continue to emphasize that such a move would be 
detrimental to improved relations with the EU and the 
U.S. It would also remove one of Lukashenko's key 
bargaining chips. 
 
--We see these two goals - promoting democracy and human 
rights in Belarus and encouraging a Western orientation 
- as mutually reinforcing.  It is important that we 
pursue both simultaneously. 
 
END NON-PAPER TEXT 
RICE