VZCZCXRO2281
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0618/01 2831407
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091407Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7727
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0425
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2357

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000618 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BELGRADE PLEASE ALSO PASS PODGORICA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK GR MT KV
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: CRVENKOVSKI URGES POSITIVE U.S. 
PRESSURE IN BOTH ATHENS AND SKOPJE ON NAME ISSUE; SUPPORTS 
KOSOVO RECOGNITION, BUT CRITICAL OF PROCESS 
 
REF: SKOPJE 616 
 
Classified By: Amb. Reeker for reasons 1.5. (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The U.S. and other close allies should press 
both Athens and Skopje to consider the latest UN Mediator's 
name proposal positively, President Crvenkovski urged the 
Ambassador in an Oct. 9 meeting.  Crvenkovski admitted not 
knowing the full content of the package, but even though it 
appeared to lean more toward Greece's position there was 
likely enough positive content for both sides to accept it or 
at least use it as a solid basis for further negotiation.  He 
doubted whether PM Gruevski was prepared to be flexible. 
Ambassador said he planned to speak with the PM and strongly 
urge him not to say "no."  Crvenkovski complained that 
Gruevski's tactics of using a parliamentary debate on Kosovo 
recognition could lead to unnecessary public discord when -- 
in his view -- the Macedonian people were already prepared to 
accept it.  Ambassador said that recognition was already 
overdue and the result was more important than the PM's 
tactics.  End summary. 
 
A Deal We Can Work With? 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) President Crvenkovski told the Ambassador Oct. 9 that 
name negotiator Dimitrov gave him only a summary by phone of 
the latest proposal from UN Mediator Nimetz, which he said 
upon Greek negotiator Vassilakis' insistence Nimetz only 
called a "set of ideas."  Crvenkovski understood that -- 
whatever it is called -- the proposal is closer to the Greek 
position than Nimetz's Sept. 11 paper, in particular on the 
question of Macedonian identity and language.  He believes 
both Greece and Macedonia may have reasons to accept or 
reject it.  Crvenkovski admitted that he could not know Greek 
PM Karamanlis' thinking on the proposal, but noted the Greek 
press was not entirely negative. 
 
¶3. (C) The President urged that neither side say no, and 
instead take the opportunity of Nimetz's two-week vacation to 
consult internally.  He requested direct, positive U.S. 
pressure on both Skopje and Athens to consider the proposal 
and, if not agree to it outright, at least accept it as a 
solid basis for further negotiation.  Pressure from the UK 
and Germany could also be helpful, but not from France, as 
Paris is viewed in Macedonia as far too pro-Greek. 
 
¶4. (C) Crvenkovski was pessimistic that PM Gruevski would be 
flexible going forward.  For his part, the President did not 
plan to hold a coordination meeting with Gruevski too 
quickly, preferring to lay the groundwork and project 
Macedonia as considering the proposal calmly and seriously. 
He was deeply concerned that should a name proposal go to 
referendum, Gruevski may sabotage it; the entire Macedonian 
political leadership must be behind a solution, he insisted. 
Ambassador responded that he would call the PM the same day 
and urge him not to reject any deal out of hand.  Macedonia 
must be reasonable and willing to negotiate whether Greece is 
or not. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador reached Gruevski later Oct. 9 and urged him 
to consider the proposal or use it as a basis for 
negotiation.  Gruevski responded that he is not fully 
informed about its content, but he heard from his chief of 
staff -- who was in New York with GoM name negotiator 
Dimitrov -- that Dimitrov thought the latest Nimetz proposal 
was "one of the worst" in recent memory.  Nevertheless, the 
PM agreed that "tactically we shouldn't say no right away." 
 
Kosovo Recognition: Get It Done 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Crvenkovski noted that the parliament was set to 
debate recognition of Kosovo the same day, adding that as 
president he had no legal role in the issue.  He expressed 
disappointment that Gruevski and his party, VMRO-DPMNE, have 
apparently chosen not to take an official position but plan 
to "leave it up to parliament."  He worried that a 
parliamentary debate with no clear position from the 
government would stir unnecessary public discord even though 
the public here is prepared for this step.  This should not 
be viewed as just an "Albanian issue."  Ambassador understood 
this concern, but added that Washington viewed Macedonian 
recognition of Kosovo as overdue and our expectation was that 
the matter would be closed today.  (Note: While the it is 
 
SKOPJE 00000618  002 OF 002 
 
 
correct that the opposition SDSM is upset that the government 
did not formally propose recognition and is debating that 
issue in parliament, we still expect the issue will be closed 
today, Oct. 9.  SDSM has assured us that the party strongly 
supports recognition itself.) 
Reeker