VZCZCXRO6069
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #0976/01 2751329
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011329Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7138
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01OF 02 CHISINAU 000976 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018 
TAGS: PREL PBS PINR RS MD
SUBJECT: A LONG-TIME OBSERVER'S IEWS ON TRANSNISTRIAN DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Classified B: Charge d'Affaires Kelly Keiderling for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In a September 27 meeting former OSCE Ambassador to 
Moldova William Hill told Ambassador Chaudhry that he thought it 
unlikely that the planned 5-plus-2 meeting in October would gather 
all participants.  Hill blamed Transnistrian President Igor Smirnov 
for avoiding a meeting with Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin prior 
to the 5-plus-2 meeting.  He said Russian Special Envoy Valery 
Nesterushkin had claimed that the Russians had no new Kozak-2 plan. 
Meanwhile, Voronin may have given up on achieving a settlement with 
Transnistria before he leaves office next year.  End Summary. 
 
5-plus-2 Meeting Unlikely 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador met with former OSCE Ambassador to Moldova, William 
Hill, on September 27 to hear Hill's readout on his meetings over the 
previous two days with Russian Special Envoy Valery Nesterushkin and 
Transnistrian "President" Smirnov.  Hill noted that Nesterushkin had 
signed onto a 5-plus-2 meeting in Vienna in October, but now seemed 
to doubt that it would take place.  In his discussions with OSCE 
Mission to Moldova Ambassador Philip Remler, Hill had concluded that 
the Transnistrians wanted Smirnov and Voronin to participate in a 
2-plus-1 meeting with Russian President Medvedev first.  During his 
meeting with Smirnov, Remler had asked that Smirnov agree to send 
Transnistrian Acting "Foreign Minister" Vladimir Yastrebchak to the 
5-plus-2 meeting in Vienna. 
 
Smirnov Continues to Stall 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Hill stated that, although prior to his arrival in 
Moldova Smirnov had not agreed to see him, Smirnov suddenly agreed to 
meet on Saturday, September 27.  Local Transnistrian TV had reported 
on Ambassador Hill's presence in Moldova on Friday night, September 
¶26.  Smirnov wanted to do a joint TV appearance with Ambassador Hill 
on Saturday but Hill politely declined.  Hill reported that Smirnov 
was likely interested in appearing to promote negotiations in public 
while avoiding any serious discussion on substantive issues in 
private.  Ambassador Hill said that in his meetings with Smirnov over 
the years, the Transnistrian leader had generally preferred to level 
attacks on U.S. policy in order to avoid discussing Transnistria and 
Moldova. 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador Hill suggested that the Russians had forced Smirnov 
to agree to meet with Voronin prior to a 5-plus-2 meeting.  Smirnov 
could not defy Russia, but was using any means available to avoid a 
meeting.  Ambassador Hill noted that Russian Ambassador to Moldova 
Valeri Kouzmin had said that Smirnov was very talented at resisting 
change.  Smirnov was actively working both to avoid a possible 
meeting with Voronin and to dodge a trip to Vienna for a 5-plus-2 
meeting by taking part in Abkhazia "independence" celebrations. 
 
What do the Russians Want? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Hill stated that Nesterushkin had come to Moldova 
to push the negotiation process.  In their meeting, Ambassador Hill 
sought to determine whether the Russians had a new proposal to unveil 
in a 2-plus-1 meeting.  Hill asked what kind of proposal the Russians 
had and Nesterushkin responded that Russia had nothing.  Ambassador 
Hill nonetheless believed that the Russians probably had some type of 
plan, perhaps a Kozak-2.  Hill speculated that if the Russians were 
able to get some kind of Voronin-Smirnov declaration out of a meeting 
with Medvedev, it would be good public relations.  This would allow 
the Russians to promote their image as a peacemaker and counter the 
international focus on their aggressive actions in Georgia. 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Hill suggested that although Ambassadors Kouzmin 
and Nesterushkin might not necessarily be singing from the same sheet 
of music, they were quite close in position.  Ambassador Kouzmin had 
advised Hill that he felt Chisinau did not have the political will to 
solve the conflict.  Similarly, Nesterushkin had complained to Hill 
that Moldova was not willing to make any compromises.  In particular, 
the Moldovans did not want to share power.  Ambassador Hill 
speculated that the Russians might be trying to get Moldova to agree 
to permit a unilateral troop presence.  However, he suggested that 
GOM capitulation to stationing Russian troops in Transnistria could 
cause protest demonstrations in Chisinau. 
 
Voronin has Shifted his Timetable 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador Hill thought that perhaps Voronin was taking a 
tactical approach by not rushing into a 2-plus-1 meeting, thereby 
trying to see if he could get the Russians to offer more.  At the 
same time, Ambassador Hill noted that over the years Voronin had not 
been patient.  If something did not work, Voronin would move on to 
something else.  Although many had originally thought and still 
thought that Voronin had been pushing hard for a settlement believing 
 
CHISINAU 00000976  002 OF 002 
 
 
it would help his party in the elections next spring, Ambassador Hill 
now disagreed.  Hill stressed that a bad settlement could cause much 
more discontent.  It was possible that Voronin had concluded the 
same, believing that the Russians would not concede anything further. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Given Smirnov's primary goal of preserving his own power, it 
is easy to understand his motivation for stalling any movement 
towards a settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.  However, if 
Russian will and pressure are strong enough, it is not likely that 
Smirnov would be able to stall for much longer.  Although Voronin had 
been pushing hard for progress before the elections next year, lately 
we have heard a new message from the GOM.  Chisinau has come to 
realize that a bad agreement reached in haste could be worse for 
Moldova than no agreement at all.  Hence, the GOM appears to be 
shifting its timetable. 
 
KEIDERLING