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Viewing cable 08RIYADH1579, UPDATED SAUDI VIEWS ON JCCIP IMPLEMENTATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08RIYADH1579 2008-10-22 08:01 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Riyadh
VZCZCXRO1086
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHRH #1579/01 2960801
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 220801Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9395
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE 9806
RHMFISS/COMUSAFCENT SHAW AFB SC IMMEDIATE
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0257
RHRMAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  IMMEDIATE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHRH/CHUSMTM RIYADH SA IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001579 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, CENTCOM FOR POLAD, NAVCENT AND J5, DOE 
FOR KKOLEVAR AND WBRYAN, DEPARTMEMT FOR P, NEA, S/CT AND 
NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018 
TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET MARR MCAP MOPS OVP PGOV PREL
PTER, SA 
SUBJECT: UPDATED SAUDI VIEWS ON JCCIP IMPLEMENTATION 
 
REF: A. RIYADH 1408 
     B. RIYADH 1298 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ford M. Fraker for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY. The Ambassador met with Assistant Minister of 
Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayif bin 'abd al-'Aziz (MBN) to 
discuss the next steps in implementation of the Joint 
Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Border 
Security (JCCIP).  MBN reiterated the urgency posed 
by the threat of a terrorist attack against Saudi oil 
facilities.  He made the same point earlier in the day to U/S 
Edelman.  The Prince emphasized the Saudi desire to keep a 
single point of contact and single point of payment as the 
Saudis develop and fund JCCIP.  Previously, the DCM met with 
MOI officials to discuss the structure of JCCIP and the Saudi 
request to reduce the initial number of working groups to 
three.  MOI also proposed that JCCIP undertake work on cyber 
security, based on the Saudi assessment that the Kingdom is 
vulnerable in this regard.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------- 
The Urgent Need for Progress 
---------------------------- 
 
2. (S) On October 18, Ambassador Fraker met with Assistant 
Minister of Interior Prince Mohammed bin Nayif bin 'abd 
al-'Aziz (MBN) to discuss the next steps in implementing the 
Joint Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection and 
Border Security (JCCIP).  MBN had met earlier in the day with 
DOD Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman 
(Septel) where MBN urged the USG to move quickly in assisting 
MOI stand up the Facilities Security Force (FSF).  Both 
Ambassador Fraker and Ambassador Edelman underscored USG 
commitment to standing up the JCCIP. 
 
3. (S) MBN reiterated to Ambassador Fraker the urgent need to 
address the real threat of a terrorist attack against Saudi 
oil facilities.  There are 25 Tier 1 critical oil 
production-related sites in the Kingdom that are vulnerable 
to terrorist attack.  A successful attack on any of these 
facilities would have an immediate, and devastating, impact 
on the global economy; e.g., 70% of Saudi oil (7 million 
barrels) flows through Abqaiq, which Al Qaeda unsuccessfully 
attacked in Feb, 2006.  MBN noted that since then, the MOI 
has foiled several other plans to attack Saudi ARAMCO 
facilities. 
 
4. (S) MBN noted that his grandfather King Abdulaziz had 
always placed high value on his strategic relationship with 
the United Sates and had advised his sons to do likewise. 
After the Abqaiq attack in 2006, the Saudi government had 
realized that it must do much more to protect its critical 
infrastructure which was in fact critical to both the Saudi 
and global economies.  MBN said he had been tasked by his 
superiors to meet these new security requirements.  He had 
been given a budget and the authority to recruit 35,000 men 
to carry out this project.  As his grandfather had advised, 
he had turned to the United States for help. 
 
5. (S) Now nearly two years after their initial request, 
little has been achieved.  Until recently, the Prince said he 
and the senior leadership of the MOI had doubted American 
interest in our commitment to JCCIP.  Since his meetings with 
CENTCOM J5 MG John Allardice on September 11 in Jeddah 
(Reftel A), he now believes the USG is indeed serious, but 
stressed the need to show progress to the Kingdom's senior 
leaders, including his father, the Minister of Interior, and 
his uncle, the King. 
 
RIYADH 00001579  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
----------------------- 
The Need for Efficiency 
----------------------- 
 
6. (S) The Ambassador again noted to MBN that JCCIP 
implementation would be most effective if a U.S. company was 
utilized for the Command and Control portion of the Border 
Guard Modernization Project since this would facilitate 
inter-operability and ease working relationships with USG-led 
JCCIP WGs.  Raytheon's bid for the Command/ Control/ 
Communications/ Computer/ Intelligence (C4I) contract for the 
Saudi Border Guard Development Program remains pending 
(Reftel A). MBN responded that the SAG's 
decision on the company selected will be done "by the book" 
and based on who offers the best systems for the best price. 
 
7. (S) MBN then repeated the Saudi desire for a single point 
of contact with the USG for JCCIP, as well as a single point 
of payment for USG services to the MOI.  Which he said was 
the "only way" this could work. 
 
8. (S) Earlier this month, DCM had a working-level meeting 
with Major General Dr. Sa'ad al-Jabri, Special Advisor to MBN 
to discuss an improved structure for the JCCIP Working 
Groups.  Al-Jabri proposed that JCCIP should initially 
consist of only three working groups: JWG for Industrial 
Security, JWG for Facilities Security Force and JWG for 
Internal Security. 
 
--------------------------- 
JWG for Industrial Security 
--------------------------- 
 
9. (S) Al-Jabri explained that the Joint Working Group on 
Industrial Security (JWG/IS) would continue with the 
assistance of the Department of Energy provided under the 
Joint Working Group Memorandum of Understanding signed in 
December 2006.  Al-Jabri believed JWG/IS should be a 
permanent group of U.S. and Saudi personnel working jointly 
in Riyadh.  This vision would require both the U.S. and Saudi 
sides to increase their substantive staffs assigned to JCCIP. 
 MOI is identifying counterparts for U.S. personnel.  MOI 
also is trying to locate housing and office space on the 
Diplomatic Quarter for all JWGs.  Al-Jabri noted that some 
MOI offices connected with JCCIP might relocate to the 
Diplomatic Quarter to facilitate closer cooperation. 
 
10. (S) Programmatically, the JWG/IS would cover all security 
matters "inside the fence" of critical facilities.  The work 
of this group would include assessments of facilities, 
developing and implementing security standards and 
regulations, monitoring the MOI's industrial security system, 
and assistance with MOI's national contingency planning. 
This group would work tacitly with the owners like ARAMCO and 
SABIC.  This JWG would essentially mirror those of various 
MOI's departments which are responsible for all policy, 
procedures, and standards at critical facilities. 
 
11. (S) Regarding future site assessments, MOI wants to 
review the results of the Abqaiq assessment, scheduled to be 
presented by DOE on Oct. 27 in Riyadh, before it commits to 
further assessments.  Additionally, MOI requests U.S. 
assistance in developing a Threat Advisory System (similar to 
system used by the Department of Homeland Security). 
 
--------------------------------- 
JWG for Facilities Security Force 
--------------------------------- 
 
RIYADH 00001579  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
12. (S) The FSF is responsible for protecting everything 
"outside the perimeter fence."  It will not be involved in 
what goes on inside the facility.  Al-Jabri wants to move 
quickly on the JWG for Facilities Security Force (JWG/FSF). 
He said this is MOI's top priority.  He characterized the 
work of this JWG as "building an army from scratch". 
Al-Jabri agreed that this could best be done through 
CENTCOM's proposal for an OPM-FSF similar to OPM-SANG which 
has successfully advised the Saudi Arabian National Guard for 
many years.  Like its namesake, OPM-FSF will advise on 
organization, recruitment, training, and operations.  This 
week, MOI will receive CENTCOM's draft Letter of Request 
(LOR) to review, which is the initial step in the FMS process 
to establish OPM-FSF. 
 
13. (S) Al-Jabri said that the MOI wants the Facilities 
Security Force working group to assume responsibility for 
Maritime Security and help the FSF assume coastal/maritime 
duties currently performed by MOI's Coast Guard.  These 
duties include the protection of on-shore oil facilities such 
as the Ras Tannurah and Safaniyah sites, desalination plants 
and power plants, as well as off-shore oil platforms and 
loading sites.  5,000 of FSF's authorized strength is to be 
dedicated to maritime protection. 
 
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JWG for Internal Security 
------------------------- 
 
14. (S) The third JWG, JWG-Internal Security, would encompass 
assessments, training, and performance testing for elements 
of the MOI not covered by the other two working groups. 
Al-Jabri specifically wants to add cyber security to the list 
of areas for U.S.- Saudi cooperation.  Al-Jabri stressed his 
strong interest in this topic because he believed Saudi 
Arabia was vulnerable to the threat of a cyber attack. 
 
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Comment 
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15. (S) COMMENT.  The Saudis began discussing critical 
infrastructure protection with us just after the Feb. 2006 
failed attack against Abqaiq.  Two years later, they are just 
about to receive their first detailed threat assessment. 
They believe the threat is very real and are pressing us to 
move more quickly in implementing JCCIP.  Prince Mohammed bin 
Naif was unusually blunt with both the Ambassador and 
Undersecretary Edelman.  Accurate or not, he believes that 
should a successful attack disrupt global energy supplies 
occur, a lack of urgency on the part of the USG will be 
partially to blame. 
 
16. (S) The consolidation into three working groups is due to 
MOI's lack of capacity to staff more working groups.  The 
creation of the Internal Security Working Group is the first 
indication we have received of MOI interest to expand JCCIP 
beyond the relatively limited scope of infrastructure 
protection.  END COMMENT. 
FRAKER