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Viewing cable 08PARTO100602, U) SECRETARY RICE'S OCTOBER 4, 2008 CONVERSATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PARTO100602 2008-10-06 03:31 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL US Delegation, Secretary
O 060331Z OCT 08
FM USDEL SECRETARY //NEW DELHI,ASTANA//
TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARTO 100602 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2018 
TAGS: OVIP RICE CONDOLEEZZA PREL PTER MASS IN
SUBJECT: (U) SECRETARY RICE'S OCTOBER 4, 2008 CONVERSATION 
WITH INDIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER PRANAB MUKHERJEE 
 
1.  (U)  Classified by:  Paul Wohlers, Deputy Executive 
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State, Reason 1.4 (d). 
 
2.  (U)  October 4, 2008: 3:30 p.m.; New Delhi, India. 
 
3.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Secretary 
Ambassador David Mulford 
SCA Affairs Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher 
PA Assistant Secretary Sean McCormack 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Lt. General William Fraser 
National Security Council Senior Director Mark Webber 
Chief of Staff Brian Gunderson 
Les Viguerie (Notetaker) 
 
India 
External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee 
National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan 
Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon 
Special Envoy to the Prime Minister Shyam Saran 
Ambassador Ronen Sen 
Adviser to the Foreign Minister Omita Paul 
Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary Gaitri Kumar 
 
4.  (C)  Summary:  Secretary Rice and External Affairs 
Minister Mukherjee acknowledged the deepening of U.S.- 
Indian relations as reflected in congressional approval of 
the Civil Nuclear Initiative.  They discussed Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, India's relations with China, Iran, and 
Burma, and defense cooperation.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------- 
CIVIL NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 
----------------------- 
 
5.  (C)  Mukherjee expressed his satisfaction with 
congressional approval of the Civil Nuclear Agreement 
between the United States and India and appreciated the 
critical role played by the President and Secretary in 
securing passage.  He said the Agreement symbolized the 
transformation of bilateral ties that had begun seven 
years ago.  Mukherjee noted that conclusion of the 
Agreement opened a new chapter in the relationship.  He 
looked forward to further deepening of cooperation so that 
India and the United States could work together 
internationally to address new global challenges.  In his 
view, congressional support for the Agreement was a 
bipartisan vote in favor of stronger ties, which would 
carry forward in the future.  The Secretary agreed that 
the large bipartisan majorities in both houses of Congress 
in favor of the Agreement were a welcome sign.  She said 
that the President would soon sign the legislation 
approving the Agreement, and she hoped that arrangements 
could then be made quickly to have a bilateral signing 
ceremony. 
 
------------------------ 
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 
------------------------ 
 
6.  (C)  Observing that India lived in a dangerous 
neighborhood, Mukherjee urged greater U.S. coordination 
with India on instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  He 
said India cannot isolate itself from growing violence and 
extremism in Pakistan.  India shares U.S. goals to 
strengthen democratic forces in Pakistan; while the United 
States and India may approach this in different ways, 
tighter coordination would aid both efforts.  Mukherjee 
offered his assessment that the Pakistani Army and 
intelligence service were part of the problem and that, 
while Pakistan's civilian leadership recognized this, they 
were unable to do much to rein in competing power centers. 
He was skeptical that the change in the leadership of 
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate 
would lead to change.  Meanwhile, India had growing 
concerns about extremist organizations in Pakistan, 
particularly the Jaamat ud-Dawa, and India sought to have 
the organization listed as a terrorist organization by the 
UN Security Council. 
 
7.  (C)  Turning to Afghanistan, Mukherjee said that the 
security situation had been deteriorating for some time 
and that matters had taken a turn for the worse in the 
last six months.  He stressed that India was worried that, 
as Afghanistan approached its elections, there would be a 
"politically fluid" situation.  In his view, carrying out 
peaceful elections would pose a major challenge to 
security forces.  The Secretary noted that the United 
States was carrying out an across-the-board review of its 
efforts in Afghanistan to determine the right strategy to 
support stabilization and reconstruction.  One key 
component of this strategy would be the strengthening of 
the Afghan Army.  The United States was looking at ways to 
fund this effort.  Noting India's generous contributions 
to Afghan reconstruction, the Secretary said any Indian 
support for Afghan security forces would be appreciated. 
Mukherjee noted Indian financial support of Afghan 
reconstruction efforts, but said India had not provided 
security forces for Afghanistan because of Pakistani 
sensitivities. 
 
8.  (C)  The Secretary underlined U.S. concerns about the 
rise in extremism in Pakistan.  She noted that Pakistan's 
security problems were in part due to militants in the 
North West Frontier Province and the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas.  Militancy there was affecting 
the rest of Pakistan.  She said the Pakistanis understood 
this and were trying to increase their capacity to fight 
militants in tribal areas.  The Secretary said the United 
States was gaining confidence in Pakistan Chief of Army 
Staff Ashfaq Kayani.  She hoped that Pakistani political 
forces were coalescing around President Zardari, who also 
faced a difficult economic situation.  The Secretary noted 
Indian concerns about violence in Jammu and Kashmir and 
firings across the Line of Control.  She stressed U.S. 
interest in continued good relations between India and 
Pakistan.  She also encouraged Indian efforts to reach out 
to the new government and urged continuation of the 
various dialogues. 
 
9.  (C)  Mukherjee stressed India's interest in helping 
the Zardari government as well as Pakistani civil society. 
He noted that it was easier for India if either the 
military or civilians were in charge in Islamabad, but 
that now it was difficult to tell who had power, asking 
rhetorically whether the current political leaders "can 
deliver the goods." He underlined that India would 
continue its Composite Dialogue with Pakistan.  Mukherjee 
pointed to increased people-to-people contacts and steps 
like the planned mid-October opening of cross-border trade 
as long-term solutions to tensions, but noted that 
terrorist attacks in India undercut public support for 
better relations with Pakistan. 
 
----- 
CHINA 
----- 
 
10.  (C)  Responding to the Secretary's question about 
Indo-China relations, Mukherjee said India had been 
disappointed in the most recent round of talks between 
National Security Adviser Narayanan and his Chinese 
counterpart over border disputes.  He charged that China 
had gone back on prior understandings about the border 
between Sikkim and Tibet.  Mukherjee added that India had 
not received a satisfactory explanation for China's 
behind-the-scenes support to Nuclear Suppliers Group 
members who had opposed granting India an exception. 
While noting India's economic and trade ties with China 
were booming, Mukherjee pointed to China's long-standing 
relations with Pakistan and renewed interest in Bangladesh 
as examples of China seeking leverage in the region.  He 
said it was difficult to understand or explain China's 
interest in the Bay of Bengal and that these "signals" 
were not consistent with the "strategic and cooperative 
partnership" between India and China. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
11.  (C)  The Secretary warned that differences between 
the international community and Iran over its nuclear 
program were getting worse, pointing to Tehran's lack of 
cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and its failure to address questions about its 
program.  She said that major banks and companies were 
leaving Iran and that further sanctions were likely. 
Mukherjee reiterated India's position that Iran had a 
right to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear power, but that 
it also had a responsibility as an Non-Proliferation 
Treaty signatory to address IAEA concerns about its 
nuclear program.  He questioned the efficacy of sanctions 
without Russian and Chinese support, but said that India 
would try to persuade Iran to respond to international 
concerns.  The Secretary noted that Iran was already 
feeling the effects of sanctions and that continued 
pressure and increased isolation could lead Iran's next 
leaders to be more reasonable than Ahmadinejad. 
 
----- 
BURMA 
----- 
 
12.  (C)  Mukherjee defended India's ties with Burma, 
saying that India wanted to prevent China from achieving 
overwhelming influence there.  He said India continued to 
press the Burmese leadership to enact political reforms 
and take into account all stakeholders and claimed that 
India had facilitated contacts between the UN and Burma. 
He noted India's long border with Burma meant Burma could 
make trouble for India through support of separatists in 
northeastern India.  The Secretary urged India to continue 
to press the Burmese government and noted that India could 
face even bigger problems, given the instability created 
by Burma's military rulers. 
 
-------------------------- 
UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 
-------------------------- 
 
13.  (C)  Mukherjee made a pitch for a permanent seat for 
India in the UN Security Council, noting that there was a 
growing appreciation among UN members for India's capacity 
to serve on the Council.  He argued that membership on the 
Council should reflect today's realities and asked for 
U.S. support as India moved forward.  The Secretary agreed 
that India had a good case to make as a democracy and a 
global power, but noted that reforming the Council would 
be hard because there was some resistance to every 
potential new permanent member. 
 
------------------- 
DEFENSE COOPERATION 
------------------- 
 
14.  (C)  Mukherjee noted that bilateral ties were 
expanding in a broad range of fields, but singled out 
defense cooperation as particularly promising.  He noted 
the scale and frequency of military exercises had 
increased and that India was interested in joint research 
and development, co-development, and co-production of 
military equipment.  Mukherjee passed to the Secretary a 
proposal to resolve the question of End Use Monitoring for 
military systems with sensitive U.S. technologies and said 
he hoped there could soon be an agreement on this issue. 
He also hoped for early agreement on a logistics support 
agreement to facilitate joint military exercises and a 
communications agreement to foster military 
interoperability. 
 
 
RICE